Facts:

The case involves Ajoy Ghosh, an undertrial prisoner who had been incarcerated since 1962. The Court notes that there was a significant lack of action taken by the authorities in addressing Ajoy Ghosh's situation, including providing medical treatment. The violation of various statutory provisions, including the Prisons Act, Criminal Procedure Code, and Indian Lunacy Act, is evident. Ajoy Ghosh's case represents a broader issue of the treatment of undertrial prisoners.

Issues:

Whether the treatment and confinement of Ajoy Ghosh constitute a violation of statutory provisions and human rights?

Whether accountability should be fixed for the failure of authorities to address Ajoy Ghosh's case?

What interim measures, if any, should be taken to address Ajoy Ghosh's situation?

Held:

The Court's anguish over the treatment of Ajoy Ghosh and the failure of authorities to take appropriate action. The violation of statutory provisions is acknowledged, and the issue of accountability is raised.

That Ajoy Ghosh has been accommodated in a home maintained by the Missionaries of Charity. The Court appreciates their willingness to care for him without cost to the State Government.

Provides the interim measure: The Court directs the State of West Bengal to make a donation of Rs. two lakhs to the Missionaries of Charity (Brothers) as a gesture of appreciation for their charitable work.

Facts:

The case involves the rape and murder of a four-year-old girl, Anuradha.

Anuradha was taken from her mother's house by one of the accused, Sunil, and later found dead in Sunil's house.

An autopsy conducted on the victim's body revealed extensive injuries consistent with sexual assault.

The trial court convicted both accused individuals of rape, unnatural offenses, and murder.

The High Court, in a Division Bench, acquitted the accused, citing doubts about the evidence, especially concerning the circumstances of Anuradha's disappearance and the recovery of a bloodstained garment.

The High Court also raised concerns about the absence of independent witnesses during the recovery of evidence.

Issues:

Whether the High Court erred in acquitting the accused individuals based on doubts about the evidence presented.

Whether the absence of independent witnesses during the recovery of evidence should automatically cast doubt on the police's actions.

Held:

The High Court erred in acquitting the accused individuals based on minor discrepancies and doubts about the evidence presented.

The evidence provided by the prosecution was not effectively challenged.

Minor discrepancies in witness testimonies were insufficient to undermine the case.

The absence of independent witnesses during certain events should not automatically cast doubt on the police's actions.

The accused individuals were convicted of rape and unnatural offenses and were also convicted under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

The life sentences imposed for rape and unnatural offenses were upheld.

No additional sentence was imposed under Section 304 Part II due to the existing life sentences.

Decision:

The convictions for rape, unnatural offenses, and culpable homicide not amounting to murder were upheld. This appeal is disposed of accordingly.

Facts:

The appellant, Bhanu Construction Co. Pvt. Ltd., entered into contracts with the National Thermal Power Corporation (N.T.P.C.), which were later terminated by the N.T.P.C. An encashed bank guarantee added to the dispute.

A learned Single Judge of the High Court had previously held that the N.T.P.C.'s actions were illegal and directed the refund of the amount collected under the bank guarantee.

The appellant initiated arbitration proceedings seeking claims totaling Rs. 23 crores in relation to the contracts.

The respondent banks (Andhra Bank and State Bank of India) filed a suit in the City Civil Court, seeking recovery of an amount of Rs. 19 crores. They also filed an interlocutory application requesting the N.T.P.C. to deposit any amount that might become payable to the appellant in the arbitration proceedings before the court.

The civil court, through an order dated 20-9-94, directed the Power Grid Corporation of India not to pay any money to the appellant until further orders, with the intention of making the funds available in case a decree was passed in favor of the banks.

Issues:

Whether the civil court's order dated 20-9-94 was within its jurisdiction, considering the provisions of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993.

Held:

Section 18 of the Act bars the jurisdiction of courts and other authorities (except the Supreme Court and High Courts under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution) from dealing with matters specified in Section 17.

The "appointed day" mentioned in the Act refers to the date on which the Tribunal is established, not the date on which the Act came into force.

In this case, the Tribunal was established on 30-11-94, which was after the order passed by the civil court on 20-9-94.

Therefore, the civil court's order dated 20-9-94 was within its jurisdiction because it was issued before the establishment of the Tribunal on 30-11-94.

