Specific Performance – Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Bar of Limitation – The Plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement from 1989, cancellation of a sale deed from 2011, and declaration of ownership of the suit property. The defendant filed for rejection of the suit under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, contending that the suit was barred by limitation, as the agreement was undated, unstamped, unregistered, and mentioned a mobile number which did not exist in 1989. Held: The suit was clearly barred by limitation as it was filed after 31 years, and the agreement was prima facie fabricated – Application under Order VII Rule 11 allowed – Suit dismissed [Paras 3-4, 7-10].

Declaratory Relief and Specific Performance – Delay in Filing Suit – The plaintiff claimed ownership based on an agreement from 1989 but did not act on it until 2020, even after the original owner’s death in 1996 and subsequent mutation entries. The court held that the plaintiff’s inaction for over three decades and failure to challenge mutation entries was fatal to the claim – The delay indicated the plaintiff's lack of rights over the property, and the suit was barred by limitation [Paras 3.2, 8-9].

Limitation Act – Issue of Limitation as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact – The trial court had refused to dismiss the suit under Order VII Rule 11, holding that the issue of limitation was a mixed question of law and fact. The High Court rejected this reasoning, stating that when facts are clear and undeniable from the pleadings, the suit can be dismissed at the threshold without leading evidence – Limitation is not always a mixed question of fact and law [Paras 6, 10.1].

Fraudulent Claims and Vexatious Litigation – The court noted that the plaintiff's case appeared to be an attempt to create nuisance and extract concessions from the defendant by reviving a long-dormant and likely fabricated claim – Such vexatious claims must be dismissed at the outset to prevent abuse of the legal process [Paras 10, 10.1].

Agricultural Land Act – Section 43A of the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, 1948 – The suit property was governed by the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Land Act, which required permission for sale under Section 43A. The purported 1989 agreement did not mention obtaining such permission, further rendering the agreement invalid [Paras 3.2, 8].

Decision: The impugned order of the trial court dated 10.04.2023 rejecting the application under Order VII Rule 11 is set aside – The suit is rejected as it is barred by limitation – The Civil Revision Application is allowed [Paras 11-13].

Divorce – Grounds of Cruelty, Adultery, and Desertion – Appellant sought divorce on allegations of cruelty, adultery, and desertion by the respondent – Held: The allegations made by the appellant were vague, unsubstantiated, and lacked specific dates, times, and evidence – The appellant failed to prove cruelty or adultery, and the court found that the respondent was willing to return to the matrimonial home, negating the ground of desertion – Divorce cannot be granted based on vague and unsubstantiated allegations [Paras 14-20, 22-23].

Second Marriage During Pendency of Divorce Proceedings – Appellant solemnized a second marriage after obtaining an ex parte divorce decree, which was later set aside by the High Court – Held: The appellant's second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage was unjustified, and the allegations of cruelty and desertion were fabricated to justify the second marriage – The appeal was dismissed, and the lower court’s judgment refusing divorce was upheld [Paras 6, 22-23].

Decision:

Appeal dismissed – Judgment of the Family Court dismissing the divorce petition affirmed – The appellant’s allegations were vague and unproven, and the respondent expressed willingness to continue the marriage [Para 24].

Application of Section 319 CrPC – Addition of Accused Based on New Evidence – Contradictory Testimony – The petitioner, mother of the deceased, was added as an accused based on new evidence presented during trial under Section 319 CrPC – while earlier witnesses claimed the death was accidental, evidence emerged suggesting the death resulted from manual strangulation – Held: The trial court rightly exercised its discretion under Section 319 CrPC to summon the petitioner as an accused, based on the contradictions in witness testimonies and the postmortem report suggesting manual strangulation [Paras 10-15].

Contradictory Family Testimony – Protection of Accused Family Members – Hostile Witnesses – The family members initially testified that the deceased died from an accidental fall in the bathroom – however, subsequent testimony from P.W.16, a family friend, indicated possible foul play involving the petitioner – the court noted the suspicious protection of family members by hostile witnesses – Held: The court, using its powers under Section 165 of Indian Evidence Act, interrogated witnesses to establish the truth, supporting the inclusion of the petitioner as an accused [Paras 12-15].

Postmortem Evidence – Cause of Death Contradicts Family’s Narrative – The postmortem report revealed that the deceased had died due to manual strangulation – contradicting the family’s version of an accidental fall – Held: The medical evidence was crucial and consistent with foul play, leading to the petitioner’s addition as an accused [Para 14].

Motive for Murder – Forced Marriage – Love Affair – The prosecution introduced evidence that the deceased had been forced into an unwanted marriage, despite a prior romantic relationship – this served as a potential motive for the petitioner’s involvement in her daughter’s murder – Held: P.W.16’s testimony regarding the deceased’s unhappy marriage was a critical factor in supporting the prosecution’s theory, justifying the petitioner’s summoning as an accused [Paras 10-13].

