Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Petitioners sought quashing of FIR on the grounds of false implication in a murder case due to land dispute – Allegation that petitioners administered poison to the deceased based on a dying declaration – Petitioners contended that the deceased had purchased the poison himself and arranged for his last rites – Held: FIR cannot be quashed at this stage as the prosecution's version is supported by the dying declaration and corroborated by forensic evidence – Allegations of false implication due to land dispute insufficient to quash proceedings [Paras 12, 17].

Criminal Law – Dying Declaration – Section 32 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Deceased made a statement to the informant that petitioners administered something to him – This statement, treated as a dying declaration, formed the basis for the FIR – Post-mortem report confirmed death by phosphide poisoning – Held: Dying declaration supported by medical evidence provides sufficient grounds to proceed with the prosecution [Paras 12, 17].

Judicial Precedents – Scope of Inquiry under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Petitioners relied on judgments asserting that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial under Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Held: The Court's power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised sparingly and cannot involve detailed inquiry into the merits of the case at this stage – FIR cannot be quashed unless it is manifestly absurd or inherently improbable [Paras 9, 16].

Decision:

Petition dismissed – FIR cannot be quashed based on the grounds of false implication at this stage, as the prosecution has presented prima facie evidence through the dying declaration and post-mortem report – The observations made are confined to the disposal of this petition and will not affect the merits of the case during trial [Paras 12, 17].

Service Law - Probation Termination – Automatic Confirmation – Punjab Civil Services Rules – The petitioner, a probationary Civil Judge, challenged the termination of her services under Rule 7 of the Punjab Civil Services (Judicial Branch) Rules, 1951, on the ground of unsatisfactory performance – Held: Once the probationary period of three years is completed without an express order of confirmation or termination, the probationer is deemed to be confirmed – Consequently, termination without a full-fledged inquiry violates the principles of natural justice [Paras 6, 8, 14].

Misconduct Allegations – Absence of Full-Fledged Inquiry – Section 65-B of Evidence Act – Allegations of misconduct, including misbehavior with medical officers during an inquest, were raised against the petitioner – Held: The inquiry conducted was inadequate as it relied on unverified electronic evidence without compliance with Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act – The failure to summon all members of the medical board and obtain a proper certification for the electronic evidence resulted in a breach of natural justice [Paras 10, 11, 16].

Principles of Natural Justice – Right to Fair Inquiry – The petitioner argued that only one member of the medical board was summoned, and electronic evidence (audio/video) was improperly admitted without following the proper legal process – Held: In the absence of a proper inquiry and opportunity for cross-examination, the termination order was stigmatic and punitive in nature, and thus, could not stand [Paras 19, 24].

Decision – The writ petition was allowed, the impugned termination order was set aside, and the petitioner was ordered to be reinstated with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, except monetary benefits [Paras 27, 28].

Taxation Law - Reopening of Proceedings – Section 74 of the CGST Act – Second Show Cause Notice Quashed – The petitioner challenged the issuance of a second Show Cause Notice under Section 74 of the CGST Act after the earlier proceedings under Section 73 were concluded in favor of the petitioner. Held: Once proceedings under Section 73 are concluded, reopening under Section 74 is only permissible if fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts is specifically alleged. In this case, the Show Cause Notice under Section 74 failed to mention any such allegations. Thus, the second notice lacked the necessary jurisdictional basis and was quashed [Paras 19, 25, 28].

Fraud, Misstatement, or Suppression – Jurisdictional Requirements for Section 74 CGST Act – The Court emphasized that for invoking Section 74, the Show Cause Notice must clearly state the presence of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts. A mere allegation of excess ITC without these elements does not satisfy the jurisdictional threshold for reopening concluded proceedings under Section 73 [Paras 20, 27].

Maintainability of Writ Petition – Show Cause Notice Lacking Jurisdiction – The Court rejected the argument that a writ petition is not maintainable against a Show Cause Notice, ruling that when the notice is without jurisdiction, a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable. In this case, the absence of allegations required under Section 74 rendered the proceedings unlawful [Paras 28, 30].

Decision:

The writ petition was allowed, and the Show Cause Notice dated 03.08.2024 issued under Section 74 of the CGST Act was quashed. However, the Respondent was granted liberty to issue a fresh notice under Section 74 if there are allegations of fraud, wilful misstatement, or suppression of facts to evade tax [Paras 31-34].

