Transmission Tower Construction – Omission of Revenue Village from Gazette Notification – Not Fatal – Petitioners, villagers of Sabalabhanga Jungle, challenged construction of towers and drawing of high-tension transmission lines through their village by Opposite Party No. 4 (JSPL), which had acquired the project from bankrupt MPCL through liquidation by NCLT in February 2023 – The India Gazette Notification dated 13.06.2013 listed eighteen villages but did not specifically include revenue village Sabalabhanga Jungle – The Collector, Angul granted revised permission on 30.10.2025 including village Sabalabhanga but not Sabalabhanga Jungle – Three towers (Nos. 39, 40 and 41) had already been constructed by MPCL in 2014-2015 in village Sabalabhanga Jungle – Held: The purpose of the Gazette Notification is to broadly describe the area through which the proposed overhead transmission line would pass; the specific language "through, over, around and between" the notified villages is wide enough to include adjacent and intervening villages; non-mention of village Sabalabhanga Jungle does not materially affect the drawl of transmission lines [Paras 3–4, 11–15].

Electricity Act – Telegraph Act – Right to Lay Transmission Lines Over Private Land – No Acquisition Required – Under Section 164 of the Electricity Act read with Section 10 of the Indian Telegraph Act, the licensee or authorized person has the absolute right to place electric lines and transmission towers over private land without acquiring the same — only a right of user is created in favour of the authority — no consent of the owner or occupier is required — owners and occupiers are entitled to claim full compensation for damages sustained by reason of the erection of towers or drawing of transmission lines [Paras 5–8, 14–15].

Gazette Notification – Broad Language – Adjacent Villages Covered – The phrase "around and between" in the Gazette Notification has a wider connotation to include villages adjacent to or falling between notified villages — each and every village or specific survey number through which the transmission line passes is not required to be mentioned in the notification — substantial compliance with the notification is sufficient — non-mentioning of survey numbers or every intervening village is not fatal [Paras 9, 15].

PTCC Approval – Premature Objection – Petitioners' contention regarding absence of Power and Telecommunication Coordination Committee (PTCC) approval rejected — as per PTCC Manual 2010, route map with topographical details is to be submitted before charging the transmission line, which stage had not yet arrived [Para 16].

Decision: Writ petition disposed of — Prayer of Petitioners rejected — Opposite Party No. 4 directed to pay appropriate compensation to owners of private land in revenue village Sabalabhanga Jungle for any damage caused by erection of towers or drawing of electric transmission lines.

Criminal Law – Sexual Assault – Digital Penetration – Rape – Sections 354, 376 and 448 IPC – Appeal against conviction – Appellant, a car cleaner known to the victim, convicted by the Fast Track Special Court (POCSO) for criminal trespass, outraging modesty and rape by digital penetration – Sentenced to 1 year, 5 years and 10 years rigorous imprisonment respectively, all concurrent – On appeal, High Court finds the testimony of PW1 (victim) cogent, consistent and fully corroborated by medical evidence – Conviction and sentence confirmed – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1-2, 40-41].

Definition of Rape – Digital Penetration – Section 375(b) IPC – Post-2013 Amendment – Scope of Offence – Appellant contended that insertion of fingers into the private part of the victim amounts only to an attempt to commit rape and not rape proper – Held: Post the 2013 amendment to Section 375 IPC, the definition of rape expressly includes insertion, to any extent, of any object or part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina of a woman – Digital penetration falls squarely within the ambit of Section 375(b) IPC – No degree of penetration is required to complete the offence – Even the slightest or partial penetration is sufficient to attract the charge of rape [Paras 27-28, 33].

Victim Testimony – Sole Testimony – Reliability – Corroboration by Medical Evidence – PW1 (victim) deposed in vivid and clear terms describing the entire sequence of the assault – Her oral deposition was corroborated by the Medico Legal Examination Report prepared by PW3 (Senior Resident Doctor, Department of OBG, Goa Medical College), which recorded finger penetration into the vagina and noted injuries including bruises on the upper arms and swelling of the left knee – Held: Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable and consistent – The victim's evidence inspired confidence and withstood cross-examination [Paras 5, 29, 33].

