Service Law – Regularization of Casual Employment – Long-term Employment as Circle Organizers (COVDO) – Petitioners’ Discharge Set Aside – The petitioners were employed as COVDOs on a temporary basis in 1993 and 1996 and served for many years. They were repeatedly terminated, reinstated, and finally discharged. The petitioners challenged their discharge, seeking regularization in accordance with the judgment in Uma Devi – Held: The petitioners' discharge was illegal, and they should be reinstated as COVDOs. The State is directed to consider regularizing their services within three months [Paras 28-29].

Termination Without Notice – Violation of Natural Justice – Discharge Orders Quashed – The court noted that the petitioners were discharged without any prior notice and without providing reasons for their termination. This was found to be a violation of the principles of natural justice – Held: The discharge orders dated 07.02.2015 and subsequent orders were set aside due to lack of notice and justification for termination [Paras 24-25].

Distinction Between Village Defense Organization (VDO) and Home Guards – Wrongful Discharge as Home Guards – The court observed that the petitioners were employed as COVDOs under the Village Defense Organization, not as Home Guards, and their wrongful classification and discharge as Home Guards by the authorities was improper – Held: Petitioners were never Home Guards but COVDOs, and should be reinstated in their correct positions [Paras 23, 28].

Regularization of Temporary Employees – Applicability of Uma Devi Judgment – Petitioners Eligible for Regularization – The court referred to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Secretary, State of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi, holding that employees who had been in long-term service and had been working on sanctioned posts could not be denied regularization. The petitioners, having served for over 20 years, were eligible for consideration under the guidelines laid down in Uma Devi – Held: The authorities must consider regularizing the petitioners in compliance with the law within three months [Paras 17, 27-29].

Decision – Writ Petitions allowed – The court set aside the petitioners' discharge orders and directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioners as COVDOs. The authorities were further instructed to consider the petitioners' regularization in accordance with the law within three months [Paras 28-29].

Ex Parte Order in Maintenance Case – Non-Appearance of Petitioner – Section 125 CrPC – The petitioner challenged the ex parte order passed by the Family Court, directing him to pay maintenance of Rs. 10,000 per month to his wife – Petitioner contended that no proper notice of hearing was served, and the Family Court failed to observe whether his absence was wilful – Held: As per Section 126(2) CrPC, before passing an ex parte order, the Court must satisfy itself that the respondent wilfully avoided attending the proceedings – The Court found no evidence that the petitioner wilfully neglected to attend or was informed about the specific dates of the hearing [Paras 8-12].

Satisfaction of Court Before Proceeding Ex Parte – Requirement under Section 126(2) CrPC – The Family Court failed to record satisfaction that the petitioner wilfully neglected to attend the Court – A mere knowledge of the maintenance case's filing was insufficient to establish wilful avoidance of court attendance – The absence of a specific notice of hearing dates to the petitioner violated procedural requirements – Held: Ex parte order set aside due to non-compliance with Section 126(2) CrPC [Paras 10-12].

Final Decision – The revision petition is allowed – The ex parte order dated 06.07.2023 passed by the Family Court is set aside – The matter is remitted back to the Family Court, Begusarai, to decide the case afresh after giving both parties an opportunity of hearing – Both parties directed to appear before the Family Court on 12.11.2024 [Paras 13-14].

Criminal Procedure – Section 125 CrPC – Second Maintenance Application – Res Judicata – The applicant sought to quash the order of the Family Court entertaining a second application under Section 125 CrPC by the respondent wife despite the first application being dismissed without liberty to file a fresh case – The applicant contended that the second application was barred by res judicata – The Court, while referring to various judgments including Sanjeev Kapoor vs. Chandana Kapoor and Sarguja Transport Service vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, held that proceedings under Section 125 CrPC aim at providing social justice and preventing vagrancy and destitution – Since these are summary proceedings and the duty to provide maintenance is continuous, the principle of res judicata does not apply [Paras 23-24].

Continuing Duty – Refusal to Maintain Wife – The Court emphasized that the obligation to maintain a wife is a continuous one – It reiterated that refusal by a husband to maintain his wife creates a recurring wrong – Even if the first application was dismissed, a fresh cause of action arises due to the ongoing obligation under law, and the second application is maintainable [Paras 5, 23, 38].

Decision: Application dismissed – The Court held that the second application under Section 125 CrPC was maintainable despite the earlier case being dismissed without permission to refile – The ongoing duty of the husband to maintain his wife under Section 125 CrPC is not extinguished by the dismissal of an earlier application [Paras 38-40].

Dowry Death – Section 304-B IPC – The petitioner alleged that his sister, Gulshan, was harassed and killed by her in-laws, including her husband, over unmet dowry demands and her inability to conceive – The trial court acquitted all nine accused, leading to this revision petition – Held: The court found that the demand for dowry was sufficiently proven against Gulshan’s husband, Mehfuj Ali, but not against the other accused – Acquittal of Mehfuj Ali quashed, while the acquittal of other respondents affirmed [Paras 12, 25, Conclusion].

