Discharge Petition – Prima Facie Case – Sections 420 and 120B IPC – Charges Framed – The petitioners sought discharge from charges relating to financial irregularities and fraudulent loan disbursals under criminal conspiracy. The court held that prima facie evidence showed the petitioners' involvement as members of the Gram Sewa Sehkari Sabha Samiti. – Held: The trial court rightly framed charges against the petitioners based on the material evidence available. [Paras 29-30, 34].

Role of Management Committee – Fictitious Resolution – Liability Established – Petitioners argued that they were not part of the fraudulent resolution passed for loan disbursal. The court, however, noted that the resolution bore the petitioners' signatures, indicating their involvement in the process. – Held: The signatures on the resolution provided sufficient evidence to establish the petitioners' participation at this stage. [Paras 36-37].

Framing of Charges – Standard of Evidence – Sufficient Grounds to Proceed – The petitioners claimed insufficient evidence to justify framing charges. The court emphasized that at the stage of framing charges, only a prima facie case is required, not full proof of guilt. – Held: Sufficient material existed to frame charges under Sections 420 and 120B IPC. [Paras 38-40].

Civil Law - Derivative Action – Rights of Shareholders – The appellants, minority shareholders, filed a derivative action challenging the sale of a property owned by the company. They sought injunctions and other reliefs on the ground of mismanagement and under-valuation – Held: A shareholder has no direct right over the assets of the company. However, in derivative suits, shareholders can claim relief if the company's interest is harmed. The sale of the Thane property, conducted without allowing plaintiffs to challenge the valuation report, raised questions of mala fides and arbitrary conduct by the respondents [Paras 10, 15].

Maintainability of Derivative Suit – Jurisdiction of Civil Courts – The respondents argued that the suit should be dismissed, contending that such matters fall under the jurisdiction of the NCLT – Held: While jurisdictional objections can be raised, as this case is at the interlocutory stage, it is premature to decide on maintainability. The trial court is directed to address the issue as a preliminary matter under Order XIV Rule 2 CPC [Paras 30, 45].

Appointment of Special Officer – Supervision of Sale Proceeds – Considering the mala fides in the sale process, the Court appointed Joint Special Officers to inspect the property and supervise future sales or transactions related to the Thane property. The Special Officers are to ensure transparency and report to the Court on developments, protecting the company's interests [Paras 47, 49].

Decision: The appeals are allowed in part. The sale of the Thane property is not set aside but subjected to strict supervision by the appointed Special Officers. Further transactions involving the property are to be disclosed, and the issue of maintainability is left to be decided by the trial court [Paras 30, 47].

Tenancy Rights – Inheritance of Tenancy – Section 2(j) H.P. Urban Rent Control Act – Eviction Ordered – The appellants argued that they inherited the tenancy after the death of Rajesh Kochhar, the original tenant’s son, under Section 2(j) of the Act. The court held that after the deaths of Rajesh and Prakash Kochhar, the tenancy did not devolve further to the legal heirs, and the respondents, as owners, were entitled to possession. – Held: The eviction was upheld, and the respondents were granted possession of the suit property. [Paras 13, 16-18].

Maintainability of Suit – Plea of Authorized Signatory – Suit Held Maintainable – The appellants questioned the competence of the authorized signatory of the respondent trust to file the suit. The court rejected this contention, noting the valid resolution authorizing Mohit Gupta to file the suit on behalf of the trust. – Held: The objection regarding maintainability was dismissed, confirming the suit’s validity. [Paras 20-22].

Mesne Profits – Use and Occupation Charges – Rs. 500/- per Day Granted – The respondents claimed Rs. 500/- per day as use and occupation charges. The appellants did not specifically deny the claim, and under Order 8 Rule 5 CPC, the court considered it admitted. – Held: The respondents were entitled to Rs. 500/- per day as use and occupation charges until possession was delivered. [Paras 26-28].

Adverse Possession – Claim Not Raised at Trial – Barred at Appeal Stage – The appellants attempted to raise a plea of adverse possession during the appeal, despite not having raised it in the trial court. The court disallowed the plea, reaffirming the respondents’ absolute right to recover possession unless adverse possession for 12 years had been proven. – Held: The plea of adverse possession was rejected. [Paras 29-30].