Civil Writ - Provident Fund Dues – Director’s Liability for Recovery under Section 8B of the EPF Act – Petition Allowed – Petitioners sought to quash recovery proceedings initiated against them, including the issuance of a recovery certificate, show cause notice, and arrest warrants under Section 8B of the EPF Act, due to alleged non-payment of provident fund dues by the company where petitioner was a director – Held: The petitioner, though a director of the company, was not an ‘employer’ as defined under Section 2(e) and 2(k) of the EPF Act since he was neither the ‘owner’ nor the ‘occupier’ with control over company affairs; he was merely an employee receiving a salary and contributing to provident fund and ESI schemes – Consequently, he could not be subjected to recovery proceedings under Section 8B of the EPF Act – Petition allowed, and impugned orders set aside [Paras 7, 16, 17].

Civil Liability under Section 8B vs. Criminal Liability under Section 14A of the EPF Act – Distinction in Application – The Court distinguished between civil liability for provident fund recovery under Section 8B and criminal liability under Section 14A of the EPF Act – Civil liability requires the individual to be an ‘employer’ or ‘occupier’ with ultimate control over factory affairs, while criminal liability can attach to any director, manager, or officer in charge of the company’s conduct at the time of the offence – Since the petitioner did not meet the criteria for civil liability, recovery proceedings under Section 8B were invalid, though criminal liability could still be assessed independently in a separate trial [Para 17].

Interpretation of ‘Employer’ and ‘Occupier’ under the EPF Act – Employee Status of Director – Petitioner argued he was an employee without control over the company and was wrongly held liable as an ‘employer’ – Court held that the term ‘employer’ in the EPF Act refers to individuals with managerial or proprietary control, not mere nominal directors without operational responsibility – Since the petitioner was not listed as an ‘occupier’ in the company’s Form 5A and had no control over factory operations, he was exempt from liability for provident fund dues under Section 8B [Paras 12-16].

Decision: Petition allowed – The impugned recovery proceedings, including the recovery certificate, show cause notice, and arrest warrants against the petitioner, are set aside – The petitioner cannot be held liable under Section 8B of the EPF Act as he was not an ‘employer’ or ‘occupier’ with control over the company’s affairs – No grounds for invoking civil recovery proceedings against petitioner under the EPF Act.
 

Criminal Law – Conviction for Attempt to Murder – The appellants were convicted under Sections 307/149 IPC for assaulting the complainant, causing the amputation of his right hand palm – Appellants argued that the injury was not fatal and was caused by a single blow to a non-vital part of the body – Held: The court reduced the conviction from Section 307 to Section 326 IPC, noting that the injury was grievous but not sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, and there was no clear intention to kill [Paras 13-18, 23-26].

Common Object – Application of Section 149 IPC – Appellants argued they did not share a common object to attempt murder – Court observed that all appellants participated in the attack with deadly weapons, making them liable under Section 149 IPC for the common object of causing grievous hurt [Paras 15, 27-30].

Conspiracy – Section 120-B IPC – The trial court's conviction under Section 120-B was set aside due to lack of evidence supporting the existence of a prior agreement to commit the offense – No conspiracy was proven beyond a reasonable doubt [Paras 31-32].

Sentencing – Conviction Modified – Conviction under Section 307 IPC reduced to Section 326 IPC – The appellants sentenced to 5 years' rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of ₹20,000 each – Court held that a lesser punishment would not serve the ends of justice given the gravity of the injury inflicted in a public place [Paras 33-38].

Compensation – Section 357(3) Cr.P.C. – Out of the fine amount, ₹80,000 to be paid to the complainant as compensation for his injuries [Para 39].

Advocate's Right to Speech – Gag Order by Bar Council of India – Writ Petition Allowed – The petitioner, a practicing advocate, challenged the gag order imposed by the Bar Council of India restraining advocates from making public statements concerning alleged financial mismanagement in the Karnataka State Bar Council – The Court held that the Bar Council of India had no statutory power to issue such a gag order under Sections 4, 6, and 7 of the Advocates Act, as it would amount to a violation of the fundamental right to free speech under Article 19(1)(a) – The order was deemed unsustainable and was quashed [Paras 10-20].

