Education Law – Private Un-aided Schools – Fee Fixation – Statutory Framework – Autonomy vs. Regulation – DoE's conduct amounting to studied indifference to law – Batch of 137 private, un-aided, recognised schools challenged DoE orders rejecting fee-hike proposals for academic sessions 2016-17 to 2022-23 – DoE compelled schools to seek prior approval before commencement of academic sessions despite no such requirement in law – DoE's multipronged scrutiny mechanism involving chartered accountants, Project Management Unit (E&Y LLP), and internal committee resulted in blanket rejections – Schools argued that DoE's regulatory powers are limited to preventing profiteering and commercialisation – Held: The impugned orders are vitiated and untenable in law; all such orders quashed and set-aside [Paras 1–4, 78–80, 145].

Constitutional Right – Article 19(1)(g) – Right to Run Educational Institution – Fee Autonomy – Private, un-aided, recognised schools have a fundamental right to fix their own fee structures – This right is subject only to the restrictions of non-profiteering, non-commercialisation, and non-charging of capitation fees – The DoE's authority to regulate fee does not extend to general interference in a school's fee structure – Held: In the absence of a finding of profiteering or commercialisation arrived at after a full-dressed financial audit under Section 18(5) of the DSE Act, the DoE cannot interfere with a school's fee structure [Paras 55–56, 66, 77.2–77.3].

Section 17(3), DSE Act – Prior Permission for Fee Hike – Statutory Requirement – No prior permission or sanction of the DoE is required by a private, un-aided, recognised school to increase its fee at the commencement of an academic session – The only statutory obligation is filing of a full statement of proposed fee with the DoE before commencement of the academic session – Prior approval of the DoE is required only for a mid-session fee hike – DoE's directions compelling schools to seek prior permission for fee hike at session commencement are ultra vires the DSE Act and DSE Rules – Held: Point for determination No. 2.1 answered accordingly – All impugned orders rejecting pre-session fee-hike proposals are quashed [Paras 60, 77.1, 144.1–144.2].

Natural Justice – Audi Alteram Partem – Violation – DoE Orders Passed Without Show Cause Notice and Hearing – DoE rejected fee-hike proposals without issuing show cause notices, without making available the chartered accountants' reports relied upon, and without affording a hearing before the Director of Education – The discussion held by the DoE's chartered accountants with schools is not a substitute for a hearing by the Director who passes the rejection order – Held: Orders/circulars/directions of the DoE passed in violation of principles of natural justice are liable to be set-aside; Point for determination No. 1 answered accordingly [Paras 101–110].

Fund-Based Accounting – GAAP – ICAI Guidance Note – Schools as Not-For-Profit Institutions – Schools are required to maintain accounts on the accrual/mercantile system of accounting as not-for-profit institutions in accordance with the Income Tax Act, 1961, and the ICAI Guidance Note on Accounting by Schools [GN(A) 21 (2005)] – The DoE cannot impose a parallel accounting regime inconsistent with settled accounting principles, GAAP, and the ICAI Guidance Note – Held: Impugned directions contrary to the IT Act and ICAI Guidance Note are impermissible and untenable in law; Point for determination No. 3 answered accordingly [Paras 111–121, 144.4].

Surplus Funds – Reasonable Surplus – Profiteering – The mere availability of surplus funds with a school cannot be the sole basis for the DoE to infer profiteering or commercialisation – A finding of profiteering can only be returned after a full-dressed financial audit under Section 18(5) of the DSE Act – A reasonable surplus of 6% to 15% (as indicated in Islamic Academy) is permissible for growth and development and cannot per se constitute profiteering – Held: DoE's approach of treating surplus funds as proof of profiteering without conducting requisite audit is illegal; Point for determination Nos. 2.3 and 5.1 answered accordingly [Paras 58, 82–84, 126.1–126.3, 144.3].

