Service Law — Grant-in-Aid Institution — Claim for Salary — Illegal Appointment — Minor Appointed to Public Post — Void Ab Initio — Petitioners claimed to be appointed as Peon and Clerk respectively in a junior high school on 01.07.1980 and sought salary from the State exchequer after the institution was brought on the grant-in-aid list — Director of Education (Basic) passed impugned order denying salary upon finding appointments illegal and managerial return rejected — Petitioner No. 2's date of birth recorded as 08.06.1967, making him approximately 13 years of age on the alleged date of appointment — Held: Appointment of a minor to a public post is per se illegal, void, and non est in the eyes of law — No right, equitable or legal, can flow from an appointment void ab initio — Claim for salary from the State exchequer on the basis of such appointment is wholly untenable — Impugned order upheld — Writ petition dismissed [Paras 31–34, 42–44, 52–54, 62–63].

Statutory Recruitment Rules — Mandatory Procedure — Non-Compliance — Void Appointment — Appointments to posts of Peon and Clerk in recognized basic schools are governed by mandatory procedural requirements under Rules of 1978 and 1984, including issuance of proper advertisement, constitution of a duly constituted selection committee, participation of nominee of competent authority, and grant of approval — No document on record establishes compliance with any such requirement — Appointments made dehors the statutory procedure are illegal, void, and unenforceable — No legal right can be claimed on the basis thereof [Paras 35–36, 49, 55–57].

Writ Jurisdiction — Suppression of Material Facts — Inconsistent Pleadings — Fraud on Court — Petitioners initially asserted in earlier writ proceedings (Writ Petition No. 25487 of 2008) that petitioner No. 2 joined in 1977 at age approximately 10 years — In the present proceedings, date of appointment was sought to be shifted to 01.07.1980 — Such shifting of stand constitutes calculated misrepresentation of material facts — Litigant invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 must disclose full, true, and correct facts — Suppression or distortion of material particulars disentitles a party from seeking discretionary relief — Conduct of petitioners amounts to playing fraud upon the Court [Paras 51, 58, 61].

Fabricated Documents — Conflicting Records Bearing Identical Reference Numbers — Document dated 21.07.2005 relied upon by petitioners found to contain the same reference number as another document with materially divergent particulars — Such discrepancy gives rise to serious doubt as to authenticity and suggests interpolation — Allegations by respondents that records were manipulated by the then Manager to displace petitioners and accommodate his nominees could not be established — Fresh inquiry report dated 05.12.2016 recorded that petitioners were not found working in the institution and their names were absent from the attendance register for the period July–December 2016 — Resignations of petitioners were also placed on record [Paras 23–28, 58].

Salary from State Exchequer — No Right Without Lawful Approval — It is well settled that no claim for salary can be sustained against the State exchequer unless the appointment is lawful and duly approved by the competent authority — Managerial return forwarded by the Manager for financial approval was rejected by the District Level Committee — No financial sanction was ever accorded — In such circumstances, claim for salary and arrears is wholly misconceived [Paras 59–60].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — Impugned order of Director of Education (Basic), U.P. dated 20.12.2014 upheld — Petitioners held not entitled to salary or arrears from the State exchequer.

Prevention of Corruption — Trap Case — Demand and Acceptance of Bribe — Acquittal — Appellant, a Desk Officer in the Department of Industrial Development, was alleged to have demanded ₹50,000/- from PW2, Director of M/s. Aries Granites, for securing a 100% EOU licence and to have acted through co-accused A2 (a retired government officer) who received ₹10,000/- from PW2 in a trap laid by the CBI on 06.06.1989 — Trial court convicted both accused for offence under Section 120B IPC and convicted A1 additionally under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the PC Act — Sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of five years each with fine — On appeal, held: Evidence unsatisfactory — Prosecution failed to prove demand and acceptance of illegal gratification beyond reasonable doubt — Appellant acquitted [Paras 14–34].

