Service Law – Resignation Under Duress – No Break in Service – Writ Petition Allowed – The petitioner, an Assistant Engineer in the Howrah Municipal Corporation, was required to resign before being released for deputation as an Executive Engineer under the Ministry of Surface Transport – Upon termination of deputation, he was reappointed as an Assistant Engineer but was denied continuity of service due to an alleged break – Held: The resignation was not voluntary but imposed as a condition for deputation – Resignation letter was conditional and does not constitute a valid resignation – The break in service must be condoned [Paras 19-26].

Employment Law – Conditional Resignation – Not a Voluntary Relinquishment of Office – A valid resignation requires an unconditional intention to relinquish office – Held: Since the resignation was a forced precondition for deputation and not voluntary, it cannot be treated as a resignation in law – Relying on Dr. Prabha Atri v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 701 and Moti Ram v. Param Dev, (1993) 2 SCC 725, the court held that an employee cannot be deemed to have resigned if the act was compelled by the employer [Paras 20-22].

Continuity of Service – Break in Service Unjustified – Petitioner Entitled to Benefits – The Howrah Municipal Corporation imposed the resignation condition, which led to the break in service – Held: Since the break was due to the Corporation’s actions, the petitioner must be treated as being in continuous service from his original appointment date – Following Sushil Kumar Yadunath Jha v. Union of India, (1986) 3 SCC 325, the court directed reinstatement with full financial and retirement benefits [Paras 30-40].

Final Decision – Writ Petition Allowed – Break in Service Condoned – Financial Benefits Granted – High Court quashed the Corporation’s decision treating the period as a break in service – Directed the Corporation to restore continuity of service and pay arrears and retirement benefits within six weeks [Paras 41-42].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Deposit of 20% Compensation – Judicial Discretion – Orders Set Aside – The petitioner, convicted under Section 138 of the NI Act, challenged the ASJ’s order requiring him to deposit 20% of the compensation amount for suspension of sentence – Petitioner contended that the ASJ erroneously treated the deposit as mandatory and failed to exercise discretion – Held: The phrase “may order” in Section 148 of the NI Act grants discretion to the appellate court – Imposition of deposit must be reasoned and not automatic – ASJ failed to consider the petitioner’s financial capacity and wrongly assumed ownership of a business in its reasoning – Orders directing deposit quashed, and matter remanded for fresh consideration [Paras 15-20].

Criminal Procedure – Right to Appeal – Unjustified Financial Burden Not Permitted – Appellate courts must ensure that financial conditions do not unjustly deprive the convicted person of their right to appeal – Held: Courts must assess financial capacity before directing deposit – Blanket imposition of deposit without application of mind is not permissible – ASJ’s order lacked proper assessment, warranting remand for reconsideration [Paras 22-24].

Judicial Precedents – Applicability of Supreme Court Rulings – Failure to Follow Established Law – Petitioner relied on Jamboo Bhandari v. MP State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., (2023) 10 SCC 446, and Surinder Singh Deswal v. Virender Gandhi, (2019) 11 SCC 341 – Held: Supreme Court has clarified that while deposit under Section 148 is generally required, exceptions can be made where the deposit would be unjust or deprive the appellant of their right to appeal – ASJ failed to apply these principles, necessitating fresh consideration [Paras 21-22].

Final Decision – Orders Quashed – Case Remanded for Fresh Consideration – High Court set aside the ASJ’s orders dated 27.01.2025 and remanded the matter for reconsideration of the deposit requirement in light of the petitioner’s financial condition and Supreme Court precedents – ASJ directed to pass fresh orders after proper evaluation [Paras 30-35].

Criminal Law – Attempt to Commit Rape – Prima Facie Case Not Made Out – Summoning Order Modified – The revisionists were summoned for attempt to commit rape (Section 376 read with Section 18 of POCSO Act) based on allegations that they grabbed the victim’s breasts, broke the string of her lower garment, and attempted to drag her beneath a culvert – The Court held that these acts did not establish a prima facie case of attempt to rape, as there was no evidence of an intent to commit penetrative sexual assault – Held: Summoning order modified; accused to be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act instead [Paras 26-29].

