Bail – Regular Bail – Heinous Offence – Delay in Trial – Article 21 – Petitioner arrested on 03.05.2018 and charged under Sections 302, 307, 353, 201 IPC and Section 25 Arms Act for firing upon government officials executing NGT demolition orders, resulting in death of two officials – Prosecution unable to complete evidence despite lapse of over seven years and eight months – Application under Section 311 CrPC filed at stage of arguments and witnesses recalled but not produced – Held: Delay in trial entitles petitioner to bail notwithstanding gravity of offence; petition allowed [Paras 2, 21–22].

Speedy Trial – Fundamental Right – Article 21 – Right to speedy trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution – Right commences from the stage of arrest and continues through investigation, trial, appeal and revision – Burden lies on the prosecution to justify and explain the delay – Inordinate delay in conclusion of trial entitles the accused to bail irrespective of the gravity of the offence [Paras 10–20].

Bail – Parameters – Nature of Offence vs. Prolonged Incarceration – While gravity of offence is a relevant factor in bail matters, the State cannot detain an accused indefinitely without proving guilt – When prosecution is unable to complete evidence within a reasonable time, the right to speedy trial overrides the stringency of the offence – Constitutional mandate of Article 21 prevails over bar created by gravity of crime [Paras 8–9, 21–22].

Pre-Trial Detention – Constitutional Limits – Detaining under-trial prisoners for an indefinite period violates Article 21 – Long incarceration and unlikely prospect of early conclusion of trial justify grant of bail – Stringent statutory provisions curtailing bail are premised on assumption that trial will be concluded expeditiously; failure of State to ensure expeditious trial cannot be used to perpetuate incarceration [Paras 10–16, 19].

Decision: Petition allowed – Petitioner ordered to be released on bail upon furnishing bail bonds of Rs. 1,00,000/- with one surety – Conditions imposed including non-intimidation of witnesses, attendance at each hearing, restriction on leaving address without informing police, surrender of passport and furnishing of mobile/social media details – Bail liable to cancellation on violation of conditions – Observations not to bear on merits of the case.

Civil Law – Title to Immovable Property – Declaration – Second Appeal – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Concurrent findings of trial Court and first appellate Court that plaintiff holds valid title to the plaint schedule property through a chain of registered sale deeds tracing back to 1981 – Defendant No.3's vendor had no title on the date of the 2018 sale deed, the property having already been conveyed by his father as GPA holder in 1981 – Will relied upon by defendants relating only to Bangalore properties and not to the Nellore plot – Held: No substantial question of law arises – Second appeal dismissed at admission stage – Two months' time granted to vacate [Paras 22, 26, 27, 28].

"Second Appeal — Substantial Question of Law is Sine Qua Non — Concurrent Findings of Fact Not to Be Interfered With"

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – The appellants challenged concurrent findings of two Courts — Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only when a substantial question of law arises — A proper test is whether the question directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and is either an open question or not free from difficulty — In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the inference drawn by the first appellate Court will not be interfered with — Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence, and contents of documents cannot constitute a substantial question of law — The questions raised are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law — Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission [Paras 14, 27, 28].

"Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — No Title Passes from a Vendor Who Has No Title"

Title to Immovable Property – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Registration Act, 1908 – The defendants' vendor (defendant No.3) purported to sell the plaint schedule property in 2018 — However, by 1981, his father as GPA holder of defendant No.3's sister had already sold the same plot to Epuru Sulochanamma under a registered sale deed — The Will of 1991 (Ex.B-1), relied upon by the defendants, was admitted even by its propounder (D.W.2) to relate only to Bangalore properties and movable properties and not to the Nellore property — Held: The principle "nemo dat quod non habet" applies — Defendant No.3 had no title on the date of execution of the 2018 sale deed and could not have transferred any title to defendant No.1 — Registration of a document by the registering authority does not confer title unless the transferor is the lawful owner [Paras 21, 22, 23, 26].

"New Plea of Ancestral Property Under Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act Not Permissible for First Time in Second Appeal"

Pleadings – New Plea in Second Appeal – Section 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – The appellants raised for the first time in second appeal the contention that the property was ancestral and that defendant No.3 and his sister were co-owners along with their father by virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act — Held: This plea was neither raised in the written statement nor suggested to plaintiff's witnesses in cross-examination before the trial Court nor raised before the first appellate Court — The second appellate Court cannot go into a question not raised in the pleadings or evidence — Contention rejected [Para 25].

