Intellectual Property – Trade Mark – Interim Injunction – Infringement and Passing Off – 'AL KAMDHENU GOLD' Mark – Two cross-suits filed between Ashiana Ispat Limited (AIL) and Kamdhenu Limited (KL) concerning the mark 'AL KAMDHENU GOLD' (Impugned Mark) – AIL claims ownership by virtue of 2002 Agreement and long user since 2002 and seeks injunction against KL for passing off – KL, registered proprietor of 'KAMDHENU', 'KAMDHENU GOLD' and 'KAMDHENU GOLD TMT', claims infringement and passing off by AIL – Court finds AIL has not established prima facie case of prior user or independent goodwill – KL establishes prima facie case for infringement and passing off – Held: Interim injunction granted in favour of KL; AIL's application for interim injunction dismissed [Paras 36–59].

Trade Mark – Assignment vs. Licence – 2002 Agreement – Nature and Effect – AIL claimed the 2002 Agreement constituted a trade mark assignment under which KL unequivocally relinquished rights over the Impugned Mark and recognised AIL as absolute owner – Held: Assignment is a permanent transfer of proprietary rights whereas a licence is a permitted use without transfer of ownership – A plain reading of Clauses 5, 22–26 of the 2002 Agreement indicates that the parties operated within a licensor-licensee framework – Clause 24 expressly made AIL's ownership contingent upon final registration of the Impugned Mark – No registration ever obtained by AIL – Pervasive control retained by KL including termination rights confirms the arrangement was in substance and effect a licence user arrangement and not an assignment [Paras 20–29].

Trade Mark – Permitted Use – Section 48(2) of Trade Marks Act – Goodwill – Use of a trade mark by a licensee is deemed to be use by the proprietor for all purposes under the Trade Marks Act – AIL's advertisements during subsistence of 2002 Agreement constituted permitted use and any goodwill generated thereby enured to the benefit of KL as licensor – AIL's invoices from 1997 to 2024 did not bear the Impugned Mark but bore marks of KL – AIL therefore failed to establish independent prior user and goodwill in the Impugned Mark [Paras 38–44].

Contract – Novation – Section 62 of Contract Act – 2021 Agreement – Novation of 2002 Agreement – Recital E of 2021 Agreement expressly took note of 2002 Agreement and recorded that the product CTD bars/Tor Steel covered by 2002 Agreement had become obsolete and that AIL wished to continue the arrangement for manufacture of next-generation TMT bars under the Mark 'KAMDHENU NXT' – Mutual intention of parties to substitute 2002 Agreement with a new arrangement discernible from the terms and commercial context of 2021 Agreement – Held: Prima facie 2021 Agreement constitutes a novation of the 2002 Agreement [Paras 30–35].

Maintainability – Specific Performance – Declaratory Relief – Termination of Agreement – AIL filed suit for specific performance of 2002 Agreement disputing both novation and applicability of termination letter dated 19.09.2024 to 2002 Agreement – Where a party disputes that a contract has been terminated, unilateral termination may constitute repudiatory breach entitling the aggrieved party to treat the contract as continuing and seek specific performance without first obtaining declaratory relief – Distinction drawn from I.S. Sikandar (supra) where termination was undisputed – Maintainability objection kept open for determination on merits [Paras 7–14].

Family Arrangement – Licensor-Licensee – Estoppel – AIL's claim of joint family management and joint development of 'KAMDHENU' Mark rejected – All three agreements between AIL and KL expressly stated the parties were unrelated, distinct and separate entities operating on a purely commercial and contractual basis – All rights in trade marks and goodwill vest in corporate entities and not individual directors or families – Claims based on family arrangement do not impact legal rights between unaffiliated commercial entities – AIL as licensee/ex-licensee estopped from challenging KL's proprietary rights in KAMDHENU Mark and its formatives [Paras 17–19, 44].

