Facts:

Mrs. Har Kiran Commar, the appellant, was involved in a land acquisition case.

Her brother, Gurdip Singh Uban, had previously obtained limited relief based on a letter from the Joint Director allowing him to proceed with further construction.

The Solicitor General of India made a concession regarding the de-notification of land acquisition under specific conditions.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's case was similar to her brother's in terms of the conditions for de-notification of land acquisition.

Whether the letter from the Joint Director in the appellant's case permitted additional construction.

Whether the letter from March 1989 relied upon by the appellant was operative.

Held:

The court held that the appellant's case was not similar to her brother's, as there was no letter permitting additional construction in her case. The court ruled that the letter from March 1989 was inoperative and that her land acquisition proceedings had not been quashed. Therefore, she could not seek the same relief as her brother, and her application was dismissed.

Facts:

M/S. Scooters India Ltd. (the Appellant) employed M. Mohammad Yaqub (the 1st Respondent) as an unskilled worker, subsequently promoting him to the position of a semi-skilled worker.

The company had a standing order (Standing Order 9-3-12) that mandated the automatic termination of an employee if they remained absent from duty without leave for more than 10 consecutive days.

On August 1, 1976, the company removed the 1st Respondent's name from its rolls under Standing Order 9-3-12 due to his unexcused absence.

Issues:

Whether the termination of the 1st Respondent amounted to retrenchment.

Whether the principles of natural justice were adhered to in the termination process.

Held:

The Court acknowledged the previous case of Uptron India Limited Vs. Shammi Bhan and Another, which held that principles of natural justice must be applied when termination is based on the automatic provisions of standing orders. The Court clarified that the provision of Standing Order 9-3-12, leading to automatic termination, could not be invoked without complying with the principles of natural justice.

The Court noted that in this case, the principles of natural justice were not followed since the 1st Respondent was not allowed to rejoin duty despite his attempts to do so.

The Court observed that the appellant had failed to provide evidence to demonstrate that the 1st Respondent had not reported for duty, which was inconsistent with the 1st Respondent's evidence.

Based on the above findings, the Court upheld the decisions of both the Labour Court and the High Court, dismissing the appellant's appeal.

Facts:

Shri S. Bangarappa was accused of amassing wealth disproportionate to his known sources of income during his tenure in public offices.

The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed charges against him under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

The trial court had initially decided to frame charges against Shri S. Bangarappa, indicating a prima facie case.

Issues:

Jurisdiction of the court to try the case.

Authority of the CBI to conduct the investigation.

Scrutiny of evidence at the stage of framing charges.

Held:

The Court clarified that the CBI's investigation did not require an officer of the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police as the CBI had issued authorization for the investigation.

The absence of jurisdiction of the court to try the case should not be a ground to quash the proceedings. It could be transferred to another court with jurisdiction or kept in abeyance until the government issues a notification empowering another court.

At the stage of framing charges, the primary purpose is not to evaluate the evidence but to determine if there are sufficient materials for proceeding with the trial.

The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and directed the trial court to continue with the trial in accordance with the law, emphasizing the need for an expeditious resolution.

Facts:

B.S. Sharma, a judicial officer, was transferred to the position of Presiding Officer in an Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court.

He argued he could serve until age 67 under Section 7-C of the Industrial Disputes Act.

Issues:

Could the petitioner, a judicial officer, continue as the Presiding Officer until age 67 despite the usual superannuation age being 60 years?

The interpretation of Section 7-C in the petitioner's case.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision that the petitioner remained under judicial service rules with a superannuation age of 60.

Section 7-C did not determine superannuation but set conditions for appointment or continuation.

The petitioner's superannuation age was 60, as per service rules, not 67.

The special leave petition was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute regarding the proportionality of punishment in disciplinary matters within the Delhi Development Authority.

Issues:

Whether the court has the power to interfere with the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters.

The application of the doctrine of proportionality in administrative actions.

The distinction between primary and secondary roles of the court in reviewing administrative decisions.

Held:

The court discussed the primary reviewing role of Constitutional Courts when administrative action is challenged under Article 14, emphasizing the importance of assessing the correctness of discrimination levels applied, their excessiveness, and their nexus with the intended objective.

In cases where administrative action is challenged as 'arbitrary' under Article 14, the court must consider whether the administrative order is 'rational' or 'reasonable' based on the Wednesbury test. The court's role in such cases is secondary, focusing on whether the administrator has acted legally and considered relevant factors.

The court clarified that in cases of punishment in disciplinary matters, the court primarily applies the Wednesbury principles for assessing arbitrariness. It does not apply proportionality as it does not involve fundamental freedoms or discrimination under Article 14.

The court noted that when punishment in disciplinary matters is challenged, and the Wednesbury principles are violated, the usual course of action is to remit the matter to the administrator for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment. Only in exceptional cases, characterized by long delays, can the court substitute its own view of the punishment.

Facts:

The appellants, industries, entered into an agreement with the Electricity Board for the supply and purchase of high tension electric energy for use in the manufacture of their products. According to the agreement, consumers had to pay a minimum guaranteed amount to the Board based on the minimum guaranteed consumption, equivalent to a 40% load factor of the contract demand. The Board raised bills for a certain period for the minimum guaranteed amount. The consumers challenged their liability to pay the difference amount between the actual consumption and the minimum guaranteed consumption by filing Writ Petitions before the High Court.