Presumption under Section 113-B, Evidence Act – The court emphasized the presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B when cruelty or harassment is shown to have occurred "soon before" the victim's death – Gulshan died within seven years of marriage under unnatural circumstances due to poisoning – The court held that the husband failed to rebut the presumption of dowry-related harassment and cruelty [Paras 12, 26, 28].

Acquittal of Other Accused – Insufficient Evidence – The court upheld the acquittal of the other accused, including Gulshan’s in-laws and extended family, due to the lack of direct evidence linking them to dowry demands or harassment – No sufficient proof of their involvement in the alleged conspiracy or cruelty was presented by the prosecution [Paras 11, 36].

Cause of Death – Suicide or Homicide – The post-mortem and forensic reports indicated that Gulshan died due to poisoning, but no external injuries suggesting force or violence were found – The defence argued that Gulshan committed suicide due to depression over childlessness, which the court found probable in light of the evidence, though not sufficient to exonerate the husband’s role [Paras 12, 28, 36].

Decision: The appeal is partly allowed – Acquittal of respondent Mehfuj Ali is quashed, and he is convicted under Section 304-B IPC for dowry death – Acquittal of the remaining respondents is affirmed – All pending applications are disposed of [Paras 36, Conclusion].

Service Law – Seniority List – Promotion – Writ petition challenging the revised seniority list dated 14.3.2022, which placed the petitioner at a lower rank and affected his promotion prospects – Petitioner contended that his service should be reckoned from his date of regularization in 1998, not from his initial appointment in 1997, which was on a consolidated pay during the training period – Held: The seniority list based on the petitioner's 1997 appointment is valid, as the training period is considered a prerequisite for regularization – No illegality found in the seniority list or subsequent promotion of private respondents – Petitioner's claim for seniority from 1998 is unsustainable [Paras 9-19].

Date of Appointment – Regularization – Training Period – Petitioner argued that his initial appointment in 1997 was adhoc and his regular service began in 1998 – Court observed that regularization involves a prior period of service, and the training period in 1997 was a prerequisite for regularization in 1998 – The initial appointment in 1997 cannot be disregarded for seniority purposes – Held: Seniority should be calculated from the date of initial appointment in 1997, not from regularization in 1998 [Paras 13-16].

Adhoc Appointment – Applicability of Apex Court Ruling – Petitioner relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Rashi Mani Mishra v. State of U.P., which distinguished between adhoc and regular appointments – Court distinguished the facts, noting that the petitioner's 1997 appointment was not adhoc but part of a regular process leading to his regularization – The judgment cited by the petitioner is inapplicable [Paras 17-19].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – No illegality in the seniority list prepared by the fifth respondent or the promotions granted to private respondents – No costs [Paras 20-21].
 

Criminal Procedure – Anticipatory Bail – Section 438 Cr.P.C. – Application for Anticipatory Bail Post-Cancellation of Bail – Maintainability Challenged – The petitioner sought anticipatory bail after the addition of a graver offence (Section 376 I.P.C.) during investigation. The State challenged the maintainability of the petition, arguing that the petitioner should have either surrendered and sought regular bail under Section 437 Cr.P.C. or filed a revision under Section 401 Cr.P.C. after the bail was cancelled. Held: Once the accused participated in the proceedings, contested the cancellation, and suffered an adverse order, a subsequent application for anticipatory bail is not maintainable. The correct remedy would be to seek revision of the cancellation order [Paras 1, 2, 30, 31]. 

Cancellation of Bail – Addition of Graver Offence – Section 376 I.P.C. – The victim's complaint initially led to registration of a case under Sections 341, 417, 506, and 509 I.P.C. Subsequently, based on her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecution sought to add Section 376 I.P.C. The trial court cancelled the petitioner’s bail after adding this graver non-bailable section – Held: Addition of a graver offence post-grant of bail requires the accused to either surrender and seek bail for the newly added offence or challenge the cancellation in revision. Filing an anticipatory bail application post-cancellation is not permissible [Paras 13, 30, 31]. 

Anticipatory Bail – Liberal Interpretation – Article 21 of the Constitution – The petitioner argued that anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. must be interpreted liberally in light of Article 21 of the Constitution, as held in Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth vs. State of Gujarat and Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia vs. State of Punjab – Held: While anticipatory bail protects personal liberty, it cannot be used as a recourse after bail cancellation following a contested hearing [Paras 9, 10, 26]. 

Procedure Under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. – Compliance with Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. – The Court emphasized that any application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must comply with the procedure under Section 154(1) and 154(3) Cr.P.C. The magistrate must ensure that the procedure is followed before directing investigation [Paras 7, 8]. 

Decision – The application for anticipatory bail is dismissed as not maintainable, as the petitioner had participated in the cancellation hearing and failed to seek anticipatory bail prior to the cancellation order. The petitioner is at liberty to seek other appropriate remedies in law [Paras 30, 31, 32]. 

