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by sayum
27 December 2025 6:11 AM
“The Sub-Registrar is not a quasi-judicial authority — he performs an executive function and has no power to adjudicate title disputes” – In a significant ruling reaffirming the limited executive powers of registering authorities, the Madras High Court on 12th September 2025 held that a Sub-Registrar cannot refuse registration of a sale deed based on private third-party objections or mere pendency of a police complaint.
The Court termed such refusals “unsustainable, unlawful, and outside the scope of the Registration Act”, emphasizing that registration is an administrative act, not an adjudicatory process.
“Mere Objections from a Stranger Cannot Throttle the Statutory Right of Sale”
The core issue in the case was the refusal memo dated 02.09.2025 issued by the Sub-Registrar of Pappireddipatti. The petitioner, A.K.K. Kannan, had presented a sale deed dated 25.08.2025 for registration. However, the registering officer refused registration on the basis of an objection raised by one Ponmalai Senthil, who alleged an unregistered sale agreement for the same property and the existence of a police complaint.
The Court categorically rejected this reasoning:
“Merely citing a third-party objection or pendency of a police complaint does not fall under any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 162 of the Registration Rules or Sections 22-A or 22-B of the Registration Act. Such refusal is without jurisdiction.”
“Registration Officers Have No Power to Decide Disputes — Only to Execute the Process”
Justice Krishnan Ramasamy relied on a series of precedents and statutory provisions to lay down the well-settled position that a Sub-Registrar is not a judge of title or ownership. Quoting extensively from the judgment in W.P. No. 11056 of 2024 and reiterating rulings from the Supreme Court and Division Benches of the High Court, the Court said:
“The Sub-Registrar performs an executive act under Sections 34 and 35 of the Registration Act. He does not decide any ‘lis’ between parties. He cannot refuse registration unless the case strictly falls under the circumstances enumerated in Rule 162 or Sections 22-A and 22-B.”
“Circulars Cannot Override the Act — Interpretation of Law Belongs Exclusively to Courts”
Condemning the routine reliance on departmental circulars or letters from police to justify refusal of documents, the Court noted:
“Circulars cannot override statutory provisions. Interpretation of law is the exclusive domain of Courts. It is not open for registering officers to interpret judicial decisions or selectively apply them.”
Citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Pernod Ricard India Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court reiterated that:
“The Court has the exclusive function of authoritatively construing legislation. No administrative agency or police officer can override the legal framework with informal objections.”
“Police Complaints, Alleged Agreements, and Objections Are No Ground for Refusal”
The judgment strongly reemphasized that mere allegations or private complaints do not displace the statutory right to register a property document:
“Even if a criminal complaint exists, unless and until a competent court stays or prohibits registration, the Sub-Registrar cannot refuse registration on the ground of an alleged offence or unregistered document.”
The Court also emphasized that any third party with grievances must approach a civil court and not block registration through letters or oral objections.
“Rule 162 and Sections 22-A & 22-B Alone Determine Refusal Power — Nothing Beyond”
The Court drew a hard line on the only valid grounds for refusal, listing the exhaustive circumstances under Rule 162, which include:
Outside these, no other ground can justify refusal.
“Statutory Framework Does Not Allow the Registrar to Withhold Registration Over Title Disputes”
The Court reiterated the consistent judicial view that title disputes cannot be examined by registration officers:
“If someone disputes title, the proper course is to approach the civil court. The Sub-Registrar cannot adjudicate ownership claims. He is not expected to evaluate the title or irregularities.”
Refusal Set Aside, Registration Ordered Within Two Weeks
Allowing the petition, the Court directed: “The impugned refusal memo dated 02.09.2025 is hereby set aside. The second respondent is directed to register the sale deed dated 25.08.2025 within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of this order.”
“Routine Refusals Based on Protests Are Judicially Unsustainable — The Law Must Prevail Over Practice”
This ruling is a bold reaffirmation that registration authorities cannot become gatekeepers of private disputes and that sale and registration rights cannot be blocked by protest letters or frivolous complaints. The Court made it clear:
“It is not open to the registering authority to interpret court decisions or apply departmental instructions that contradict settled law. Any such conduct violates the statutory scheme and constitutional property rights under Article 300A.”
Date of Decision: 12 September 2025