The judgment also mentions that the suit has been transferred to the Tribunal, and the appellant can seek appropriate remedies or modifications of the interim order through the Tribunal.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of based on the above observations, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The case revolves around a dispute over the possession and sale of a house in Mohalla Boiwada, Aurangabad.

The house was originally owned by Mohd. Hussain and was mortgaged to Petitioner No. 1 for a term of 7 years.

In 1953, Mohd. Hussain agreed to sell the house to Mohd. Yarkhan for a specified amount, and an agreement of sale was executed.

Subsequently, a sale deed was executed by heirs of Mohd. Hussain in favor of Petitioner No. 1.

Disputes arose, leading to a suit for redemption and possession filed by Respondent No. 1 against Petitioner No. 1.

The case involved interpreting Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act and determining whether the conditions for part performance were met.

Issues:

Whether the conditions of Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act were fulfilled in this case, particularly with regard to the readiness and willingness of the parties to perform the contract.

Whether the respondent was entitled to redeem the mortgage and seek possession of the property.

Held:

The judgment discusses the mandatory language of Section 53-A, emphasizing that if the conditions are fulfilled, the party in possession is protected, and the other party is debarred from claiming possession.

It is determined that the conditions of Section 53-A were indeed met in this case. The agreement of sale was a concluded contract, and Mohd. Yarkhan had acted in accordance with it.

The High Court's decision to reject the plea of willingness on the basis of an earlier written statement was found to be erroneous.

The balance consideration had been paid, and various actions had been taken to assert possession by Mohd. Yarkhan.

Therefore, it was held that Respondent No. 1 was debarred from claiming possession of the mortgaged property, and the appeal was allowed.

No costs were awarded in this matter.

Facts:

The 4th Respondent was employed as a Chief Welfare Officer by the 3rd Respondent Corporation.

His services were terminated but reinstated after an appeal to the State Government.

The 4th Respondent rejoined on 26th July 1989 but had not been paid arrears due to the corporation's financial situation.

A Scheme sanctioned by BIFR led to the purchase of Mill No. 3 by the State of Orissa, which subsequently sold it to the Appellants.

Dispute arose regarding the liability for the 4th Respondent's arrears.

Issues:

Who was liable to pay the arrears of salary to the 4th Respondent.

Held:

The court examined the Scheme sanctioned by BIFR and the MOU and correspondence between the Appellants and the State of Orissa.

The Scheme showed that the State of Orissa was responsible for paying arrears to employees of Corporate Branch and Sales Offices up to the Scheme's sanction date.

The MOU and letters specified that the Appellants were liable only for particular liabilities mentioned in those documents.

The arrears of salary owed to the 4th Respondent were not transferred to or assumed by the Appellants.

The State of Orissa was held responsible for paying the arrears to the 4th Respondent for the period from 15-12-1981 to 2-8-1989.

The High Court's decision to direct payment for this period was upheld. The Appeal stands disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Singhai Rakesh Kumar, sold agricultural lands within the municipal limits of Bina and realized capital gains from these sales. The Income Tax Officer assessed him for capital gains tax. The appellant appealed the decision to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which held that the profit from the sale of agricultural lands did not constitute capital gains under the Income Tax Act, 1961. This led to a reference to the High Court regarding the question of whether the profit from the sale of agricultural lands amounted to capital gains under the Income Tax Act, 1961. In parallel, the appellant filed a writ petition in the High Court, challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Issues:

Whether profit from the sale of agricultural lands within municipal limits constitutes capital gains under the Income Tax Act, 1961?

Is the Explanation to Sub-section (1A) and Clause (iii) of Sub-section (14) of Section 2 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, unconstitutional?

Held:

Interpretation of Article 366(1) of the Constitution The definition of 'agricultural income' in Article 366(1) encompasses "agricultural income as defined for the purposes of the enactments relating to Indian income tax." The term 'enactments' signifies that agricultural income, for constitutional purposes, aligns with the definition in the relevant income tax legislation at the time.

Principles of Referential Incorporation Referential incorporation in legislation can be categorized into two types. The first involves specific reference to another statute as of a particular time. The second encompasses general reference to the law on a particular subject. The latter category generally includes subsequent amendments to the referenced law. The legislative intent is to incorporate changes consistent with the purpose of the adopting statute.

Validity of Amendments to the Income Tax Act, 1961 The Income Tax Act, 1961, had been amended to define 'agricultural income' and 'capital asset' in a manner that subjected income from the sale of agricultural land within municipal limits to capital gains tax. Parliament has the authority to define agricultural income under the Income Tax Act, and these amendments were legally valid.