Earmarked Funds – Contingency Reserve Fund, Development Fund, Depreciation Reserve Fund, Gratuity Fund – Impermissible Diversion – DoE added monies held by schools in Contingency Reserve Fund, Development Fund, Depreciation Reserve Fund, and statutory retirement liability funds (gratuity, leave encashment) to the 'funds available' with the school for meeting revenue expenses – This practice violates Rule 176 and Section 18(4)(b) of the DSE Act which mandate that income collected for a specific purpose must be used only for that purpose – Held: DoE's computation of 'funds available' is flawed and impermissible; Monies in earmarked funds cannot be directed towards revenue expenditure; Points for determination Nos. 5.2, 5.3, and 5.5 answered accordingly [Paras 16–25, 116–117, 126.4, 127].

Land-Clause Schools – No Additional Regulatory Power – Schools with a land-clause in their allotment letters are in the same position as other private un-aided schools insofar as the DoE's regulatory powers under the DSE Act are concerned – A contractual land-clause cannot override or amend statutory provisions of the DSE Act – The land-clause, properly construed, requires prior DoE sanction only for mid-session fee hike, consistent with Section 17(3) – Enforcement of the land-clause is the remit of the land-owning/land-administering agency, not the DoE – Held: DoE's regulatory powers are identical with respect to schools with and without a land-clause; Point for determination No. 4 answered accordingly [Paras 86–100, 144.5].

Remuneration – Administrative Staff – Chairperson/Director/Manager/Consultant – DoE's contention that no salary can be paid to persons holding posts of Chairman, Director, Manager, Consultant, or Managing Committee members (since no such posts exist in government schools) is wholly untenable – A private school requires its own administrative setup and is entitled to pay its administrative personnel from fees collected – Held: Any DoE objection to such remuneration is impermissible; Point for determination No. 5.8 answered accordingly [Paras 130–131].

Remuneration – Pay Above Government Scale – Permissible – Section 10(1) of the DSE Act mandates only that employees of a private school shall not be paid less than corresponding government school employees – No provision bars payment of higher remuneration – Private schools may pay staff at rates higher than government employees to attract better talent – Held: DoE objection to payment of remuneration higher than government employees is impermissible; Point for determination No. 5.9 answered accordingly [Paras 132].

Managing Committee – DoE's Override Power – Limited – DoE has power in principle to override a fee-hike decision of a school's Managing Committee, even when DoE's own nominees are on the committee – However, this power can only be exercised after a determination of profiteering or commercialisation through an audit under Section 18(5) of the DSE Act, and not at the stage of section 17(3) – A fee-hike decision approved with the consent of DoE's Managing Committee nominees should ordinarily be respected – Held: Point for determination No. 6 answered accordingly [Paras 139–140].

Mid-Session Fee Hike – Time-Bound Approval Process – For mid-session fee hike proposals, the school must submit its proposal at least 2 months before the proposed implementation date – The DoE must decide within those 2 months, failing which the fee-hike shall be deemed approved – The approved mid-session fee hike is effective from the date proposed by the school, not from the date of the DoE order – Held: Point for determination Nos. 7 and 8 answered accordingly [Paras 141–143].

Decision: All writ petitions allowed – All impugned orders of the DoE rejecting fee-hike proposals at the commencement of academic sessions quashed and set-aside – Pending fee-hike proposals before the DoE stand closed as they were based on a misconceived requirement of prior approval – Fee increase last proposed by various schools in their respective statements of fee shall apply from the next academic session beginning April 2027 – No school shall demand or recover from any parent or student any arrears of fee or other charges retrospectively for past academic sessions – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 145–151].

Municipal Law – Mutation – Recognition of Tenancy – Natural Justice – Rival Claims – Municipal shop room originally allotted to late Triranjan Mahapatra; upon his death, legal heirs (respondent nos. 5 and 6) continued and later on 24.09.2021 handed over possession to petitioner upon receipt of Rs. 11,00,000/- and executed an affidavit before the Judicial Magistrate affirming no objection to petitioner's induction – Petitioner sought mutation which was deferred by the Municipality during Administrator's tenure – Respondent no. 4 subsequently approached Municipality claiming separate transaction with the same heirs; Municipality granted mutation and certificate of enlistment to respondent no. 4 on 18.08.2022 and 30.08.2022 respectively, even after receiving petitioner's objection dated 18.08.2022 – During subsequent hearing on 26.09.2022 Municipality itself acknowledged existence of rival claims and directed status quo and sealing, but never communicated the said order to the petitioner – Held: Mutation and recognition of tenancy by a municipal authority is administrative in nature and does not confer title, but the authority is obligated to act fairly, transparently and in adherence to principles of natural justice while deciding rival claims – Grant of exclusive recognition to one claimant without prior adjudication of an unresolved competing claim supported by documentary materials is arbitrary and procedurally improper – Non-communication of an order affecting civil consequences amounts to violation of natural justice – Mutation and certificate of enlistment granted in favour of respondent no. 4 set aside; Municipality directed to reconsider afresh [Paras 21–28].

Writ Jurisdiction – Scope – Civil Proceedings – Bar of Res Judicata – Orders of Civil Courts confined to questions of interim injunction and possession do not operate as conclusive adjudication upon legality of municipal decision-making process relating to mutation and recognition of tenancy – Pendency of civil proceedings does not bar judicial review where violation of natural justice and arbitrariness in administrative action are apparent on the face of the record – Writ petitioner has not sought declaration of title but has challenged arbitrary exercise of administrative power – However, disputed questions relating to ultimate entitlement and validity of inter se transactions between private parties cannot conclusively be adjudicated in writ jurisdiction [Paras 26–27].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Mutation and certificate of enlistment granted in favour of respondent no. 4 set aside – Midnapore Municipality directed to reconsider recognition of tenancy and mutation in respect of Municipal Holding/Premises No. A-3 afresh upon granting adequate opportunity of hearing to petitioner, respondent no. 4 and respondent nos. 5 and 6, considering all relevant documents, and passing a reasoned order to be communicated to all parties – Status quo as to nature and character of premises to be maintained; no third-party interest to be created till reconsideration is completed – No order as to costs [Paras 28–30].

Civil Law — Supervisory Jurisdiction — Article 227 — Maintainability — Challenge to Ex-Parte Decree — Legal representatives of the judgment debtor challenged an ex-parte money decree dated 01.01.1985 and a restraint order dated 08.08.1993 passed in execution proceedings after a delay of over 29 years — Held: Petition under Article 227 challenging a decree assailable under CPC provisions is ordinarily not maintainable; however, since the petition was entertained four years ago and pleadings were complete, the Court proceeded to examine the matter on merits rather than relegate the parties — Ratio in Virudhunagar (supra) applies with full force against petitioners [Paras 19–21, 36].

Civil Procedure — Execution of Decree — Legal Representatives — Binding Effect — Sections 2(11), 50 and 146 CPC — Judgment debtor died in 1988 after the suit was decreed ex-parte in 1985; second execution application filed in 1989 against legal representatives — Submission that decree is not binding on legal representatives who were not parties to the suit, rejected — Decree is enforceable against legal representatives of a deceased judgment debtor under the express provisions of CPC [Paras 22–23].

Civil Procedure — Execution Proceedings — Auction Sale — Decree Holder as Auction Purchaser — Order XXI Rule 72 CPC — Decree holder purchased property at auction with express permission of the executing court — Earlier auction without court permission was set aside on objection of judgment debtors; fresh auction conducted thereafter with requisite permission — Auction confirmed on 13.08.1999; sale certificate registered; actual physical possession delivered; execution proceedings closed in full satisfaction — All objections under Section 47 CPC decided on merits; no further challenge laid thereto — Held: No infirmity in auction sale; executing court cannot go behind the decree and challenge to its validity not permissible in supervisory jurisdiction after 40 years [Paras 28–36].

Civil Procedure — Finality of Decree — Challenge After 40 Years — Abuse of Process — Petitioners suppressed material facts and filed incomplete order sheet to obtain ex-parte interim stay against eviction although possession had already been delivered to decree holder — Contradictory pleadings on question of knowledge adopted in petition and written submissions — Court found petitioners guilty of raising false and misleading pleas to secure interim order — Conduct condemned — Cost of Rs. 2/- imposed so as to convey the worth of their objections and conduct [Paras 47–49].

Decision: Petition dismissed with cost of Rs. 2/-; petitioners directed to deposit cost before Registrar General by 07.07.2026; District Magistrate, Saharanpur directed to recover cost as arrears of land revenue in case of default; administration directed to ensure no hindrance in securing actual and physical possession of contesting respondents; compliance report directed on or before 12.08.2026.

Sexual Offences — POCSO Act — Age of Victim — Proof — Sections 5(m) r/w 6 and 376AB IPC — Age below 12 years is a foundational requirement for attracting the aggravated provisions — Prosecution relied upon school affidavit (Ext. PW5/A), admission register (Ext. PW5/D) and birth certificate (Ext. PW5/B) issued by school Principal to Investigating Officer — Held: Certificate issued by Principal to IO during investigation is a statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C.; inadmissible and liable to be discarded — Entries in admission register based solely on affidavit (Ext. PW5/A) wherein mother's name recorded as "Dolly", whereas PW3 examined as mother is "Poornima" — No explanation offered by prosecution to establish they are the same person — Evidence of age held unsatisfactory; charge under Sections 5(m) r/w 6 POCSO Act and Section 376AB IPC not sustainable [Paras 20–22].

Sexual Offences — Testimony of Victim — Corroboration — Consistency — Slight variations in FIS, Section 164 statement, and court testimony of PW1 regarding events of 10.05.2020 — Version of PW1 regarding digital rape on 14.05.2020 and penetrative sexual assault on 15.05.2020 remained consistent throughout — Medical evidence (Ext. PW2/A MLC) corroborated allegation of sexual intercourse — Tear of 0.5 cm on posterior fourchette and abrasion on labia minora noted — Variation in history narrated to doctor not material; primary duty of doctor is treatment, not fact-finding — Chain of custody objection and delay in reporting FIR not fatal to prosecution case — Held: Materials on record establish offence under Section 375 IPC [Paras 24–30].

Criminal Procedure — Conviction for Minor Offence — Section 222 Cr.P.C. — Charge framed under Section 376AB IPC and Sections 5(m) r/w 6 POCSO Act — Age not proved to be below 12 years; aggravated conviction set aside — Ingredients of Section 375 IPC and Section 376AB IPC identical except for age factor — Section 376(1) IPC prescribes lesser punishment than Section 6 POCSO Act — Held: Section 376(1) IPC is a minor offence vis-à-vis Section 6 POCSO Act within the meaning of Section 222(1) Cr.P.C.; accused can be convicted thereunder even without a specific charge — Sentence modified to minimum ten years' rigorous imprisonment under Section 376(1) IPC [Paras 31–33].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed — Conviction under Sections 354 and 354A IPC confirmed — Conviction under Section 376AB IPC, Sections 5(m) r/w 6 and 9(m) r/w 10 POCSO Act set aside — Appellant convicted under Section 375 IPC punishable under Section 376(1) IPC — Sentence modified to ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

Bail – Question Paper Leak – Socio-Economic Offence – CPSE 2024 – Petitioners, including exam agency officials, agents, transporters and intermediaries, are accused of leaking question papers of the Combined Police Service Examination (CPSE) 2024 in a systematic and organised manner, receiving illegal gratification of crores of rupees in the aggregate – The CPSE 2024 was cancelled twice due to leakage, depriving meritorious candidates of fair opportunity – CBI filed charge sheets; investigation still open with supplementary charge sheet recently filed – Petitioners had been in custody for approximately seven to eight months – Held: Duration of custody alone is not sufficient ground to grant bail where the offence is grave and corrodes public trust in the examination system and institutions of the State – Socio-economic offences constitute a class apart requiring a different approach in bail matters – Bail applications of all seventeen petitioners rejected [Paras 5–7].

Bail – Interim Bail – Medical Ground – Petitioner Muna Mohanty was on interim bail since 11.02.2026 for surgery – Surgery having been undergone and bed rest advised for two weeks with effect from 16.05.2026 – Held: Interim bail not extended; petitioner directed to surrender to custody after completion of the prescribed two-week bed rest period, i.e., within 21 days [Para 8].

Decision: All 17 bail applications rejected – Petitioner Muna Mohanty's interim bail not extended; directed to surrender to custody within 21 days from the date of judgment after completion of two-week bed rest advised from 16.05.2026 [Para 8].