Inconsistencies in Prosecution Evidence — Testimony of Complainant (PW2) — PW2's account of the initial demand inconsistent — complaint stated demand of ₹50,000/- whereas in the box he deposed that demand was ₹80,000/- reduced to ₹30,000/- — PW2 stated on 06.06.1989 he did not contact anyone before reaching the CBI office at 11:00 AM, yet the FIR was registered at 10:30 AM — No clarification sought by the prosecutor in re-examination — How the meeting at Hotel Marina was fixed in the forenoon of 06.06.1989 remains unexplained — PW2's claim that both panch witnesses were present at Hotel Marina contradicted by PW4, who deposed that he had not accompanied the team to Hotel Marina and that PW2 and the TLO had already left and returned before he reached — Source of the ₹10,000/- trap currency also disputed — These inconsistencies raise serious doubt on the prosecution case [Paras 21–22, 26].

Audio Recordings — Admissibility and Evidentiary Value — Two audio cassettes were relied upon by the prosecution — Trial court rejected the first cassette (conversation between PW2 and A1) due to poor audio quality and inaudibility — Trial court relied on the second cassette (conversation between PW2 and A2) — Held: Same infirmities applied to the second cassette as several portions were also inaudible — No court order was obtained before breaking the seal and preparing the transcripts — Transcripts prepared 20 days after the raid — No sample voice of either A1 or A2 was obtained and no forensic voice comparison conducted — Identification of voices made solely by interested witness PW2 — Chain of custody compromised — Second audio cassette cannot form a reliable basis for conviction [Para 23].

Non-Examination of Key Panch Witness — Adverse Inference — One of the two panch witnesses (Amarnath), who was the shadow witness and recovery witness, was not examined despite being present on several hearing dates before the trial court — No coercive steps taken to secure his presence after he reportedly settled abroad — His evidence would have been directly relevant to the trap proceedings and recovery — Non-examination adversely affects the prosecution case, particularly in the light of other infirmities [Para 24].

Disclosure Statement — Admissibility under Section 27, Indian Evidence Act — A2's alleged disclosure statement stating that bribe money would be collected by A1 at the former's residence was admitted by the trial court under Section 27 of the Evidence Act — Held: Finding perverse — Section 27 permits only that portion of information which distinctly relates to a fact discovered, i.e., the place from which an object is produced and the accused's knowledge thereof — The disclosure in question did not lead to recovery of any physical object — Mere discovery of A1 present at A2's residence does not constitute a "fact discovered" within the meaning of Section 27 — Disclosure statement inadmissible and cannot be used against A1 — Ratio in Pulikuri Kottaya (AIR 1947 PC 676), K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. (AIR 1962 SC 1788), Bodh Raj v. State of J&K, (2002) 8 SCC 45 and Babu Saheba Goudar Radragoudar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2024 SC 2252 applied [Paras 29–33].

Improper Marking of Section 161 CrPC Statements — Trial Court Irregularity — Statements of prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC were marked as exhibits wholesale by the trial court — This is contrary to the scheme of Sections 161 and 162 CrPC and Section 145 of the Evidence Act — Such statements can only be used to contradict a witness in the manner contemplated under Section 145 of the Evidence Act and for no other purpose — Wholesale marking deprecated — Ratio in Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. (AIR 1959 SC 1012) and Delhi Administration v. Lakshman Kumar, (1985) 4 SCC 476 followed [Para 28].

Money Possibly Paid as Consultancy Charges — PW2 himself admitted in cross-examination that A2 discussed consultancy charges for preparing a fresh representation, stated charges ranging from ₹30,000/- to ₹50,000/-, and that it was in the context of such discussions that ₹10,000/- was paid — No re-examination to dispel this version — Doubt arises whether the amount was bribe or consultancy fees — Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof [Para 25].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Conviction and sentence of appellant/A1 under Section 120B IPC and Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act set aside — Appellant acquitted under Section 248(1) CrPC — Bail bond cancelled — Pending applications disposed of.