Supervisory Powers of Bar Council of India – Limited Scope – The Court observed that while the Bar Council of India has general supervisory powers over State Bar Councils, these do not extend to restraining advocates from exercising their right to speech, as this would exceed the statutory mandate of Section 7(1)(g) of the Advocates Act [Paras 12-18].

Decision: The writ petition was allowed. The gag order imposed by the Bar Council of India, dated 08/04/2024, communicated through a letter dated 12/04/2024, was quashed.

Election Law – Disqualification for Defection – Petitioners challenged the order by the Kerala State Election Commission disqualifying them for defecting from the Revolutionary Marxist Party of India (RMPI) – The Election Commission found that the petitioners, who contested under the "Football" symbol allotted to RMPI, violated the party’s whip by voting against the official candidate for Panchayat President – Petitioners contended that they contested as independents under the Democratic Development Front (DDF) and were not RMPI members – Held: Petitioners, having contested using RMPI’s official symbol, were deemed RMPI candidates and bound by the party’s whip, leading to their disqualification under the Kerala Local Authorities (Prohibition of Defection) Act, 1999 [Paras 1, 3, 6, 9, 28-30].

Election Symbols – Use of “Football” Symbol – Petitioners argued they were independents contesting under the DDF, not RMPI – However, the RMPI's State Secretary had officially recommended the "Football" symbol for them, and the Returning Officer allotted it based on RMPI's priority status – The Court held that even though the "Football" symbol is a free symbol, the petitioners, having used it as RMPI candidates, were bound by the party's instructions, leading to their disqualification [Paras 17-19, 27].

Judicial Review – Writ of Certiorari – Petitioners sought to quash the Election Commission’s decision, arguing that they were wrongly classified as RMPI members – The Court held that the Election Commission’s findings were based on clear evidence, including the use of RMPI’s symbol and the defiance of the party whip – No grounds were found to issue a writ of certiorari as the Commission's order was neither perverse nor based on erroneous application of law [Paras 18, 31-32].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Disqualification of the petitioners for defection upheld.

Writ Jurisdiction – Request for CBI Investigation – Petition Dismissed – Petitioner, Geeta Gandhi, sought the court’s intervention under Article 226 to direct a CBI investigation into the alleged murder of her son, Kartik Gandhi, under mysterious circumstances in Leh – Held: The court found no compelling reasons to transfer the investigation from the Delhi Police to the CBI as there was no evidence to suggest any incompetency on the part of the local police – The petitioner failed to demonstrate any interstate or international ramifications of the case that would justify a CBI investigation [Paras 29, 30].

Allegations of Conspiracy – Lack of Substantive Evidence – The petitioner alleged that her son was murdered under a conspiracy involving several suspects, including Aditya Singh, who accompanied the deceased to Leh – Held: The court found that the petitioner’s claims of conspiracy were based on circumstantial evidence, and the investigation by the Delhi Police was already underway – The petitioner’s request for a CBI probe was rejected, as the allegations did not meet the threshold for transferring the case to a central agency [Para 28].

Judicial Oversight – Section 482 CrPC – Limited Scope – The court reiterated the principle that judicial interference in ongoing investigations should be minimal, especially when the investigation is being conducted by competent authorities – The petitioner had the option to approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for further investigation if required – The court also observed that the petitioner’s claims of a larger conspiracy lacked material evidence to warrant CBI intervention [Para 27].

Decision – The petition was dismissed, with the court holding that the Delhi Police should continue its investigation – The request for CBI intervention was declined, with liberty granted to the petitioner to approach the Magistrate if further investigation is required [Paras 31, 32].

Civil Law – Review Petition – Principle of Res Judicata – Satyadhyan Ghosal Case Applied – The petitioners sought review of a judgment dismissing their second appeal, arguing that under Mohammadan law, adoption and execution of wills are not recognized – Held: The petitioners were estopped from raising these issues, as the findings regarding adoption and will had attained finality in the first round of litigation – The principle of res judicata applies, barring re-litigation of issues already settled [Paras 12-18].

Application of Shariat Act – Non-retroactive Effect – The petitioners further contended that the Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 2007, which mandates inheritance as per Mohammadan law, should apply to the present case – Held: The Shariat Act is not applicable retroactively, as the dispute pertains to events before its enactment [Paras 19-22].

Decision: The review petition was dismissed – The court found no error apparent on the face of the record to warrant review – The petitioners were precluded from re-agitating issues that had been settled in earlier proceedings.