Medical Evidence – PW2 versus PW3 – No Variance – Alleged Discrepancy – Hurt Certificate vs. Medico Legal Report – Appellant sought to create a contradiction between the evidence of PW2 (Medical Officer, PHC) who found no external injuries suggestive of forceful penetration, and the opinion of PW3 who found evidence of vaginal penetration – Held: PW2 examined the victim only for external injuries at a Primary Health Centre and did not conduct a gynecological examination for sexual assault – PW3, a Senior Resident qualified in Obstetrics and Gynecology, conducted the comprehensive medico legal examination – Their opinions operate in different spheres and are not in variance – Opinion of PW3 is more relevant for medical corroboration of rape [Paras 31-32, 35].

House Trespass – Section 448 IPC – Proof – Entry through Balcony – Appellant contended that the topography of the premises made it impossible for him to have entered the victim's locked bedroom from outside and that house trespass was not proved – Held: Suggestions put by the Appellant during cross-examination of the victim admit and acknowledge his presence in the flat – The Appellant was apprehended on the spot in the corner of the balcony of the victim's bedroom without pants – No alternative explanation offered – Offence of house trespass proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 38-39].

Investigation – DNA Profiling – Non-Collection – Not Fatal – Section 53(A) CrPC – Facilitative, Not Mandatory – Appellant argued that failure to collect DNA evidence and swab/slides from the Appellant's fingers was fatal to the prosecution case – Held: Section 53(A) CrPC is facilitative in nature and not mandatory – Failure to conduct DNA profiling cannot by itself be treated as fatal to the prosecution case, particularly where reliable and cogent evidence otherwise establishes guilt – Investigative shortcomings cannot be a ground for acquittal in the face of trustworthy evidence [Para 36].

Plea of Insanity – Section 84 IPC – Burden of Proof – Not Discharged – Appellant attempted to raise a doubt regarding his mental capacity based on the Investigating Officer's inquiry into his IQ level during investigation – Held: The Investigating Officer found no documentation suggesting mental illness or low IQ – The Appellant failed to raise any plea of unsoundness of mind even in his statement under Section 313 CrPC – Burden of proving insanity under Section 84 IPC rests on the accused and was not discharged [Paras 24, 36].

Sentencing – Proportionality – Section 376 IPC – Minimum Sentence – Appellant had no prior convictions – The Trial Court imposed the minimum prescribed sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC – Held: Sentence is proportionate to the gravity and heinousness of the offence – No interference warranted [Para 39].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Sections 448, 354 and 376 IPC confirmed – Sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment (concurrent) upheld as proportionate.

Criminal Law — Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. — Direction for Registration of FIR — Interlocutory Order — Revisability — Magistrate's Discretion — Complaint under Sections 376, 420, 506 IPC filed alleging rape on false promise of marriage — Judicial Magistrate declined to direct registration of FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and instead directed complainant to lead preliminary evidence treating it as a private complaint — Additional Sessions Judge, in revision, relying on Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1, set aside the order and directed registration of FIR — Petitioner challenged the revisional order under Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Held: Order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and is amenable to revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. — However, Additional Sessions Judge erred in mechanically applying Lalita Kumari without considering nine-month delay in filing complaint, prior extortion FIR registered against the complainant, absence of need for complex police investigation, and the Magistrate's duly considered police station report — Impugned order of Additional Sessions Judge set aside — Order of Judicial Magistrate restored — JMIC directed to proceed with the matter as a private complaint in accordance with law [Paras 1–22].

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. — Magistrate's Discretion — Not Mandatory to Direct FIR Registration — A Magistrate is not bound to mechanically direct police investigation in every complaint case — Direction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is warranted only where the information reveals commission of a cognizable offence and police investigation is necessary to dig out evidence not available with the complainant nor procurable without State assistance — Where the complainant is in possession of complete details of the accused and no complex or scientific investigation is required, the complaint case procedure ought to be adopted — Powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must be used sparingly to prevent miscarriage of justice and not as a matter of course [Paras 17–18, 21] — Relied upon: Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 238.