Issues:

Whether consumers are required to pay if supply by the Board is less than the minimum guaranteed consumption.

Whether the principle of prospective overruling can be applied by the High Court in cases like this.

Held:

The terms and conditions of supply, as envisaged in the contract and the statutory provisions and general conditions, have been standardized for uniform application among consumers. There is no scope for individual or free bargaining in this regard by each consumer with the Board. The failure of the Board to effect supply up to the contract demand level does not relieve the consumers from the obligation to pay a minimum guaranteed sum per month.

Consumers cannot be exonerated from the liability to pay minimum guaranteed charges, except in very exceptional cases envisaged in the contract and subject to the stipulations and restrictions contained therein.

The word "continuous" in the contract does not mean uninterrupted supply at all times but also includes recurring supply at repeated intervals.

Payment of minimum guaranteed charges is necessary to ensure the constant and periodical maintenance of supply lines and other installations, even during periods when the supply may not meet the contract demand due to various factors.

The payment of minimum guaranteed charges is an integral part of the tariff structure and cannot be treated like any other contract. Consumers are estopped from going back on their commitment to pay the minimum charges.

The minimum guarantee is of monthly consumption equivalent to 40% load factor of the contract demand, and the Board's right to demand these charges depends on the corresponding duty of supplying energy to that extent.

The writ jurisdiction conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution does not carry any restriction in the quality and content of such powers. The court can apply the principle of prospective overruling in balancing the rights of parties and in the interest of justice.

The peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases and the interests of justice necessitate the application of the law declared therein only prospectively. This decision will not apply retrospectively.

Facts:

The case involves Managing Directors of Sarangpur Mills Limited. The Managing Directors had agreements with the company, allowing for additional remuneration. The company's Board of Directors passed a resolution for the financial year 1972, allowing the commission payable to each Managing Director to be used for purchasing single premium deferred annuity policies on their lives. The Income Tax Officer initially considered this amount as part of the Managing Directors' remuneration, taxable as income from salaries.

Issues:

Whether the amount used for purchasing annuity policies is part of the remuneration of the Managing Directors.

How to interpret the resolutions passed by the company's Board of Directors.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the amounts used for purchasing annuity policies were indeed part of the remuneration of the Managing Directors and should be treated as income from salaries for tax purposes. The Court interpreted the resolutions as explicitly stating that the commission payable to the Managing Directors had accrued to them and was then resolved to be used for purchasing the annuity policies. The Court rejected the argument that the resolutions were intended to deny the obligation to pay a particular part of the remuneration to the Managing Directors.

Decision: The civil appeals were allowed with costs in favor of the Revenue (tax authority).

Facts:

The appeal arises from an assessment order in the year 1982-83, where the Sales Tax Officer subjected the sales made by the appellants in their hotel restaurants to sales tax.

Issues:

Challenge to the 46th Amendment to the Constitution.

Interpretation of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, regarding the taxation of sales made in hotel restaurants.

Held:

Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, learned senior counsel for the appellants, has not argued the first contention related to the challenge to the 46th Amendment. His contention is that on a correct interpretation of the provisions of the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975, there is no sale in a restaurant in a hotel, and therefore, no sales tax could be levied.

It was contended by Mr. Subramanium that Section 4(1)(c) is only relatable to hotels or restaurants where there is cabaret or floor show or similar entertainment, and this cannot lead one to the conclusion that in the case of restaurants other than those which fall under this category when the customer takes food, the same can be regarded as a sale to him. We are unable to agree with this submission... The moment the dish is supplied and sale price paid, it would amount to a sale.

Decision: The court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it with costs.

Facts:

The appellant, Kshetriya Kisan Gramin Bank, was a Regional Rural Bank sponsored by the Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Bank Limited, Lucknow. Employees of various Regional Rural Banks, including the appellant, filed writ petitions seeking parity in pay and benefits with employees of nationalized banks. The Industrial Tribunal, led by Justice Obul Reddy, issued an award, indicating that the determination of pay scales should be decided by the Central Government in consultation with relevant authorities. An "Equation Committee" was subsequently formed to determine pay structures for Regional Rural Bank employees.

Issues:

Whether the Industrial Tribunal applied the principle of "equal pay for equal work" or the principle of parity?

Whether the Equation Committee's recommendations, based on the principle of parity with sponsor banks, were valid?

Whether the Allahabad High Court's judgment was justified in setting aside the Equation Committee's recommendations?

Held:

The Industrial Tribunal did not apply the principle of "equal pay for equal work" but instead applied the principle of parity. The tribunal's award indicated that employees of Regional Rural Banks could claim parity with employees of their respective sponsor banks.

The Equation Committee's recommendations were in line with the tribunal's findings and the statutory criteria outlined in the Regional Rural Banks Act, 1976. Therefore, the High Court's interference with the Committee's recommendations was unwarranted.

The High Court's conclusion that employees of all Regional Rural Banks are entitled to the same parity, irrespective of the pay structure of their respective sponsor banks, was erroneous. The sponsor bank plays a vital role in determining the pay structure of Regional Rural Bank employees, and a classification based on sponsorship is permissible.

The appeal was allowed, and it was directed that the pay structure for employees of the Kshetriya Kisan Gramin Bank should be as per the report of the Equation Committee, which was accepted by the government.