Property Law – Self-Acquired Property – Female Hindu – Title Dispute – Appeal by plaintiff claiming exclusive ownership over suit land purchased in 1963 – Plaintiff contended that sons (Defendants No.2 and 3) fraudulently mutated their names in revenue records and sold the property to Defendant No.1 – Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suit – High Court held: Plaintiff had exclusive title under Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act – However, suit barred by limitation as plaintiff failed to prove fraudulent concealment or diligence under Section 17 of Limitation Act – Appeal dismissed [Paras 22–44]

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Section 14(1) – Property of Female Hindu – Plaintiff, a Hindu woman, purchased land during lifetime – Held: As per Ex.P4 (sale deed), plaintiff purchased 3 acres 10 guntas from Hanumant Balu Mang in 1963 when Defendants No.2 and 3 were minors – Property acquired by female Hindu through purchase becomes her absolute property – Defendant No.1’s plea of joint family property rejected as there was no evidence of hotchpot or joint contribution – Plaintiff’s exclusive ownership of suit property established [Paras 22–28, 31–33]

Transfer of Property – Mutation Entries – Validity – Defendants No.2 and 3 mutated their names in revenue records (M.E. No.1927) allegedly based on Varadi (Ex.D11) and sold property to Defendant No.1 – Held: Mutation entries do not convey title – No valid conveyance in law through Varadi – No evidence to show plaintiff put property into hotchpot or consented to joint ownership – Sale deed by Defendants No.2 and 3 invalid as they had no title [Paras 29–33]

Limitation Act, 1963 – Articles 58 & 17 – Suit for Declaration – Delay – Plaintiff filed suit in 1995 challenging sale deed executed in 1986 – Claimed ignorance of mutation entry and alienation – Held: Burden on plaintiff to show fraud and diligence as per Section 17 – No allegations of fraud made – Plaintiff lived with Defendants No.2 and 3, who assisted her in agriculture – Claim of ignorance unbelievable – Court held suit barred by limitation, findings of Courts below upheld [Paras 35–44]

Evidence – Conduct of Plaintiff – Plaintiff (PW1) claimed lack of knowledge of mutation and sale – Cross-examination revealed she lived and worked with Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 stayed with her during visits – She denied signature on vakalatnama and plaint, undermining credibility – Court found her version untrustworthy – Failure to challenge similar mutations in other lands further weakened her case [Paras 39–43]

Decision: Regular Second Appeal dismissed – Plaintiff held to be absolute owner under Section 14(1) of Hindu Succession Act – However, suit barred by limitation – No interference with findings of Trial and First Appellate Courts warranted [Paras 34, 44]

Judicial Service Law - Premature Retirement – Judicial Officers – Integrity Remarks – ACR entries from 2009 onwards indicating doubts on integrity, punctuality, work shirking and adverse general reputation – Full Court’s collective decision based on entire service record upheld – Limited judicial review applicable – Recovery of subsistence allowance after premature retirement held impermissible when disciplinary proceedings kept in abeyance – CWP 16020/2021 dismissed; CWP 16022/2021 partly allowed [Paras 5.4–5.13].

Premature Retirement – Judicial Officers – Scope of Judicial Review - High Court analyzed the service record including adverse ACR remarks relating to integrity, punctuality, work shirking and general reputation from 2009 onwards – Held: Remarks were sufficient for the Administrative Committee and Full Court to form bona fide opinion that continuation was not in public interest – Court cannot reassess adequacy of material in judicial review – Standards stricter for judicial officers – Reliance placed on Pyare Mohan Lal, Ram Murti Yadav, Om Prakash, Rajendra Singh Verma – Orders of premature retirement cannot be interfered with unless mala fide, no evidence, or perversity [Paras 5.4, 5.5, 5.3, 5.7] .

Integrity-Related ACR Remarks – Weight in Premature Retirement - Repeated remarks concerning spoken reputation, integrity to be kept under watch, work shirking, lack of punctuality from 2009–2012 formed valid basis for review committees – Held: Petitioners’ argument that they had an “unblemished” record rejected – Even a single integrity doubt may suffice for compulsory retirement in case of judicial officers [Paras 5.5, 5.3] .