Standard for Attempt to Commit Rape – Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt – The Court applied the test for attempt in sexual offences, holding that an attempt requires an overt act beyond mere preparation – Citing Rex v. James Lloyd (1836) 7C & P 817 and Express v. Shankar (1881) ILR 5 Bom 403, the Court ruled that mere disrobing or touching without further decisive action does not constitute an attempt to rape – Held: The accused’s conduct did not indicate an unequivocal intent to commit rape, and therefore, the charge under Section 376 IPC was unsustainable [Paras 24-25].

POCSO Act – Aggravated Sexual Assault – Conviction Under Section 9/10 of POCSO Act Justified – The Court held that the allegations against Akash and Pawan constituted aggravated sexual assault under Section 9(m) of the POCSO Act, as the victim was below 12 years of age – The punishment for aggravated sexual assault under Section 10 of POCSO Act is imprisonment for not less than five years but up to seven years – Held: The accused shall face trial under Section 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of POCSO Act instead of Section 376 IPC [Paras 27-28].

Criminal Intimidation – Summoning Under Sections 504 and 506 IPC Upheld – The victim’s family was allegedly threatened with a country-made pistol, and the victim's mother was abused and intimidated when she complained – The Court held that these acts justified summoning the accused Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC – Held: No modification required in summoning for criminal intimidation charges [Paras 22-23].

Decision: Revision Partly Allowed – The Court modified the summoning order, holding that the accused Akash and Pawan should be charged under Sections 354(b) IPC and Section 9/10 of the POCSO Act, instead of Section 376 IPC read with Section 18 of POCSO Act – The summoning of Ashok under Sections 504 and 506 IPC remains unaltered – Trial court directed to issue fresh summons accordingly [Paras 29-30].

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction on Termination of Tenancy – Appeal Dismissed – Plaintiff, the owner of the suit premises, initiated eviction proceedings after serving a valid quit notice – Defendant claimed lower rent and denied arrears – Trial court decreed eviction, which was upheld by the first appellate court – Held: The tenancy was month-to-month and duly terminated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act – The tenant failed to provide evidence of regular rent payments – Eviction order upheld [Paras 16-19].

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – No Substantial Question of Law – Appeal Not Maintainable – Appellant sought to challenge concurrent findings of fact – Held: A second appeal under Section 100 CPC can only be admitted on substantial questions of law – No legal issues warranting interference were raised – High Court cannot reappreciate factual findings of lower courts unless there is a manifest error or violation of law – Appeal dismissed at admission stage [Paras 20-22].

Judicial Precedents – Scope of Second Appeal – Limited to Substantial Questions of Law – Following Boodireddy Chandraiah v. Arigela Laxmi, (2007) 8 SCC 155, and Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki, AIR 2006 SC 1975, the court held that factual determinations by lower courts are binding unless there is a legal infirmity – Mere dissatisfaction with concurrent judgments does not justify a second appeal [Paras 13-15, 22].

Final Decision – Second Appeal Dismissed – Three Months Time for Tenant to Vacate – High Court dismissed the second appeal, confirming the eviction order – Granted three months for the appellant/tenant to vacate the premises – No costs imposed [Para 23].

Service Law - Promotion and Direct Recruitment – Vacancy Allocation – Rule Interpretation – The learned single judge directed that 50% of Sub-Inspector (Traffic) posts be reserved for departmental promotion and the rest be filled through direct recruitment – The High Court noted that under Rule 4 of the 2013 Rules, vacancies are to be split equally between promotion and direct recruitment, but if eligible candidates for promotion are not available, those vacancies are to be filled through direct recruitment – Held: Since the respondents were not eligible for promotion as of January 2024, the Transport Department was justified in proceeding with direct recruitment for all vacancies – Order of single judge reversed [Paras 2-7].