Section 319 CrPC Invocation – Allowed Even in Advanced Stage of Trial – The petitioner argued that her addition as an accused under Section 319 CrPC was unjustified since the trial was nearing completion – Held: The court ruled that the timing of the invocation of Section 319 was immaterial, provided new evidence emerged justifying the addition of the accused [Para 15].

Decision: Petition dismissed – the court upheld the trial court’s order to summon the petitioner as an accused in the ongoing trial – the case was remanded to the trial court to continue proceedings, with the petitioner granted the right to present her defense [Paras 16].
 

Bail – Criminal Jurisprudence – Circumstantial Evidence – Petitioner seeks bail in a case involving circumstantial evidence with no direct evidence linking him to the crime, except a witness of last seen – Court notes that the petitioner has already spent over one year and three months in custody – Petitioner has no prior criminal history, and the only evidence is the last-seen witness, which requires trial for full adjudication – Bail granted as prolonged incarceration without trial would violate the principle of presumption of innocence [Paras 3, 4, 11].

Presumption of Innocence – Right to Bail – Refers to the fundamental principle "Bail is the Rule and Jail is an Exception" established by the Supreme Court – Bail granted on the grounds of the petitioner’s right to liberty and a speedy trial, as per Article 21 of the Constitution – The Court emphasizes that unless it can be shown that the petitioner would interfere with the judicial process or pose a danger, continued detention is not justified [Paras 6–9].

Custodial Period and Trial Progress – Grounds for Bail – Petitioner has been in custody for over a year, and only four out of seventeen prosecution witnesses have been examined – Court observes that the trial is still at an initial stage, and further incarceration would be unnecessary when the petitioner can be released on bail under suitable conditions to prevent tampering with evidence [Paras 11–12].

Decision: Petition allowed – Petitioner granted regular bail upon furnishing a bond to the satisfaction of the concerned trial court – Court observes that any future involvement in similar offenses would lead to the possibility of bail cancellation, and nothing in the current order should affect the merits of the trial [Paras 12–13].

Industrial Disputes – Reinstatement vs. Lump Sum Compensation – Unfair Labour Practices – The petitioner, a government-aided private college, challenged the Labour Court's order of reinstatement with 50% back wages – Respondents (workmen) were retrenched in 2006 after completing 240 days but were appointed on ad hoc basis without approval from the competent authority – Court held that reinstatement is not automatic even if the termination violates Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act – Considering that workmen were not appointed on sanctioned posts and the initial award of lump sum compensation was not challenged by the workmen, Court set aside the reinstatement order and awarded lump sum compensation instead [Paras 5–9, 12–13].

Reinstatement – Back Wages – Principles Laid Down in Bhurumal’s Case – Following the Supreme Court's decision in B.S.N.L. v. Bhurumal, 2014 (7) SCC 177, and State of Uttarakhand v. Raj Kumar, 2019 (14) SCC 353, Court emphasized that reinstatement with full back wages is not automatic, especially for daily-wage or ad hoc workers – Compensation in lieu of reinstatement is appropriate where the appointment was not made following prescribed procedures and where the worker has already accepted lump sum compensation in the first round of litigation [Paras 8–13].

Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act – Judicial Discretion in Awarding Relief – Court reiterated that under Section 11-A, the Labour Court can award reinstatement or compensation, depending on the facts – Given the circumstances of the case, lump sum compensation of ₹3.5 lakhs was awarded to each workman, while the petitioner was directed to pay 50% back wages for the period prior to the interim stay along with last drawn salary under Section 17-B for subsequent periods [Paras 10–13].

Decision: Petitions disposed of – Reinstatement order set aside – Petitioner directed to pay ₹3.5 lakhs as lump sum compensation to each workman, along with 50% back wages and last drawn salary under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act until the date of this order – Payments to be made within one month, failing which interest at 12% per annum will be applicable [Paras 13–14].
 

Civil Law – Order 21 Rule 32 CPC – Violation of Decree – Petitioners filed a revision petition against the dismissal of their application under Order 21 Rule 32 of the CPC by the Civil Judge, Pathankot – Petitioners alleged that the respondents willfully violated the judgment and decree dated 24.04.2014, which restrained them from interfering with the petitioners' possession of the suit property – Trial Court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence to prove a willful violation – Held: Petitioners failed to provide compelling evidence such as photographs or police complaints, and the trial court rightly dismissed the application [Paras 1, 2, 4, 7, 8].

Evidence – Witness Testimony and Lack of Corroboration – Petitioners' witness, Rachpal Singh (AW-1), and Om Parkash (AW-2) testified regarding the alleged violation of the decree – However, the trial court noted the absence of essential evidence, such as photographs of the incident, the truck number, or any police complaints – Additionally, AW-2 admitted that a sewage line had been laid by the municipal corporation under the suit property 18-20 years ago, weakening the case – Trial Court found no cogent evidence to prove willful violation beyond doubt, as required for proceedings under Order 21 Rule 32 [Paras 7, 8].

Legal Principle – Standard of Proof – The trial court, relying on Raj Kumar Vs. Parshotam Dass, held that the violation of a decree under Order 21 Rule 32 CPC must be proved with the same standard as in criminal cases, i.e., beyond a reasonable doubt – The petitioners' failure to meet this standard led to the dismissal of the application [Paras 8].