"Registered Will Confined to Bangalore Properties — Cannot Pass Title Over Nellore Property"

Will – Scope of Bequest – Evidence – The defendants' title rested on a Will dated 30.05.1991 (Ex.B-1) — D.W.2, the propounder of the Will and vendor of defendant No.1, himself admitted in evidence that there is no specific recital about the plaint schedule property in the Will and that the Will relates only to properties at Bangalore and movable properties — By the date of the alleged Will, the father of defendant No.3 had already conveyed the plaint schedule plot to Sulochanamma in 1981 through a registered sale deed and was therefore not seized of that property to bequeath — Held: The Will cannot confer any title over the Nellore property [Paras 19, 20, 21].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission — Concurrent judgments and decrees of trial Court and first appellate Court confirmed — Defendants granted two months' time to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff — No order as to costs [Para 28].

Criminal Law – Murder – Conviction – Circumstantial Evidence – Appellant convicted under Section 302 IPC for the murder of deceased Rakesh Beyong by multiple stab injuries at Khola Camp, Bhalukpong on 18.02.2017 – Trial Court sentenced him to life imprisonment with 10 years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- – On appeal, High Court finds the chain of circumstances complete and unbroken pointing exclusively to the guilt of the Appellant – Held: No infirmity in the judgment of conviction; appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 70].

Circumstantial Evidence – Governing Principles – For conviction based on circumstantial evidence, circumstances must be cogently established, of definite tendency unerringly pointing to guilt, cumulatively forming a complete chain leaving no escape, and incapable of explanation on any hypothesis other than guilt of the accused – Prosecution must prove the complete chain beyond reasonable doubt – Tests restated and applied [Paras 64, 17].

Motive – Prior Altercation and Humiliation – Deceased had assaulted and humiliated the Appellant at a picnic at Atobong during the day of the incident after consumption of alcohol – Appellant sustained injuries during the tussle – Strong inference of motive for revenge drawn from the said incident – Motive, though not sole basis, forms an important link in the chain of circumstances [Paras 57, 61].

Last-Seen Evidence – Presence Near Place of Occurrence – Evidence of PW-5 (Ajit Rangmo) establishes that deceased and Appellant visited his shop in the evening between 5:00–6:00 PM with a gap of about half an hour – Both left in different directions – Evidence of PW-8 (Narayan Sharma) establishes Appellant's presence at his shop at around 7:00–7:30 PM with blood on right hand – Appellant admitted visiting PW-8's shop under Section 313 CrPC though disputed the timing – Presence of Appellant near place of occurrence at relevant time established [Paras 50–56, 63].

Bloodstained Hands – Adverse Inference – PW-8 deposed that Appellant visited his shop at 7:00–7:30 PM with blood on his right hand – Appellant admitted the visit but made no comment on the blood observed by PW-8 – Silence on a specific incriminating question, while consistently answering other questions, constitutes a relevant circumstance – Non-denial treated as an additional inculpatory link [Paras 65–66].

Absconding – Guilty Conduct – Appellant fled to Assam after the incident and returned only after being lured by PW-5 over phone with false assurance that deceased was alive and under medical treatment – Claimed to have gone to Mumbai and returned within four days, which the Court found physically impossible without any supporting evidence – False alibi itself constitutes an additional incriminating circumstance undermining presumption of innocence [Paras 57–58, 62].

Extra-Judicial Confession – Admissibility – PW-12 (brother-in-law of deceased) deposed that Appellant admitted having killed the deceased – PW-17 stated he was present when Appellant made a statement admitting the offence before police – Appellant denied the same under Section 313 CrPC – Extra-judicial confession, while a weak piece of evidence, is not the sole basis of conviction in this case – Relied upon as corroborative along with independent circumstantial evidence [Paras 68–69].

Non-Recovery of Weapon – Not Fatal – Weapon of offence (knife) allegedly thrown at the site of the weekly Sunday market held the very next day – Non-recovery explained by the prosecution – Held: Recovery of weapon is not an inflexible requirement; conviction can stand where other evidence is cogent, consistent and sufficient to establish guilt [Para 67].

Test Identification Parade – Not Mandatory – PW-8 could not specifically identify the Appellant in the dock but the Appellant himself admitted visiting PW-8's shop under Section 313 CrPC – Once the accused acknowledges his presence, TIP becomes redundant as it is merely an investigative tool and not substantive evidence [Para 23].

