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by Admin
14 December 2025 5:24 PM
“Casting doubt upon a finding returned by the Court below, when the same isn’t within immediate purview, cannot be justified.” - In a powerful reaffirmation of judicial discipline and victim-centric justice, the Supreme Court of India set aside the Gujarat High Court's decision suspending the sentence of a convict in a POCSO case. Emphasizing that appellate courts must not lightly interfere with trial court convictions, the bench observed, “Till and such time, the finding of the Trial Court is examined independently by the High Court, and proven to be incorrect, it has to be taken as the position in law.”
The Court held that the High Court erred in doubting the age of the victim and undermining the findings of the trial court without a proper hearing under Section 374 of the CrPC, stating emphatically that, “suspension of sentence is the exception and not the rule.”
This case arose from the conviction of Jigresh Kumar alias Jigo Rajubhai Padhiyar, who had been held guilty under Sections 363, 366(A), 376(3) of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The Special POCSO Court at Anand, Gujarat, had sentenced him to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, in addition to lesser concurrent sentences for other charges.
The conviction was based on the prosecution’s case that the victim, a minor, was sexually assaulted by the accused, who had harassed her since she was just eleven years old. The court found that the age of the victim was established by documentary evidence, including panchayat records and a birth certificate.
Despite this, the Gujarat High Court suspended the sentence during appeal, questioning the authenticity of the birth certificate and concluding that the age of the victim was doubtful. The mother of the victim, aggrieved by this order, approached the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court confined itself to examining the correctness and legality of the High Court’s exercise of power under Section 389 CrPC, which allows suspension of sentence pending appeal. It reiterated that this provision is not to be used casually, especially in cases involving heinous offences like sexual assault on minors.
Quoting from its own precedent in Kashmira Singh v. State of Punjab, the Court acknowledged that delays in hearing appeals can, in rare cases, justify suspension of sentence. However, it drew a sharp line:
“The rationale of this practice can have no application where the sentence imposed is 20 years... The judicial use of this power must not be at the cost of ‘legitimate public aspirations’, which here would be, all things considered, Respondent No.2 be confined in jail.”
Referring to Afjal Ansari v. State of U.P. and Shivani Tyagi v. State of U.P., the bench held that the suspension of sentence should not be allowed where the trial court’s findings stand unchallenged and unexamined. The Court found the High Court's doubts about the victim’s age unjustified and beyond the scope of Section 389 proceedings.
It stated unequivocally: “Whether or not the finding regarding the age of the victim is correct or not... is a question open for consideration in the jurisdiction under Section 374 CrPC, and not under Section 389 CrPC.”
Setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court directed that the accused surrender forthwith. The bench further clarified that if the appeal remains unheard by the High Court within eighteen months, the accused may renew his bail application. But until then, the trial court’s findings must be respected.
The Court concluded: “We are of the considered view that the High Court ought not to have suspended the sentence as was imposed by the Trial Court.”
This judgment is a stern reminder that suspension of sentence does not equate to setting aside a conviction. The Supreme Court has drawn a firm boundary around the discretionary power under Section 389 CrPC, insisting that such power must not be exercised at the expense of victims’ rights, public trust, and the authority of trial court findings.
As the Court remarked with clear judicial intent, “Casting doubt upon a finding returned by the Court below... cannot be justified.” The decision sends a strong signal that convicted offenders in child sexual abuse cases must not find premature reprieve unless the conviction itself is judicially overturned.
Date of Decision: April 21, 2025