Matrimonial Law  – Maintenance – Section 125 CrPC – Ex Parte Order – Revision Not Maintainable – Statutory Remedy of Recall Available – Family Court passed ex parte maintenance order awarding Rs.3,000/- per month to wife and Rs.1,000/- each to four minor children after petitioner/husband was proceeded ex parte on 27.01.2025 – Petitioner filed criminal revision before High Court contending there was a prior compromise and that the ex parte order was liable to be set aside – Held: Against an ex parte order under Section 125 CrPC, a specific statutory remedy is available under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS for recalling the order before the trial court itself by showing sufficient cause – Criminal revision before High Court directly challenging the ex parte maintenance order is not maintainable – Petitioner directed to file application under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS within 10 days – Following Vanita v. Manakchandra (1984 MPWN 113) and Anup Kumar v. Pratibha Kushwaha (2026 SCC OnLine All 1423) [Paras 5-9].

Criminal Procedure – Maintenance – Imprisonment for Non-Payment – Interim Direction – Petitioner was regularly being sent to imprisonment for non-payment of monthly maintenance and was in imprisonment at time of hearing – Held: If petitioner files application under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS within 10 days (on or before 08.05.2026), he shall be released immediately (if not required in any other case) and shall not be sent again to imprisonment till decision of said application – Recovery of maintenance amount can be made from immovable property of petitioner/husband if any – Direction regarding release not to be treated as a precedent [Paras 14-15].

Decision: Criminal Revision dismissed as not maintainable – Liberty reserved with petitioner to file application under Section 126(2) CrPC / Section 145(2) BNSS for setting aside the ex parte order – No opinion expressed on merits – If application filed within 10 days, petitioner to be released from imprisonment and not sent again to imprisonment till decision on the application – Pending applications disposed of.

Property Law — Sale Deed — Oral Agreement for Re-conveyance — Presumption of Registered Document — Burden of Proof — Plaintiff borrowed ₹75,000 from Defendant No. 1 in 1997 and executed a registered sale deed (Ext. A1) transferring 25 cents of property, claiming an oral agreement for re-conveyance on repayment — In 2006, Defendant No. 3 paid ₹1,75,000 to Defendant No. 1 and received a registered sale deed (Ext. A2), again allegedly subject to an oral agreement for re-conveyance to the plaintiff — When re-conveyance was refused, plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of oral agreements — Trial court dismissed suit — Held: Once documents are registered, there is a presumption of correctness and due execution under Section 34 of the Registration Act — Onus of proof lies on the party seeking to rebut such presumption — No cogent evidence was adduced by plaintiff to rebut the presumption attaching to Exts. A1 and A2 — Other than bare suggestions in cross-examination, nothing was elicited to show that the sale deeds were documents of security — Appeal dismissed [Paras 12–17].

Oral Agreement — Specific Performance — Cogent and Reliable Evidence Required — Sale agreements may be oral but must satisfy conditions under Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act — Nothing prevented the plaintiff from incorporating the terms of the alleged oral agreement of re-conveyance within the registered sale deeds themselves — A decree for specific performance cannot be granted on the basis of an oral agreement unless there is cogent and reliable evidence to prove the agreement — Plaintiff failed to establish by cogent evidence the existence of an oral agreement with Defendant No. 1 at the time of Ext. A1 or with Defendant No. 3 at the time of Ext. A2 for re-conveyance of the plaint schedule property — Trial court's finding upheld [Para 17].

Security Transaction — Indicia — Absence of Title, Possession, Mutation — Not Conclusive — Plaintiff argued: (i) 4.20 Ares in Re-Sy. No. 373/5 was not in her name at the time of execution of sale deeds; (ii) prior title deeds not handed over; (iii) defendants never took possession or measured the property; (iv) Defendant No. 1 did not mutate the property for nine years; (v) consideration understated — Held: Original title deeds were in fact produced by Defendant No. 3, including originals of Exts. A1, A6 partition deed and A2 — Contention that prior title deeds were not delivered under Section 55(3) cannot be sustained — Absence of title over a part of the property does not prove that the transaction was security — It was for the plaintiff to disclose her prior agreement for sale of 4.20 Ares — Non-mutation for nine years is not sufficient to presume security — No evidence was produced as to actual market value at time of transaction — Advocate Commissioner's report regarding possession rightly discarded as inspection was not conducted in presence of defendants [Paras 12–15].

