Kidnapping — Section 363 IPC — Lawful Guardianship — Acquittal — The appellant was convicted by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. 7, Calcutta under Section 363 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for four years — The conviction arose from an incident dated 03.11.2003 in which the appellant allegedly took a minor girl from the custody of one Chhanda Bibi on the pretext of purchasing garments and was found near a red light area — The Trial Court simultaneously acquitted the appellant of the charge under Section 373 IPC for want of evidence — No appeal was preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal — On appeal, the High Court sets aside the conviction under Section 363 IPC — Held: The prosecution failed to prove that Chhanda Bibi was the lawful guardian of the victim — The victim voluntarily accompanied the accused, was familiar with him prior to the incident, and never raised any protest or alarm — The charge under Section 363 IPC is therefore not established [Paras 18-23].

Lawful Guardianship — Inconsistencies in Evidence — Chhanda Bibi was neither a relative of the victim nor formally entrusted with her guardianship — The victim's mother had left her at the house of Chhanda Bibi where she worked as a maidservant without remuneration — Glaring inconsistencies were found between the testimonies of the victim and Chhanda Bibi regarding the duration of the victim's stay and the circumstances of her residence — Chhanda Bibi did not enquire about the victim for three days after she left and lodged no missing diary, indicating absence of custodial responsibility — Held: Chhanda Bibi cannot be described as a lawful guardian within the meaning of Section 363 IPC [Paras 18-19].

Voluntary Act — Acquaintance with Accused — No Protest — The victim was aged 16 to 17 years — She had acquaintance with the appellant prior to the incident — She did not raise any alarm or protest throughout the day — The Investigating Officer recorded that the victim disclosed the appellant's intention to marry her and that she was familiar with him — No allegation of sexual assault was made — PW2, a local witness, did not hear any weeping — Held: On the totality of evidence, the victim voluntarily went with the accused and no kidnapping was made out [Paras 21-22].

Prosecution's Case — Deficiencies — No GD Entry was made before the raiding party left the police station — The IO did not record statements of the lady constables — Superior officers of the raiding party were not examined — The seizure list did not bear the signature of the victim or the accused — The medical report's X-ray plate was misplaced and not produced — The raid itself remained insufficiently proved [Paras 15-16].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Judgment and order of conviction dated 06.06.2007 and 08.06.2007 under Section 363 IPC set aside — Appellant released from bail bond.

Criminal Law - Sexual Offences - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 - Sections 5 and 6 - Indian Penal Code 1860 - Sections 376 and 450 - Conviction of four accused challenged - Accused 1 (A1) alleged to have committed multiple acts of penetrative sexual assault and taken nude photos to blackmail the victim - Accused 2 and 3 (A2 and A3) alleged to have committed gang rape - Accused 4 (A4) mother of A1 alleged to have abetted by omitting her duty to protect the child - Trial Court convicted all accused primarily on victim testimony - High Court found victim testimony reliable only against A1 - Foundational facts for age and assault by A1 established attracting Section 29 presumption - Version against A2 and A3 found to be embellished as their names were missing from initial statements to police and magistrate - Evidence against A4 found insufficient to prove intentional aiding or illegal omission - Held - Conviction of A1 upheld - A2 - A3 and A4 acquitted due to deficient evidence - [Paras 1-82].

Criminal Law - Delay in FIR - Sexual Offences - Impact of blackmail - Victim was a child aged 11 at the time of the first incident - FIR lodged after two years - Prosecution explained delay citing threats by A1 to leak nude photographs - Relied on State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh - Held - Delay per se not a mitigating circumstance in rape cases where satisfactorily explained - Blackmail and fear of social reputation are valid reasons for delay in child sexual abuse cases - Delay not fatal to the prosecution of A1 - [Paras 56-61].

Evidence Law - Victim Testimony - Reliability - Discrepancies regarding multiple accused - Victim (PW1) did not name A2 and A3 in FIS or Section 164 statement - Names emerged only after interaction with Child Line workers - Victim alleged gang rape by three persons but medical evidence showed no corresponding injuries - Held - Testimony partially reliable - Sufficient to convict A1 but insufficient to fasten liability on A2 and A3 due to material omissions and improvements - [Paras 64-73].

