Murder – Conspiracy and Common Intention – Section 302 read with 120B IPC – Conviction Affirmed – The appellants were convicted for the murder of the deceased, Ramchandra Jha, based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses (P.W.-1 and P.W.-6), who identified the appellants as the perpetrators – The court upheld the conviction, noting the clear role each appellant played in the attack, including direct participation in firing the shots – The conspiracy to commit the murder was proven through consistent testimony, corroborated by circumstantial evidence [Paras 10, 15, 17, 22].

Eyewitness Testimony – Reliability of Family Members – The court upheld the reliability of the testimonies given by the informant (P.W.-1) and her son (P.W.-6), rejecting the defense's contention that they were unreliable due to their relationship with the deceased – The court held that the family members’ evidence was consistent, detailed, and corroborated by medical evidence, making it credible despite minor contradictions [Paras 13-14, 24-26].

Arms Act – Illegal Possession and Use of Firearms – Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 26 – Appellant Ranjeet Kumar @ Bittu was convicted under the Arms Act for possessing and using a country-made pistol, with forensic evidence confirming the match between the firearm and the bullets recovered from the scene – The court affirmed his conviction under Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act, finding the recovery of arms to be lawful and properly evidenced [Paras 18-21].

Delay in Lodging FIR – Not Fatal – The court dismissed the defense's argument that the delay in filing the FIR undermined the prosecution's case, ruling that the delay was adequately explained due to the emotional and traumatic state of the informant, who had witnessed her husband's murder – The FIR was lodged within a reasonable time considering the circumstances [Paras 27-30].

Decision: All appeals were dismissed – The court upheld the life sentences imposed on the appellants for murder under Sections 302 and 120B IPC, as well as the concurrent sentences under the Arms Act – The trial court's decision to impose fines and direct compensation payments to the informant was also upheld [Paras 33-34].

Civil Law - Derivative Action – Rights of Shareholders – The appellants, minority shareholders, filed a derivative action challenging the sale of a property owned by the company. They sought injunctions and other reliefs on the ground of mismanagement and under-valuation – Held: A shareholder has no direct right over the assets of the company. However, in derivative suits, shareholders can claim relief if the company's interest is harmed. The sale of the Thane property, conducted without allowing plaintiffs to challenge the valuation report, raised questions of mala fides and arbitrary conduct by the respondents [Paras 10, 15].

Maintainability of Derivative Suit – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts – The respondents argued that the suit should be dismissed, contending that such matters fall under the jurisdiction of the NCLT – Held: While jurisdictional objections can be raised, as this case is at the interlocutory stage, it is premature to decide on maintainability. The trial court is directed to address the issue as a preliminary matter under Order XIV Rule 2 CPC [Paras 30, 45].

Appointment of Special Officer – Supervision of Sale Proceeds – Considering the mala fides in the sale process, the Court appointed Joint Special Officers to inspect the property and supervise future sales or transactions related to the Thane property. The Special Officers are to ensure transparency and report to the Court on developments, protecting the company's interests [Paras 47, 49].

Decision: The appeals are allowed in part. The sale of the Thane property is not set aside but subjected to strict supervision by the appointed Special Officers. Further transactions involving the property are to be disclosed, and the issue of maintainability is left to be decided by the trial court [Paras 30, 47].

Taxation Law - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code – Extinguishment of Claims – Section 31 and Section 32A IBC – The appellant sought to extinguish excise duty demands not included in the resolution plan approved during Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under IBC – Held: Following the resolution plan approved by the NCLT and in the absence of a claim filed by the revenue before the IRP, the demand stood extinguished. No proceedings could continue for claims not included in the resolution plan [Paras 12, 13, 102].

Rule 22 CESTAT (Procedure) Rules – Application to Insolvent Companies – The revenue argued that the appeal abated under Rule 22 as the appellant was under insolvency – Held: Rule 22 applies in cases of liquidation or winding up of a company, but not when the company continues its business under a resolution plan as a going concern under IBC. Therefore, the appeal did not abate [Paras 19, 22].

Refund of Appropriated Amount – The appellant sought refund of 29,729,891, already appropriated by the revenue – Held: Since the demand was not part of the CIRP, the appellant was not entitled to claim refund of the appropriated amount, though the remaining demand of 50,915,106 stood abated [Paras 50915106].

Decision: The appeal is allowed. The CESTAT order is set aside. The demand of 50,915,106 is held to have abated, but the appellant is not entitled to claim a refund of 29,729,891 appropriated by the revenue [Paras 50915106].

Civil Law – 138 NI Act - Recovery of Money – Cheque Issued in Personal Name of Managing Director – Plaintiff Company’s Locus Standi – The plaintiff company filed a suit for recovery of money based on a cheque issued in the personal name of its Managing Director, V.G. Siddartha Hegde – Held: The company, being a separate legal entity from its members, had no right to file the suit based on a cheque drawn in the personal capacity of its Managing Director. The suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff company lacked locus standi [Paras 2, 5].

Special Power of Attorney – Validity of SPA for Filing Suit – The plaintiff relied on a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by its Managing Director in favor of the person representing the company in court – Held: The SPA was executed in the personal capacity of the Managing Director and not as the authorized representative of the company. Therefore, it could not confer authority on the representative to act on behalf of the company in the matter [Paras 5, 7].

Remand of Case – Request for Remand Denied – The appellant sought remand of the case for reconsideration – Held: Since the appellant failed to demonstrate that the findings of the Trial Court were erroneous, remanding the case was unnecessary and the appeal was dismissed [Para 7].

Decision: The appeal is dismissed as devoid of merit. The Trial Court's judgment is upheld, and the plaintiff company is found to lack the legal standing to file the suit based on the cheque issued in the name of its Managing Director [Paras 5, 7].

Discharge Petition – Prima Facie Case – Sections 420 and 120B IPC – Charges Framed – The petitioners sought discharge from charges relating to financial irregularities and fraudulent loan disbursals under criminal conspiracy. The court held that prima facie evidence showed the petitioners' involvement as members of the Gram Sewa Sehkari Sabha Samiti. – Held: The trial court rightly framed charges against the petitioners based on the material evidence available. [Paras 29-30, 34].

Role of Management Committee – Fictitious Resolution – Liability Established – Petitioners argued that they were not part of the fraudulent resolution passed for loan disbursal. The court, however, noted that the resolution bore the petitioners' signatures, indicating their involvement in the process. – Held: The signatures on the resolution provided sufficient evidence to establish the petitioners' participation at this stage. [Paras 36-37].

Framing of Charges – Standard of Evidence – Sufficient Grounds to Proceed – The petitioners claimed insufficient evidence to justify framing charges. The court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, only a prima facie case is required, not full proof of guilt. – Held: Sufficient material existed to frame charges under Sections 420 and 120B IPC. [Paras 38-40].

Negligence – Bank Liability – Cheque Forgery – The first appellate court found the bank negligent for clearing cheques with forged signatures of the plaintiff's Managing Director without proper verification – The trial court dismissed the suit for insufficient evidence, but the appellate court reversed this, holding the bank responsible for negligence in comparing the signatures – However, the High Court restored the trial court's decision, stating that the comparison of signatures required expert evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, and the first appellate court wrongly assumed the role of a handwriting expert under Section 73 [Paras 26-34, 39-40].

Bar of Subsequent Suit – Order 2 Rule 2 CPC – The first suit related to one cheque, while the second suit concerned six other cheques – The High Court held that the second suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, as the plaintiff failed to seek leave to file subsequent suits despite a composite cause of action existing when the first suit was filed – The claim that separate suits could be filed for different cheques was rejected [Paras 30-36].

Section 73 Evidence Act – Comparison of Signatures by Court – The first appellate court compared the disputed signatures of the Managing Director with those on other documents without expert evidence – The High Court criticized this approach, stating that Section 73 allows comparison only in limited circumstances and should be used cautiously – The High Court held that the bank officials could not be held liable solely based on the court's signature comparison [Paras 26-28, 42].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 85 and Banker's Protection – The bank claimed protection under Section 85(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arguing that it had cleared the cheques in good faith – The High Court found that the cheques, allegedly bearing forged signatures, did not qualify as valid negotiable instruments under the Act, thereby negating the bank's defense under Section 85(2) [Paras 33-38].

Decision: The second appeals were allowed, and the first appellate court's judgment was set aside. The trial court's decision dismissing both suits was restored. Any deposited amount under interim orders was directed to be refunded to the appellant bank with interest [Paras 40-43].