Decision: Appeal dismissed — Judgment and decree of trial court dated 30.11.2011 in O.S. No. 334 of 2009 upheld — Parties directed to bear their respective costs — Pending interlocutory applications closed.

Criminal Law — Default Bail — NDPS Act — Extension of Remand — Accused Not Present — Gross Illegality — Article 21 — Petitioner/Accused No. 2 was in custody in Crime No. 65 of 2024 under the NDPS Act — Extension of time for remand was granted by I Additional District and Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge for NDPS offences, Rajamahendravaram, vide order dated 06.02.2026 — Extension granted in the absence of the accused, neither physically nor virtually — No charge sheet filed within the statutory period — Assistant Public Prosecutor fairly conceded the absence of the accused at the time of extension — Held: Failure to procure the presence of the accused either physically or virtually before the court, and failure to inform him that the application of the Prosecutor for extension of time is being considered, is not a mere procedural irregularity but a gross illegality violating the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution — Impugned order set aside — Petitioner enlarged on default bail subject to conditions [Paras 3–7] — Relied upon: Jigar @ Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat, 2022 Supreme (SC) 973.

Decision: Criminal revision allowed — Order dated 06.02.2026 in Crl.M.P. No. 95 of 2026 set aside — Petitioner/Accused No. 2 enlarged on bail on execution of personal bond of ₹20,000 with two sureties for like sum each — Conditions imposed: weekly appearance before SHO on Sundays between 10:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. till cognizance is taken; non-commission of offences; cooperation with the investigating officer; no inducement or threat to witnesses; surrender of passport or affidavit of non-possession.

Land Acquisition — Compensation — DKT Patta Lands — Resumption for Public Purpose — Enhancement Refused — Appellants, successors of original DKT patta assignees in Sy. Nos. 846/1 and 846/2, filed suits claiming compensation at Rs. 600/- per square yard alleging that the market value determined by the Revenue Divisional Officer was grossly inadequate — Trial Court dismissed suits holding that compensation was fixed in terms of High Court directions in W.P. No. 1049 of 2008 and appellants had already received solatium, additional compensation and interest — Held: No illegality or error of law or fact in the judgment of the trial Court; appeals dismissed [Paras 10, 29-31].

Compensation — Market Value — Determination as on Date of Possession — Exemplar Evidence — Appellants relied upon Ex. A12 (Market Value Guidelines Register) and Ex. A3 (sale deed for Sy. No. 858/1) to claim enhanced rate — Held: Ex. A12 came into force with effect from 01.08.2010 whereas possession of suit lands was taken in 2008; guidelines operative subsequent to the relevant date cannot be applied for determination of market value as on date of possession — Ex. A3 related to a different survey number classified as house sites and could not serve as multiplier for agricultural assigned lands — Neither document could be relied upon for the purpose of enhancement [Paras 21-25].

Award as Exemplar — Award No. 22 of 2007-2008 — Adjacent Land — Ring Road Acquisition — Award No. 22 of 2007-2008 dated 05.12.2007 relating to acquisition of adjoining lands for outer ring road, Kadapa, fixing market value at Rs. 1,20,000/- per acre, held to be a valid and reliable exemplar — Joint Collector, acting upon this Award, fixed ex gratia at Rs. 1,50,000/- per acre with 30% solatium, additional compensation and interest; 12% additional market value with 9% and 15% interest from dates of possession (28.01.2008 and 10.03.2008) was also paid pursuant to High Court direction — Held: Compensation so determined and paid is in terms of directions in W.P. No. 1049 of 2008 and is proper [Paras 23-25, 29].

Compensation — Date of Determination — Date of Notification vs. Date of Possession — Relying on Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. State of Karnataka, appellants contended that compensation ought to be determined with reference to prevailing market value — Held: Compensation in the present case was already determined with reference to the date of taking possession in 2008, not the date of resumption/notification in 2004; no grievance or illegality on this count [Para 26].