Upholding of High Court Decision The High Court's conclusions align with the law. Therefore, the appeals are dismissed with costs.

Facts:

The case involves the issuance of a caste certificate to the respondent, based on the School Leaving Certificate and records of close relatives, categorizing them as belonging to the "Halba" Scheduled Tribe. The respondent secured admission to the MBBS degree course in the reserved category for Scheduled Tribes based on this certificate. Subsequently, the certificate was sent for verification by the Scrutiny Committee, which concluded that the respondent did not belong to the "Halba" tribe. The Appellate Authority, after further inquiry, determined that the respondent belonged to the "Koshti" caste and not to "Halba/Halbi" Scheduled Tribe.

Issues:

Whether it is permissible to hold an inquiry or let in evidence to determine if a particular group is part of the Scheduled Tribe specified in the Presidential Order, even if it is not explicitly mentioned.

Whether "Halba-Koshti" caste qualifies as a sub-tribe within Entry 19 (Halba/Halbi) of the Scheduled Tribes Order applicable to Maharashtra.

Held:

The court emphasized that the objective of Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution is to provide additional protection to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to their social and educational backwardness. The terms "castes" and "tribes" are defined as per Articles 366(24) and 366(25) and must be expressly included in the President's Order to be recognized as Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.

The court clarified that the power to amend the Presidential Orders rests solely with Parliament, and no state government, authority, court, or tribunal can amend these orders. These orders cannot be modified or varied by any means other than law made by Parliament.

The court stated that the President's power to specify parts or groups within a caste or tribe is limited, and such specification applies only to parts of the state, not the entire state. The objective is to prevent disputes regarding whether a caste or tribe qualifies as Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for constitutional purposes.

The court made it clear that no inquiry or evidence is permissible to establish that a caste, tribe, or any part or group within them is included in the Presidential Order unless explicitly mentioned in the Order.

The court emphasized that the rule of stare decisis (precedent) is not inflexible and can be departed from when necessary to rectify incorrect precedents, especially when they run counter to the Constitution.

The court held that the circulars, resolutions, and instructions issued by the State Government, which attempt to amend the Scheduled Tribes Order, are not binding on the Government or other affected parties. Such circulars cannot modify the Orders.

Regarding the respondent, the court ruled that the "Halba-Koshti" caste certificate was illegal, but the respondent is allowed to continue practicing as a doctor. However, the respondent cannot claim further advantages under the Scheduled Tribes Order. Existing admissions and appointments that have become final will remain unaffected by this judgment.

Facts:

The respondent, K. M. Shankarappa, challenged specific provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, as amended by Act No. 49 of 1981. The challenged provisions included Sections 3(1), 4(1), 5D, 6(1), and 7(1). The court had previously called for the establishment of a Tribunal for appeals from decisions of the Board in a related case (K.A. Abbas vs. The Union of India).

Issues:

Whether the challenged provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952, are constitutionally valid.

Whether Section 6(1) of the Act, which allows the Central Government to review decisions of the Appellate Tribunal, is consistent with the principles of the Constitution.

Held:

The court held that Section 6(1) of the Cinematograph Act, which permits the Central Government to review decisions of the Appellate Tribunal, is unconstitutional. The court ruled that once a quasi-judicial body like the Appellate Tribunal has made a decision, it should be considered final and binding on the Executive and the Government. Allowing the Executive to review or revise such decisions would undermine the separation of powers and the rule of law, which are fundamental principles of the Constitution. The court emphasized that it is the responsibility of the State Government to maintain law and order if there are divergent views or potential unrest after a film is cleared by the Tribunal.

The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The appellant had rented out a shop to the respondent in 1975 for a monthly rent of Rs. 200/-

In 1989, the appellant applied to determine the fair rent of the shop under Section 4 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973.

Issues:

The main issue was the interpretation of 'rent agreed upon' in Section 4(2)(b) and whether it includes monthly tenancies.

Held:

The Court held that 'rent agreed upon' should be interpreted broadly to encompass any payment made for land use, whether fixed by agreement or other means.

The element of assent (agreement) is essential to the concept of rent.

Fair rent determination depends on the existence of a subsisting agreement at the time of the application.

If an agreement exists, the agreed rent is the basic rent; if not, the basic rent is the prevailing market rate.

Decision: The Court upheld the decision of the High Court and dismissed the appeal without ordering any costs.