Interim Injunction – Balance of Convenience – Irreparable Harm – Products at issue are reinforcement steel bars used in transportation and infrastructure projects where safety and structural integrity are critical – Any defect in goods bearing the Impugned Mark likely to be associated with KL thereby damaging KL's reputation and goodwill – Such harm cannot be adequately compensated in monetary terms – Balance of convenience favours KL as registered proprietor of 'KAMDHENU', 'KAMDHENU GOLD' and 'KAMDHENU GOLD TMT' – Held: Defendants in KL Suit restrained from manufacturing, marketing, selling or dealing in products bearing the Impugned Mark or any deceptively similar mark incorporating 'KAMDHENU' as an essential feature [Paras 45–57].

Decision: I.A. No. 14115/2025 in CS(COMM) 569/2025 filed by Kamdhenu Limited allowed – Defendants in KL Suit jointly and severally restrained from using the Impugned Mark 'AL KAMDHENU GOLD' or any mark bearing 'KAMDHENU' as an essential feature in relation to steel products – I.A. No. 3990/2025 in CS(COMM) 130/2025 filed by Ashiana Ispat Limited dismissed.

Criminal Law – Rape and Kidnapping – Acquittal – Appellant convicted by Trial Court under Sections 376 and 363 IPC for allegedly kidnapping a minor girl in a TSR and confining her for nine days during which he raped her five times – Sentenced to RI of 7 years under Section 376 IPC and RI of 2 years under Section 363 IPC – On appeal, High Court finds the testimony of the prosecutrix riddled with material inconsistencies, improbabilities, and unnatural conduct throughout the incident – Age of prosecutrix not proved in accordance with law – Prosecution failed to establish essential ingredients of the offences beyond reasonable doubt – Held: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; Appellant acquitted [Paras 1–25].

Sole Testimony – Sterling Quality – Reliability – It is settled law that conviction in sexual offence cases can rest on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it inspires confidence and is free from material contradictions – However, the said principle is not absolute – Where the testimony suffers from improbabilities and inconsistencies going to the root of the prosecution's case, corroboration becomes necessary – In the instant case, the prosecutrix made no attempt to raise alarm during TSR journey lasting 1½ hours, failed to seek help during confinement despite proximity of neighbours and PCO owner, returned home without police assistance, and expressed concern for the Appellant's arrest rather than her own safety – Testimony held not of sterling quality and unfit to sustain conviction without corroboration [Paras 1–7, 16, 24].

Proof of Age – Minor – Secondary Evidence – Documentary Evidence – Prosecution relied on photocopies of Birth Certificate and school records to establish that the prosecutrix was below 16 years of age – No original documents produced and no foundation laid for leading secondary evidence – Parents gave contradictory statements regarding year of birth – School register entry of date of birth has no evidentiary value unless the person making the entry or furnishing the information is examined – Age of prosecutrix held not proved in accordance with law – Charge under Section 363 IPC consequently unsubstantiated [Paras 18–21].

Medical Evidence – Corroborative Value – MLC – Two-Finger Test – Medical evidence in rape cases is corroborative in nature and not substantive – MLC of prosecutrix showed no injury on her person, ruling out forcible sexual act – The now-banned two-finger test result indicating admission of two fingers created an additional possibility inconsistent with the prosecution's version – Medical evidence did not conclusively establish guilt nor complete the chain of circumstances [Para 22].

Investigation – Lapses – Non-Examination of Witnesses – Multiple lapses in investigation noted including non-examination of TSR driver, landlord of confinement premises, neighbours, and PCO owner; non-recovery of knife; absence of site plan; and inordinate delay of two months in recording statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. – Held: While defective investigation alone cannot be a ground for acquittal where reliable ocular evidence exists, in the present case the cumulative lapses coupled with an unreliable sole testimony render the prosecution's case insufficient to sustain conviction [Para 17].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned judgment dated 18.12.2008 and order on sentence dated 20.12.2008 set aside – Appellant acquitted – Bail bond cancelled and surety discharged.

Ferry Ghat – Transfer During Pendency of Writ Petition – Circumvention of Court Proceedings – Zilla Parishad transferred Ramchandrakhali ferry ghat to the Panchayat Samity by resolution dated 12.03.2025, after receipt of notice of the writ petition served on 06.01.2025 – Transfer effected despite pendency of proceedings amounts to defiance of court and an attempt to overreach the Court – Transfer held devoid of legal sanction – All subsequent acts including lease granted to added respondent declared illegal – Zilla Parishad directed to take back the ferry ghat within two weeks and float fresh tender within one week thereafter under the Jaladhara scheme notification dated 28.01.2020 [Paras 7, 9, 10].