Decision – Revision petition dismissed – No misreading or misapplication of evidence by the trial court – The court exercised its jurisdiction properly, and no illegality or infirmity was found in the impugned order – Pending applications disposed of accordingly [Paras 9, 10, 11].

Local Commissioner – Appointment – Scope of Revision under Article 227 – Discretion of the Trial Court – Petitioner sought appointment of a Local Commissioner to ascertain the existence of a well on the suit property during an ongoing suit for permanent injunction – Trial Court dismissed the application, holding that appointing a Local Commissioner to collect evidence on behalf of the defendant is impermissible – Court reaffirmed that appointing a Local Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC is discretionary and cannot be used as a means for parties to collect evidence – Revision against such orders is not maintainable as they do not adjudicate rights or decide any issue [Paras 4–8].

Revisability of Orders under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC – Jurisdiction of High Court – Following the precedent of Pritam Singh vs. Sunder Lal, 1990 (2) PLR 191, and other judgments, the Court held that orders refusing the appointment of a Local Commissioner do not decide any rights of the parties and are therefore not revisable under Section 115 CPC or Article 227 of the Constitution – Revisional jurisdiction is not available for re-appreciation or re-evaluation of facts, and the trial court's discretion cannot be interfered with in the absence of manifest error or injustice [Paras 6–8].

Supervisory Jurisdiction – Limits of Interference under Article 227 – Court emphasized that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct mere errors of fact or law unless there is a manifest error or a grave injustice – The petitioner's application for appointing a Local Commissioner was a strategy to delay proceedings, and the trial court rightly dismissed it [Paras 8–9].

Decision:

Petition dismissed – The impugned order passed by the trial court was upheld as it was found to be within the court's discretion and did not result in any injustice – The petition was devoid of merit and thus dismissed [Paras 8–9].

Criminal Procedure – Section 125 CrPC – Second Maintenance Application – Res Judicata – The applicant sought to quash the order of the Family Court entertaining a second application under Section 125 CrPC by the respondent wife despite the first application being dismissed without liberty to file a fresh case – The applicant contended that the second application was barred by res judicata – The Court, while referring to various judgments including Sanjeev Kapoor vs. Chandana Kapoor and Sarguja Transport Service vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, held that proceedings under Section 125 CrPC aim at providing social justice and preventing vagrancy and destitution – Since these are summary proceedings and the duty to provide maintenance is continuous, the principle of res judicata does not apply [Paras 23-24].

Continuing Duty – Refusal to Maintain Wife – The Court emphasized that the obligation to maintain a wife is a continuous one – It reiterated that refusal by a husband to maintain his wife creates a recurring wrong – Even if the first application was dismissed, a fresh cause of action arises due to the ongoing obligation under law, and the second application is maintainable [Paras 5, 23, 38].

Decision: Application dismissed – The Court held that the second application under Section 125 CrPC was maintainable despite the earlier case being dismissed without permission to refile – The ongoing duty of the husband to maintain his wife under Section 125 CrPC is not extinguished by the dismissal of an earlier application [Paras 38-40].

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Application for Anticipatory Bail Post-Cancellation of Bail – Maintainability Challenged – The petitioner sought anticipatory bail after the addition of a graver offence (Section 376 I.P.C.) during investigation. The State challenged the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the petitioner should have either surrendered and sought regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. or filed a revision under Section 401 Cr.P.C. after the bail was cancelled. Held: Once the accused participated in the proceedings, contested the cancellation, and suffered an adverse order, a subsequent application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable. The correct remedy would be to seek revision of the cancellation order [Paras 1, 2, 30, 31]. 

Cancellation of Bail – Addition of Graver Offence – Section 376 I.P.C. – The victim's complaint initially led to registration of a case under Sections 341, 417, 506, and 509 I.P.C. Subsequently, based on her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecution sought to add Section 376 I.P.C. The trial court cancelled the petitioner’s bail after adding this graver non-bailable section – Held: Addition of a graver offence post-grant of bail requires the accused to either surrender and seek bail for the newly added offence or challenge the cancellation in revision. Filing an anticipatory bail application post-cancellation is not permissible [Paras 13, 30, 31]. 

Anticipatory Bail – Liberal Interpretation – Article 21 of the Constitution – The petitioner argued that anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. must be interpreted liberally in light of Article 21 of the Constitution, as held in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth vs. State of Gujarat and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab – Held: While anticipatory bail protects personal liberty, it cannot be used as a recourse after bail cancellation following a contested hearing [Paras 9, 10, 26]. 

Procedure Under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Compliance with Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. – The Court emphasized that any application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must comply with the procedure under Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. The magistrate must ensure that the procedure is followed before directing investigation [Paras 7, 8]. 

Decision – The application for anticipatory bail is dismissed as not maintainable, as the petitioner had participated in the cancellation hearing and failed to seek anticipatory bail prior to the cancellation order. The petitioner is at liberty to seek other appropriate remedies in law [Paras 30, 31, 32].