Civil Procedure – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC – Cause of Action – Privity of Contract – Plaintiff filed suit for recovery of dues towards supply of industrial materials, impleading both defendant No.2 (who issued purchase orders, acknowledged liability, made part payment and entered into reconciliation of accounts) and defendant No.1/petitioner (at whose project site the materials were delivered and utilised) – Petitioner filed application under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC for rejection of plaint on ground of absence of cause of action – Commercial Court rejected the application holding that triable issues existed – Held: At the stage of Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC, the Court is required to examine only the averments in the plaint and documents relied upon therein – Plaint itself disclosed that the entire commercial transaction, acknowledgment of liability and part payment were exclusively between the plaintiff and defendant No.2 and no averment was made disclosing any contractual obligation, acknowledgment or undertaking by defendant No.1 – Mere utilisation of materials at defendant No.1's project site, without any pleading of privity of contract or legal obligation, does not constitute cause of action against defendant No.1 – Plaint rejected as against petitioner; suit to proceed against defendant No.2 alone [Paras 6–12].

Decision: Civil Revision allowed – Order of Commercial Court rejecting application under Order VII Rule 11(a) CPC set aside – Plaint rejected as against petitioner/defendant No.1 – Petitioner's name deleted from Civil Suit No. 591 of 2015 – Suit to proceed against defendant No.2 alone [Para 12–13].

Writ Law - Service Law - Withholding of Pension - Madhya Pradesh Civil Services Pension Rules 1976 - Rule 9 - Petitioner retired as Naib Tahsildar on 31-07-2011 - Departmental inquiry was initiated regarding a mutation order passed in 2009 while exercising quasi-judicial functions - Inquiry report was submitted a day before retirement and 5% pension was withheld via impugned order dated 21-04-2016 - Petitioner contended that advice from MPPSC was not supplied and no pecuniary loss was caused to the State - Respondents argued that charges were proved and scope of judicial review is limited - Court observed that mandatory consultation with MPPSC was undertaken but the copy of said advice was not supplied to the petitioner in advance - Held - Non-supply of the inquiry report and advice from the Public Service Commission is a breach of natural justice which vitiates the inquiry - Withholding of pension lacks sufficient legal basis in absence of a finding of grave misconduct - Impugned order quashed - [Paras 1-31].

Writ Law - Judicial Protection - Judges Protection Act 1985 - Sections 2 and 3 - Status of Naib Tahsildar - Whether a revenue officer performing mutation is a Judge - Section 2 defines Judge as any person empowered by law to give a definitive judgment in any legal proceeding - Petitioner exercised powers under M.P. Land Revenue Code - Held - Petitioner being empowered to give judgment is a Judge as per the statutory definition and is entitled to additional protection under Section 3(1) - No court or authority shall entertain proceedings against such person for acts done in the discharge of judicial duty - [Paras 17-23].

Writ Law - Misconduct vs Negligence - Service Jurisprudence - Definition of Misconduct - Petitioner charged with procedural irregularities in an isolated mutation case - No ill-motive or mala fide conduct established - Held - Mere error of judgment or negligence simpliciter or lack of efficiency does not constitute misconduct - Misconduct implies blameworthy conduct or act arising from ill-motive - An error of judgment in a quasi-judicial capacity does not partake the character of misconduct unless something additional is brought into existence - Pension is a proprietary right that cannot be taken away without following proper procedure of law and recording definite findings on the gravity of misconduct - [Paras 24-30].

Decision: Writ petition allowed – Impugned order dated 21-04-2016 quashed – Respondents directed to refund withheld 5% pension with interest at 6% per annum from the date of retirement till payment – Failing payment within three months the amount shall carry interest at 12% per annum.