Ferry Ghat – Classification as "Small" – Revenue Loss – Lease Amount – The Zilla Parishad sought to justify transfer on the ground that Ramchandrakhali was a small ferry ghat – Held: Classification unsustainable as the ferry ghat carries a lease amount of Rs. 17,96,850/- compared to Rs. 72,000/- for Chandipur Masjidbati ferry ghat – Panchayat Samity leased out the ghat at a much lower rent than could have been fetched by the Zilla Parishad, resulting in revenue loss to the State exchequer – Ferry ghat similarly placed with the other three ghats reverted to the Zilla Parishad; pendency of writ petition cannot be a ground to distinguish it [Paras 2, 9].

Writ Jurisdiction – Acts in Defiance of Court – Principle Against Overreaching – Where a respondent, upon receiving notice of court proceedings, hurriedly effects a transfer with a view to circumventing the impending order or to steal a march over the opponent, such act is liable to be set aside – Reliance placed on Ranjit Kumar Halder v. State of West Bengal (CPAN 1424 of 2003 in WPST No. 612 of 2003) and Daniel v. Ferguson, (1891) 2 Chancery Division 27 – Held: Transfer of ferry ghat after notice of writ petition falls squarely within this principle [Paras 8, 9].

Decision: Writ Petition disposed of – Transfer of Ramchandrakhali ferry ghat to Panchayat Samity set aside – Zilla Parishad directed to take back the ferry ghat within two weeks and float fresh tender within one week thereafter – Added respondent permitted to participate in fresh tender and to take necessary steps in accordance with law if aggrieved by acts of Panchayat Samity – Added respondent to continue operating the ferry ghat until fresh tender notice is floated – No order as to costs.

Motor Vehicles Act – Section 163A – Personal Accident Cover – Owner-Insured – Jurisdiction of MACT – Deceased owner of motorcycle died in accident caused by unknown vehicle – Legal heirs filed claim petition under Section 163A before Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal – Tribunal awarded Rs. 15,00,000/- with interest at 7.5% p.a. relying on personal accident package policy – Held: Owner/insured, not being a third party, is not entitled to claim compensation under Section 163A before the MACT relying upon personal accident coverage – Award set aside – Appeal allowed [Paras 6, 9, 10].

Third Party Liability – Owner vs. Third Party – Section 147, Motor Vehicles Act – Scope of Compulsory Insurance – Risk to the owner/insured of the vehicle is not required to be covered under Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act – Owner/insured or legal heirs of deceased owner cannot maintain a petition under Section 163A before the MACT for injuries/death relying upon personal accident cover – They may directly approach the insurer under the personal accident cover and in case of failure, approach the Consumer Forum or other appropriate forum [Paras 6, 9, 10].

Conflicting Decisions – Reference to Larger Bench – Supreme Court – Issue of whether legal heirs of vehicle owners who died in accidents can claim compensation under no-fault liability provisions of Section 163A, or whether such claims are limited to third party liability, referred by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) Nos. 15447–48 of 2024 (Wakis Afrin (Minor) v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.) to a larger bench due to conflicting decisions of coordinate benches – High Court held the present case governed by its own earlier binding precedent [Para 9].

Plea of Limited Liability – Stage of Raising – Distinguishing Supreme Court Precedent – In Manjusha v. United India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2025 SCC Online SC 1512), the Supreme Court allowed the claimants' appeal since the plea of limited liability was neither raised before the Tribunal nor in the Memorandum of Appeal – Distinguished: In the present case, the Insurance Company raised the question of limited liability in the Memorandum of Appeal – Hence the said decision held inapplicable [Para 9].