Criminal Law - Abetment - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act 2012 - Section 16 - Illegal Omission - A4 (mother of A1) convicted by Trial Court for not preventing the crime while being present in the house - High Court analyzed the definition of abetment - Held - Conviction for abetment by illegal omission requires proof of intentional act or omission to facilitate the crime - Mere presence in the house or failure to take due care of a child does not automatically amount to intentional aiding under Section 16 - Prosecution failed to prove A4 aided A1 - [Paras 75-78].

Decision: Criminal Appeal No. 280 of 2021 allowed in part – Conviction of A1 confirmed – A4 acquitted. Criminal Appeal No. 274 of 2021 allowed – A2 and A3 acquitted. Criminal Appeal (V) No. 66 of 2025 dismissed.

Matrimonial Law – Mental Cruelty – Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Pre-suit and Post-suit Cruelty – Decree of Divorce Affirmed – Marriage solemnised on 27.04.2005; wife left matrimonial home on 02.11.2009; husband instituted divorce suit on 15.01.2010; wife lodged criminal complaint on 05.02.2010 (three months after the alleged incident and 21 days after filing of divorce suit) – Trial Court decreed divorce on grounds of cruelty and irretrievable breakdown of marriage – On appeal, Division Bench found pre-suit cruelty established through evidence of PW-1 (husband) corroborated by PW-2 (elder brother, residing in matrimonial home), whose evidence remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination – Admissions of DW-3 (wife's mother) in cross-examination corroborated plaint allegations as to wife's stubborn nature, imposition of will on matrimonial family, and baseless character assassination of husband – Post-suit cruelty established through two criminal complaints (Asansol P.S. Case No. 31/2010 under Section 498A IPC; Asansol P.S. Case No. 15/2017 under Sections 403, 406 and 120B IPC) both culminating in acquittal on ground of no evidence – Husband detained for nine hours at police station after arrest from outside workplace on basis of baseless complaint – Cumulative conduct of wife held to constitute mental cruelty – Held: Decree of divorce on ground of cruelty affirmed; appeal dismissed [Paras 27–51, 65–67].

Evidence – Interested Witness – Elder Brother of Husband – PW-2, elder brother of respondent-husband residing in matrimonial home, corroborated PW-1's evidence in entirety – Appellant contended PW-2 was an interested witness – Held: Mere relationship with a party does not automatically render a witness interested or unreliable; PW-2's direct knowledge of events by virtue of residing in matrimonial home made him a competent and reliable witness – Evidence-in-chief of PW-1 and PW-2 remained substantially unshaken in cross-examination [Para 31, 32].

Evidence – Apparent Contradiction – "Difference of Opinion" vs. "Marital Dispute" – Husband stated at one place that differences arose from inception of marriage and at another that marital dispute arose 1–1½ years after marriage – Held: Qualitative distinction exists between "difference of opinion" from the date of marriage and "marital dispute" that crystallised about 1–1½ years thereafter; the two statements are not contradictory or mutually exclusive [Para 33].

Criminal Acquittal – Effect on Civil Proceedings – Mental Cruelty – Acquittal of husband in both criminal cases not on technical grounds but on finding of no evidence by the criminal court – Ratio of Chiranjeevi v. Smt. Lavanya (where acquittal was for failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt, not for no evidence) held inapplicable – Rani Narasimha Sastry v. Rani Suneela Rani, (2020) 18 SCC 247 applied: husband undergoing trial on wife's complaint and being acquitted for lack of evidence itself constitutes cruelty perpetrated by the wife – Followed also in Poulomi Biswas v. Shamik Biswas (coordinate Bench of this Court) [Paras 41–46].

Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Ground for Divorce – Section 13(1)(ia), Hindu Marriage Act – Article 141, Constitution of India – Parties separated since November 2009; no resumption of conjugal life; no animus revertendi on part of wife; son of parties attained majority – Held: Irretrievable breakdown of marriage, though not an independent statutory ground of divorce, falls within the ambit of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act [Paras 52–58].