Section 313 CrPC – Statements – Relevance – Portions of the statement under Section 313 CrPC supporting the prosecution case can be relied upon in conjunction with other evidence – Court may draw adverse inference from false or evasive answers – Conviction cannot rest solely on Section 313 statement but the same serves as a relevant additional link [Para 66].

Decision: Criminal appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Section 302 IPC upheld – Trial Court record sent back – Amicus Curiae to be paid fee by Arunachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Unsubstantiated Allegations in Written Statement – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Appellant-husband sought divorce on ground of mental cruelty – Trial Court dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: allegations levelled by the respondent-wife in her written statement, including attempt to kill their second daughter, illicit affair of the husband with another lady, and incitement of third parties to make immoral proposals to the wife, were wholly unsubstantiated – Allegation of attempt to kill daughter on February 15, 2019 demolished by wife's own admission in cross-examination that she had not returned to her matrimonial home after December 15, 2018, three months prior to such alleged incident – No corroborative evidence, oral or documentary, adduced for the alleged illicit affair – Testimony of wife (DW-1) and her mother (DW-2) stood in stark contradiction to each other – Reckless, defamatory and unsubstantiated allegations in pleadings against the spouse and his family, including jeopardising the husband's service in the CISF (a disciplined force), constitute mental cruelty – Trial Court erred in not taking this component of cruelty into account – Appellant entitled to decree of divorce on this ground alone [Paras 27–36].

Mental Cruelty – Plaint Allegations by Husband – Not Substantiated – Adverse Inference – Allegations by the appellant-husband of the wife refusing to do household work, ill-behaving with in-laws and perpetrating cruelty during her stay at the matrimonial home were vague and unaccompanied by specific dates or instances – PW-2, an acquaintance of the husband, admitted he learnt of the facts the day before deposing, relegating his testimony to hearsay – None of the family members of the husband, who would have been the best witnesses, were produced, warranting adverse inference against the appellant on the plaint case of cruelty during cohabitation – Trial Court justified in rejecting plaint allegations for want of independent corroboration [Paras 24–26].

Restitution of Conjugal Rights – Not a Prerequisite for Divorce – The learned Trial Judge erred in holding that non-filing of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was indicative of lack of bona fides on the part of the husband – Held: there is no requirement in law that a party must initiate restitution proceedings as a precondition for seeking divorce – No evidence of animus revertendi on the part of the respondent-wife during the entire period of separation since December 15, 2018 [Para 38].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Independent Ground for Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Parties had been separated for over eight years since December 2018 – Both parties stated during arguments that they did not wish to resume conjugal life – No attempt made by either party to unite during this period – Held: a marital relationship that has only become bitter and acrimonious over the years inflicts cruelty on both sides; keeping the facade of such a broken marriage alive does injustice to both parties – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage itself spells cruelty to both parties and is a ground for dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia) – Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, followed [Paras 39–41].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated December 6, 2023 of the Additional District Judge, Khatra, in Matrimonial Suit No. 07 of 2020 set aside – Suit decreed – Marriage between the parties dissolved by divorce – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Murder – Section 302/34 IPC – Conviction Upheld – Eye-Witness Testimony – Four appellants convicted for the murder of Sita Ram Pradhan, who was shot dead at a fair price shop in the presence of P.W.1 (complainant-Gram Pradhan) and P.W.2 (a villager present for kerosene oil) on 13.07.1994 – Accused Bhullar caught the deceased and pulled him down; accused Bashir and Hamid fired from country-made pistols; accused Wakeel Ahmad alias Munda fired at the face of the deceased from a double-barrel gun at close range – Held: testimonies of P.W.1 and P.W.2 were consistent, cogent and coherent on all material particulars — time, place, manner of occurrence, names of accused and their individual roles — no material contradiction emerged in extensive cross-examination spanning approximately 82 pages for P.W.1 – Conviction upheld and sentence confirmed [Paras 28–31, 51–52].

Eye-Witness – Chance Witness – Natural Presence at Scene – P.W.1 was present at the fair price shop for distributing kerosene oil of his village; P.W.2 was present for purchasing kerosene oil – Held: where witnesses are present at the spot for a specific and natural purpose, they cannot be characterised as chance witnesses – Their presence was natural and satisfactorily explained – Mere enmity or interest does not warrant rejection of testimony; such evidence requires deep scrutiny and corroboration, not automatic rejection – Allegations of illicit relationship between P.W.1 and wife of the deceased, and of false implication under political pressure, were unsubstantiated by any cogent evidence adduced by the defence – Bare allegations cannot substitute proof [Paras 30, 33–34, 36–38].

