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by sayum
13 October 2026 11:21 AM
"The impleadment of an officer or a department, without formally arraying the State as a juristic entity under Article 300 of the Constitution, renders the petition fundamentally defective when substantive relief is sought against the public exchequer." Supreme Court, in a judgment dated October 13, 2026, held that a writ petition seeking financial or administrative relief against the State is fundamentally defective if the State is not formally impleaded as a party respondent.
A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu observed that merely impleading an individual officer or a department does not satisfy the requirement of law, as sovereign liability cannot be fastened upon the State without its formal presence in the proceedings.
State Is A Necessary Party
The court underscored that the State of Maharashtra, being the entity against which a writ of mandamus for absorption was sought, was a necessary party to the litigation. The bench rejected the contention that the petition was competent simply because the State was represented by an officer or the Assistant Government Pleader, noting that such representation cannot dispense with the requirement of formal impleadment.
Requirement Of Formal Impleadment
The Supreme Court relied on the precedent in Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway, reinforcing that an employee cannot enforce an order for service benefits against the government by merely suing a subordinate official. The court clarified that any decree or order passed without arraying the State as a party would not bind the State, even if such an order were allowed to attain finality.
Reliance On Established Precedents
Drawing on the decision in Jagtu v. Suraj Mal, which examined Order 1 Rule 9 and Order 27 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, the court reiterated that where a declaration of rights is sought against the State, it must be a party to the proceedings. The court further cited Chaman Lal v. State of Punjab to deprecate the practice of granting monetary relief against the public exchequer in the absence of the State as a formal respondent.
"The belated impleadment of the 'Joint Director' does not cure the fundamental defect of non-joinder of the State of Maharashtra. An officer or a department of the State cannot be equated with the State itself for the purposes of fastening sovereign or financial liability."
Merits Of Absorption Policy
Beyond the procedural infirmity, the court addressed the substantive claim of the respondent regarding his absorption as a lecturer. The bench observed that the respondent was appointed in a college operating on a "no grant-in-aid" basis, which placed him outside the scope of the State's surplus absorption policy as defined in the Government Resolution dated March 24, 1994, and the subsequent 1997 corrigendum.
Negative Equality Not Permissible
The court dismissed the respondent’s argument seeking parity with another lecturer, noting that Article 14 of the Constitution does not permit the claim of negative equality. The bench clarified that if an irregular benefit was mistakenly conferred upon another individual in the past, it does not create a legal right for others to demand the same, as the law does not exist to perpetuate prior illegalities.
"If an illegal or irregular benefit has been conferred upon a similarly situated person inadvertently or by mistake, it does not confer any legal right on others to claim the same relief to perpetuate an illegality."
Invocation Of Extraordinary Jurisdiction
Despite finding that the respondent was not entitled to absorption on merits, the court noted the peculiar equities of the case, given that the respondent had remained out of employment since 1999 and had attained the age of superannuation. Invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the court set aside the High Court's direction for absorption.
To secure complete justice, the court directed the State of Maharashtra to pay a consolidated sum of Rs. 10,00,000 to the respondent within eight weeks, in full and final settlement of all claims. This direction was explicitly stated to be passed in the unique facts of the case and was restricted from being treated as a precedent for future litigation.
Date of Decision: 13 October 2026