Guidelines of 1979 & 2011 – Applicability - Guidelines of 20.09.1979 and Full Court’s 2011 clarification (requiring B+ grading in latest ACRs) held inapplicable – Premature retirement based not on grading alone but holistic record with integrity doubts – 2007 Rules relate only to promotions, not premature retirement [Paras 3.1, 3.4, 5.7] .

Disciplinary Proceedings Pending – Whether Bar to Retirement - Petitioners claimed that since disciplinary proceedings were pending or not concluded, retirement was illegal – Held: Incorrect; premature retirement was not based solely on pending proceedings but on ACR-based integrity concerns – No evidence of disciplinary proceedings being kept pending to circumvent due process – Not a “shortcut” under principles of Umedbhai Patel [Paras 3.2, 5.8] .

Bias Allegations – Rejected - Allegations of bias against Administrative Judge found baseless – Adverse remarks also made by other Administrative Judges; concerned Judge retired in 2013 while retirement orders were passed later; allegations held to be afterthought – Collective Full Court decision reinforces absence of bias [Para 5.9] .

Suspension Period Treated as Leave of the Kind Due – Legality - Full Court had kept disciplinary proceedings in abeyance; therefore treating suspension as leave of the kind due and ordering recovery of ₹23,85,664/- was unjust, arbitrary, and contrary to principles laid down in Rafiq Masih – Held: Recovery impermissible; orders quashed in respect of petitioner Ravinder Kumar Condal – Relief restricted only to him as Asha Condal did not raise such challenge [Paras 5.11–5.13] .

Decision: CWP-16020-2021 (Asha Condal): Dismissed. CWP-16022-2021 (Ravinder Kumar Condal): Partly allowed – Recovery and leave-due orders quashed – Premature retirement upheld [Para 5.13] .

Specific Performance – Readiness and Willingness – Registered sale agreement dated 16.10.1992 relied on by plaintiff – Plaintiff failed to prove continued readiness and willingness to pay balance consideration of ₹2,00,000 within the stipulated three months – No legal notice issued within prescribed time – Notice issued after 2 years and 11 months – Held: Plaintiff failed to establish readiness and willingness as mandated under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act – Specific performance rightly denied [Paras 14, 18, 24].

Sale Agreement – Competing Claims – Prior Agreement Prevails – Earlier agreement of sale dated 10.12.1990 (Ex.B-7) in favour of defendant No.6 found to be true, valid, and partly acted upon through subsequent registered sale deeds dated 29.04.1993 in favour of defendants 2 to 6 – Plaintiff aware of prior transaction – Held: Ex.B-7 prevails over Ex.A-2 – Plaintiff’s agreement is subject to earlier equitable rights [Paras 16, 18, 24].

Bona Fide Purchaser – Protection under Section 19(b) – Defendants 2 to 6 held bona fide purchasers for value under registered sale deeds executed in pursuance of prior agreement (Ex.B-7) – No relief can be granted against them in absence of any challenge to those sale deeds – Plaintiff’s suit for specific performance not maintainable against bona fide purchasers without notice [Paras 17, 23].

Refund of Advance – Equitable Relief – Though specific performance denied, Court held plaintiff entitled to refund of advance consideration of ₹1,00,000 paid under Ex.A-2, with 6% interest from date of suit till realization – Refund to be paid by legal representatives of deceased vendor out of her estate [Paras 24–25].

Evidence – Proof of Execution – Ex.A-2 found valid – Attesting witness (daughter of executant) and scribe supported execution and payment of advance – Trial court’s contrary view reversed – Agreement held genuine, but unenforceable due to superseding prior agreement and lack of timely action [Paras 15–16].

Appellate Jurisdiction – Interference with Trial Court's Discretion – Trial court’s finding on invalidity of Ex.A-2 reversed due to misappreciation of evidence – However, discretionary denial of specific performance upheld on settled legal grounds, including delay, suppression of facts, and superior equities in favour of prior purchasers [Paras 15, 18, 24].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Relief of specific performance denied – Plaintiff entitled to refund of ₹1,00,000 with 6% interest p.a. from date of suit till realization – Refund to be paid by legal representatives (respondents 7 to 11) from estate of deceased defendant No.1 – Appeal dismissed as against bona fide purchasers (respondents 2 to 6) – No order as to costs [Para 25].

Municipal Law – Unauthorized Construction – Bar on Civil Court Jurisdiction – Section 433A MMC Act – Civil Court Cannot Entertain Suit Challenging Demolition Notices – Plaint Rejected – Plaintiff challenged notices under Sections 260 and 478 MMC Act alleging unauthorized construction – Civil court refused to reject plaint holding suit not barred – Held: Suit was plain challenge to statutory notices; no specific averment of nullity or bad faith – Bar under Section 433A attracted – Plaint rejected under Order VII Rule 11 [Paras 14, 36, 42, 46–47]

Civil Procedure – Order VII Rule 11 – Rejection of Plaint – Barred by Statute – Duty of Court to Reject Suit at Threshold – Court held that where statutory bar exists, plaint must be scrutinised meaningfully to assess if jurisdiction is retained – If not, it must be rejected at inception – Trial Court erred by delving into merits and failing to apply strict standards under Order VII Rule 11 [Paras 44–46]

Interpretation – Scope of Civil Court Jurisdiction in Urban Planning Matters – Bar is Not Absolute but Limited to Cases Not Involving Nullity or Bad Faith – While recognising that some exceptions exist to ouster clauses (e.g. nullity, bad faith, abuse of power), Court reaffirmed that such exceptions must be specifically pleaded and not merely stated in vague terms – No such grounds found in plaint [Paras 20–28, 41]

Town Planning – Civil Suit to Prevent Demolition – Suit Filed as Tactical Measure to Delay Action Against Illegal Construction – High Court Disapproves Misuse of Court Process – Plaintiff expanded tin-shed without permission; sought to mask demolition notice challenge as suit for possession – Held: Suit a strategic device to delay statutory action – Not permissible in law [Paras 43, 45]

Municipal Law – Section 260 and 478 MMC Act – Action for Unauthorized Construction – Civil Court Cannot Interfere with Demolition Once Notice Issued Unless Action Is Nullity – Court reaffirmed statutory scheme where designated officers are empowered to demolish illegal structures – Civil suits against such notices are barred unless challenge is based on strong foundational grounds [Paras 15–17, 42]

Decision: Revisions allowed – Order of Trial Court dated 8 October 2015 set aside – Plaint in Regular Civil Suit No.130 of 2015 rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Civil suit barred under Section 433A of MMC Act – Status quo to continue for four weeks to allow appeal [Paras 47–49]

Labour Law – Gratuity – Forfeiture – Post-Employment Conduct – Petitioner-company forfeited gratuity under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Payment of Gratuity Act citing breach of post-resignation confidentiality and non-compete clauses – Allegation that respondents joined rival firm and misused trade secrets – Held: Even assuming misconduct, alleged acts occurred after cessation of employment – Section 4(6)(b)(ii) applies only to offences involving moral turpitude committed during the course of employment – Forfeiture not legally sustainable [Paras 1, 4, 8–10, 14–15].

Natural Justice – No Prior Notice – Petitioner did not issue any show cause notice to employees before forfeiting gratuity – Held: Violation of natural justice renders action unsustainable – Forfeiture of property-like entitlement (gratuity) cannot be done arbitrarily – Reliance on State of Jharkhand v. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava, (2013) 12 SCC 210, affirmed [Paras 11, 14–15].

Industrial Disputes – Forfeiture Requires Statutory Compliance – Petitioner’s reliance on Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele and Ramchandra Joshi v. Bank of Baroda misplaced – Forfeiture under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) must be preceded by valid termination for an act committed in course of employment – No such termination or allegation existed at relevant time [Paras 5, 12–13].

Civil Litigation – No Prejudice in Pending Civil Suit – Court clarified that its findings or those of authorities under Gratuity Act will not prejudice petitioner’s ongoing civil suits seeking damages against respondents – Petitioner free to prove its claims independently therein [Paras 6, 16, 18].

Decision: Writ petitions dismissed – Concurrent findings of Labour and Industrial Courts upheld – Forfeiture of gratuity invalid as alleged misconduct occurred post-employment and without notice – Observations not to prejudice petitioner’s pending civil suits.

Family Law – Custody of Minor Children – Split Custody – Welfare of Child Paramount – Preference of Minor Considered – Family Court granted custody of elder daughter to mother and younger son to father – Appellant-mother sought custody of both children to restore sibling bond – Held: Both parents are educated and financially stable; minor son (aged 11) has lived with father and paternal grandmother for 7 years and expressed genuine, independent desire to continue in same environment – No indication of coaching or adverse conditions – Court found no compelling reason to alter settled custody arrangement, especially where change could disrupt child’s emotional equilibrium and academic stability [Paras 1–3, 6–7, 15–17].

Child Custody – Preference of Child – Emotional Bonding and Continuity – Court interacted with both siblings – Son displayed strong attachment to father and grandmother and showed comfort in present routine – Although emotional bond with sister existed, frequent interaction was minimal due to years of separation – Court observed absence of hostility but also absence of shared day-to-day life – Held: Disruption of established bond with current caregiver not warranted solely to reunite siblings [Paras 6–9, 15–16].

Custody Jurisprudence – Allegations Between Parents Not Determinative – Welfare Principle Supersedes Fault-Based Arguments – Appellant cited father’s alleged misconduct, alcohol use, and discriminatory parenting – Family Court found such allegations either unproven or not materially affecting welfare of minor son – Court reiterated settled principle that child custody determination must transcend mutual recriminations between parties and focus only on child’s best interest [Paras 10.4, 13–14, 17].

Visitation Rights – Parental Cooperation Essential – Possibility of Future Modification Not Barred – Court upheld existing arrangement but emphasized that child welfare is dynamic – Directed both parties to maintain cordial interaction and ensure continuity in sibling relationship through visitation – Liberty granted to approach competent court for modification upon substantial change in circumstances [Paras 19–21].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Impugned order dated 18.09.2023 upheld – Custody of minor son to remain with father and minor daughter with mother – Existing visitation rights of mother to continue – No costs [Paras 19–21].

Accident Claim - Motor Vehicles Act – Driving Licence – Statutory Grace Period – Expired licence remains valid for 30 days under proviso to Section 14 – Licence expired on 04.06.2001; accident on 04.07.2001 within grace period – Driver legally licensed – No breach of policy conditions – Insurer not entitled to recovery rights – Tribunal’s award upheld [Paras 3–6].

Motor Vehicles Act – Section 14 Proviso – Effect of expiry of driving licence – Statutory extension of validity – Held: Proviso explicitly provides that a driving licence continues to remain effective for 30 days from the date of expiry – Licence of driver expired on 04.06.2001; statutory grace period ran from 05.06.2001 to 04.07.2001 – Accident at 10:45 AM on 04.07.2001 fell squarely within grace period – Licence deemed valid at time of accident [Paras 3–4].

Insurance Law – Breach of Policy Conditions – Absence of valid licence – Insurer’s plea rejected – Renewal made after accident irrelevant as licence had statutory efficacy on accident date – No willful breach attributable to insured – Recovery rights cannot be granted to insurer [Paras 2–4, 6].

Interpretation – Computation of statutory period – Section 9, General Clauses Act – Counting of days – Grace period begins the day after expiry – 30th day falls on 04.07.2001 – Court affirms correct computation and applicability of grace period [Paras 3–4].

Precedent – Proviso to Section 14 consistently interpreted – Court relies on:

(a) State of Haryana & Anr. v. Karkor & Ors. (P&H, 24.05.2018) – licence valid during statutory grace period; insurer not entitled to recovery rights;

(b) Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Santosh Kumari, 2018 (4) ADJ 527 (Allahabad HC) – expired licence continues to be effective for 30 days and insurer cannot allege breach during this period –

Held: Same view applies; Tribunal’s findings correct; no reason for appellate interference [Para 5].

MACT Appeal – Scope of interference – Tribunal correctly fastened liability upon insurer – No infirmity in findings – Appeal devoid of merit – Dismissed [Paras 1–2, 6–7].