Ocular Evidence and Medical Evidence – Consistency – Post-Mortem Report – P.W.4, Dr. B.B. Sethi, found four entry and four exit firearm wounds on the body of the deceased corresponding to the testimony of P.W.1 and P.W.2 that four shots were fired – Blackening and tattooing around the wound on the face confirmed close-range firing as stated by eye-witnesses – Cause of death: shock and haemorrhage due to ante-mortem firearm injuries – Medical evidence fully corroborated the ocular testimony – Held: there was complete coherence between medical and ocular evidence; no inconsistency established [Paras 39–41].

Time of Occurrence – Empty Stomach – No Ground for Doubt – Defence contended that the incident occurred at 04:00 A.M. and not at 07:30 A.M. as alleged, citing the empty stomach of the deceased as found in post-mortem – Held: P.W.1 specifically deposed that the deceased had observed a Tuesday fast and had not yet defecated or eaten on the morning of the incident – The act of attending to nature's call and presence or absence of food in the stomach cannot be fixed with mathematical precision – The doctor's opinion as to time of death is not conclusive when contradicted by cogent direct evidence – Contention rejected [Paras 40].

Non-Examination of Witnesses – Non-Seizure of Documents – Adverse Inference – Prosecution not bound to examine every named witness – It is the prerogative of the prosecution to produce such evidence as it considers necessary – Non-examination of persons named in FIR or ration card holders does not automatically invite adverse inference – Non-seizure of the register of distribution of essential commodities is not fatal where the place of occurrence is firmly established by reliable eye-witness account corroborated by medical evidence [Paras 43–44].

Section 313 CrPC – Opportunity to Accused – All incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence were duly put to the appellants in their statements under Section 313 CrPC – No illegality or infirmity found in the manner in which opportunity was afforded – Reliance by appellants on Ashok v. State of U.P. (2024 INSC 919) on this ground rejected [Para 49].

Direct Evidence vis-à-vis Circumstantial Evidence – Distinction in Appreciation – Where a case rests on direct ocular testimony, the Court must assess whether the witness falls within the categories of wholly reliable, wholly unreliable, or neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, and whether such testimony is corroborated – In cases of circumstantial evidence, the chain must be complete and conclusively point to guilt, where motive assumes greater significance – In cases of trustworthy direct evidence, motive recedes into the background – Sathya Narayanan v. State (2013 (80) ACC 138), which pertains to circumstantial evidence, held inapplicable to the present case based on direct ocular evidence [Para 50].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction of all four appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC upheld – Sentence of life imprisonment and fine of Rs. 20,000/- confirmed – Appellants already in jail directed to remain in custody and serve out sentence – Trial Court record to be transmitted within ten days.

Criminal Law – Bail – UAPA and Explosive Substances Act – Dismissal – Appellant along with co-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Labha arrested on 08.02.2025 on the basis of mobile tower dump analysis, CCTV footage and secret informers — accused allegedly threw an explosive substance on the building of Police Post, Fatehgarh Churrian Road, Amritsar on 03.02.2025 — appellant received Rs. 50,000 for committing the act — disclosure statements revealed concealment of AK-56 rifle, country-made pistol and Glock pistol supplied through drone — Glock Pistol 30 bore with cartridges recovered at the instance of appellant — appellant had criminal antecedents in FIR No. 4 dated 10.02.2025 under Arms Act and BNS — custody of approximately one year held not to be prolonged — Held: No case on merits made out for bail — appeal dismissed [Paras 1–10].

"Conspiracy to Cause Explosion – Evidence of Involvement – Role of Appellant"

Bail – Explosive Substances Act – UAPA – Role of Appellant – Co-accused Lovepreet Singh alias Labha in his disclosure statement revealed that he and the appellant were induced by Harpreet Singh alias Happy Pashian and Buta Singh alias Joban to throw a grenade/explosive substance on Police Post Fatehgarh Churrian Road for payment of Rs. 7 lakh — appellant received Rs. 50,000 for participation — subsequent disclosure statements corrected that an explosive substance wrapped in packet (not grenade) was thrown — hotel shelter provided to accused before and after the explosion by co-accused Amritpal Singh alias Amrit — call detail records and mobile tower locations of phones recovered from co-accused corroborated their constant association and presence at the place of occurrence [Paras 6–8].

