Criminal Law - Abkari Act - Sections 8(1) and 8(2) - Possession of illicit arrack - Conviction for possession of 4 litres of arrack - Revision petitioner caught red-handed - Inventory of residue prepared but lacked Magistrate certification - Held - Strict compliance with procedural safeguards is mandatory - Failure to produce residue before court or provide evidence of its lawful destruction through a certified inventory creates doubt regarding the seizure - Conviction and sentence set aside - [Paras 1-15]

Abkari Act - Section 53A - Certification of inventory - Mandatory procedure - Primary evidence - Prosecution relied on Ext.P8 inventory for disposal of residue - Inventory lacked signature and seal of the Magistrate - Held - Act of certifying an inventory under Section 53A is not an empty formality - Inventory assumes the character of primary evidence during trial - Magistrate is expected to exercise due care and caution to satisfy himself regarding the correctness of particulars before certifying - Absence of Magistrate verification in Ext.P8 renders the seizure of contraband doubtful - [Paras 12-15]

Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Sections 397 and 401 - Revisional Jurisdiction - Scope of interference - Concurrent findings of trial court and appellate court - Held - While the High Court generally does not interfere with concurrent findings - it is duty-bound to intervene when there is a clear failure to appreciate that mandatory statutory procedures were not followed - Procedural lapses in search - seizure - and certification of inventory under the Abkari Act are sufficient to vitiate the prosecution case - [Paras 7-15]

Decision: Criminal revision petition allowed – Judgment of conviction and order of sentence set aside – Petitioner acquitted – Fine amount deposited to be refunded.

NDPS Act – Bail – Commercial Quantity – Section 37 – Prolonged Pre-Trial Custody – Article 21 – Applicant alleged to have been found in possession of 22.564 kg of ganja; co-accused found with 5.098 kg; total recovery 27.632 kg constituting commercial quantity – Chargesheet filed under Sections 20/29 of the NDPS Act – Applicant in custody for over 3 years and 3 months – Only 9 of 17 prosecution witnesses examined – Held: Rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act cannot be applied in a manner that defeats the constitutional guarantee under Article 21; prolonged pre-trial incarceration even under special statutes with stringent bail conditions is violative of the right to life and liberty – Satisfaction contemplated under Section 37 is prima facie in nature and does not require a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt at the bail stage – Bail granted [Paras 9–10, 15].

Search and Seizure – Absence of Independent Witnesses and Videography – Seizure effected near a Police Colony at 07:40 PM in the absence of any public witness and without photography or videography – Held: Absence of independent witnesses and failure to document seizure through photography or videography, though not fatal to the prosecution's case, cast a doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's case and constitute a relevant consideration at the bail stage – Where recovery is supported only by official witnesses and lacks independent documentation, judicial scrutiny is warranted – These factors create a shadow over the fulcrum of the prosecution case [Paras 11–13].

Prior Criminal Antecedents – Bail – Applicant with six prior involvements, acquitted in one, none under the NDPS Act – Held: Prior involvements do not per se warrant denial of bail – Disability of the applicant is also a relevant consideration [Para 14].

Decision: Bail application allowed – Applicant directed to be released on bail bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one surety of like amount subject to standard conditions including appearance before Special Court on each date of hearing, surrender of passport, not leaving the country without prior permission, not tampering with evidence and not contacting prosecution witnesses.

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Section 143A – Interim Compensation – Second Revision – Inherent Powers – Gross Injustice – Petition Dismissed with Costs – Respondent advanced a friendly loan of Rs.5,00,000/- to Petitioner and co-accused in several instalments – Cheque issued by Petitioner in discharge of liability was dishonoured for insufficiency of funds – Trial court directed Petitioner and co-accused to pay 20% of cheque amount as interim compensation under Section 143A – Revisional court upheld interim compensation but limited liability to the Petitioner alone as sole signatory of the cheque, following Supreme Court precedent – Petitioner challenged this order before the High Court – Held: Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10,000/- to be deposited with DHCLSC within one week [Paras 1, 4-5, 9].

Second Revision – Bar under Section 397(3) CrPC / Section 438(3) BNSS – Inherent Powers – Invocation Only in Cases of Gross Injustice – Section 397(3) CrPC [now Section 438(3) BNSS] prohibits institution of a second revision petition – What is explicitly prohibited by law cannot be given backdoor entry through invocation of inherent powers – However, where a case of gross injustice is established, the High Court is justified in invoking inherent jurisdiction in the nature of second revision – The threshold question is therefore whether gross injustice is made out on the facts [Paras 6-7].

Gross Injustice – Not Established – Petitioner's Admitted Defence – The sole argument advanced to demonstrate gross injustice was that the Petitioner received only Rs.50,000/- out of the total loan amount and therefore could not be held liable for the entire cheque amount – Held: Argument not convincing – If the Petitioner received only Rs.50,000/-, there was no reason for him to draw a cheque of Rs.5,00,000/- – The submission that he merely signed the cheque makes no difference in view of the admitted defence – This is not a case of gross injustice warranting exercise of inherent powers to circumvent the statutory bar [Para 8].

Decision: Petition dismissed as frivolous – Impugned order upheld – Petitioner directed to deposit costs of Rs.10,000/- with DHCLSC within one week – Copy of order to be sent to trial court for compliance.

Criminal Law – Unlawful Assembly – Sections 147, 323/149 and 308/149 IPC – Cross-Case – Conviction Upheld – On 14.06.1982 at about 08:00 a.m., injured Kailash was repairing the southern wall of his hut when the five appellants, armed with lathis, reached the spot, assaulted him, chased and pushed him into a small pond (gadhai) where he became unconscious and was later revived – Other members of the informant's party who came to his rescue were also beaten – Appellants acquitted of Section 324/148 IPC offences by the Trial Court which convicted them under Sections 147, 323 read with 149 and 308 read with 149 IPC – High Court upheld conviction holding that prosecution established its case beyond reasonable doubt through consistent and reliable evidence of PW1 (first informant and injured witness), PW2 (independent witness) and PW3 (injured Kailash), corroborated by medical evidence – Appeal dismissed [Paras 26–42].

Cross-Case – Evidence – Settled principle that in deciding a cross-case, the Judge can rely only on the evidence recorded in that particular case and cannot be influenced by evidence or arguments in the cross-case – Each case must be decided on its own record independently [Para 27].

Right of Private Defence – Plea Rejected – Appellants contended that Hari was repairing his field boundary and the first informant's party was the aggressor – Held: No witness or evidence produced by appellants in support of their defence version – Evidence on record proves that Kailash was repairing his own hut's wall when the accused arrived armed and commenced the assault – Right of private defence is available only to one suddenly confronted with the necessity of averting impending danger not of self-creation; force must not be wholly disproportionate – Appellants were the aggressors; the informant's side exercised private defence when attacked – Appellants not entitled to the plea [Paras 37–39].

Eye-Witness – Presence at Spot – PW1 Sekha arrived at the spot while the incident was unfolding and witnessed Kailash being pushed into the pond – Contention that PW2 Raj Kumar stated that none of the family members of Kailash were present while he was being beaten, and therefore PW1 was not an eye-witness, rejected – Held: The incident occurred in stages at different places; PW1 arrived during the incident and was himself beaten by the accused; his presence cannot be doubted [Para 34].

Medical Evidence – Corroboration of Oral Testimony – PW4 Dr. S.P. Narain examined all four injured persons (Sekha, Kailash, Indrasan and Singhasan) on the same day and found injuries consistent with assault by hard and blunt objects; injury pattern consistent with lathi assault – Medical evidence corroborates the consistent oral testimony of prosecution witnesses [Para 36].

Abatement – Four co-appellants (Ram Daras, Hari, Gulab and Bhikhari) died during pendency of appeal; appeal abated against them vide order dated 18.02.2026 – Appeal survived only qua Appellant No. 2 Jai Nath [Para 3].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence of Appellant No. 2 Jai Nath under Sections 147, 323 read with 149 and 308 read with 149 IPC upheld – Impugned judgment and order of the IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Ballia dated 13.11.1986 confirmed – Jai Nath, who is on bail, directed to surrender before the Trial Court within three weeks to undergo remaining sentence, failing which the Trial Court to adopt coercive measures.

Public Procurement – Tender Disqualification – Blacklisting Disclosure – Article 226 of the Constitution of India – Writ Dismissed – Petitioner was disqualified from a Request for Empanelment (RFE) floated by NICSI for deployment of office support and project management resources on the ground that it had furnished an incorrect and incomplete declaration regarding its blacklisting status – Petitioner had been blacklisted by APEDA vide order dated 09.12.2025, received on 22.12.2025, which was stayed by this Court on 29.12.2025 – Bid was submitted on 30.12.2025 – Declaration-cum-undertaking signed on 22.12.2025 stated that the firm "has not been blacklisted or not under active blacklisting period/active debarred list" – Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) found the declaration non-compliant – Representation rejected vide order dated 25.03.2026 – Held: Writ petition dismissed, impugned order upheld [Paras 1-2, 31-32].

Ambiguous Declaration – Non-Compliance with Tender Conditions – Clause 8.1(c) of RFE – The declaration submitted by the Petitioner did not constitute a clear and unequivocal assertion of compliance with either stipulated alternative, namely "not blacklisted" or "not under any active blacklisting/debarment" – The formulation used was capable of multiple interpretations and diluted the clarity and certainty required in an eligibility declaration – In matters of public procurement, strict adherence to the prescribed format of declarations assumes critical importance, particularly where the condition goes to the root of eligibility – Any ambiguity in a material declaration cannot be treated as a mere technical irregularity, especially where the tender conditions provide for summary rejection – Respondent was justified in treating the declaration as non-compliant [Paras 16-17, 21, 23].

Interim Stay of Blacklisting Order – Disclosure Obligation Not Extinguished – Duty of Candour in Public Procurement – The stay granted by this Court on 29.12.2025 may at best have eclipsed the operative effect of the blacklisting order during the pendency of proceedings, but did not obliterate the underlying factum that an order of blacklisting had been passed on 09.12.2025 – The Petitioner was at liberty to disclose the factum of blacklisting together with the interim order and leave it to the tendering authority to assess its effect – No such disclosure was made at the time of submission of bid – Tender conditions requiring disclosure are founded on the principle of utmost candour expected from bidders – A bidder cannot unilaterally assume that grant of interim protection dispenses with the obligation of disclosure – Held: Failure to make complete and candid disclosure justifies disqualification [Paras 18-20].

Judicial Review – Scope in Tender Matters – Limited to Decision-Making Process – Scope of judicial review in matters relating to tenders and contractual decisions is limited to examining the decision-making process and not the correctness of the decision itself – Court does not sit in appeal over decisions of tendering authorities and interference is warranted only where the process is arbitrary, mala fide or in violation of tender terms – Where two views are possible in matters of contractual evaluation, the Court would not substitute its own view for that of the tendering authority – No arbitrariness or perversity found in the conclusion of the TEC – Held: No ground for interference under Article 226 [Paras 14, 22-25, 27].

Natural Justice – Non-Speaking Order – Petitioner afforded adequate opportunity to submit a representation pursuant to order dated 10.03.2026, which was duly considered by the TEC – In matters of technical evaluation in tender processes, the decision of the evaluation committee is not required to be a detailed adjudicatory or quasi-judicial order – No further hearing was required at the stage of technical evaluation – Impugned order not liable to be set aside on grounds of violation of natural justice or being non-speaking [Paras 28-29].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed along with pending application – Impugned order dated 25.03.2026 upheld – Technical disqualification of Petitioner from NICSI empanelment process affirmed.

Bail – UAPA – Terrorist Conspiracy – No Independent Recovery – Nomination by Co-Accused Interrogation – Appellant was nominated as accused in FIR No. 184/2023 solely on the basis of interrogation of co-accused Sehajpreet Singh @ Nirbair Singh @ Sunny with no independent recovery of any incriminating article attributed to the appellant – Appellant has massive criminal antecedents spanning eight FIRs including under UAPA, Arms Act and NDPS Act – Held: Despite serious criminal antecedents, the Court is required to analyse the evidence collected against the present accused and its legal admissibility; where the only material connecting the appellant with the commission of the offence is the statement of a co-accused during interrogation without any independent corroborative evidence or recovery, continued pre-trial incarceration would cause grave injustice – Further pre-trial custody not warranted; bail granted subject to stringent conditions [Paras 7–16].

Bail – UAPA – Twin-Prong Test – Standard of Prima Facie Satisfaction – Conditions Imposed – Under the proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAPA, bail must be rejected as a rule if there are reasonable grounds for believing the accusations are prima facie true; such standard is lower than that for discharge but higher than mere suspicion – Court must examine material in the case diary and final report; if first test satisfied, Court proceeds to tripod test of flight risk, witness tampering and evidence tampering – Bail conditions adopted from Gulfisha Fatima v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2026 INSC 2) including personal bond of Rs. 1 lakh, restrictions on speech and expression, prohibition on contact with witnesses, surrender of weapons and arms licence within 15 days of release, prohibition on leaving jurisdiction without permission – Foundational condition: bail liable to be revoked if appellant commits any non-bailable offence carrying more than three years' imprisonment [Paras 11, 17–27].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order of Additional Sessions Judge, SAS Nagar dated 14.01.2026 set aside – Appellant directed to be released on bail in FIR No. 184/2023 upon furnishing bonds of Rs. 1 lakh subject to comprehensive conditions including those from Gulfisha Fatima (supra), prohibition on possession of firearms, surrender of arms licence, restrictions on speech, prohibition on tampering with evidence or witnesses, and obligation to appear on all dates of hearing – All pending applications disposed of [Paras 17–31].

Criminal Law – Section 175(3) BNSS – Magistrate's Discretion – Sexual Assault – Applicant, a married woman aged 22 years, alleged that she was ambushed in a sugarcane field on 25.12.2025, molested and subjected to attempted rape by opposite parties no. 2 to 5 – Police refused to register FIR despite repeated representations to police and superior officers – Application under Section 175(3) BNSS filed before CJM, Gonda – CJM treated the application as a complaint case holding that the applicant had personal knowledge of all facts, which she could prove herself and through other witnesses – Applicant challenged this order contending that in a case of cognizable offence disclosing sexual assault, FIR registration is mandatory in view of Lalita Kumari (Supra) – Held: Magistrate has rightly treated the application as a complaint case as there is no evidence in the present case requiring investigation by the police – Application rejected [Paras 1-29].

Magistrate's Discretion – Section 175(3) BNSS (erstwhile Section 156(3) CrPC) – Options Available – Once an application under Section 175(3) BNSS is entertained, the Magistrate has the following options: (i) to pass an order for registration of the FIR; (ii) to treat the application as a complaint case and proceed accordingly; (iii) where evidence is of such a nature which can only be collected by thorough police investigation, the Magistrate must direct registration of the FIR; (iv) where the complainant is in possession of complete details and material evidence and investigation by police may not be required, the Magistrate may follow the procedure of a complaint case – Exercise of this discretion is on a case-to-case basis dependent on the complaint, nature of allegations and offence – The Magistrate must apply his mind judiciously and is not always bound to pass an order for registration of a case when such application is moved – Once the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190 CrPC, he cannot ask for police investigation [Paras 26-28].

Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. – Scope and Ambit – Mandatory FIR – Distinction between Section 154 and Section 156(3) CrPC – Lalita Kumari lays down the ratio that FIR registration is mandatory under Section 154 CrPC if information discloses commission of cognizable offence – However, the judgment centres around the statutory obligation of police under Section 154 and does not lay down any law in respect of remedies available to the informant under CrPC to be invoked in case of failure of police to perform its duty under Section 154(1)/154(3) as a sine qua non for seeking Writ of Mandamus – Lalita Kumari does not establish that the Magistrate is bound to pass an order for registration of the FIR in every case under Section 156(3) CrPC where cognizable offence is disclosed [Paras 12, 17].

Sexual Offence – Gravity of Offence – Police Investigation – Evidence – In cases alleging sexual harassment or sexual assault, Courts should not further burden the complainant and should press upon the police to investigate where it is not possible for the complainant to retrieve important evidence – Where CCTV footage or other evidence is not under the possession or control of the complainant, the Magistrate ought to exercise jurisdiction under Section 156(3) to direct police investigation – However, where there is no such evidence requiring police investigation and the complainant is in possession of complete details, the Magistrate may rightly treat the application as a complaint case – In the present case, no evidence was found requiring investigation by police and therefore the impugned order needs no interference [Paras 14, 28].

Decision: Application rejected — Order of CJM, Gonda treating the application under Section 175(3) BNSS as a complaint case upheld — Registrar General directed to circulate copy of this judgment to all subordinate courts through District Judges.

Criminal Law – Bail – Communal Harmony – Desecration of River Ganges – Uploading of Video on Social Media – Applicants alleged to have desecrated the Ganges and uploaded a video on Instagram as part of a conspiracy to disturb communal harmony – Charged under Sections 298, 299, 196(1)(b), 279, 223(b) and 308(5) BNS and Section 67 IT Act – Applicants in custody since 17.03.2026 – Held: Prima facie case for bail made out; bail applications allowed [Paras 3-11].

Bail – Parity – Co-accused Released – Applicants similarly situated to co-accused who were granted bail by coordinate Benches of this Court vide orders dated 15.05.2026 in Criminal Misc. Bail Application Nos. 12532, 12529 and 14740 of 2026 – Principle of parity applied [Para 4, 8].

Bail – Factors – Period of Detention – Absence of Criminal Antecedents – Unconditional Apology – Court took into account period of custody already undergone, lack of criminal antecedents, and unconditional apology tendered in supplementary affidavits expressing heartfelt remorse and lifelong respect for Maa Ganga and the Hindu community – Apology found genuine and heartfelt – Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 7-10].

Decision: Bail applications allowed – Applicants Danish Saifi, Noor Islam and Amir Kaifi directed to be released on personal bond and two reliable sureties each to the satisfaction of the Court concerned – Standard conditions imposed including non-tampering with evidence, non-intimidation of witnesses, regular appearance before trial Court and non-indulgence in criminal activity – Observations not to be construed as opinion on merits.

Criminal Law – Criminal Breach of Trust – Section 405 and 406 IPC – Provident Fund Deductions – "Employer" and "Occupier" – Ultimate Control – Petitioners were former General Managers and Branch Manager of Ayurdhara Pharmaceuticals, South Ancheri, a unit of the Kerala State Federation of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe Development Co-operative Society – Charged with criminal breach of trust for failure to deposit employees' provident fund contributions deducted from salaries during May 2011 to February 2016 – Held: Petitioners do not satisfy the definition of "Employer" or "Occupier" under Section 2(e) and 2(k) of the EPF Act or "Occupier" under Section 2(n) of the Factories Act, as ultimate control over the affairs of Ayurdhara Pharmaceuticals vested in the Federation, not in the petitioners who were lower-level officers of the Co-operative Department – FIR and all proceedings quashed [Paras 4-18].

Criminal Law – Employer – Occupier – Definition – Sections 2(e) and 2(k) EPF Act, Section 2(n) Factories Act – "Employer" in relation to an establishment which is not a factory means the person or authority having ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment, or the manager/managing director/managing agent when affairs are entrusted to them – "Occupier" of a factory is the person who has ultimate control over the affairs of the factory – General Managers and Branch Managers assigned to a unit of a Federation do not have ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment when ultimate control is vested in the Federation and its Managing Director under the bye law – Such officers are not "Employers" or "Occupiers" within the meaning of the EPF Act or Factories Act [Paras 7-11].

Criminal Law – Cooperative Society – Bye Law – Managing Director – Ultimate Control – As per the Bye Law of the Federation, management vests in the Board of Directors with the Managing Director as the Chief Executive responsible for general administration of the Federation and all units functioning under it – Managing Director has authority to sign cheques, receive moneys, supervise staff, sue and be sued on behalf of the Federation – Form No. 5A submitted under the EPF Scheme showed the name of the Managing Director as the owner and occupier of Ayurdhara Pharmaceuticals, South Ancheri – The persons liable to be prosecuted are the Managing Directors of the Federation during the relevant periods, who were however excluded from the final report without justification [Paras 12-16].

Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 CrPC – Where on the face of prosecution records and relevant bye law it is apparent that ultimate control over the affairs of the establishment did not vest in the petitioners, the question of ultimate control is not purely factual and requiring evidence – Court can quash proceedings in exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of process of law – Argument that question of ultimate control must await trial is not acceptable where the legal position is apparent from the prosecution records themselves [Para 17].

Decision: All three petitions allowed – FIR registered in Crime No. 1598/2016 of Ollur Police Station and all proceedings before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-III, Thrissur in CC No. 1230/2017 quashed [Para 18].