Civil Law – Title to Immovable Property – Declaration – Second Appeal – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Concurrent findings of trial Court and first appellate Court that plaintiff holds valid title to the plaint schedule property through a chain of registered sale deeds tracing back to 1981 – Defendant No.3's vendor had no title on the date of the 2018 sale deed, the property having already been conveyed by his father as GPA holder in 1981 – Will relied upon by defendants relating only to Bangalore properties and not to the Nellore plot – Held: No substantial question of law arises – Second appeal dismissed at admission stage – Two months' time granted to vacate [Paras 22, 26, 27, 28].

"Second Appeal — Substantial Question of Law is Sine Qua Non — Concurrent Findings of Fact Not to Be Interfered With"

Second Appeal – Section 100 CPC – Substantial Question of Law – The appellants challenged concurrent findings of two Courts — Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only when a substantial question of law arises — A proper test is whether the question directly and substantially affects the rights of the parties and is either an open question or not free from difficulty — In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences of fact are possible, the inference drawn by the first appellate Court will not be interfered with — Mere appreciation of facts, documentary evidence, and contents of documents cannot constitute a substantial question of law — The questions raised are not even pure questions of law, let alone substantial questions of law — Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission [Paras 14, 27, 28].

"Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — No Title Passes from a Vendor Who Has No Title"

Title to Immovable Property – Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet – Registration Act, 1908 – The defendants' vendor (defendant No.3) purported to sell the plaint schedule property in 2018 — However, by 1981, his father as GPA holder of defendant No.3's sister had already sold the same plot to Epuru Sulochanamma under a registered sale deed — The Will of 1991 (Ex.B-1), relied upon by the defendants, was admitted even by its propounder (D.W.2) to relate only to Bangalore properties and movable properties and not to the Nellore property — Held: The principle "nemo dat quod non habet" applies — Defendant No.3 had no title on the date of execution of the 2018 sale deed and could not have transferred any title to defendant No.1 — Registration of a document by the registering authority does not confer title unless the transferor is the lawful owner [Paras 21, 22, 23, 26].

"New Plea of Ancestral Property Under Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act Not Permissible for First Time in Second Appeal"

Pleadings – New Plea in Second Appeal – Section 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – The appellants raised for the first time in second appeal the contention that the property was ancestral and that defendant No.3 and his sister were co-owners along with their father by virtue of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act — Held: This plea was neither raised in the written statement nor suggested to plaintiff's witnesses in cross-examination before the trial Court nor raised before the first appellate Court — The second appellate Court cannot go into a question not raised in the pleadings or evidence — Contention rejected [Para 25].

"Registered Will Confined to Bangalore Properties — Cannot Pass Title Over Nellore Property"

Will – Scope of Bequest – Evidence – The defendants' title rested on a Will dated 30.05.1991 (Ex.B-1) — D.W.2, the propounder of the Will and vendor of defendant No.1, himself admitted in evidence that there is no specific recital about the plaint schedule property in the Will and that the Will relates only to properties at Bangalore and movable properties — By the date of the alleged Will, the father of defendant No.3 had already conveyed the plaint schedule plot to Sulochanamma in 1981 through a registered sale deed and was therefore not seized of that property to bequeath — Held: The Will cannot confer any title over the Nellore property [Paras 19, 20, 21].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed at the stage of admission — Concurrent judgments and decrees of trial Court and first appellate Court confirmed — Defendants granted two months' time to deliver vacant possession of the plaint schedule property to the plaintiff — No order as to costs [Para 28].

Criminal Law – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Allegations of Forced Religious Conversion – Petitioner, Principal of a school, sought quashing of FIR alleging she pressured the complainant teacher to convert from Hinduism to Christianity and terminated her services upon refusal – Petitioner contended FIR was malicious and motivated by service dispute after termination of complainant – Held: Allegations in FIR and statement of complainant recorded under Section 164 CrPC prima facie disclose commission of offences under Sections 3 and 5 of the Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 – At the stage of quashing, Court cannot examine reliability of allegations – Petition dismissed [Paras 8, 12–14].

Criminal Law – Exercise of Inherent Powers – Scope of Interference in Investigation – High Court reiterated that power under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only in rare cases – Criminal proceedings should not be scuttled at the initial stage where FIR discloses a cognizable offence – Court cannot undertake enquiry into the truthfulness of allegations or evaluate defence such as existence of service dispute at the quashing stage [Paras 8, 11].

Madhya Pradesh Freedom of Religion Act, 2021 – Offences of Conversion by Inducement or Pressure – Complainant alleged that she was repeatedly pressured to convert her religion and was subjected to harassment and termination upon refusal – Material collected during investigation and statement recorded before Magistrate supported allegations – Held: Allegations are serious and sufficient to put the petitioner on trial – Defence regarding service dispute may be considered during trial but cannot justify quashing of FIR at this stage [Paras 9, 12–13].

Decision: Petition under Section 482 CrPC dismissed – FIR and criminal proceedings allowed to continue – Petitioner at liberty to establish innocence during trial.

Criminal Law – Abetment of Suicide – Cruelty – Acquittal – Accused charged under Sections 498A and 306 IPC for alleged harassment and dowry demands leading to the suicide by hanging of his wife Rekhaben on 24.04.2007 – Trial Court acquitted the accused holding that prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt – State preferred appeal under Section 378 CrPC – Held: No infirmity in the acquittal; appeal dismissed [Paras 1, 19–21].

Abetment of Suicide – Ingredients – Section 306 IPC – For conviction under Section 306 IPC, prosecution must establish an active role of instigation, conspiracy or intentional aiding by the accused – Mere harassment or domestic discord does not ipso facto constitute abetment – There must be a direct causal link and proximate connection between the accused's conduct and the deceased's decision to commit suicide – Prosecution failed to prove any positive act or mens rea proximate to the time of suicide [Paras 9.1–9.8].

Instigation – Legal Threshold – Instigation connotes an active suggestion or incitement of such intensity that it operates upon the mind of the victim and pushes her toward suicide – A word uttered in anger without intending consequences to follow cannot constitute instigation – Accused must have created circumstances leaving the deceased with no other option but to commit suicide – Not established in the present case [Paras 9.5, 9.6, 10, 10.1].

Prosecution Witnesses – Unreliable and Contradictory Testimony – Key witnesses including the complainant (P.W.7), father (P.W.10), mother (P.W.11), sister (P.W.12) and brother-in-law (P.W.13) either turned hostile, gave contradictory versions, or admitted ignorance of material facts – Son of deceased (P.W.9) categorically denied any harassment or cruelty by the accused – Neighbour statements recorded by P.W.6 revealed no evidence of harassment [Paras 8.5–8.13].

Motive – Extra-Marital Affair and Dowry Demand – Prosecution alleged accused had an extra-marital affair and demanded dowry of Rs.41,000/- at the time of marriage – No witness could identify the alleged other woman – Material witnesses admitted they were unaware of the personal life of the accused and deceased at Mundra – Motive not conclusively proved [Paras 8.1, 8.9–8.12].

Acquittal Appeal – Scope of Interference – Appellate court has full power to review evidence in an acquittal appeal but must bear in mind the double presumption of innocence in favour of the accused – High Court should not interfere where the trial court's view is reasonable and plausible and two reasonable conclusions are possible – Interference warranted only where judgment suffers from patent perversity or misreading of material evidence [Paras 13–18].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Acquittal of respondent-accused under Sections 498A and 306 IPC confirmed – No infirmity found in the trial court's judgment – Record and proceedings remitted to the concerned trial court.

Prevention of Corruption Act – Bribe Demand and Acceptance – Hostile Complainants – Conviction Upheld – Appellant No. 1 Prithvilal Meena, working as Assistant Engineer, JVVNL, inspected electricity meters at complainants' premises on 29.01.2016 and imposed VCR penalty of Rs. 80,000 — subsequently demanded illegal gratification for settlement — ACB trap organised on 02.02.2016 — tainted amount of Rs. 5,500/- recovered from the conscious possession of appellant No. 2 Hemraj @ Foru, who acted as conduit on directions of appellant No. 1 — phenolphthalein test of hands and pocket of appellant No. 2 positive — both appellants present in the same room at time of trap — complainant PW-8 Ramphool turned hostile and complainant PW-13 Kailash resiled in cross-examination — Held: Conviction sustained on the basis of electronic evidence, trap proceedings and circumstantial evidence — appeal dismissed [Paras 1–3, 59–65].

"Electronic Evidence – Voice Recording – Admissibility – Section 65-B Certificate – Demand Established"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Electronic Evidence – Admissibility – Voice Recording – The prosecution relied upon digitally recorded conversations of 01.02.2016 and 02.02.2016 capturing demand and direction for acceptance of illegal gratification by appellant No. 1 Prithvilal Meena — transcripts proved as Ex. P-11 and Ex. P-15 — certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 produced as Ex. P-38 by PW-14 Tarunkant Somani, leader of trap team — appellant No. 1 did not dispute voice recording during trial nor challenged its authenticity in cross-examination — appellants refused to furnish voice samples despite lawful notice — Held: Adverse inference under Section 114(g) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 drawn against appellants for withholding best evidence — voice recording admissible and demand legally established — hostile testimony of complainants does not demolish prosecution case when electronic evidence independently proves demand [Paras 28–35, 37].

"Demand and Acceptance – Proof by Electronic and Circumstantial Evidence – Hostile Complainant"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance – Sine Qua Non – Proof – Demand is sine qua non for constituting offence under Prevention of Corruption Act — demand can be proved by electronic or circumstantial evidence and not necessarily by direct testimony of complainant — conviction can be sustained even if complainant turns hostile, provided demand is otherwise established — in the present case, transcription of voice recordings clearly disclosed demand by appellant No. 1 accompanied by threat of VCR penalty — trap laid immediately after recorded conversation — tainted amount recovered corresponds exactly to amount discussed in voice recording — both accused found present together — chain of incriminating circumstances complete and unbroken — Held: Demand and acceptance duly proved — presumption under Section 20 of the Act operative — burden to rebut not discharged by appellants [Paras 18–19, 29, 36, 57–59].

"Acceptance Through Middleman – Section 8 – Private Person as Conduit – Criminal Conspiracy"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Section 8 – Private Person – Acceptance as Conduit – Appellant No. 2 Hemraj @ Foru, a private person, accepted bribe amount of Rs. 5,500/- from complainant pursuant to directions of appellant No. 1 Prithvilal Meena — tainted money recovered from his trouser pocket — phenolphthalein test positive — corroborated by FSL Report Ex. P-23 and testimonies of PW-9, PW-10, PW-14, PW-15, PW-16 and PW-17 — Held: Acceptance of illegal gratification through agent or middleman is deemed acceptance by public servant himself — personal recovery from public servant not indispensable — Section 8 of the Act squarely covers private person acting as conduit — concerted action of both appellants constitutes criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B IPC — Section 8 and 120-B IPC proved against appellant No. 2 [Paras 40–51].

"Prosecution Sanction – Application of Mind – Valid Sanction"

Prevention of Corruption Act – Prosecution Sanction – Validity – PW-11 Sunil Mehta, sanctioning authority, deposed that entire investigation record was perused before according sanction — cross-examination did not show non-application of mind — all relevant documents considered — Held: Sanction order reflects due application of mind and is valid [Para 52].

"Shadow Witness – Partial Overheard Conversation – Trap Proceedings – Practical Realities"

Trap Proceedings – Shadow Witness – Partial Overhearing – Defence argument that voice recording findings are unsafe as shadow witness did not overhear entire conversation — Held: It is neither legally mandated nor practically feasible for a shadow witness to overhear every word — accused may insist on private conversation or meeting in restricted area — close proximity of shadow witness may arouse suspicion and frustrate trap — what is required is proof beyond reasonable doubt and not proof through any particular mode — trap proceedings cannot be judged by artificial laboratory standards [Paras 38–39].

"Panchsheel Test – Circumstantial Evidence – Chain Complete"

Circumstantial Evidence – Panchsheel Test – Sufficiency – All circumstances collectively establish complete and unbroken chain of evidence — electronic evidence, recovery of tainted amount, positive phenolphthalein test, documentary evidence in form of red diary and handwritten slip, presence of both accused together and failure to rebut presumption under Section 20 — chain of circumstances consistent only with guilt of appellants and excludes every possible hypothesis of innocence — Held: Panchsheel test as propounded in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 satisfied — conviction affirmed [Paras 62–64].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Kota in Sessions Case No. 10/2016 dated 06.07.2019 affirmed — appellants directed to surrender forthwith to serve remaining sentence.

Matrimonial Law – Divorce – Mental Cruelty – Unsubstantiated Allegations in Written Statement – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Appellant-husband sought divorce on ground of mental cruelty – Trial Court dismissed the suit – On appeal, held: allegations levelled by the respondent-wife in her written statement, including attempt to kill their second daughter, illicit affair of the husband with another lady, and incitement of third parties to make immoral proposals to the wife, were wholly unsubstantiated – Allegation of attempt to kill daughter on February 15, 2019 demolished by wife's own admission in cross-examination that she had not returned to her matrimonial home after December 15, 2018, three months prior to such alleged incident – No corroborative evidence, oral or documentary, adduced for the alleged illicit affair – Testimony of wife (DW-1) and her mother (DW-2) stood in stark contradiction to each other – Reckless, defamatory and unsubstantiated allegations in pleadings against the spouse and his family, including jeopardising the husband's service in the CISF (a disciplined force), constitute mental cruelty – Trial Court erred in not taking this component of cruelty into account – Appellant entitled to decree of divorce on this ground alone [Paras 27–36].

Mental Cruelty – Plaint Allegations by Husband – Not Substantiated – Adverse Inference – Allegations by the appellant-husband of the wife refusing to do household work, ill-behaving with in-laws and perpetrating cruelty during her stay at the matrimonial home were vague and unaccompanied by specific dates or instances – PW-2, an acquaintance of the husband, admitted he learnt of the facts the day before deposing, relegating his testimony to hearsay – None of the family members of the husband, who would have been the best witnesses, were produced, warranting adverse inference against the appellant on the plaint case of cruelty during cohabitation – Trial Court justified in rejecting plaint allegations for want of independent corroboration [Paras 24–26].

Restitution of Conjugal Rights – Not a Prerequisite for Divorce – The learned Trial Judge erred in holding that non-filing of a suit for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was indicative of lack of bona fides on the part of the husband – Held: there is no requirement in law that a party must initiate restitution proceedings as a precondition for seeking divorce – No evidence of animus revertendi on the part of the respondent-wife during the entire period of separation since December 15, 2018 [Para 38].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Independent Ground for Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Parties had been separated for over eight years since December 2018 – Both parties stated during arguments that they did not wish to resume conjugal life – No attempt made by either party to unite during this period – Held: a marital relationship that has only become bitter and acrimonious over the years inflicts cruelty on both sides; keeping the facade of such a broken marriage alive does injustice to both parties – Irretrievable breakdown of marriage itself spells cruelty to both parties and is a ground for dissolution under Section 13(1)(ia) – Rakesh Raman v. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433, followed [Paras 39–41].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgment and decree dated December 6, 2023 of the Additional District Judge, Khatra, in Matrimonial Suit No. 07 of 2020 set aside – Suit decreed – Marriage between the parties dissolved by divorce – No order as to costs.

Money Laundering – Freezing of Bank Accounts – Section 17(1A), PMLA – Proceeds of Crime – Respondent Zo Pvt Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Winzo Games Pvt Ltd, had its bank accounts frozen under Section 17(1A) of the PMLA on 30.12.2025 – Enforcement Case Information Report registered on the basis of multiple FIRs alleging cheating, forgery, conspiracy and fraud in relation to real money gaming operations of the parent entity – Winzo alleged to have generated proceeds of crime of Rs.3,522.05 Crores – Unsecured loans of Rs.255 Crores advanced by Winzo to respondent-Zo, of which Rs.231.20 Crores outstanding – Freezing order passed in respect of assets of approximately Rs.690 Crores – Single Judge relegated respondent to Adjudicating Authority but directed payment of salaries from frozen accounts – Appellant challenged only the direction for payment of salaries [Paras 3-6].

"Proceeds of Crime Cannot Be Presumed" – Section 2(1)(u), PMLA – Strict Construction – Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) – Proceeds of crime must be strictly linked to a predicate offence – Only property derived or obtained, directly or indirectly, as a result of criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence can constitute proceeds of crime – Enforcement Directorate cannot proceed against a person for money laundering on mere assumption that property recovered must be proceeds of crime without a registered offence or pending inquiry – In the instant case, the sole surviving FIR involved only Rs.42 Lakhs; the contention that the entire amount in the accounts of the respondent represented proceeds of crime was held to be unacceptable [Paras 29-36].

Freezing Orders – Adjudicating Authority – No Power to Order Partial Defreeze – Section 8, PMLA – Admitted position before the Court was that the Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA had no power to issue interim directions or to order payments from amounts frozen under Section 17(1A) – In such circumstances, the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge in directing payment of salaries, while relegating the respondent to its statutory remedy, was neither perverse nor unwarranted – Reliance placed by appellant on Mangal Rajendra Kamthe (supra) distinguished on facts, as in that case the statutory authority had powers to deal with the situation, unlike the Adjudicating Authority under the PMLA [Paras 36-40].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Direction of Single Judge permitting payment of salaries from frozen accounts upheld – Adjudicating Authority under Section 8 of the PMLA having no power to grant partial defreeze for salary payment, the exercise of discretion by the Single Judge was justified – No order as to costs – All pending interlocutory applications disposed of [Para 41].

Foreigners Act – Citizenship – Foreigners Tribunal – Writ petition challenging opinion declaring petitioner a foreigner – Petitioner failed to prove lineage with grandfather through contemporaneous records – Key documents including Kabin Nama, school certificate, and Gaon Panchayat certificate not proved by issuing authorities – DW-2 introduced new facts beyond pleadings regarding father’s residence in Cooch Bihar – Discrepancies in names across electoral rolls not explained – Burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act not discharged – Held: No infirmity in Tribunal’s decision – Writ petition dismissed.

Foreigners Act – Foreigners Tribunal – Declaration as Foreigner – Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 – Petitioner declared a foreigner by the Foreigners Tribunal No. 9, Dhubri in F.T. Case No. FT-9/79/GKJ/2015 – Petitioner claimed to be an Indian citizen and that the letter ‘D’ was erroneously inserted against her name in the electoral roll – Petitioner attempted to establish lineage with her grandfather Sahar Uddin whose name appeared in the voters’ lists of 1966 and 1970 – However, failed to prove any linkage between herself and her grandfather through contemporaneous records – Registered Sale Deed of 1994 not accepted as a linking document due to overwriting on the purchaser’s name without explanation – Held: Petitioner failed to discharge her onus under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 [Paras 2, 9, 24, 25].

Evidence – Proof of Documents – Documentary Evidence Not Proved Through Contemporaneous Records – Petitioner relied on Kabin Nama, school certificate, and Gaon Panchayat certificate to establish lineage with her parents and grandparents – However, the Qazi who registered the marriage was not examined – The Secretary of the Gaon Panchayat who issued the certificate was not produced as a witness – The Headmaster who issued the school certificate was also not examined – The Member of the Tribunal did not sign the school certificate (Ext-1) – Held: Documents and their contents were not proved as the issuing authorities were not produced as witnesses and contents were not established through contemporaneous records – A document cannot be proved on the basis of personal knowledge alone [Paras 7, 14, 15, 16].

Foreigners Tribunal – Pleadings – Evidence Beyond Written Statement – DW-2 (petitioner’s brother) introduced new facts through his evidence-in-chief that their father was a voter of Tufanganj Constituency in Cooch Bihar prior to 1990 – This fact was never mentioned by the petitioner in her written statement or evidence – DW-1 never submitted that her father was a resident of Cooch Bihar – Dissimilarities surfaced between the evidence of DW-1 and DW-2 – Evidence recorded and exhibited in a haphazard manner with overlapping markings – Held: A party cannot traverse beyond the pleadings made in the written statement – Written statement is the basic statement of defence of a proceedee before the Foreigners Tribunal [Paras 12, 13, 17, 19, 21].

Foreigners Act – Burden of Proof – Section 9 of the Foreigners Act, 1946 read with Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Burden of proving citizenship lies upon the person who asserts to be a citizen – Facts relating to date of birth, place of birth, parentage, and their citizenship are within the personal knowledge of the person concerned – Petitioner failed to establish that her father Sakir Hossain was the son of Sohar Uddin – Not a single document was proved to establish that the petitioner’s father was a voter or an Indian citizen – Discrepancies in names of father and grandfather across voters’ lists of different years and constituencies were not properly explained [Paras 20, 22, 23, 25, 26].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No infirmity found in the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunal No. 9, Dhubri – Petitioner held to be a foreigner of post-25.03.1971 stream – Consequences of the impugned order to follow – Bail order dated 09.02.2017 stands vacated – No order as to costs [Paras 26, 27, 28].

Service Law – DLR Employee – Regularisation vs Work-Charged Establishment – Petitioner engaged as Daily Labour Roll (DLR) Watchman in 1984 – Despite availability of regular posts and long service, authorities brought him over to Work-Charged Establishment in 2012 – Petitioner retired in 2015 without pensionary benefits – Held: When employee served continuously for over three decades and similarly situated employees were regularised, action of authorities in denying regular establishment benefits is arbitrary – Authorities directed to consider bringing petitioner to Regular/Pensionable Establishment notionally to enable pensionary benefits [Paras 5, 9-10].

Service Jurisprudence – Long Continuous Service of Casual/NMR/DLR Employees – Obligation of State as Model Employer – Courts emphasised that State cannot exploit employees by extracting service for decades while denying regular benefits – Employees engaged prior to cut-off date and continuously serving are entitled to sympathetic consideration for regularisation and pensionary benefits [Paras 6.3, 6.4, 6.11].

Regularisation – Finance Department Resolution dated 15.05.1997 – Scheme for absorption of NMR/DLR employees – Resolution does not mandate that such employees must first be brought to Work-Charged Establishment before regularisation – Failure of authorities to undertake exercise of regularisation despite long service contrary to scheme and judicial pronouncements [Paras 6.2].

Equality – Article 14 of the Constitution – Discriminatory treatment – Similarly situated employees in other divisions were regularised while petitioner was denied the same benefit – State cannot adopt different standards for employees similarly placed – Principle of parity and consistency applicable [Paras 7.4, 7.11].

Work-Charged Employees – Pensionary Benefits – Courts have repeatedly directed notional absorption in Regular Establishment even by creation of supernumerary post to ensure pensionary benefits to long-serving employees – Denial of pension after decades of service amounts to exploitation by State [Paras 6.7, 7.7, 9.2].

Pension – Social Security Measure – Employee served for about 31 years from 1984 till retirement – State cannot deny pension after extracting long years of service – Welfare State must ensure social security to such employees [Paras 8, 9.1].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Opposite parties directed to consider bringing the petitioner to the Regular/Pensionable Establishment notionally for the period necessary to qualify for pension and extend all consequential benefits including pensionary benefits – Exercise to be completed within three months.

Gratuity claim – Limitation – Interest – Definition of wages – Employees filed applications for gratuity after several years – Employer contested on grounds of limitation and exclusion of special allowance from wages – Held: Where employer fails to issue notice under Section 7(2), limitation under Rule 10 does not apply – Employer liable to pay interest under Section 7(3A) on unpaid amounts – Matter remanded to determine whether special allowance constitutes dearness allowance under Section 2(s) – Petitions partly allowed.

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 7(1), Section 7(2) – Limitation – Employer's Obligation – Employees claimed gratuity after gap of several years without filing Form "I" within prescribed time – Employer contended claim barred by limitation – Held: Section 7(2) casts clear obligation on employer to determine gratuity and issue notice whether or not application is made by employee – Second proviso to Rule 10 provides that where employer fails to issue notice under Section 7(2) read with Rule 8, limitation shall not apply – Employer cannot defeat claim by taking advantage of delay when delay contributed to by employer's inaction – Objection on ground of limitation rejected [Paras 18-25]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 7(3), Section 7(3A) – Interest on Delayed Payment – Employer deposited admitted amount before Controlling Authority but disputed balance – Employee entitled to interest on unpaid portion – Held: Section 7(3A) provides for simple interest where gratuity not paid within thirty days – Proviso creates exception only where delay attributable to employee and employer obtains written permission from Controlling Authority – No such permission obtained – Interest not payable on admitted amount from date of deposit – Interest payable on remaining balance from date specified until actual payment [Paras 26-36]

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(s) – Definition of Wages – Special Allowance – Whether special allowance forms part of wages for gratuity calculation – Employer contended special allowance is consolidated component of incentives, not dearness allowance – Held: Character of salary component cannot be determined merely by nomenclature – Depends on purpose of payment, manner of calculation, whether linked to cost of living – Appellate Authority failed to examine whether special allowance is in reality dearness allowance – Matter remanded for fresh consideration on this limited issue [Paras 37-45]

Evidence – Photocopied Documents – Evidentiary Value – Employee relied on photocopied document showing restructuring of perks – Authorities below did not examine original document or record finding about authenticity – Held: When documents produced in photocopy form, authority must examine whether they can be relied upon as secondary evidence – Exercise not carried out – Matter remanded for proper evaluation [Paras 40-41, 43-44]

Decision: Writ petitions partly allowed – Judgments of Appellate Authority dated 19.10.2024 and Controlling Authority dated 09.11.2023 affirmed except as modified – Matter remitted to Appellate Authority for fresh consideration on question whether special allowance constitutes dearness allowance under Section 2(s) and whether documents establish entitlement to gratuity at rate of 26 days – Appellate Authority to decide within eight weeks – No order as to costs.