Civil Writ - Interpretation of Section 142(1), Maharashtra Prohibition Act – Powers of Collector – The petitioners, liquor license holders, challenged the closure orders under Section 142(1) of the Maharashtra Prohibition Act, which mandated the closure of all liquor shops in the district on Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Jayanti – Held: The term "any place" in Section 142(1) must be interpreted broadly to include more than one place or shop where liquor is sold if the Collector forms an opinion that it is in the interest of public peace. The provision does not restrict the Collector’s powers to a single establishment [Paras 35-36].

Public Peace and Lawful Orders – Interest of Public Peace – The Court upheld the orders of the Collector, noting that the power to impose such restrictions in the interest of public peace is within the scope of Section 142(1). The order to close shops district-wide on special occasions like Dr. Ambedkar Jayanti was reasonable and in line with maintaining public peace [Paras 36].

Applicability of Rules – Notice Requirement – Petitioners argued that the Collector failed to comply with Rule 9-A(2)(d) of the 1969 Rules, which mandates a seven-day notice period for declaring a dry day – Held: The seven-day notice requirement under Rule 9-A(2)(d) applies to specific closures under different circumstances, but does not restrict the Collector’s powers under Section 142(1) for maintaining public peace. The notice period was not applicable in this case [Para 31].

Decision: The writ petitions are dismissed. The orders of the District Collector are upheld, and the interpretation of "any place" under Section 142(1) is broadened to include multiple establishments, ensuring that the powers conferred are used in the interest of public peace [Paras 35-36].

Bail Application – Consideration of Role in Crime – The petitioner sought bail, arguing that her role was limited to holding the complainant’s sister and that she was not involved in the stabbing – Held: While the petitioner was involved in the incident, the material on record did not indicate that she participated in stabbing or inflicting injuries on the deceased. Given her limited role and the fact that all eyewitnesses have been examined, bail was granted [Paras 4, 10, 12].

Factors for Grant of Bail – Role of Accused and Risk of Absconding – The Court considered the petitioner’s role, her continued incarceration since May 2019, and the absence of any risk of tampering with evidence or fleeing justice. The Court emphasized that bail is not punitive and must be considered based on the severity of the accused's role in the crime [Paras 12, 13].

Guidelines for Granting Bail – The Court relied on the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 and Neeru Yadav vs. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508, reaffirming that the seriousness of the offence and the individual role of the accused must guide the decision on bail [Paras 8, 9, 12].

Decision: The bail application is allowed, and the petitioner is granted bail.

Employment Law - Appointment Process – Provisional vs. Final Merit List – The petitioner, who was ranked first in the provisional merit list for the post of ANM, challenged the appointment of the respondent, who was ranked first in the final merit list after re-scrutiny – Held: Mere empanelment in a provisional list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment. The final merit list, prepared after re-scrutiny, placed the respondent at the top, and the petitioner as waitlisted – The appointment of the respondent was valid and in accordance with the law [Paras 1, 5].

Bias and Malafide Allegations – Rejection of Claims – The petitioner alleged bias and malafide action by the authorities in appointing the respondent – Held: No evidence of arbitrariness or malafide action was found in the preparation of the final merit list or the appointment process. The writ petition was dismissed on merit [Paras 5, 6].

Right to Appointment – No Indefeasible Right – Empanelment – The Court reaffirmed that empanelment in a merit list does not guarantee appointment, and the employer retains discretion, provided the process is not arbitrary – The petitioner's claim to the post based solely on her provisional ranking was rejected [Para 5].

Decision: The writ petition is dismissed for lack of merit. The appointment of the respondent was found to be lawful, as she ranked first in the final merit list after re-scrutiny. The interim orders are vacated [Paras 5, 6].

Taxation Law - Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code – Extinguishment of Claims – Section 31 and Section 32A IBC – The appellant sought to extinguish excise duty demands not included in the resolution plan approved during Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) under IBC – Held: Following the resolution plan approved by the NCLT and in the absence of a claim filed by the revenue before the IRP, the demand stood extinguished. No proceedings could continue for claims not included in the resolution plan [Paras 12, 13, 102].

Rule 22 CESTAT (Procedure) Rules – Application to Insolvent Companies – The revenue argued that the appeal abated under Rule 22 as the appellant was under insolvency – Held: Rule 22 applies in cases of liquidation or winding up of a company, but not when the company continues its business under a resolution plan as a going concern under IBC. Therefore, the appeal did not abate [Paras 19, 22].

Refund of Appropriated Amount – The appellant sought refund of 29,729,891, already appropriated by the revenue – Held: Since the demand was not part of the CIRP, the appellant was not entitled to claim refund of the appropriated amount, though the remaining demand of 50,915,106 stood abated [Paras 50915106].

Decision: The appeal is allowed. The CESTAT order is set aside. The demand of 50,915,106 is held to have abated, but the appellant is not entitled to claim a refund of 29,729,891 appropriated by the revenue [Paras 50915106].

Negligence – Bank Liability – Cheque Forgery – The first appellate court found the bank negligent for clearing cheques with forged signatures of the plaintiff's Managing Director without proper verification – The trial court dismissed the suit for insufficient evidence, but the appellate court reversed this, holding the bank responsible for negligence in comparing the signatures – However, the High Court restored the trial court's decision, stating that the comparison of signatures required expert evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act, and the first appellate court wrongly assumed the role of a handwriting expert under Section 73 [Paras 26-34, 39-40].

Bar of Subsequent Suit – Order 2 Rule 2 CPC – The first suit related to one cheque, while the second suit concerned six other cheques – The High Court held that the second suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC, as the plaintiff failed to seek leave to file subsequent suits despite a composite cause of action existing when the first suit was filed – The claim that separate suits could be filed for different cheques was rejected [Paras 30-36].

Section 73 Evidence Act – Comparison of Signatures by Court – The first appellate court compared the disputed signatures of the Managing Director with those on other documents without expert evidence – The High Court criticized this approach, stating that Section 73 allows comparison only in limited circumstances and should be used cautiously – The High Court held that the bank officials could not be held liable solely based on the court's signature comparison [Paras 26-28, 42].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 85 and Banker's Protection – The bank claimed protection under Section 85(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, arguing that it had cleared the cheques in good faith – The High Court found that the cheques, allegedly bearing forged signatures, did not qualify as valid negotiable instruments under the Act, thereby negating the bank's defense under Section 85(2) [Paras 33-38].

Decision: The second appeals were allowed, and the first appellate court's judgment was set aside. The trial court's decision dismissing both suits was restored. Any deposited amount under interim orders was directed to be refunded to the appellant bank with interest [Paras 40-43].

Murder – Conspiracy and Common Intention – Section 302 read with 120B IPC – Conviction Affirmed – The appellants were convicted for the murder of the deceased, Ramchandra Jha, based on the testimonies of eyewitnesses (P.W.-1 and P.W.-6), who identified the appellants as the perpetrators – The court upheld the conviction, noting the clear role each appellant played in the attack, including direct participation in firing the shots – The conspiracy to commit the murder was proven through consistent testimony, corroborated by circumstantial evidence [Paras 10, 15, 17, 22].

Eyewitness Testimony – Reliability of Family Members – The court upheld the reliability of the testimonies given by the informant (P.W.-1) and her son (P.W.-6), rejecting the defense's contention that they were unreliable due to their relationship with the deceased – The court held that the family members’ evidence was consistent, detailed, and corroborated by medical evidence, making it credible despite minor contradictions [Paras 13-14, 24-26].

Arms Act – Illegal Possession and Use of Firearms – Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 26 – Appellant Ranjeet Kumar @ Bittu was convicted under the Arms Act for possessing and using a country-made pistol, with forensic evidence confirming the match between the firearm and the bullets recovered from the scene – The court affirmed his conviction under Sections 25(1-B)(a) and 26 of the Arms Act, finding the recovery of arms to be lawful and properly evidenced [Paras 18-21].

Delay in Lodging FIR – Not Fatal – The court dismissed the defense's argument that the delay in filing the FIR undermined the prosecution's case, ruling that the delay was adequately explained due to the emotional and traumatic state of the informant, who had witnessed her husband's murder – The FIR was lodged within a reasonable time considering the circumstances [Paras 27-30].

Decision: All appeals were dismissed – The court upheld the life sentences imposed on the appellants for murder under Sections 302 and 120B IPC, as well as the concurrent sentences under the Arms Act – The trial court's decision to impose fines and direct compensation payments to the informant was also upheld [Paras 33-34].