Permanent Alimony – Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act – Suo Motu Award – Scope – Appellant contended Trial Court ought to have granted permanent alimony suo motu at the time of passing the divorce decree – Held: Section 25(1) requires an application to be filed; affidavits-of-assets of both parties are to be filed and considered; no such application was filed by the appellant-wife either before the Trial Court or before the High Court at any stage – No court can suo motu pass an order of permanent alimony without a prayer therefor and supporting materials – Judgments in Rakhi Sadhukhan v. Raja Sadhukhan, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1259 and M.V. Leelavathi v. Dr. C.R. Swamy, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1724 distinguished: in both cases the Supreme Court acted under Article 142 and there had been adjudication of permanent alimony by the Trial Court – Held: Appellant at liberty to file a fresh application for permanent alimony before the competent civil court at any time subsequent to the decree, as expressly contemplated by Section 25(1) [Paras 60–64, 68].

Decision: Appeal dismissed on contest – Impugned judgment and decree dated 09.12.2021 of the learned Additional District Judge, Fourth Court at Asansol, District Paschim Bardhaman in Matrimonial Suit No. 40 of 2011, decreeing divorce in favour of respondent-husband affirmed – Appellant-wife granted liberty to file application for permanent alimony under Section 25, Hindu Marriage Act before the competent civil court – No order as to costs.

Res Judicata – Territorial Jurisdiction – Subsequent Change in Law – Same Cause of Action – Effect of Finality of Earlier Orders – Plaintiff, a former Relationship Manager of HDFC Bank, filed suit at Nagpur for declaration, restoration of service and damages upon termination – Appointment letter contained a clause conferring exclusive jurisdiction on Courts at Mumbai – Defendants' initial application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC for return of plaint rejected by Trial Court and confirmed by this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 81 of 2018; application for review also rejected – Subsequently, the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Verma v. HDFC Bank interpreted an identical clause to hold that Courts at Mumbai alone have jurisdiction – Defendants filed a fresh application under Order VII Rule 10 CPC relying on the said decision – Trial Court rejected the fresh application on the ground of res judicata – Held: Since the earlier order on territorial jurisdiction had attained finality between the parties and was not challenged further, it operates as res judicata – A fresh application seeking to revisit the same order on the basis of a subsequent Supreme Court decision is, in substance, a review and is barred by the express prohibition in Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, which provides that reversal or modification of a decision on a question of law by a subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case is not a ground for review – Civil Revision dismissed [Paras 20, 21, 22, 24, 35, 36, 40].

Res Judicata – Exceptions – Distinction Between Inherent Jurisdiction and Territorial Jurisdiction – The rule that an erroneous decision on a pure question of jurisdiction does not operate as res judicata applies only to subject matter jurisdiction (inherent jurisdiction) and not to procedural aspects of jurisdiction such as territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary jurisdiction – An order passed without inherent jurisdiction is a nullity in the eyes of law and can be ignored; an order passed without territorial jurisdiction is not a nullity, is completely binding on the parties until set aside, and must be challenged to be vacated – Exclusion of territorial jurisdiction by agreement between parties does not deprive other Courts of their inherent jurisdiction; it merely restricts the forum among Courts otherwise competent to try the matter – Held: The exception to res judicata recognised in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal with respect to erroneous decisions on jurisdiction is confined to subject matter jurisdiction and cannot be extended to errors of territorial jurisdiction [Paras 14, 23, 27, 28, 38, 39].

Res Judicata – Change in Interpretation of Law – Same Cause of Action – The rule that change in interpretation of law by a superior Court does not operate as res judicata applies where the pure question of law falls for consideration in a separate proceeding on a different cause of action – Where the cause of action is the same and the subsequent application is filed in the same civil suit, the prior decision on the question of law operates as res judicata with greater force, notwithstanding a subsequent Supreme Court decision taking a different view – Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC expressly enacts that subsequent reversal or modification of the legal basis of an order is not a ground for review, thereby giving primacy to the principle of res judicata – Held: The ratio in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal and Canara Bank v. N.G. Subbaraya Setty does not assist the defendants where cause of action and proceedings are identical [Paras 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 35].

Decision: Civil Revision dismissed – No order as to costs.

NDPS – Bail – Ganja – Definition – Section 2(iii)(b) – Commercial Quantity – Section 37 Rigours Rendered Doubtful – Applicants arrested on 09.12.2024 carrying 21.95 kg of alleged ganja; Seizure Memo recorded the bag contained dried leaves and small branches; FSL report described the exhibit as dried greenish brown flowering and fruiting tops vegetative material – Seized quantity only marginally exceeded the commercial quantity threshold of 20 kg – Held: Where the seized material is a heterogeneous mixture including both flowering/fruiting tops (which constitute ganja) and leaves, stalks and branches (which do not), only the weight of the actual flowering and fruiting tops is relevant for determining whether the quantity constitutes commercial quantity – Discrepancy in weight renders the applicability of Section 37 rigours doubtful; bail granted [Paras 7–14].

NDPS – Definition of Ganja – Heterogeneous Mixture – Only Flowering and Fruiting Tops Relevant – Section 2(iii)(b) defines ganja as the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant, excluding seeds and leaves when not accompanied by the tops – Where the seized material is a heterogeneous mixture of Category A (flowering/fruiting tops) and Category B (leaves/stalks/seeds), the placebo material of Category B does not constitute the actual narcotic drug and its weight cannot be clubbed with the weight of Category A for the purpose of determining whether the seized quantity constitutes commercial quantity – Such discrepancy in weight is a matter of trial and benefits the bail applicant – Held: Rigours of Section 37 do not automatically apply where the actual weight of ganja cannot be precisely determined from the material seized [Paras 7–11].

Bail – NDPS – Section 37 – Period of Custody – Trial Progress – Mujabil was in custody for approximately 1 year and 4 months; Shahid @ Aabu for approximately 1 year – Charges framed but prosecution evidence not yet commenced; 16 witnesses cited – Trial likely to take substantial time – No prior criminal involvement of either applicant – Mujabil was only 18 years of age at the time of arrest – Shahid @ Aabu had been released on interim bail on three occasions without any allegation of misuse – Held: Bail granted subject to conditions [Paras 12–14].

Decision: Both bail applications allowed – Applicants directed to be released on bail on furnishing personal bond of Rs. 35,000/- each with one surety in like amount, subject to standard conditions including appearance before Special Court, surrender of passports, not leaving the country, maintaining operative mobile numbers, and not contacting prosecution witnesses or tampering with evidence – Observations confined to bail adjudication and not to be construed as opinion on merits.

Personal Liberty – Live-In Relationship – Police Protection – Right to Life – Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution – Petitioners, both married to different individuals and having children with their respective spouses, entered into a live-in relationship at Hyderabad on 25.02.2026 out of their own free will – Petitioner no. 1 alleged harassment and torture by her husband since 2016 – Family members and husband of petitioner no. 1, along with local police officials, allegedly intimidated and threatened the petitioners, causing them to relocate to Delhi – Petitioners executed a Memorandum of Understanding inter se on 11.03.2026 and sent representations to authorities which remained unacted upon – Held: Both petitioners being Indian national citizens and consenting adults are entitled to the protection of fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution – Marital status or nature of relationship (whether married or in a live-in relationship) is not a germane factor when the Court is dealing with protection of life and personal liberty – Petition allowed; petitioners directed to be free to contact the SHO and Beat Constable/Duty Officer of PS Lodhi Colony, Delhi for assistance and protection as and when required [Paras 3–11].

Writ of Mandamus – Police Protection – Consenting Adults – Scope – A writ of mandamus or appropriate direction for police protection may be issued by a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution read with Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, in favour of consenting adults whose right to life and personal liberty is under threat – The validity or enforceability of a Memorandum of Understanding executed between the petitioners inter se is not required to be gone into for the purposes of granting such protection – Delhi Police directed to extend adequate assistance and protection to the petitioners in accordance with law – In the event of change of residence to another police station's jurisdiction, petitioners directed to share their details with the SHO of the concerned PS within three days of shifting [Paras 9–12].

Decision: Petition allowed – Petitioners entitled to police protection in accordance with law – SHO and Beat Constable/Duty Officer of PS Lodhi Colony, Delhi directed to provide adequate assistance and protection as and when required – In case of change of residence, petitioners to apprise the SHO of the concerned PS within three days.

Constitutional Law – Promissory Estoppel – Legitimate Expectation – COVID-19 Lockdown – Chief Minister's Press Conference Assurance – Enforceability – Division Bench held that the Chief Minister's statement of 29.03.2020, assuring that the State would pay rent of migrant tenants unable to pay due to poverty during lockdown, was not enforceable by mandamus as it was never reduced to writing in any Office Memorandum, Notification, Circular, Rule, Regulation or other instrument having the force of law – Two distinct assurances identified: (i) proscription on landlords compelling migrant tenants to vacate, backed by DDMA Order No. 122-A (enforceable); (ii) State undertaking to pay migrants' rent (not enforceable, unsupported by any legal instrument) – Statement of Chief Minister made "in the heat of the moment" without prior assessment of financial implications – Held: A mere oral statement by the Chief Minister in a press conference, however eminent the source, does not constitute an enforceable "promise" in law; no mandamus can issue to compel performance of a duty not grounded in law – Directions of Single Judge modified accordingly [Paras 42–48, 61–72, 81–82].

Promissory Estoppel – Government Statements – Speech vs. Policy Decision – Distinction between pre-election and post-election statements of a politician recognised – However, even a statement by an elected Chief Minister on a public platform cannot be enforced by mandamus unless translated into a formal written instrument of State – Statement made in a press conference without any executive instruction, Rule, Regulation or other document having the force of law cannot constitute a "promise" for the purpose of promissory estoppel – Principle that promissory estoppel does not operate at the level of Government policy reiterated – Union of India v. Ganesh Rice Mills and State of Karnataka v. K.K. Mohandas applied; State of Punjab v. Nestle India Ltd. distinguished – Held: Even if citizens believed the statement to be legally binding, such belief cannot authorise the Court to issue mandamus in the absence of a legal duty [Paras 35–38, 46–72].

Legitimate Expectation – Doctrine – Scope and Limitations – Doctrine of legitimate expectation does not create a legal right; it creates at best an expectation that the State will act consistently, transparently and predictably – Doctrine can be invoked to ensure compliance with natural justice before the authority resiles from an established promise or practice, but cannot independently found a claim for substantive relief – Sivananda C.T. v. High Court of Kerala (Constitution Bench) followed: claimant must establish (i) legitimacy of the expectation and (ii) that denial violated Article 14 – Since no legally enforceable promise was held out in the first instance, doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to bind the State to the press conference statement – Followed in State of U.P. v. Bhawana Mishra, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 37 [Paras 73–76].

Mandamus – Writ – Conditions for Issuance – A writ of mandamus can issue only to compel performance of a legal duty; it cannot be issued to direct the State to frame a policy – Asif Hameed v. State of J & K applied – DDMA Order No. 122-A proscribed landlords from evicting or collecting rent from migrant tenants during lockdown and was never challenged; landlords accordingly held disentitled from recovering rent for the lockdown period – However, no mandamus could issue directing the State to bear or reimburse such rent in the absence of any official instrument to that effect – State at liberty to take a policy decision on the matter voluntarily [Paras 53, 62, 71, 78–81].

Issue Estoppel – Maintainability – Division Bench of this Court in Gaurav Jain v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine Del 652, referred to; maintainability of writ not re-agitated by State before Division Bench – Single Judge's finding on maintainability affirmed [Paras 10, 20].

Decision: Appeal disposed of – Directions of Single Judge modified – Prayer for mandamus directing State to implement the Chief Minister's press conference assurance of 29.03.2020 rejected – DDMA Order No. 122-A upheld: landlords disentitled from recovering rent from migrant tenants for the lockdown period – State at liberty to take a voluntary policy decision regarding the Chief Minister's rent assurance if it so deems appropriate – No orders as to costs.

Maintenance – Section 125 CrPC – Enhancement – Divorced Wife – Revisional Jurisdiction – Applicant-wife married on 29.12.2008, divorced on 26.05.2016, sought enhancement of maintenance from Rs. 10,000/- to Rs. 25,000/- per month – Family Court fixed husband's notional income at Rs. 33,000/- per month applying the able-bodied principle in absence of documentary proof and awarded approximately one-third thereof as maintenance, accounting for husband's obligation to maintain second wife and son from remarriage – Husband's revision challenging the order was dismissed by a co-ordinate Bench on 01.02.2023 – Held: Applicant-wife failed to point out any patent error or miscarriage of justice in the impugned order; no case made out for interference in revisional jurisdiction – Revision dismissed [Paras 2–8].

Maintenance – Duty of Husband – Settled Principles – It is the legal and ethical duty of the husband to maintain his wife and children regardless of circumstances – Wife and children are entitled to the same standard of living they enjoyed while living with the husband – Possession of an LL.B. degree by the wife cannot per se be a ground to refuse or reduce maintenance – A divorced wife is equally entitled to maintenance as a matter of social welfare legislation – Held: These principles reaffirmed; maintenance obligation cannot be shirked [Paras 5–6].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Scope – Concurrent Findings – Revisional jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC is not to be exercised unless there is a patent error or miscarriage of justice in the impugned order – Where the Family Court has assigned proper reasons and arrived at a reasoned conclusion, concurrent findings should not be disturbed – Held: The test for exercise of revisional jurisdiction as laid down by the Supreme Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander not satisfied [Para 7].

Decision: Criminal Revision Application dismissed – Impugned order dated 11.01.2022 of the Family Court, Ahmedabad in Criminal Misc. Application No. 2787 of 2016 confirmed – Criminal Misc. Application (Direction) No. 1 of 2022 disposed of as not surviving – Liberty granted to the applicant-wife to seek modification of maintenance under Section 127 CrPC upon change of circumstances.

Contempt of Court – Civil Contempt – Breach of Solvent Surety – Implicit Undertaking to Court – Respondents furnished solvent surety in respect of Gat No. 775 as a condition for leave to defend the summary suit — Despite full knowledge of the subsisting surety condition reaffirmed by court orders dated 02.05.2011, 10.10.2011 and 07.04.2014, respondents executed a registered sale deed of the suretyship property in favour of a third party on 13.06.2023 — Held: A solvent surety furnished as a condition of leave to defend carries with it an implicit undertaking that the property shall remain unencumbered until disposal of the suit or further court order — Breach of such surety constitutes civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 — Respondents held guilty of contempt [Paras 15–18].

Contempt – Apology – Not Accepted as Bona Fide – Unconditional apology tendered by respondents accompanied by an offer to replace the solvent surety — Explanation offered that financial necessity compelled execution of the sale deed, and that the advocate handling the matter had expired — Held: Where contempt is committed with full knowledge and consciousness, the apology tendered is merely a legal device to wriggle out of responsibility and cannot be accepted as bona fide — Courts should not show compassion when disobedience of an undertaking or court order is committed with impunity — Apology is not just a word; a true apology requires introspection, atonement and self-reform — Mere expression of being sorry coupled with an offer to replace surety, made only after court recorded prima facie findings of breach, does not constitute a bona fide apology — Apology rejected [Paras 19–29].

Contempt – Sentence – Discharge on Undertaking and Settlement – Respondent no. 1 tendered an undertaking to pay the full suit claim of Rs. 4,60,00,000/- (principal of Rs. 2,30,00,000/- plus equivalent amount towards interest) — Consent terms signed by both parties — Held: In view of the undertaking and settlement, respondents discharged on payment of a fine of Rs. 2,000/- — Respondents directed to deposit principal amount of Rs. 2,30,00,000/- with the trial court on or before 08.05.2026, with interest payable in four equal monthly instalments of Rs. 57,50,000/- — Trial court to permit petitioners to withdraw the deposited amounts without condition and dispose of the suit in accordance with the consent terms [Paras 31–37].

Contempt – Solvent Surety – Breach – Third-Party Rights Created – Effect – Third-party purchaser of the suretyship property cannot be a necessary party to contempt proceedings — Beneficiaries of a contumacious transaction have no right or locus to be heard in contempt proceedings on the ground that they are bona fide purchasers for value without notice — Court exercising contempt jurisdiction may declare such transactions void or issue appropriate directions to nullify the advantage secured by the contemnor [Paras 20–24].

Decision: Respondents held guilty of contempt of court — Unconditional apology not accepted as bona fide — Respondents discharged on payment of fine of Rs. 2,000/- to be deposited before trial court within four weeks — Undertaking dated 04.05.2026 and consent terms dated 04.05.2026 taken on record and accepted as undertakings to the court — Trial court directed to permit petitioners to withdraw deposited amounts and to dispose of suit in accordance with consent terms — Contempt Petition disposed of accordingly.