Criminal Procedure – Application under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. – Prayer for Further Investigation – Alleged Death by Burn Injuries – Dismissal of Application Challenged – The petitioner sought further investigation into the death of his niece, alleging that her husband (the accused) made a video call to a relative instead of rescuing her while she was ablaze – Investigation was initially directed under Section 304B I.P.C., but the court found Section 304B inapplicable as the death occurred after seven years of marriage – The Investigating Officer did not include charges under Section 302 I.P.C. despite the petitioner’s requests – The Magistrate dismissed the petitioner’s application for further investigation – Held: The Court found that further investigation would not serve any fruitful purpose as the Investigating Officer was already permitted to continue investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. and would file a supplementary charge sheet if necessary [Paras 1, 9]. 

Witness Statements – Conflicting Testimonies – Victim's Statement to Doctor Contradictory – The petitioner alleged that the accused’s conduct during the incident indicated his guilt, while the Investigating Officer relied on statements from doctors and witnesses suggesting the victim set herself ablaze due to marital discord – The attending doctor stated that the victim claimed to have set herself on fire, while other evidence suggested foul play – Held: Discrepancies in witness testimonies do not necessitate further investigation at this stage, but the trial court may consider invoking Section 311 Cr.P.C. to examine witnesses if needed during trial [Paras 6, 7, 8]. 

Consideration of Section 302 I.P.C. during Trial – Although the investigating agency did not add Section 302 I.P.C. in the charge sheet, the trial court is expected to consider all charges, including Section 302 I.P.C., based on the evidence produced during the trial – Held: The trial court shall be at liberty to amend charges if relevant evidence of murder surfaces [Para 10]. 

Decision – Criminal revision application dismissed – Further investigation not required as the Investigating Officer was allowed to continue the investigation under Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. – The trial court shall consider the applicability of Section 302 I.P.C. during the trial, and summon additional witnesses under Section 311 Cr.P.C. if necessary [Paras 9, 10, 11]. 

Quashing of FIR – Civil Dispute Presented as Criminal Case – Sections 406 and 420 IPC – Petitioner alleged that the FIR registered by the complainant, claiming non-repayment of ₹70,00,000 lent as a loan, is a civil dispute being framed as a criminal offence – Petitioner contended that the FIR does not disclose fraudulent intent or breach of trust and that the complaint is aimed at recovering a time-barred loan through criminal means – Court held: The dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature, concerning non-repayment of a loan amount, which does not constitute criminal breach of trust or cheating without fraudulent inducement – FIR quashed [Paras 4-6, 14-18].

Criminal Breach of Trust – Section 406 IPC – No Entrustment of Money – The law distinguishes between simple advancement of money and entrustment of money – Court held: In a loan transaction, there is no "entrustment" of money; therefore, no criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC is made out in the absence of such entrustment, even if the petitioner fails to repay the loan [Para 10-11].

Cheating – Section 420 IPC – No Fraudulent Inducement – For an offence under Section 420 IPC, fraudulent inducement and mens rea must be present from the beginning of the transaction – Court held: The mere inability of the petitioner to repay the loan amount does not give rise to a criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent intent can be demonstrated from the outset – No such fraudulent intent was evident in this case [Para 12-13].

Decision: FIR quashed – The court found that the FIR and subsequent criminal proceedings initiated were a misuse of the legal process, as the matter was purely civil in nature – Consequently, the petition is allowed, and FIR No. 76/2018, along with all proceedings arising therefrom, is quashed [Paras 18-19].
 

Contractual Matters – Tender Process – Judicial Review – Petitioner challenges the award of contract for supply of Liquid Medical Oxygen (LMO) to respondent No.5, alleging that PGIMER unlawfully relaxed eligibility criteria for respondent No.5 – Respondent No.5, a startup MSME, was allowed relaxation of experience and financial turnover requirements as per General Financial Rules (GFR) 2017 and Government of India instructions – Court holds that relaxation was justified under public procurement rules for startups and there was no mala fide intention or arbitrariness – Financial savings to PGIMER and absence of disruption in oxygen supply were emphasized as factors in the decision-making process [Paras 21–22, 24–32].

Tender Relaxation for Startups – Exemption Clauses – The tender floated by PGIMER inadvertently excluded provisions for MSME startups, but exemption granted to respondent No.5 was consistent with GFR 2017 and prior government directives – Court noted that PGIMER’s technical committee evaluated respondent No.5's capacity to supply LMO and found no procedural malfeasance in the grant of relaxation – The bid from respondent No.5 resulted in substantial cost savings and maintained uninterrupted oxygen supply to PGIMER [Paras 25–26, 32–33].

Scope of Judicial Review – Limited Interference – Court reaffirms that in contractual matters, judicial review should focus on whether the process is arbitrary, biased, or mala fide – In this case, the decision to grant relaxation to respondent No.5 was based on public interest and conformed to legal norms – Interference is unwarranted as the decision-making process was transparent, and no fundamental rights were violated – Reliance on judgments clarifying that minor deviations in the tender process do not justify judicial intervention in the absence of mala fide intent [Paras 26–30].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Court upholds PGIMER's decision to award contract to respondent No.5, stating that the process complied with the law and served the public interest – Minor procedural errors were found to be non-prejudicial and did not warrant judicial interference [Paras 32–35].