Rights of Assignees of Government Land — Parity with Full Owners — Full Bench judgment in LAO-cum-RDO, Chevella Division v. Mekala Pandu (supra) laying down that assignees of Government land are entitled to compensation equivalent to market value and all attendant benefits on par with full owners, even where assigned lands are resumed in accordance with terms of patta and for public purpose — This principle was given effect to by the order in W.P. No. 1049 of 2008, pursuant to which solatium, additional compensation and interest were granted to appellants over and above ex gratia — Held: Law laid down in Mekala Pandu (supra) has already been applied in appellants' favour; no further enhancement warranted [Para 18, 27].

Decision: Appeals dismissed — No order as to costs — Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, stand closed.

Civil Law — Amendment of Written Statement — Order 6 Rule 17 CPC — Post-Trial Commencement Amendment — Inconsistent Plea — Due Diligence — Petitioner/defendant, against whom a suit for possession, recovery of rent and damages was filed in 2017 in respect of a ground floor property in Sunder Nagri, Delhi, sought in 2022 to amend his written statement after conclusion of plaintiff's evidence — Original written statement denied any landlord-tenant relationship and asserted the suit property was DDA-acquired land — Proposed amendment sought to introduce a new and inconsistent plea that the defendant/his predecessor had purchased the property from one Noor Biwi on 07.05.1985 and constructed the shop — Held: Amendment rightly refused — Facts sought to be introduced were within petitioner's knowledge at the time of filing the written statement — An earlier application under Order VIII Rule 1A to bring the same documents on record had been dismissed in 2018, yet the petitioner waited four more years to file the amendment application — Amendment sought after commencement of trial requires showing that due diligence was exercised and the matter could not have been raised earlier — No such case made out — Proposed amendment also totally inconsistent with the original plea and would cause prejudice to the respondent — Impugned order upheld — Petition dismissed [Paras 7–10].

Decision: Petition dismissed — Impugned order dated 22nd March, 2023 upheld — Pending applications disposed of.

Land Acquisition — Requisition — Service of Order — Section 3(2) of West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 — Mandatory or Directory — Binding Precedent — Petitioners challenged acquisition of 0.06 acres of plot no. 2454/2759 under LA Case LA-II/2 of 1993-94 on the sole ground that the order of requisition under Section 3(1) was never served upon their predecessor-in-interest, rendering all subsequent acquisition steps non-est — Held: The question stands concluded by the binding Division Bench decision in Madhurina Mitra v. State of West Bengal (2026 SCC OnLine Cal 817), which held that the proposition in Sailendra Nath Pal v. State of West Bengal (2010) 2 CHN (Cal) 315 — treating Section 3(2) as mandatory — is per incuriam, being contrary to the earlier Division Bench in Mihir Kumar Sarkar v. State of West Bengal AIR 1972 Cal 8, and impliedly overruled by May George v. Special Tahsildar (2010) 13 SCC 98 — Non-service of order under Section 3(2) does not vitiate the requisition or subsequent acquisition proceeding — Purpose of Section 3(2) notice is only to notify the person concerned that possession would be taken, and no sanction is provided in the statute for non-observance thereof [Paras 22, 85-90].

Mandatory vs. Directory Provisions — Tests — Scheme of the 1948 Act — Court surveyed the well-settled tests for determining whether a statutory provision is mandatory or directory: (i) public duties are generally directory, private rights mandatory; (ii) intent of the legislature is to be gathered from nature, design and consequences of construing it one way or the other, not merely from the word "shall"; (iii) absence of consequences for non-compliance is a factor tending towards directory construction but is not conclusive; (iv) if non-compliance would not render the entire proceedings invalid, it leans directory — Section 3(2) uses the word "shall", but the statute prescribes no consequence for non-service, and the purpose of service is merely to notify the person for compliance; taking possession without service does not amount to trespass rendering the requisition void, since Section 3(3) provides an execution mechanism only upon failure to comply after service — Held: Provisions of Section 3(2) are directory and not mandatory [Paras 23-85].