"Recovery of Weapons – Disclosure Statement – Arms Supplied Through Drone"

Arms Act – Recovery – Weapons Concealed and Recovered – Appellant and co-accused disclosed in separate statements dated 09.02.2025 that a sack containing AK-56 rifle, country-made pistol and Glock pistol was concealed by burying in a plot at Loharka Road, Amritsar — weapons were supplied through drone by co-accused Harpreet Singh alias Happy Pashian — Glock Pistol 30 bore with 4 cartridges recovered at the instance of the appellant — recoveries corroborated by Recovery Memos dated 09.02.2025 [Para 7, Point 8].

"Custody Period – Not Prolonged – Bail Not Maintainable on Merits"

Bail – Period of Custody – Intent to Affect Sovereignty and Integrity of India – Appellant in custody since 08.02.2025 — State opposed bail on ground that intent was to cause massive destruction to life and property affecting sovereignty and integrity of India — Court noted that custody of approximately one year cannot be stated to be prolonged in cases of this nature — no case on merits made out for grant of bail — Held: Appeal dismissed [Paras 4, 8–10].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Bail application rejected — All pending applications disposed of.

Defamation – Section 500 IPC – Online Publication – Redisplay of Defamatory Social Media Post – Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash defamation proceedings – Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (a film-sector publication and its editorial staff) redisplayed on their website highly derogatory statements originally posted by Accused No.1 on a Facebook group against the complainant, a film actor-director, in the context of a controversy over a prominent actor's arrest for rape – Held: Section 499 IPC draws no distinction between an original defamatory publication and a redisplay of such material already in the public domain – Content published on the website was prima facie defamatory – Petition dismissed [Paras 8, 10, 11].

"Redisplay of Defamatory Content — No Absolution Merely Because Material Was Already in Public Domain"

Defamation – Redisplay – Public Domain – Section 499 IPC – The petitioners contended that their act of redisplaying the post made by the first accused in another social media platform would not attract Section 500 IPC since the imputation had already reached the public through that platform – Held: The contention cannot be accepted – Section 499 IPC makes no distinction between a defamatory publication made for the first time and a redisplay of defamatory material already in another media – The prior publication does not absolve the criminal liability of those who ventured to republish the derogatory words – Unless the act falls within any of the seven exceptions under Section 499 IPC, criminal liability persists [Para 8].

"Nature of Content — Words Lowering Moral and Intellectual Character Prima Facie Defamatory"

Defamation – Prima Facie Case – Nature of Imputations – Section 499 IPC – The contents published by the petitioners in their website contained imputations that the complainant begged for film roles from an accused rapist, stole a credit card while working in America, was a cheap fourth-rate person of perverted mind, and other highly derogatory remarks – These words were of such a nature as to lower the moral and intellectual character of the complainant in the estimation of others – Sworn statement of the complainant confirmed that his friends and well-wishers formed a negative impression of his character upon reading the said publication – Held: The matter published in the website was prima facie highly defamatory [Paras 10, 11].

"Editorial Liability — Automatic Presumption Against Editors Inapplicable Where Specific Allegations Exist"

Editorial Liability – Defamation – Specific Allegations Required – Jaideep Bose v. M/s. Bid and Hammer Auctioneers Pvt. Ltd. – The petitioners relied on the Supreme Court's dictum that Editorial Directors are not automatically presumed liable for defamation unless specific allegations of direct involvement are made – Held: That dictum, rendered in the context of Sections 5 and 7 of the Registration of Books Act, 1867, is inapplicable to the present case, where specific allegations have been made against each petitioner regarding their role in publishing the derogatory content on their website with the intent to denigrate the complainant [Para 11].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Proceedings in CC No. 825/2018 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-V, Thiruvananthapuram for offence under Section 500 IPC to continue [Para 11].

Criminal Law – Human Trafficking – Immoral Traffic – Quashing of Charge – Sections 370, 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5, 7 of Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Petitioner, owner-cum-manager of a Spa at Mapusa, sought quashing of order framing charges arising from a police trap operation in which a decoy customer paid marked currency notes for massage services, a victim girl accepted additional payment for extra/special massage, and marked notes were recovered both from the victim and the cash counter held by the Petitioner – Co-accused (customers and other named accused) had earlier been discharged by the Court – Held: Sufficient prima facie material exists on record to frame charge against the Petitioner and the challenge to the order framing charge fails – Petition dismissed [Paras 1, 20, 21].