Decision: Civil Miscellaneous Appeal allowed – No costs – Award dated 04.03.2024 in M.C.O.P. No. 688 of 2021 set aside – Respondents/petitioners at liberty to directly approach insurer under personal accident cover and if not compensated, to approach Consumer Forum or other appropriate forum – Connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

Civil Procedure – Second Appeal – Substantial Question of Law – Section 100 CPC – Second appeal admitted in 1979 on grounds mentioned in memo of appeal without framing any substantial question of law – Held: Admission of second appeal on mere grounds without stating a substantial question of law as required under Section 100(3) CPC was not appropriate – A substantial question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case – Question must emerge from sustainable findings of fact and it must be necessary to decide it for a just decision – No substantial question of law found to exist on facts – Second appeal dismissed [Paras 4–5, 11–12].

Order 41 Rule 31 CPC – Points for Determination – Mandatory or Directory – Framing of points for determination by First Appellate Court is not always mandatory – Whether there has been substantial compliance must be determined on the nature of judgment delivered in each case – Non-compliance by itself does not vitiate the judgment or render it wholly void if there has been substantial compliance – Where no points are actually raised by appellant, First Appellate Court is not required to frame points for determination – Judgment of First Appellate Court rejecting all grounds need not separately frame points where none were in issue [Paras 6–8].

Second Appeal – Findings of Fact – Non-Interference – It is settled law that findings of fact, howsoever erroneous, cannot be reopened or disturbed in second appeal – Second appeal must be adjudicated only upon a substantial question of law – Once no substantial question of law is found to exist, there is no occasion to re-appreciate evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion [Para 11].

Pecuniary Jurisdiction – Suit Valuation – Defect Cured by Amendment – Suit originally under-valued was subsequently amended by plaintiffs who corrected the valuation and made good the deficiency in court fee – Issue of pecuniary jurisdiction accordingly held to be non-existent at appellate stage – Issue not pressed in first appeal – Not a substantial question of law [Para 10].

Decision: Second appeal dismissed – No substantial question of law involved – Interim order, if any, vacated [Para 12].

Specific Performance – Sale Agreement – Two Agreements Executed Same Day – Public Policy – Section 23, Indian Contract Act – Plaintiff's assignor and original defendant executed two sale agreements on the same day in respect of 8 acres of land — one registered at a sale price of Rs. 50,000/- per acre and another unregistered at Rs. 2,82,000/- per acre — admitted intention being to evade stamp duty and registration charges — Held: Though the contracts for sale of properties are individually lawful, the object and intention behind executing two such agreements is unlawful as it defeats the provisions of law and causes loss to the exchequer — Both sale agreements held void as against public policy under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act — Plaintiff not entitled to relief of specific performance of a void contract [Paras 22, 22.1].

Assignment of Contractual Rights – Privity of Contract – Section 15, Specific Relief Act – The original agreement holder Sivaraman assigned his rights and liabilities under both sale agreements to the plaintiff — Neither Ex-A.1 nor Ex-A.2 was in the nature of a personal contract, nor did they contain any clause prohibiting assignment — Terms of both agreements permitted execution of sale deed in favour of Sivaraman or his nominees — Held: Assignment by Sivaraman in favour of plaintiff is valid — Privity of contract exists between plaintiff and original defendant — Assignee entitled to seek specific performance in absence of express or implied prohibition against assignment [Paras 16, 17, 18].

Payment Receipts – Genuineness – Burden of Proof – Defendants alleged that Ex-A.3 and Ex-A.4, receipts for Rs. 6,00,000/- and Rs. 9,00,000/- respectively, were fabricated using blank signed papers obtained by the plaintiff's father in earlier money transactions — Held: Defendants failed to prove the foundational fact of any money transaction between the original defendant and the plaintiff's father — Ex-A.3 and Ex-A.4 bear the original defendant's thumb impression and signature, are duly stamped, and are supported by the evidence of attesting witnesses P.W.1 to P.W.3 — Nothing elicited in cross-examination to discredit their testimony — Payment receipts held genuine and true — Trial Court's contrary finding set aside [Paras 19, 20, 21].

Money Decree – Unjust Enrichment – Void Contract – Though the sale agreements are void on account of unlawful object, the money transactions of Rs. 2,00,000/-, Rs. 6,00,000/- and Rs. 9,00,000/-, totalling Rs. 17,00,000/- paid as part sale consideration are not tainted by illegality — Denial of recovery of the said amount to the plaintiff-assignee would result in unjust enrichment of the defendants — In the interest of justice and equity, money decree granted for Rs. 17,00,000/- with simple interest at 6% per annum from the date of suit till realisation from the properties left behind by the original defendant [Para 24].