Right to be Considered for Promotion – No Absolute Right to Promotion – The respondents argued that denial of promotion consideration violated their fundamental right under Articles 14 & 16(1) – The Court clarified that the right under Article 16(1) extends only to being considered for promotion, not to an absolute right to be promoted – Since the respondents were ineligible at the time of the recruitment process, no legal violation occurred – Held: The respondents’ reliance on Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab and Hardev Singh v. Union of India was misplaced as those cases dealt with candidates eligible for promotion, unlike the present case [Paras 8-9].

Recruitment Process – Committee’s Role in Promotion Eligibility – The rules mandate that the committee meets annually in January to assess and recommend eligible candidates for promotion – The Court reaffirmed that the recruitment process must adhere to this schedule and that the Transport Department acted correctly in initiating direct recruitment due to the lack of eligible departmental candidates in January 2024 – Held: Department’s decision to proceed with direct recruitment was valid and justified [Paras 7-9].

Decision: Appeal allowed. The single judge’s order was set aside, and the Transport Department’s decision to proceed with direct recruitment was upheld.
 

Criminal Law – Quashing – FIR - Freedom of Speech – Social Media Post – No Incitement to Violence – The petitioner, a journalist, was charged under Sections 153A and 505 IPC based on a tweet analyzing Karnataka’s budget allocations for different religious communities – The tweet merely presented factual information derived from a public document (state budget) and contained no incendiary language – Held: The tweet did not promote enmity, hatred, or ill-will between religious groups nor did it amount to a public mischief – FIR quashed [Paras 5-10].

Mens Rea – Essential for Offence under Section 153A IPC – The Court reiterated that for an offence under Section 153A IPC, a clear and manifest intent to promote enmity between groups is a sine qua non – Mere criticism or factual comparison of government policies does not attract criminal liability – Held: The petitioner’s tweet was an exercise of free speech protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, and prosecution under Section 153A IPC was unwarranted [Paras 10-14].

Section 505 IPC – No Public Mischief or Incitement – The prosecution alleged that the petitioner’s tweet could incite public unrest – The Court held that to invoke Section 505 IPC, the statement must have a tendency to create public disorder, incite violence, or spread alarm among the public – Since the tweet was a factual analysis without inflammatory language, it did not meet the threshold for invoking Section 505 IPC – Held: FIR quashed as continuation of prosecution would be a gross abuse of process [Paras 15-18].

Abuse of Criminal Process – Quashing of FIR under Section 482 CrPC – The Court observed that the complainant did not appear in court to support the allegations, indicating an ulterior motive – Citing State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992), the Court held that when allegations in the FIR do not prima facie constitute an offence, quashing under Section 482 CrPC is justified – Held: The complaint was frivolous and filed for extraneous reasons, warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC [Paras 26-28].

Decision: Petition allowed. FIR in Crime No. 6 of 2024 quashed.
 

Criminal Law – Bail Under NDPS Act – Rigors of Section 37 Relaxed – Bail Granted – Petitioner was accused in Crime No. 235/2024 for allegedly transferring ₹2,60,000 to the second accused, who was arrested with 349 grams of MDMA – No contraband was recovered from the petitioner – Co-accused were released on default bail – Held: The allegations against the petitioner were primarily based on financial transactions without direct recovery of drugs – In such circumstances, strict conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be relaxed – Bail granted with conditions [Paras 6-8].

Judicial Precedents – Twin Conditions of Section 37 NDPS Act – No Strict Application in Absence of Direct Recovery – Supreme Court’s ruling in Shince Babu v. State of Kerala, 2024 KHC OnLine 8084, relied upon – Held: When no contraband is recovered from an accused and the prosecution relies only on monetary transactions, the twin conditions of Section 37 NDPS Act (prima facie case & non-likelihood of further offence) do not apply with the same force – Bail cannot be denied based on mere suspicion [Paras 7-8].

Bail Jurisprudence – Bail is the Rule, Jail is the Exception – Principle Reaffirmed – Following P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2019 (16) SCALE 870, and Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 KHC 6431, the court reiterated that bail should not be withheld as punishment – Held: Prolonged incarceration without trial violates Article 21 of the Constitution – Petitioner in custody for 11 months without significant evidence of direct involvement – Bail granted [Paras 8-10].

Final Decision – Bail Granted with Conditions – Petitioner released on bail with conditions including personal bond of ₹50,000, cooperation with investigation, restriction on travel, and prohibition on committing similar offences – Violation of conditions to result in bail cancellation [Para 11].
 

Criminal Procedure – Maintainability of Second Criminal Appeal under SC/ST Act – Not Permissible – The primary issue was whether an accused can file a second appeal before the High Court after dismissal of a previous bail appeal under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act – The Court held that once an appeal is dismissed by the High Court, a second appeal against the same order rejecting bail is not maintainable – The only available remedy for the accused is to file a fresh bail application before the Special Court based on changed circumstances – Held: Second criminal appeal against the same order rejecting bail is not maintainable [Paras 12-16].

Doctrine of Functus Officio – High Court Cannot Reconsider Its Earlier Bail Decision – The Court applied the doctrine of functus officio, stating that once the High Court adjudicates an appeal under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act, it becomes functus officio and cannot reconsider the same order in a second appeal – The principle was upheld in Shankar Kerba Jadhav v. State of Maharashtra (1969) 2 SCC 793, where it was held that an appellate court functions as a "court of error" and cannot revisit an order already decided – Held: High Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a repeat appeal on the same rejection order [Paras 15-18].

Right to Bail – Fresh Bail Application Before Special Court Required After Dismissal of Appeal – The accused must file a fresh bail application before the Special Court if new grounds or changed circumstances arise – The mere rejection of an earlier bail appeal does not bar a fresh bail application before the Special Court – Held: The accused retains the right to seek bail, but must approach the Special Court first [Paras 19-21].

Interpretation of Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act – Non-Obstante Clause Does Not Permit Repetitive Appeals – The non-obstante clause in Section 14A(2) overrides Section 378(3) of CrPC but does not override the settled principles of res judicata in bail matters – The High Court clarified that each bail application must be assessed on its own merits and procedural safeguards must be maintained – Held: The non-obstante clause does not permit repetitive bail appeals before the High Court [Paras 22-25].

Decision: Criminal Appeals Dismissed – The Court held that a second criminal appeal under Section 14A(2) of the SC/ST Act is not maintainable after the dismissal of the first appeal – The accused must file a fresh bail application before the Special Court if there is a change in circumstances – Liberty granted to the appellants to seek fresh bail before the Special Court under Section 439 CrPC – No costs awarded [Paras 26-28].
 

Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Appeal Dismissed – The appellant sought specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 29.11.1989 for 5 acres of land – The trial court rejected the relief on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform his contractual obligations – Held: Readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act must be demonstrated throughout the proceedings – Mere assertion without evidence does not suffice – Appeal dismissed [Paras 22-25].

Contract Law – Breach of Agreement – No Proof of Compliance by Plaintiff – As per the agreement, the plaintiff had to pay the balance sale consideration by 01.08.1990 – The plaintiff neither paid the amount nor issued any legal notice expressing readiness and willingness – Held: Non-issuance of notice before filing suit weakens the plaintiff’s claim – Defendants had removed crops as per contract terms, but plaintiff failed to perform his part – Trial court rightly refused specific performance [Paras 15-19].

Judicial Precedents – Time and Essence of Contract – No Automatic Right to Specific Performance – Plaintiff contended that time was not of the essence – Relying on K.S. Vidyanadam v. Vairavan, (1997) 3 SCC 1, and Chand Rani v. Kamal Rani, (1993) 1 SCC 519, the court held that even where time is not expressly stated as essential, performance must be within a reasonable period – Plaintiff’s inaction for a long period negates the claim for specific performance [Paras 21-22].

Final Decision – Appeal Dismissed – Refund of Advance Upheld – High Court upheld the trial court’s decree, confirming the refund of ₹2,50,000/- advance amount with interest – Appeal dismissed with no order as to costs [Para 26].