"Owner-Cum-Manager Personally Implicated — Decoy Statement Establishes Direct Role"

Framing of Charge – Prima Facie Material – Role of Petitioner – The statement of the decoy customer disclosed that the Petitioner, seated at the counter, personally informed him of the massage charges, assured provision of female masseurs in closed-door rooms, received payment of Rs.1,500/- in marked currency, and arranged a victim girl for massage – Marked notes of Rs.1,500/- were recovered from the cash counter in the Petitioner's possession during the raid – Prima facie material clearly implicates the Petitioner in active management and facilitation of the alleged activities [Paras 10, 15].

"Victim Statements Alone Not Determinative — Context of Trap Raid Governs at Charge Stage"

Victim Statements – Stereotypical Nature – Insufficient to Negate Charge – The statements of the rescued victim girls were stereotypical, denying forced exploitation, but when read conjunctively with the complaint, decoy statement and scene of offence panchanama, prima facie material emerged showing one victim accepted Rs.500/- for extra/special/hand massage, which sum was recovered from her personal search – A packet of condoms was also recovered from the same room – The nature of the extra massage is a matter to be determined upon trial, not at the charge stage [Paras 12, 14, 15].

"Definition of 'Exploitation' Under Section 370 IPC is Inclusive, Not Exhaustive"

Trafficking Offence – Exploitation – Consent Immaterial – Section 370 IPC defines exploitation inclusively to cover any form of sexual exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery – Second Explanation to Section 370 renders the consent of the victim immaterial in determining the offence of trafficking – Whether a particular act constitutes exploitation depends upon the facts of each case and is a matter for trial [Paras 12, 13, 14].

"Principle of Parity Not Applicable — Role of Petitioner Distinct from Discharged Co-Accused"

Parity – Discharge of Co-Accused – Inapplicability – Accused Nos. 7, 8 and 9 were discharged as no role was attributed to them in the complaint or charge-sheet – Accused Nos. 2 to 6 were discharged as they were merely customers of the Spa – The Petitioner, being the licensee and owner-cum-manager who personally received payment and facilitated the alleged prostitution, stands on an entirely different footing – Principle of parity cannot be invoked in favour of the Petitioner [Paras 4, 17].

"Standard at Charge Stage — Court Not to Weigh Pros and Cons but Only Assess Prima Facie Grounds"

Framing of Charge – Standard of Scrutiny – At the stage of framing charge, the Court is only required to sift the evidence to determine whether sufficient grounds exist to proceed against the accused – The Court must assume the prosecution material to be true and assess whether the ingredients of the offence are prima facie disclosed – It is not the function of the Court at this stage to weigh the pros and cons of the evidence, which is the function reserved for the trial [Para 18].

Decision: Petition dismissed – Order dated 17.01.2024 of the Sessions Judge, North Goa, directing framing of charges against the Petitioner under Sections 370 and 370-A(2) IPC and Sections 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 upheld – Rule discharged [Para 21].

Right to Information Act, 2005 — Section 20(1) — Penalty Proceedings — Right of Appellant to be Heard — Petitioner filed RTI application seeking information regarding exclusion of her Form-6 application under Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 from Revenue Adalat — SPIO failed to reply within 30 days — State Information Commission issued show cause notice to SPIO — SPIO's explanation accepted and penalty proceedings dropped — Petitioner challenged the order contending she was not furnished copy of SPIO's explanation and was not afforded opportunity to rebut — Held: The first proviso to Section 20(1) mandates only that the SPIO be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before penalty is imposed — RTI Act does not provide for hearing the appellant in proceedings under Section 20 — Penalty proceedings under Section 20 are purely a matter between the Commission and the SPIO — Penalty goes to the State exchequer and not to the complainant — Appellant has no right to be heard in penalty proceedings under Section 20(1) unless permitted by the Commission — Commission's finding that SPIO's explanation was satisfactory cannot be termed erroneous or perverse — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 7, 8].

RTI Act — Section 20(1) — Nature of Penalty Proceedings — Distinguished from Compensation under Section 19(8)(b) — Unlike proceedings for compensation under Section 19(8)(b) which require adjudication of the complainant's loss and thereby necessitate presence of appellant, penalty proceedings under Section 20 do not require the appellant's participation — The show cause notice issued by the Commission is only prima facie in nature — If the Commission finds the SPIO's explanation satisfactory, penalty proceedings can be dropped — Appearance of appellant before State Information Commission is optional as per Rule 7 of the Kerala State Information Commission (Procedure for Appeal) Rules, 2006 [Paras 7, 8].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed.