Prevention of Corruption — Trap Case — Demand and Acceptance of Bribe — Acquittal — Appellant, a Desk Officer in the Department of Industrial Development, was alleged to have demanded ₹50,000/- from PW2, Director of M/s. Aries Granites, for securing a 100% EOU licence and to have acted through co-accused A2 (a retired government officer) who received ₹10,000/- from PW2 in a trap laid by the CBI on 06.06.1989 — Trial court convicted both accused for offence under Section 120B IPC and convicted A1 additionally under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act — Sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of five years each with fine — On appeal, held: Evidence unsatisfactory — Prosecution failed to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt — Appellant acquitted [Paras 14–34].

Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence — Testimony of Complainant (PW2) — PW2's account of the initial demand inconsistent — complaint stated demand of ₹50,000/- whereas in the box he deposed that demand was ₹80,000/- reduced to ₹30,000/- — PW2 stated on 06.06.1989 he did not contact anyone before reaching the CBI office at 11:00 AM, yet the FIR was registered at 10:30 AM — No clarification sought by the prosecutor in re-examination — How the meeting at Hotel Marina was fixed in the forenoon of 06.06.1989 remains unexplained — PW2's claim that both panch witnesses were present at Hotel Marina contradicted by PW4, who deposed that he had not accompanied the team to Hotel Marina and that PW2 and the TLO had already left and returned before he reached — Source of the ₹10,000/- trap currency also disputed — These inconsistencies raise serious doubt on the prosecution case [Paras 21–22, 26].

Audio Recordings — Admissibility and Evidentiary Value — Two audio cassettes were relied upon by the prosecution — Trial court rejected the first cassette (conversation between PW2 and A1) due to poor audio quality and inaudibility — Trial court relied on the second cassette (conversation between PW2 and A2) — Held: Same infirmities applied to the second cassette as several portions were also inaudible — No court order was obtained before breaking the seal and preparing the transcripts — Transcripts prepared 20 days after the raid — No sample voice of either A1 or A2 was obtained and no forensic voice comparison conducted — Identification of voices made solely by interested witness PW2 — Chain of custody compromised — Second audio cassette cannot form a reliable basis for conviction [Para 23].

Non-Examination of Key Panch Witness — Adverse Inference — One of the two panch witnesses (Amarnath), who was the shadow witness and recovery witness, was not examined despite being present on several hearing dates before the trial court — No coercive steps taken to secure his presence after he reportedly settled abroad — His evidence would have been directly relevant to the trap proceedings and recovery — Non-examination adversely affects the prosecution case, particularly in the light of other infirmities [Para 24].

Disclosure Statement — Admissibility under Section 27, Indian Evidence Act — A2's alleged disclosure statement stating that bribe money would be collected by A1 at the former's residence was admitted by the trial court under Section 27 of the Evidence Act — Held: Finding perverse — Section 27 permits only that portion of information which distinctly relates to a fact discovered, i.e., the place from which an object is produced and the accused's knowledge thereof — The disclosure in question did not lead to recovery of any physical object — Mere discovery of A1 present at A2's residence does not constitute a "fact discovered" within the meaning of Section 27 — Disclosure statement inadmissible and cannot be used against A1 — Ratio in Pulikuri Kottaya (AIR 1947 PC 676), K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. (AIR 1962 SC 1788), Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 and Babu Saheba Goudar Radragoudar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 applied [Paras 29–33].

Improper Marking of Section 161 CrPC Statements — Trial Court Irregularity — Statements of prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC were marked as exhibits wholesale by the trial court — This is contrary to the scheme of Sections 161 and 162 CrPC and Section 145 of the Evidence Act — Such statements can only be used to contradict a witness in the manner contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act and for no other purpose — Wholesale marking deprecated — Ratio in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 1012) and Delhi Administration v. Lakshman Kumar, (1985) 4 SCC 476 followed [Para 28].

Money Possibly Paid as Consultancy Charges — PW2 himself admitted in cross-examination that A2 discussed consultancy charges for preparing a fresh representation, stated charges ranging from ₹30,000/- to ₹50,000/-, and that it was in the context of such discussions that ₹10,000/- was paid — No re-examination to dispel this version — Doubt arises whether the amount was bribe or consultancy fees — Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof [Para 25].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Conviction and sentence of appellant/A1 under Section 120B IPC and Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act set aside — Appellant acquitted under Section 248(1) CrPC — Bail bond cancelled — Pending applications disposed of.

Taxation Law - Income Tax — Dividend Distribution Tax — India–UK DTAA — Refund of Excess DDT — Reference to Larger Bench — Assessee, an Indian company engaged in manufacture of foundry chemicals, distributed dividends to its UK-based parent shareholders and paid DDT under Section 115-O at 16.994% for Assessment Years 2014–15 to 2020–21 — Assessee claimed that since the beneficial owners of dividends were UK residents, the rate ought to have been capped at 15% (later claimed at 10%) under Article 11 of the India–UK DTAA and accordingly filed refund applications under Section 237 — Revenue and the Tribunal rejected the claim following the Special Bench decision in Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax v. Total Oil India Pvt. Ltd. holding that DDT is an additional income tax on the company and not a tax on shareholders, thereby excluding DTAA applicability — Assessee relied on the Division Bench decision in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Goa (2025 SCC OnLine Bom 5983) which held to the contrary — Revenue contended that Colorcon (supra) is per incuriam, being contrary to the Division Bench decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2010 SCC OnLine Bom 1174) as confirmed by the Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. DCIT (2017) 7 SCC 421, and to Small Industries Development Bank of India v. Central Board of Direct Taxes, 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 14048 — Held: A clear cleavage of opinion exists between the Division Bench in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. and the Division Benches in Godrej & Boyce and SIDBI (supra), necessitating reference to a Larger Bench — Appeals admitted on the questions of law framed — Registry directed to place proceedings before the Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench [Paras 16–41].

Nature of DDT — Tax on Company or Shareholder — Section 115-O — Prima Facie View — The Court noted on a plain reading of Section 115-O that the provision, beginning with a non-obstante clause, imposes additional income tax on the domestic company on profits declared, distributed or paid as dividends — Sub-sections (4) and (5) make clear that the DDT so paid is the final payment of tax and neither the company nor any shareholder can claim further credit or deduction — Once DDT is paid, dividends become exempt in the hands of shareholders under Section 10(34) — Prima facie, DDT is a tax on the company and not on the shareholder, and the DTAA provisions under Article 11 relating to tax on dividend income of shareholders do not appear to apply to the operation of Section 115-O [Paras 19–22].

Conflict of Coordinate Bench Decisions — Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. v. Total Oil India — Godrej & Boyce — The Division Bench in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra) held that DDT is in substance a tax on dividend income of shareholders, the incidence being shifted to the company merely for administrative convenience, and accordingly held that the India–UK DTAA's Article 11 beneficial rate applies — This view appears contrary to the consistent position in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra) (as upheld by the Supreme Court) and SIDBI (supra), both of which held that DDT is a charge on the profits of the company and not a tax on dividend income in the hands of shareholders — The Special Bench of the Tribunal in Total Oil India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had also concluded that DTAA protection is available to domestic companies paying DDT only where the contracting states have specifically so provided in the treaty, as in the India–Hungary DTAA — No such provision exists in the India–UK DTAA [Paras 28–39].

Questions of Law Referred to Larger Bench — (i) Whether the decision of the Division Bench in M/s. Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (Tax Appeal No. 5/2024, decided 28 November 2025) lays down the correct position in law when it holds that DDT is a tax paid by the company on dividend income of the shareholder, entitling the shareholder to the benefit of the India–UK DTAA? — (ii) Whether, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (supra), the decision in Colorcon Asia Pvt. Ltd. (supra) is per incuriam? [Para 40].

Decision: Appeals admitted on the questions of law framed in paragraph 2 — Registry directed to place proceedings before the Hon'ble Chief Justice for constitution of a Larger Bench to answer the aforesaid questions.

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Compromise – Non-Compoundable Offences – Corporate Accused – Petitioner/A9, Mahindra World City Developers Limited, faced trial before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Chengalpet in C.C. No. 251 of 2020 for offences under Sections 120(b), 465, 468 and 471 IPC, being the end-purchaser in an alleged chain of forged title documents in respect of a five-cent plot in Survey No. 118/4C at Veerapuram, Madura Malaiyambakkam – De facto complainant Raji died on 17.09.2019 and his legal heirs (R2 to R8) were impleaded – The parties arrived at a settlement whereby the legal heirs agreed to accept three alternate properties in lieu of the disputed property, documents for which were submitted for registration before the Joint Registrar-II, Chengalpet on 08.04.2026 – Identities of R2 to R8 confirmed before Court by the Special Sub Inspector of Police; all confirmed the settlement – Held: Even though the offences are non-compoundable, no useful purpose would be served in keeping the proceedings alive; quashment ordered against the petitioner and all co-accused similarly placed [Paras 9–15].

Impleadment of Legal Heirs – Death of De Facto Complainant – Legal heirs of the deceased de facto complainant filed impleading petition in Crl.M.P. No. 7429 of 2026 and were impleaded as Respondent Nos. 2 to 8 by order of the Court [Para 2].

Exercise of Inherent Jurisdiction – Guidelines – Non-Compoundable Offences – Court invoked its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) guided by the Supreme Court's principles on quashing proceedings in non-compoundable cases, exercising due caution as directed, while giving effect to the genuine settlement arrived at between the parties [Para 14].

Decision: Criminal Original Petition allowed – Proceedings in C.C. No. 251 of 2020 pending before the Judicial Magistrate No. II, Chengalpet quashed against the petitioner and all co-accused similarly placed – Connected Crl.M.P. Nos. 6354 and 6355 of 2026 closed.

Criminal Law — Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. — Direction for Registration of FIR — Interlocutory Order — Revisability — Magistrate's Discretion — Complaint under Sections 376, 420, 506 IPC filed alleging rape on false promise of marriage — Judicial Magistrate declined to direct registration of FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and instead directed complainant to lead preliminary evidence treating it as a private complaint — Additional Sessions Judge, in revision, relying on Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1, set aside the order and directed registration of FIR — Petitioner challenged the revisional order under Section 482 Cr.P.C. — Held: Order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is not an interlocutory order and is amenable to revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. — However, Additional Sessions Judge erred in mechanically applying Lalita Kumari without considering nine-month delay in filing complaint, prior extortion FIR registered against the complainant, absence of need for complex police investigation, and the Magistrate's duly considered police station report — Impugned order of Additional Sessions Judge set aside — Order of Judicial Magistrate restored — JMIC directed to proceed with the matter as a private complaint in accordance with law [Paras 1–22].

Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. — Magistrate's Discretion — Not Mandatory to Direct FIR Registration — A Magistrate is not bound to mechanically direct police investigation in every complaint case — Direction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is warranted only where the information reveals commission of a cognizable offence and police investigation is necessary to dig out evidence not available with the complainant nor procurable without State assistance — Where the complainant is in possession of complete details of the accused and no complex or scientific investigation is required, the complaint case procedure ought to be adopted — Powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. must be used sparingly to prevent miscarriage of justice and not as a matter of course [Paras 17–18, 21] — Relied upon: Om Prakash Ambadkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC Online SC 238.

Interlocutory Order — Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. — Bar on Revision — An order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. allowing or rejecting a prayer for registration of FIR is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. — Such an order adjudicates a valuable right of the complainant as well as the accused and, upon issuance of directions, the Magistrate becomes functus officio — Where directions for registration of FIR are issued, the fundamental right of liberty of the person named is directly affected — Revision petition against such an order is, therefore, maintainable [Paras 11–15] — Relied upon: Amarnath v. State of Haryana, AIR 1977 SC 215.

Lalita Kumari — Mandatory FIR Registration — Exception for Abnormal Delay — While Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P. (2014) 2 SCC 1 mandates registration of FIR where disclosed information reveals a cognizable offence, it expressly carves out an exception for cases involving abnormal delay or laches in criminal prosecution without satisfactory explanation — In the present case, the complaint was filed nine months after the alleged incident and seven days after the complainant's release in an extortion case registered against her — Additional Sessions Judge failed to consider these material circumstances — Application of Lalita Kumari was, therefore, erroneous [Paras 19–20].

Decision: Petition allowed — Order of Additional Sessions Judge, Panipat dated 09.07.2021 and all subsequent proceedings set aside — Order of Judicial Magistrate Ist Class, Panipat dated 10.12.2020 treating the matter as a private complaint restored — JMIC directed to proceed in accordance with law — Nothing observed shall be construed as an opinion on the merits of the case.

Prevention of Corruption Act – Demand and Acceptance of Illegal Gratification – Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) PC Act – Accused Police Constable posted at Aya Nagar Check Post demanded and accepted Rs. 1,000/- as illegal gratification from the informant Narender Kumar for returning his identity card confiscated during a police checking on the intervening night of 26.07.1994-27.07.1994 – Trap was successfully laid on 30.07.1994 – Tainted currency recovered from the left pocket of the accused – Left hand wash and pocket wash tested positive – Accused convicted by trial court and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment on each count with sentences running concurrently – On appeal, accused deceased during pendency – Legal heirs not coming forward – Appeal considered on merits following the dictum in Bani Singh vs. State of U.P., (1996) 4 SCC 720 – Held: Conviction upheld – Appeal dismissed [Paras 2, 9-10, 26-27].

Non-Examination of Informant – Does Not Abate Prosecution – PC Act Cases – Informant Narender Kumar remained untraceable despite repeated summons and was not examined before the trial court – Held: In cases where the complainant/informant is unavailable, dead or turns hostile, the demand of illegal gratification can still be proved through testimony of other witnesses, documentary evidence or circumstantial evidence – The case does not abate nor does it automatically result in acquittal merely because the informant was not examined – Demand proved through the testimony of the panch witness PW5 [Paras 15, 21].

Panch Witness – Sole Testimony – Sufficiency – PW5 (panch witness) who accompanied the informant throughout the trap proceedings fully stood by the prosecution case and was not discredited in cross-examination – No material was shown to suggest he was an interested or partisan witness – Held: Evidence is to be weighed and not counted – Conviction can be based on the testimony of a single witness if found wholly reliable – Testimony of PW5 coupled with recovery of tainted currency from the accused's possession sufficiently establishes both demand and acceptance [Para 22].

Statutory Presumption – Section 20 PC Act – Once Foundational Facts Proved, Burden Shifts to Accused – Section 20 PC Act mandates a statutory presumption in favour of the prosecution, but such presumption is not automatic and can only be invoked after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts of demand and acceptance – Held: Once demand and acceptance stood proved from the testimony of PW5 and recovery of tainted currency, the presumption under Section 20 stands invoked – The accused failed to discharge the burden by adducing any cogent or credible evidence to rebut the presumption [Paras 23-24].

Sanction for Prosecution – Section 19(1)(c) PC Act – Competent Authority – Validity – Sanction for prosecution accorded by Vivek Gogia, IPS, Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police – Accused contended that since he was appointed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the sanctioning authority was incompetent – Held: Under Sections 12 and 21 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978, the Additional DCP is expressly empowered to appoint and remove officers of subordinate rank including constables – The test under Section 19(1)(c) PC Act is whether the sanctioning authority is competent to remove the accused from office – Since that power expressly vests in the Addl. DCP, the sanction is valid [Para 25].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction and sentence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 upheld – One year rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1,000/- on each count, sentences running concurrently, confirmed.

Service Law – Army – Back Wages – General Court Martial – Conviction – Commutation of Sentence – "No Work No Pay" – Petitioner commissioned in the Indian Army in 1984 was tried by a General Court Martial, found guilty and sentenced to cashiering and one year rigorous imprisonment – Punishment of cashiering took effect from 04.12.2001 – Petitioner's statutory petition under Section 164(2) of the Army Act was rejected – In an earlier round of litigation, AFT interfered only with the quantum of sentence and remitted the matter for reconsideration, leaving the conviction undisturbed – Central Government thereafter commuted the sentence under Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Army Act and directed reinstatement by corrigendum dated 15.02.2013, but denied back wages on the principle of "no work no pay" – Petitioner claimed back wages for the period 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013 – Held: Conviction having attained finality and never having been set aside, and the period out of service being a direct consequence of a valid conviction, the petitioner is not entitled to back wages – Petition dismissed [Paras 15-21].

Commutation of Sentence – Army Act – Section 163(2) read with Section 179 – Does Not Relate Back – Petitioner contended that commutation of sentence would relate back to the date of imposition of punishment, obliterating its consequences and entitling him to be treated as having continued in service without interruption – Held: The power exercised by the Central Government under Section 163(2) read with Section 179 of the Army Act is one of alteration or commutation of sentence and does not amount to a declaration that the original punishment was void ab initio – Commutation is a modification of punishment and does not result in setting aside the conviction or underlying proceedings – The petitioner cannot be deemed to have been in continuous service for the intervening period [Paras 17-18].

No Work No Pay – Exception – Not Available Where Conviction Subsists – The principle of "no work no pay" holds that salary is payable only for the period during which an employee has actually discharged duties – Exceptions are recognised in cases where an employee is wrongfully prevented from discharging duties on account of an illegal or unjustified act of the employer – Held: Such exception has no application where the employee was kept out of service on account of a conviction that has attained finality – The present case cannot be equated with a case of illegal termination or acquittal – The distinction between exoneration/acquittal and modification of sentence is well recognised in service jurisprudence, with materially different consequences [Paras 19-21].

Scope of Judicial Review – AFT – Writ Jurisdiction – Articles 226 and 227 – Held: The scope of interference by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction with an order of the AFT is limited – The Court does not sit in appeal over AFT decisions and will interfere only where the order suffers from patent illegality, perversity or jurisdictional error – Reappreciation of evidence or substitution of a plausible view is not warranted [Para 14].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed – Impugned order of the Armed Forces Tribunal affirmed – Denial of back wages for the period 04.12.2001 to 04.03.2013 upheld – Principle of "no work no pay" held applicable.

Criminal Law – Sexual Assault – Digital Penetration – Rape – Sections 354, 376 and 448 IPC – Appeal against conviction – Appellant, a car cleaner known to the victim, convicted by the Fast Track Special Court (POCSO) for criminal trespass, outraging modesty and rape by digital penetration – Sentenced to 1 year, 5 years and 10 years rigorous imprisonment respectively, all concurrent – On appeal, High Court finds the testimony of PW1 (victim) cogent, consistent and fully corroborated by medical evidence – Conviction and sentence confirmed – Appeal dismissed [Paras 1-2, 40-41].

Definition of Rape – Digital Penetration – Section 375(b) IPC – Post-2013 Amendment – Scope of Offence – Appellant contended that insertion of fingers into the private part of the victim amounts only to an attempt to commit rape and not rape proper – Held: Post the 2013 amendment to Section 375 IPC, the definition of rape expressly includes insertion, to any extent, of any object or part of the body, not being the penis, into the vagina of a woman – Digital penetration falls squarely within the ambit of Section 375(b) IPC – No degree of penetration is required to complete the offence – Even the slightest or partial penetration is sufficient to attract the charge of rape [Paras 27-28, 33].

Victim Testimony – Sole Testimony – Reliability – Corroboration by Medical Evidence – PW1 (victim) deposed in vivid and clear terms describing the entire sequence of the assault – Her oral deposition was corroborated by the Medico Legal Examination Report prepared by PW3 (Senior Resident Doctor, Department of OBG, Goa Medical College), which recorded finger penetration into the vagina and noted injuries including bruises on the upper arms and swelling of the left knee – Held: Conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the victim if found reliable and consistent – The victim's evidence inspired confidence and withstood cross-examination [Paras 5, 29, 33].

Medical Evidence – PW2 versus PW3 – No Variance – Alleged Discrepancy – Hurt Certificate vs. Medico Legal Report – Appellant sought to create a contradiction between the evidence of PW2 (Medical Officer, PHC) who found no external injuries suggestive of forceful penetration, and the opinion of PW3 who found evidence of vaginal penetration – Held: PW2 examined the victim only for external injuries at a Primary Health Centre and did not conduct a gynecological examination for sexual assault – PW3, a Senior Resident qualified in Obstetrics and Gynecology, conducted the comprehensive medico legal examination – Their opinions operate in different spheres and are not in variance – Opinion of PW3 is more relevant for medical corroboration of rape [Paras 31-32, 35].

House Trespass – Section 448 IPC – Proof – Entry through Balcony – Appellant contended that the topography of the premises made it impossible for him to have entered the victim's locked bedroom from outside and that house trespass was not proved – Held: Suggestions put by the Appellant during cross-examination of the victim admit and acknowledge his presence in the flat – The Appellant was apprehended on the spot in the corner of the balcony of the victim's bedroom without pants – No alternative explanation offered – Offence of house trespass proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 38-39].

Investigation – DNA Profiling – Non-Collection – Not Fatal – Section 53(A) CrPC – Facilitative, Not Mandatory – Appellant argued that failure to collect DNA evidence and swab/slides from the Appellant's fingers was fatal to the prosecution case – Held: Section 53(A) CrPC is facilitative in nature and not mandatory – Failure to conduct DNA profiling cannot by itself be treated as fatal to the prosecution case, particularly where reliable and cogent evidence otherwise establishes guilt – Investigative shortcomings cannot be a ground for acquittal in the face of trustworthy evidence [Para 36].

Plea of Insanity – Section 84 IPC – Burden of Proof – Not Discharged – Appellant attempted to raise a doubt regarding his mental capacity based on the Investigating Officer's inquiry into his IQ level during investigation – Held: The Investigating Officer found no documentation suggesting mental illness or low IQ – The Appellant failed to raise any plea of unsoundness of mind even in his statement under Section 313 CrPC – Burden of proving insanity under Section 84 IPC rests on the accused and was not discharged [Paras 24, 36].

Sentencing – Proportionality – Section 376 IPC – Minimum Sentence – Appellant had no prior convictions – The Trial Court imposed the minimum prescribed sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC – Held: Sentence is proportionate to the gravity and heinousness of the offence – No interference warranted [Para 39].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Conviction under Sections 448, 354 and 376 IPC confirmed – Sentence of 10 years rigorous imprisonment (concurrent) upheld as proportionate.

Cyber Crime – Bank Account Freezing – Educational Institution – Disproportionate Action – Sections 41A CrPC, 420 IPC, 66(D) IT Act – Writ Petition Allowed – Petitioner-school's entire bank account frozen by respondent-bank acting on notice issued by Cyber Crime Police, Varanasi, in Crime No.50/2024, on the ground that a parent of a student was allegedly involved in cyber offences and had remitted school fees of Rs.5,00,000/- as part of alleged crime proceeds – School had, upon receipt of Section 41A notice, promptly and bona fide reversed the said amount to the source account – Held: Freezing of the entire account of an educational institution solely because it received a legitimate fee payment from an allegedly accused parent constitutes a wholly arbitrary, unreasonable and disproportionate measure – Petitioner cannot be penalised for receiving bona fide fee payments in the ordinary course of its functioning – Notice dated 11.03.2026 quashed – Bank directed to mark lien to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- only, subject to outcome of Crime No.50/2024, while permitting the institution to freely operate the account for amounts exceeding Rs.5,00,000/- [Paras 4–9].

Decision: Writ Petition allowed – Notice dated 11.03.2026 quashed – First respondent-bank directed to mark lien on petitioner's account to the extent of Rs.5,00,000/- only – Petitioner permitted to operate account freely for amounts exceeding Rs.5,00,000/- – Lien subject to outcome of proceedings in Crime No.50/2024.

Criminal Law – Attempt to Murder – Section 307 IPC – Acquittal – Appellant Keshav Singh @ Kallu convicted by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri for firing a gunshot at informant Rajendra Singh on 04.12.1980, which caused gun shot injuries to Shiv Kumar Singh who was standing nearby – Role of exhortation attributed to deceased co-accused Brijbasi Lal – Sentence of 3 years rigorous imprisonment and Rs. 5,000/- fine imposed – On appeal, High Court finds the testimonies of the three witnesses of fact (PW-1, PW-2 and PW-3) to be mutually inconsistent and in material conflict with each other and with the site plan – Prosecution failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence set aside – Appellant acquitted [Paras 3, 27-31].

Chance Witnesses – PW-2 (Shiv Kumar Singh, Injured) and PW-3 (Sughar Singh) – Reliability – Inconsistent and Conflicting Statements – Both witnesses were residents of villages other than the place of occurrence and were chance witnesses whose presence at the scene was not satisfactorily explained by the prosecution – Testimony of PW-2 found entirely in contrast with PW-1 on material aspects including the time of the incident, the person levelling the disputed foundation, the role of exhortation, and whether one or two shots were fired – PW-2 exaggerated his role as the primary target of the assault, which was inconsistent with the FIR and PW-1's deposition – Testimony of PW-3 also at variance with PW-1 on the target of exhortation – Held: Evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny; if presence at the place of occurrence remains doubtful, the testimony must be discarded [Paras 17-20].

Site Plan – Inconsistency with Oral Evidence – The site plan prepared by the Investigating Officer (PW-7) showed the disputed foundation to the east of the informant's house with no wall between the two houses, whereas PW-1 stated that firing took place behind a wall – The site plan showed Mulaim Singh at a distance of 40 paces from the informant and injured, whereas witnesses stated he was sitting adjacent to them – Two separate firing positions were shown in the site plan, inconsistent with witnesses' accounts – These contradictions between ocular evidence and the site plan undermined the prosecution's version [Paras 20-21].

Faulty Investigation – Non-Recovery of Weapon, Blood-Stained Material and Ballistic Report – The licensed gun allegedly used by the appellant was not seized and no FSL or ballistic report was obtained – Blood-stained earth, clothes and mattress used to transport the injured were not recovered – Injury report of Mulaim Singh was not placed on record and he was not produced as a witness despite allegedly suffering gunshot injuries – Statement of PW-2 was not recorded by the Investigating Officer during investigation – Held: While faulty investigation does not by itself entitle an accused to acquittal, the cumulative effect of multiple investigative lapses, coupled with inconsistent and unreliable eye-witness testimony, creates reasonable doubt that must benefit the accused [Paras 24-26].

Appellate Court – Power to Interfere with Conviction – Benefit of Doubt – Held: An appellate court should be slow to interfere with conviction recorded by the trial court, but where evidence on record indicates that prosecution has failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and a plausible different view can be taken, the appellate court should not shy away from giving benefit of doubt to the accused [Para 28].

Decision: Criminal appeal allowed – Judgment of conviction and sentence dated 26.06.1987 passed by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Mainpuri in Sessions Trial No. 165 of 1986 under Section 307 IPC set aside – Appellant Keshav Singh @ Kallu acquitted – Bail bonds discharged – Criminal appeal against appellant no. 1 Brijbasi Lal abated on account of his death during pendency of appeal.