Permanent Injunction – Possession – Section 53A, Transfer of Property Act – Plaintiff, even on his own pleadings, did not take possession under any registered document — In evidence, plaintiff admitted that the defendants are in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties — Plaintiff not in lawful possession — Not entitled to the relief of permanent injunction — Trial Court's denial of injunction affirmed [Para 23].

Decision: Appeal Suit allowed in part — Relief of specific performance and permanent injunction declined — Money decree passed in favour of plaintiff for Rs. 17,00,000/- with simple interest at 6% per annum from date of suit till realisation — No order as to costs in Original Suit or Appeal Suit.

Partition Suit — Limitation — Preliminary Issue — Remand — Appellants filed suit for partition of suit schedule property and declaration that the Will dated 03.03.1956 was not binding on them — Trial Court, after remand by High Court, decided issue of limitation as a preliminary issue and dismissed the suit as barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 — Held: Question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law — Whether Article 110 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (providing twelve-year limitation for enforcing right to share in joint family property) or Article 113 (residuary, three-year period) applies could not be decided without evidence — Trial Court erred in deciding the issue prior to recording of evidence — Impugned order set aside and matter remanded for trial [Paras 12, 25, 26, 27].

Limitation — Article 110 vs. Article 113, Limitation Act, 1963 — Suit by Coparceners — Where plaintiffs claim to be coparceners of the defendants and the suit schedule property devolved through a registered partition deed of 1940, the applicability of Article 110 (twelve-year period for a person excluded from joint family property) cannot be brushed aside at the preliminary stage — The issue of which Article governs the suit requires adjudication on evidence — Reliance placed on Mohinder Kumar Mehra v. Roop Rani Mehra, (2018) 2 SCC 132 [Paras 23, 26].

Preliminary Issue — Limitation as Mixed Question of Fact and Law — While limitation issues may be framed as preliminary issues, they cannot be decided solely on admitted facts when disputed questions of law and fact bearing on the applicable Article of limitation remain unresolved — The trial Court erred by selectively relying upon undisputed facts and failed to appreciate that applicability of Article 110 or Article 113 is a matter requiring evidence — Reliance placed on Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, (2020) 17 SCC 260 [Paras 22, 24, 25].

Decision: Appeal allowed — Impugned order of the trial Court dated 07.11.2012 in O.S. No. 6732/2006 set aside — Matter remanded to the trial Court to proceed with recording of evidence and thereafter decide issue No. 11 pertaining to limitation along with all other issues.

Co-operative Milk Union – Government Land – Lease – Resumption – Validity of G.O. – Petitioner/E.R.C.M.P. Union challenged Ext.P15 G.O. dated 11.06.2025 bifurcating two acres of puramboke land, limiting 70 cents to the petitioner and allotting 130 cents to the 6th respondent/K.L.D. Board for a Central Government scheme – Petitioner contended that a 99-year lease was subsisting and could not be unilaterally resumed – Government contended that no formal lease deed existed and the Munnar chilling plant was never transferred to the 4th respondent/K.C.M.M.F – Held: Lease in favour of K.C.M.M.F. established through Government decisions and orders despite absence of formal deed – Munnar chilling plant included in the transfer – Government power to resume under Rule 15(4) of Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 lawfully exercised – Sufficient notice given – Writ Petition dismissed [Paras 2, 9, 14, 19, 21].

Lease – Creation Without Formal Deed – Co-operative Entities – Government Decisions – Cabinet Resolution – Petitioner Union claimed benefit of 99-year lease granted in favour of 4th respondent/K.C.M.M.F. vide Ext.P3 G.O. dated 24.06.1985 – Government disputed existence of concluded lease in absence of formal lease deed – Held: A narration of chronological events from 1969 through Cabinet Notes (Ext.P19), G.O.s (Exts. R3(d), P3, P5, P5(a)) and valuation reports clearly establishes lease in favour of K.C.M.M.F. – Absence of formal lease deed cannot, by itself, lead to conclusion that no lease was created – Petitioner Union, acting under the Federation, is entitled to claim the benefit of such lease [Para 9].

Transfer of Munnar Chilling Plant – Whether Excluded From Lease – G.O. Interpretation – Respondents relied on clause 5.0 of Ext.R6(j) G.O. dated 07.11.1998 to contend that the Munnar chilling plant does not find mention therein and was therefore never transferred to K.C.M.M.F – Held: Ext.R6(j), issued to effect financial re-adjustments and share arrangements, cannot nullify transactions already completed – Specific reference to the Munnar chilling plant in Ext.R6(e) G.O. and earlier instruments establishes its inclusion in the transfer – Non-mention in clause 5.0 of Ext.R6(j) cannot be given extra significance against the weight of other G.O.s – If Government intended to exclude the Munnar plant from transfer, it ought to have expressly stated so and resumed possession in a manner known to law [Paras 12–14].

Government Power – Resumption of Leased Land – Rule 15(4), Kerala Land Assignment Rules, 1964 – Government lease of puramboke land governed by the Kerala Government Land Assignment Act, 1960 and Rules framed thereunder – Rule 15(4) empowers the competent authority to terminate a lease after 60 days' written notice to the assignee, if land is required for Government or public purposes – Impugned Ext.P15 resumed 130 cents out of the leased 2 acres for use by the K.L.D. Board in connection with a Central Government scheme, which constitutes a public purpose – Held: Action of the Government is traceable to Rule 15(4) and legally sustainable [Paras 16–19].

Notice – Substantial Compliance – 60 Days' Notice – Rule 15(4) – Petitioner Union contended that mandatory 60 days' notice under Rule 15(4) was not given before issuance of Ext.P15 – Held: A series of meetings commencing from 01.02.2024, committee inspections, deliberations by Secretaries, and multiple opportunities to produce title documents afforded sufficient notice to the petitioner Union – The purpose of the notice requirement is to enable the lessee to relocate; since 70 cents were retained by the petitioner for its continued operations, no question of relocation arose – Doctrine of substantial compliance applies – No violation of notice requirement [Paras 20–21].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed.

Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 – Section 72(2) – Power of District Court – Remand – Reference Answered – District Court while exercising power under Section 72(2) has no power to remand the proceedings back to the Charity Commissioner – The provision empowers the Court only to confirm, revoke or modify the decision or remit the amount of surcharge – The word 'remand' is conspicuously absent from the provision and its omission is intentional – It is impermissible to read into the provision a power of remand which the legislature has consciously not conferred – Power to remand, being an exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature to confer, cannot be implied or inferred from the words 'confirm, revoke or modify' [Paras 16, 23–24].

Statutory Interpretation – Plain Meaning Rule – Words of a statute must be interpreted in their plain grammatical meaning – When words are clear, plain and unambiguous, courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences – 'Confirm' means to verify or approve; 'revoke' means to annul, cancel or make void; 'modify' means to partially change, alter without radical transformation, or to narrow or enlarge — none of these includes power to remand and redirect the lower forum to rehear and determine the matter – Courts cannot adopt hypothetical constructions contrary to the plain words used [Para 24].

Ratio Decidendi – Binding Effect – Obiter Dictum – Principle underlying a decision is binding and must be discerned in the context of the question involved in that case from which the decision takes its colour – A decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition it did not decide – Obiter dictum of the Supreme Court is binding under Article 141 only to the extent of observations on points raised and decided – Full Bench observations in Prabhakar Sambhu Chaudhary (supra) regarding powers of the appellate court were made in the context of scope of Section 72(4) and not Section 72(2), and hence are not binding on the question of remand under Section 72(2) [Paras 12, 15–16].

Scheme of Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 – Distinction between Section 70(3) and Section 72(2) – Under Section 70(3), the Charity Commissioner is expressly empowered to direct the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to make further inquiry or take additional evidence, i.e., effectively remand the matter – No such power is conferred on the District Court under Section 72(2) – This legislative contrast fortifies the conclusion that power of remand under Section 72(2) is intentionally absent [Paras 17–19, 23].

Decision: Reference answered – District Court while exercising power under Section 72(2) of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 has no power to remand the proceedings – Matter to be placed before the learned Single Judge for further consideration.