Decision: Appeal dismissed – Award dated 04.01.2003 of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jind affirmed – Driver’s licence deemed valid on date of accident due to statutory 30-day extension under proviso to Section 14 MV Act; consequently, no breach of policy conditions – Insurer not entitled to recovery rights – Pending applications also disposed of [Paras 6–8].

Public Service Commission – Scaling of Marks – Validity of Scaling Formula in Exams with Optional Papers – RPSC adopted scaling method in optional subjects of competitive exam for Forest Services after finding wide subject-wise variation in difficulty index and mean marks – Appellants contended that scaling was not authorized under the 1962 and 2015 Rules and yielded arbitrary and absurd results – Held: Scaling necessary to ensure uniformity and fairness in evaluation when different optional subjects are involved – Expert Committee analyzed statistical data before recommending scaling formula – No arbitrariness or mala fides found in process – Scaling limited only to optional subjects and not applied to compulsory ones [Paras 1–4, 11–13, 31, 36].

Recruitment Rules – Interpretation of “Marks Obtained” – Scaled Marks vs. Raw Marks – Petitioners argued that scaling violated Rule 29 of the 2015 Rules, which prohibits re-evaluation – Court held that “marks obtained” includes scaled marks and scaling is distinct from re-evaluation – Scaling is part of the evaluation process and is not barred by the Rules – Application of scaling found to be within the implied powers of the Commission [Paras 32–34].

Precedent – Consistency of Judicial View – Stare Decisis – Court reaffirmed settled position in Jai Singh, Chandu Parihar, and Mahesh Kumar Khandelwal that scaling in exams involving optional subjects is valid – Rejected appellants’ reliance on Sanjay Singh case, holding it inapplicable since it pertained to exams with only compulsory subjects – Held: No change in facts or law to justify deviation from consistent precedent upholding scaling [Paras 26–28, 37–38].

Constitutional Law – Article 14 – Equality and Fairness in Competitive Examinations – Without scaling, candidates choosing difficult subjects would be unfairly disadvantaged – Scaling ensures uniformity across subjects of differing difficulty levels – Held: Use of scaling promotes objectivity, fairness, and does not violate Article 14 – No arbitrariness or unequal treatment established [Paras 29–30, 40].

Decision: Appeals dismissed – Judgment of learned Single Judge upheld – Scaling formula adopted by RPSC found to be fair, rational, and legally sustainable – No costs imposed – Pending applications disposed [Paras 39–41].

Criminal Law – Rash and Negligent Driving – Sections 279 & 304A IPC – Accused convicted for causing death of a pillion rider by driving autorickshaw rashly and negligently – Courts below relied on consistent testimonies of eyewitnesses (PWs 1, 3, 4), spot sketch (Ex.P11), inquest and post-mortem reports – Held: Conviction based on credible evidence – Defence of victim’s negligence rejected – No perversity or illegality in concurrent findings of lower courts [Paras 14, 20–23].

Criminal Procedure – Scope of Revision – Section 397 CrPC – Revision not a substitute for appeal – Revisional court cannot re-appreciate evidence unless there is grave illegality or manifest error – Held: No error found in appreciation of evidence by trial and appellate courts – Interference in revision not warranted [Paras 10–13, 21].

Sentencing – Section 304A IPC – Adequacy and Proportionality – Accused sentenced to 6 months simple imprisonment by appellate court – Plea for leniency under Probation of Offenders Act rejected – Held: In view of binding precedents (Guru Basavaraj v. State of Karnataka; Saurabh Bakshi v. State of Punjab), deterrent punishment justified in motor accident deaths – Sentence of 6 months appropriate and commensurate to offence [Paras 27–31].

Motor Accidents – Responsibility of Professional Drivers – Supreme Court emphasized duty of care by professional drivers – Laxity or momentary negligence can have devastating social consequences – Held: In cases of death due to rash driving, liberal sentencing policies are not justified – Courts must uphold collective conscience and safety standards [Paras 27–30].

Decision: Criminal revision petition dismissed – Conviction and sentence of six months’ simple imprisonment under Section 304A IPC upheld – No scope for interference with concurrent findings of trial and appellate courts – Plea under Probation of Offenders Act rejected [Para 31].