Interlocutory Order — Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. — Bar on Revision — An order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. allowing or rejecting a prayer for registration of FIR is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. — Such an order adjudicates a valuable right of the complainant as well as the accused and, upon issuance of directions, the Magistrate becomes functus officio — Where directions for registration of FIR are issued, the fundamental right of liberty of the person named is directly affected — Revision petition against such an order is, therefore, maintainable [Paras 11–15] — Relied upon: Amarnath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 215.

Lalita Kumari — Mandatory FIR Registration — Exception for Abnormal Delay — While Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 mandates registration of FIR where disclosed information reveals a cognizable offence, it expressly carves out an exception for cases involving abnormal delay or laches in criminal prosecution without satisfactory explanation — In the present case, the complaint was filed nine months after the alleged incident and seven days after the complainant's release in an extortion case registered against her — Additional Sessions Judge failed to consider these material circumstances — Application of Lalita Kumari was, therefore, erroneous [Paras 19–20].

Decision: Petition allowed — Order of Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat dated 09.07.2021 and all subsequent proceedings set aside — Order of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Panipat dated 10.12.2020 treating the matter as a private complaint restored — JMIC directed to proceed in accordance with law — Nothing observed shall be construed as an opinion on the merits of the case.

Cyber Crime – Bank Account Freezing – Educational Institution – Disproportionate Action – Sections 41A CrPC, 420 IPC, 66(D) IT Act – Writ Petition Allowed – Petitioner-school's entire bank account frozen by respondent-bank acting on notice issued by Cyber Crime Police, Varanasi, in Crime No.50/2024, on the ground that a parent of a student was allegedly involved in cyber offences and had remitted school fees of Rs.5,00,000/- as part of alleged crime proceeds – School had, upon receipt of Section 41A notice, promptly and bona fide reversed the said amount to the source account – Held: Freezing of the entire account of an educational institution solely because it received a legitimate fee payment from an allegedly accused parent constitutes a wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and disproportionate measure – Petitioner cannot be penalised for receiving bona fide fee payments in the ordinary course of its functioning – Notice dated 11.03.2026 quashed – Bank directed to mark lien to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- only, subject to outcome of Crime No.50/2024, while permitting the institution to freely operate the account for amounts exceeding Rs.5,00,000/- [Paras 4–9].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Notice dated 11.03.2026 quashed – First respondent-bank directed to mark lien on petitioner's account to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- only – Petitioner permitted to operate account freely for amounts exceeding Rs.5,00,000/- – Lien subject to outcome of proceedings in Crime No.50/2024.

Tender — Cancellation — Judicial Review — Scope and Limits — Petitioner, declared L-1 bidder in NIT bearing Tender Ref. JAPIT/HIGHCOURT-DMS/01/2025 for supply and installation of server systems at Jharkhand High Court Data Center at a quoted price of Rs. 30.52 crores, was issued a computer-generated Letter of Intent and directed to submit a performance bank guarantee of Rs. 1.52 crores — Thereafter, respondents called petitioner to negotiate and reduce bid to Rs. 22.86 crores owing to budgetary constraints of Jharkhand High Court (Rs. 22-23 crores) — Petitioner refused to negotiate even after three extensions and scaled-down specifications — JAP-IT, after obtaining approval of the High Court's Computer and Digitization Committee, cancelled the entire tender process on 21.08.2025 — Held: Cancellation was not unreasoned, arbitrary or mala fide; decision-making process was transparent; budgetary constraints of the requiring body constitute cogent and valid reasons for cancellation — No case for interference under Article 226 [Paras 37-38, 52-56, 66-68].

Letter of Intent — Not a Concluded Contract — Specific Performance — Relief Not Maintainable — Petitioner contended that issuance of LOI and submission of performance bank guarantee constituted a concluded contract incapable of arbitrary termination — Held: A Letter of Intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract in future and is not a binding legal relationship — No work order or formal agreement was executed between the parties — Relief of direction to execute a contract is in the nature of specific performance, ordinarily not entertainable in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, and would require adjudication of disputed questions of fact — Prayer rejected [Paras 43, 48-51].

Judicial Review — Tender — Decision-Making Process — Merits vs. Legality — The scope of judicial review in tender matters is confined to examining the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision — Courts may interfere only where there is illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety, or where mala fides or extraneous considerations vitiate the process — Mere disagreement with the decision or a faulty approach is insufficient — Constitutional Courts must exercise utmost restraint in interfering with tender processes — No allegations of mala fides, nepotism or extraneous considerations were made in the present case — Held: No ground for interference [Paras 44-47, 56, 64-67].

Right to Reject Tender — Government as Guardian of State Finances — Even the lowest bidder has no vested right to insist that its offer must be accepted under all circumstances — Government retains the right to refuse any or all tenders, including the lowest — Where the lowest bid far exceeds the available budgetary provision, and where the bidder refuses to negotiate even after scaled-down specifications are offered, cancellation of the tender process and invitation of a fresh tender is reasonable and lawful — Held: Free play in the joints must be accorded to the respondents provided the decision-making process is transparent [Paras 44, 54-55, 67].

Acquiescence — Suppression of Material Facts — Equitable Relief — Petitioner accepted refund of EMD amounting to Rs. 60 lakhs on 22.08.2025 without protest, one day after tender cancellation, and filed the writ petition on 06.09.2025 without disclosing such acceptance — Court held that while this constituted acquiescence and suppression of material facts disentitling petitioner to equitable relief, it declined to non-suit the petitioner solely on these grounds as these issues were not raised in counter-affidavits and petitioner had no adequate opportunity to respond — Petition examined on merits and dismissed [Paras 39-42].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — No order as to costs.

Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance of Illegal Gratification – Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) PC Act – Accused Police Constable posted at Aya Nagar Check Post demanded and accepted Rs. 1,000/- as illegal gratification from the informant Narender Kumar for returning his identity card confiscated during a police checking on the intervening night of 26.07.1994-27.07.1994 – Trap was successfully laid on 30.07.1994 – Tainted currency recovered from the left pocket of the accused – Left hand wash and pocket wash tested positive – Accused convicted by trial court and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment on each count with sentences running concurrently – On appeal, accused deceased during pendency – Legal heirs not coming forward – Appeal considered on merits following the dictum in Bani Singh vs. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720 – Held: Conviction upheld – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 9-10, 26-27].

Non-Examination of Informant – Does Not Abate Prosecution – PC Act Cases – Informant Narender Kumar remained untraceable despite repeated summons and was not examined before the trial court – Held: In cases where the complainant/informant is unavailable, dead or turns hostile, the demand of illegal gratification can still be proved through testimony of other witnesses, documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence – The case does not abate nor does it automatically result in acquittal merely because the informant was not examined – Demand proved through the testimony of the panch witness PW5 [Paras 15, 21].

Panch Witness – Sole Testimony – Sufficiency – PW5 (panch witness) who accompanied the informant throughout the trap proceedings fully stood by the prosecution case and was not discredited in cross-examination – No material was shown to suggest he was an interested or partisan witness – Held: Evidence is to be weighed and not counted – Conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness if found wholly reliable – Testimony of PW5 coupled with recovery of tainted currency from the accused's possession sufficiently establishes both demand and acceptance [Para 22].

Statutory Presumption – Section 20 PC Act – Once Foundational Facts Proved, Burden Shifts to Accused – Section 20 PC Act mandates a statutory presumption in favour of the prosecution, but such presumption is not automatic and can only be invoked after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of demand and acceptance – Held: Once demand and acceptance stood proved from the testimony of PW5 and recovery of tainted currency, the presumption under Section 20 stands invoked – The accused failed to discharge the burden by adducing any cogent or credible evidence to rebut the presumption [Paras 23-24].

Sanction for Prosecution – Section 19(1)(c) PC Act – Competent Authority – Validity – Sanction for prosecution accorded by Vivek Gogia, IPS, Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police – Accused contended that since he was appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the sanctioning authority was incompetent – Held: Under Sections 12 and 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, the Additional DCP is expressly empowered to appoint and remove officers of subordinate rank including constables – The test under Section 19(1)(c) PC Act is whether the sanctioning authority is competent to remove the accused from office – Since that power expressly vests in the Addl. DCP, the sanction is valid [Para 25].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 upheld – One year rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count, sentences running concurrently, confirmed.