Criminal Law - Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 - Section 195 and 340 - Cognizance of offence under IPC Section 417 - Jurisdiction and Procedure - Held - Section 195(1) CrPC provides a bar on cognizance of specific offences relating to public justice and documents given in evidence such as Sections 193 to 196, 199, 200, 205 to 211 and 228 IPC - It has no applicability to offences under Sections 417 or 420 IPC - Magistrate erred in taking cognizance of an offence under Section 417 IPC on the basis of a complaint filed by the Registrar under Section 340 CrPC - [Paras 11, 21-23]

Indian Penal Code 1860 - Section 417 - Cheating and Fraud - Suppression of material facts - Mens Rea - Petitioner (Advocate) accused of playing fraud on the Court by appearing for his son (co-accused) in a quashing petition while his own quashing petition was dismissed - Held - Son's petition was filed prior to the dismissal of the petitioner's own petition - There was no suppression of facts - Fraud implies intentional deception with mens rea to achieve wrongful gain or cause loss - No such element found in petitioner's conduct - [Paras 13, 17, 20, 24]

Bar Council of India Rules - Rule 13 - Professional Misconduct - Advocate appearing for co-accused - Rule 13 prohibits an advocate from appearing in a case where he has reason to believe he will be a witness - Held - This rule falls under Duty to Client and not Duty to Court - It does not prohibit an advocate who is a co-accused from appearing for another co-accused - Appearance on the strength of a vakalatnama for his son does not amount to fraud or cheating - State Bar Council had already dropped misconduct proceedings under Section 35 of the Advocates Act - [Paras 25-28]

Decision: Revision petition allowed – Order dated 23.09.2025 passed in RCT No. 9808/2022 set aside – Criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner in RCT No. 9808/2022 quashed – Petitioner discharged.

Criminal Procedure — Framing of Charge — Scope of Revisional Jurisdiction — Sections 227, 228 and 397 r/w 401 Cr.P.C. — Revisional jurisdiction to be exercised sparingly; High Court cannot reappreciate evidence as in an appeal — Court at stage of charge must determine whether material on record discloses grave suspicion against accused, not mere suspicion — Where two views are possible and material gives rise only to suspicion, accused is entitled to discharge — Findings of Trial Court can be interfered with only if glaring perversity is shown [Paras 46–48].

Sexual Offences — Gang Rape — Common Intention — Section 376D IPC — Material on record, including FIR, Section 164 statement, WhatsApp chats and statements of common friends, revealed that allegations of sexual assault were directed solely against main accused Madhav — Prosecutrix herself initiated the party plan; no prior meeting of minds between accused persons established — No overt act, instigation, conspiracy or intentional aiding attributable to accused Abhinav or Annanya — Mere presence at the scene or association with principal accused, without material indicating shared design, insufficient to attract Section 376D — Discharge of Abhinav and Annanya upheld [Paras 74–90].

Criminal Law — Abetment — Sections 107 and 109 IPC — Intentional Aiding — Essential ingredients — Abetment requires instigation, conspiracy, or intentional aiding coupled with requisite mens rea — Mere facilitation or presence without intention to aid commission of offence does not satisfy ingredients — Allegation that Annanya took prosecutrix's phone and prevented locking of washroom door, and that Abhinav booked flat and purchased contraceptives, held insufficient to establish intentional aiding or meeting of minds — Call records prima facie indicated prosecutrix continued to use her phone; explanation by Annanya not inherently implausible — No pre- or post-incident communication between Abhinav and Annanya construable as incriminating [Paras 77–90].

Criminal Law — Section 328 IPC — Administering Intoxicating Substance — No recovery of intoxicating substance from scene; no medical evidence of administration; prosecutrix herself admitted to voluntarily consuming alcohol in contemporaneous chat with cousin — No allegation in any contemporaneous communication that drinks were spiked — Charge under Section 328 IPC cannot be sustained on bare oral assertions without cogent and corroborative evidence — Non-framing of charge under Section 328 upheld [Paras 61–67].

Criminal Law — Criminal Intimidation — Section 506 IPC — Allegation of threats to circulate videos — Actual existence or recovery of material forming subject of threat is not sine qua non; mere threat if proved may suffice — However, FSL reports did not indicate recovery of any photographs or videos from devices of accused — No contemporaneous communication or corroborative material to establish that threats were in fact extended — Non-framing of charge under Section 506 upheld [Paras 68–73].

Decision: Revision petitions dismissed — Discharge of accused Abhinav and Annanya confirmed — Non-framing of charges under Sections 376D, 328, 506 and 34 IPC upheld — Liberty granted to Trial Court to take appropriate steps if evidence to proceed against any accused emerges at a subsequent stage.