Laches — Delay — Acquisition Since 1976-77 and 1993-94 — Challenge After 26 Years — Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was recorded as an awardee in the award under LA/II/105 of 1976-77 in respect of the self-same plot no. 2759, and notice under Section 4(1a) for the subsequent acquisition of 0.06 acres was published in the Calcutta Gazette Extraordinary dated 13.10.1995 — Petitioners offered no acceptable explanation for the delay of over 26 years in approaching Court — Held: Writ petition is hopelessly belated; doctrine of laches applies to negate the challenge to the acquisition — Sinister silence maintained by the predecessor-in-interest despite awareness of proceedings disentitles petitioners to any relief [Paras 103-110].

Vesting of Acquired Land — Absolute Title in State — Free from All Encumbrances — With publication of notice under Section 4(1a) of the 1948 Act, the requisitioned land vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances on and from the date of publication — Held: Once land vests absolutely in the State, it cannot be divested — entries in the records of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation or record of rights cannot confer title upon the petitioners — No person can claim equitable title by remaining in possession after absolute vesting — Plot no. 2454/2759 measuring 0.88 acres in totality vested with the State Government free from all encumbrances — No scope for release of the property or any portion thereof [Paras 111-124].

Property — Deed of Conveyance — Structures — Petitioners contended that their predecessor-in-interest purchased a portion of the plot fully covered by structure — Court found that the registered deed of conveyance dated 30.04.1968 described the subject property as a paddy land with no mention of any existing structure — No material produced to show when structures were constructed subsequent to purchase — Held: Contention that the entire plot was covered by structures is not acceptable; no exemption from acquisition can be claimed on this basis [Paras 92-98].

Right to Property — Article 300A — Constitutional and Human Right — Court noted that even after the 44th Constitutional Amendment, the right to property is a constitutional and human right under Article 300A — Deprivation of property must be in accordance with law and cannot take place by executive fiat or administrative caprice — However, on the facts of this case, acquisition was carried out in accordance with law and compensation was awarded and deposited — Proposition in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah (2024) 10 SCC 533 and Ultra-Tech Cement Ltd. v. Mast Ram (2025) 1 SCC 798 held distinguishable on facts [Paras 58-66, 125-127].

Decision: Writ petition dismissed — No order as to costs.

Property Law — Deemed Conveyance — MOFA — Section 11(1) — Scope of 'Appurtenant Area' — Petitioner cooperative housing society sought deemed conveyance of its building in a multi-building layout in Bhayandar — Competent Authority, on remand, rejected the application — Petitioner claimed conveyance of 3987.16 sq.m. (plinth and appurtenant) plus 703.62 sq.m. in Recreational Ground — Respondent-developer's architect certified plinth area as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. based on sanctioned plan dated 29.03.2019 — Held: MOFA is a welfare legislation enacted to protect flat purchasers against withholding of title by promoters — Section 11(1) uses the wide expression "right, title and interest in land and building" which cannot be reduced to transfer of the superstructure alone — Conveyance must include all land appurtenant, necessary, or incidental to the beneficial enjoyment of the building — The promoter cannot convey only the building footprint and retain mandatory open spaces required by planning law, since it is those very spaces that enable grant of occupation certificate — Where setbacks, access widths, or ventilation distances were necessary to sanction the building, such spaces cannot be retained by the promoter — Writ petition partly allowed [Paras 22–31, 67].

Appurtenant Area — Meaning and Limits — Functional Dependence Test — Not Confined to Minimum Statutory Setback — 'Appurtenant area' denotes land attached to, belonging to, or necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the main property — Test is functional dependence and not mere proximity — Appurtenant area in housing layouts may include compulsory marginal open spaces, access roads, passages, fire tender movement areas, common utility strips, earmarked parking areas, and other areas which by regulation are intended for occupants of that building — Planning regulations prescribe front, side, rear margins, distance between buildings, and fire access — These areas are intended for use and occupation of the building and cannot be retained by the promoter — However, not every surrounding land becomes appurtenant — Land reserved for independent commercial use, separate towers, or unrelated activity in the layout does not become appurtenant to one building by mere proximity — Size of appurtenant area alone is not conclusive as a tower may require more open margins and fire access under regulations than its plinth area [Paras 26–45].