Narcotic Drugs – Possession of Poppy Husk – Section 15 NDPS Act – Appeal Against Conviction – Evidence Required – The appellant was convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possessing 11 quintals and 88 kilograms of poppy husk – The primary ground for appeal was the failure of the prosecution to produce key evidence, such as the examined cloth sample parcels, during the trial – Held: The non-production of the examined sample cloth parcels and reliance solely on the certified inventory and report of the Chemical Analyst do not suffice to prove the charge – Conviction quashed [Paras 8, 14-19].

Primary Evidence – Destruction of Samples – Section 52-A of NDPS Act – The Court analyzed the statutory provisions under Section 52-A of the NDPS Act regarding the disposal of narcotic drugs and the admissibility of certified inventory as primary evidence – Held: In the absence of the examined sample parcels being produced in court, the inventory and FSL report alone do not constitute primary evidence – The failure to adhere to the statutory process for producing primary evidence was fatal to the prosecution’s case [Paras 19-25].

Laboratory Testing – Legal Requirement for Representative Samples – The Court held that laboratory testing of the representative sample parcels in the presence of a Magistrate is essential under the NDPS Act, and non-compliance with this procedure invalidates the certified inventory as conclusive evidence – Appellant acquitted due to procedural lapses [Paras 16, 22-24].

Decision:

Appeal allowed – Conviction quashed – Appellant acquitted – Personal and surety bonds canceled – Appellant to be released unless required in another case – Fine amount, if deposited, to be refunded [Paras 34-35].

Civil Law – Cheque Bounce – Suit for Recovery of Money – Plaintiff, a coffee trading company, claimed that the defendant issued a cheque for ₹14,07,456 to clear outstanding dues – Cheque was dishonored due to insufficient funds – Trial Court dismissed the suit, finding that the cheque was issued in favor of the company's chairman in his personal capacity, not the company – Held: The suit was not maintainable as the plaintiff company, being a separate legal entity, cannot base its claim on a cheque drawn in favor of an individual [Paras 3.3, 15, 18].

Locus Standi – Legal Entity Distinction – The plaintiff company, registered under the Companies Act, is distinct from its chairman – The court found that the cheque, legal notice, and Special Power of Attorney (SPA) were all issued or executed in the individual name of the chairman, Sri V.G. Siddartha Hegde, rather than the company – As no resolution was passed by the company authorizing the filing of the suit, the company lacked the locus standi to initiate the suit for recovery [Paras 12, 13, 14].

Cheque Issuance – Allegation of Blank Cheque – The defendant admitted to having signed a blank cheque at the plaintiff's insistence, but denied issuing it to the company’s chairman for any transactions – The court agreed with the Trial Court's conclusion that the suit could not proceed on this basis, as the plaintiff failed to prove a legitimate financial obligation that would entitle the company to recover the amount [Paras 13, 15].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Plaintiff company lacked the legal standing to file the suit as the cheque was issued in favor of an individual and not the company – No grounds to remand the case to the Trial Court – Parties to bear their own costs [Paras 16, 17, 18].

Rash and Negligent Driving – Sudden Road Crossing by Child – Acquittal Upheld – The respondent was charged with causing the death of a child by driving rashly and negligently. The trial court acquitted the respondent, concluding that the accident was caused when the child suddenly ran into the road, and the driver could not prevent it. – Held: The trial court's view that the driver was not at fault due to the sudden actions of the child is plausible and justified, and the acquittal was upheld.

Appeal Against Acquittal – Limited Scope of Review – Acquittal Confirmed – The appellate court's role in appeals against acquittal is limited. It must determine whether the trial court appreciated the evidence correctly and whether the findings are perverse. The trial court's decision was based on sound reasoning, and there was no error in law or fact. – Held: The appeal against acquittal was dismissed as the trial court's conclusions were reasonably drawn from the evidence.

High Speed as Indicator of Negligence – Insufficient by Itself – Witnesses testified that the vehicle was moving at high speed, but no concrete evidence quantified the speed or demonstrated that the respondent was driving rashly. According to legal precedents, merely stating that a vehicle was at high speed is insufficient to prove rashness or negligence unless other supporting evidence is provided. – Held: High speed alone does not establish negligence without additional proof of reckless behavior.

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the acquittal of the respondent was upheld. The trial court's view that the child’s sudden crossing of the road contributed to the accident, and that there was no rashness on the part of the driver, was reasonable and required no interference.