Taxation Law - Income Tax — Dividend Distribution Tax — India–UK DTAA — Refund of Excess DDT — Reference to Larger Bench — Assessee, an Indian company engaged in manufacture of foundry chemicals, distributed dividends to its UK-based parent shareholders and paid DDT under Section 115-O at 16.994% for Assessment Years 2014–15 to 2020–21 — Assessee claimed that since the beneficial owners of dividends were UK residents, the rate ought to have been capped at 15% (later claimed at 10%) under Article 11 of the India–UK DTAA and accordingly filed refund applications under Section 237 — Revenue and the Tribunal rejected the claim following the Special Bench decision in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Total Oil India Pvt. Ltd. holding that DDT is an additional income tax on the company and not a tax on shareholders, thereby excluding DTAA applicability — Assessee relied on the Division Bench decision in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Goa (2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5983) which held to the contrary — Revenue contended that Colorcon (supra) is per incuriam, being contrary to the Division Bench decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1174) as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2017) 7 SCC 421, and to Small Industries Development Bank of India v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 14048 — Held: A clear cleavage of opinion exists between the Division Bench in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. and the Division Benches in Godrej & Boyce and SIDBI (supra), necessitating reference to a Larger Bench — Appeals admitted on the questions of law framed — Registry directed to place proceedings before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench [Paras 16–41].

Nature of DDT — Tax on Company or Shareholder — Section 115-O — Prima Facie View — The Court noted on a plain reading of Section 115-O that the provision, beginning with a non-obstante clause, imposes additional income tax on the domestic company on profits declared, distributed or paid as dividends — Sub-sections (4) and (5) make clear that the DDT so paid is the final payment of tax and neither the company nor any shareholder can claim further credit or deduction — Once DDT is paid, dividends become exempt in the hands of shareholders under Section 10(34) — Prima facie, DDT is a tax on the company and not on the shareholder, and the DTAA provisions under Article 11 relating to tax on dividend income of shareholders do not appear to apply to the operation of Section 115-O [Paras 19–22].

Conflict of Coordinate Bench Decisions — Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Total Oil India — Godrej & Boyce — The Division Bench in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that DDT is in substance a tax on dividend income of shareholders, the incidence being shifted to the company merely for administrative convenience, and accordingly held that the India–UK DTAA's Article 11 beneficial rate applies — This view appears contrary to the consistent position in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra) (as upheld by the Supreme Court) and SIDBI (supra), both of which held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company and not a tax on dividend income in the hands of shareholders — The Special Bench of the Tribunal in Total Oil India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had also concluded that DTAA protection is available to domestic companies paying DDT only where the contracting states have specifically so provided in the treaty, as in the India–Hungary DTAA — No such provision exists in the India–UK DTAA [Paras 28–39].

Questions of Law Referred to Larger Bench — (i) Whether the decision of the Division Bench in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 5/2024, decided 28 November 2025) lays down the correct position in law when it holds that DDT is a tax paid by the company on dividend income of the shareholder, entitling the shareholder to the benefit of the India–UK DTAA? — (ii) Whether, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra), the decision in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is per incuriam? [Para 40].

Decision: Appeals admitted on the questions of law framed in paragraph 2 — Registry directed to place proceedings before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench to answer the aforesaid questions.

Civil Law – Declaration of Title – Burden of Proof – Plaintiff's Case Must Stand on Its Own Strength – Plaintiffs claimed joint ownership and possession of a tiled house and site as ancestral property since over fifty years – Defendant contended that the property belonged to him and that plaintiffs were his tenants – Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed the suit – No documentary evidence produced by plaintiffs to establish title in their ancestors – Tax receipts (Exs. A-1 to A-3) showed corrections with the defendant's name struck off and plaintiff's name inserted, raising suspicious circumstances which the plaintiffs failed to explain by examining the Gram Panchayat official – Oral testimony of PWs 1 and 2 that the property was ancestral was contrary to recitals in Exs. A-4 and A-5 describing it as streedhana property of plaintiff No. 1 – Held: In a suit for declaration of title, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of her own title; weakness of the defendant's case cannot be a ground for granting relief; plaintiffs failed to discharge the burden [Paras 15, 16, 17].

Second Appeal – Scope of Interference – Section 100 CPC – Concurrent Findings of Fact – High Court cannot interfere with concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the First Appellate Court, which is the final court of facts, except where such findings are contrary to mandatory provisions of law, based on inadmissible evidence, or arrived at without evidence or by drawing wrong inferences – In the present case, both courts below appreciated the oral and documentary evidence and concurrently dismissed the suit – No exceptional circumstances warranting interference established – Held: Substantial questions of law framed at admission did not survive for determination; second appeal dismissed [Paras 14, 19, 20].

Additional Evidence – Order 41 Rule 27 CPC – Second Appellate Stage – I.A. No. 1 of 2024 – Appellants sought reception of documents including wedding cards, electricity bills, telephone demand notice, occupancy certificate, and shop allotment certificate as additional evidence – All documents predated the institution of the suit in 2010 – Appellants neither produced these documents before the trial Court nor before the First Appellate Court – Mere averment of illiteracy in the affidavit, without cogent explanation for non-production at earlier stages, insufficient to justify reception at second appellate stage – In the absence of pleadings, evidence cannot be considered; parties cannot travel beyond pleadings – Held: No grounds made out under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC; application dismissed [Paras 23, 24, 25, 27].

Decision: Second Appeal No. 568 of 2024 dismissed — judgments and decrees of both courts below confirmed — I.A. No. 1 of 2024 dismissed — each party to bear their own costs — miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed [Para 28].

Quashing of Charge Sheet – Matrimonial Offences – Section 498A/406/34 IPC – Omnibus Charge Sheet – The third petitioner (wife of the private opposite party) had lodged a prior complaint on 16.01.2023 apprehending false implication — as a counterblast, the private opposite party (wife) lodged complaint on 20.01.2024 leading to registration of Survey Park PS Case No. 18 of 2024 — charge sheet submitted on 28.02.2024 — petitioners sought quashing of the charge sheet and proceedings in ACGR No. 336 of 2024 pending before the Judicial Magistrate, 7th Court, Alipore — Held: The charge sheet is general and omnibus, does not specify the individual role of each accused, does not comply with the mandate in Sharif Ahmed's case, and cognizance was taken mechanically — proceedings amount to abuse of the process of the Court — charge sheet and proceedings quashed [Paras 6–12].

Charge Sheet – Mandatory Requirements – Supreme Court's Mandate – A charge sheet must show with sufficient particularity and clarity the contravention of law alleged — it must reflect ascertainment of facts, arrest, collection of evidence, examination of persons, search and seizure, and the Investigating Officer's opinion on whether an offence is made out — clear and complete entries in all columns are mandatory — the role played by each accused must be separately and clearly mentioned for each person — a charge sheet that is a mere reiteration of the FIR accompanied by collection of exhibits and recording of statements of related witnesses, without compliance with these requirements, is not a proper charge sheet [Paras 7–9].

Mechanical Cognizance – Application of Judicial Mind – The learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the charge sheet mechanically and the order taking cognizance does not reflect application of judicial mind — courts must apply their mind independently while deciding whether to take cognizance and issue summons [Para 8].

Absence of Corroboration – No Independent Witness – Stridhan Recovered – Investigation comprised statements of witnesses related to either party; no independent witness was examined — stridhan articles were admittedly recovered from the matrimonial home and returned to the wife — allegations in the FIR were not corroborated during investigation — evidence collected did not disclose commission of the offences alleged [Para 11].

Inherent Jurisdiction – Prevention of Abuse of Process – Section 482 CrPC can be exercised where uncontroverted allegations in the FIR and evidence collected in support thereof do not disclose commission of any offence and do not make out a case against the accused — continuing the proceedings in such circumstances would amount to abuse of process [Para 10].

Decision: Criminal revision allowed — Proceedings in ACGR No. 336 of 2024 including the charge sheet quashed — Petitioners released from bail bonds forthwith — Connected application CRAN 1 of 2025 disposed of — No order as to costs — Case diary returned.