Appurtenant Area v. Common Area — Distinction — Appurtenant area is building-specific, comprises mandatory marginal open spaces around a building, is necessary for functional requirements of that building including light, air, access, ventilation and fire safety, cannot be enclosed or built upon, and is intended to serve that particular building and its occupants — In contrast, common areas such as Recreational Ground, gardens, gymnasia, club-houses, swimming pools, and playgrounds are shared by all owners in the layout, vest proportionately in all societies, are governed by DCPR Clause 27(1)(g)(ii)(a) and UDCPR Clause 3.4.7(iv), and are intended to serve the community as a whole — Ownership of common area structures and appurtenant users vests in all owners on account of whose cumulative holdings the layout open space is required to be maintained [Paras 44–46].

Proportionate Share Formula — TDR-Loaded Layout — Plinth Area v. Proportionate Land Share — Government Resolution dated 22 June 2018, Clause (iv)(2), specifically uses the expressions 'plinth area' and 'appurtenant area' separately — Both components must visibly appear in the Architect's Certificate — A certificate which merely assigns a proportionate land share by ratio of built-up areas does not satisfy this requirement — 'Plinth area' in planning law means the area covered by the building at its ground level, i.e., its sanctioned footprint — It does not mean percentage share in the entire larger plot — Petitioner's figure of 3987.16 sq.m. is derived by the formula (6888.60/34459.18 × 19945.19) and represents proportionate entitlement in net plot area, not actual plinth — Respondent's certificate, which is derived from sanctioned plan No. MB/MNP/NR/7498/2018-19, identifies plinth as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. — Where a figure is linked to sanctioned municipal plans, it receives greater reliability — Plinth area accepted as 1151.56 sq.m. and appurtenant area as 1050.00 sq.m. — Total exclusive conveyable area: 2201.56 sq.m. [Paras 48–61].

Recreational Ground — Common Amenity — Proportionate Undivided Share — Petitioner's architect certificate computes total RG area as 3519.74 sq.m. and assigns proportionate share of 703.62 sq.m. based on 19.99% participation — Respondents have not produced any contrary RG computation — RG is a common amenity and petitioner cannot receive exclusive possession of any demarcated portion — However, as a society forming part of the sanctioned layout, petitioner is entitled to an undivided proportionate beneficial right in the common RG — RG share determined as 703.62 sq.m. as undivided proportionate right [Paras 62–63].

Promoter's Obligation — Duty to Execute Conveyance — Cannot Be Deferred Till Entire Layout Is Exhausted — Section 11 MOFA does not permit promoter to postpone statutory transfer of conveyance until every inch of land in the layout is utilised or all future development is exhausted — Once conditions are fulfilled, promoter cannot withhold conveyance on ground of proposed additional construction, possible redevelopment, or internal disputes regarding layout potential — In the absence of informed consent from purchasers, the duty under Section 11 remains enforceable — Otherwise, the promoter would continue as owner while purchasers remain perpetual consumers, which is contrary to the legislative scheme — Respondent No.3 also obtained revised sanctioned plans during 2018–2019 without obtaining prior consent of two-thirds of allottees as mandated by Section 14 of MahaRERA [Paras 24–25, 7].

Decision: Writ petition partly allowed — Impugned order of Competent Authority dated 08.07.2025 quashed and set aside — Petitioner society declared entitled to deemed conveyance under Section 11 MOFA read with Government Resolution dated 22.06.2018 — Exclusive conveyable area: 2201.56 sq.m. (plinth 1151.56 sq.m. + appurtenant 1050.00 sq.m.) — Undivided proportionate RG share: 703.62 sq.m. — Competent Authority directed to issue fresh certificate of deemed conveyance within eight weeks — Respondent Nos. 3 to 7 directed to extend full cooperation within two weeks — In case of non-cooperation, Competent Authority to proceed without their consent — No order as to costs.