Not Every Broken Promise Is Rape: Delhi High Court Draws Clear Line Between ‘Suspicion’ and ‘Grave Suspicion’ in False Promise to Marry Case

In a significant pronouncement on the contours of consent under Section 90 IPC and the threshold for framing of charge under Section 376 IPC, the Delhi High Court has upheld the discharge of an accused in a case alleging rape on the basis of a false promise of marriage.

Justice Saurabh Banerjee dismissed the revision petitions filed by the prosecutrix and the State, affirming the order dated 31.05.2017 passed by the learned ASJ, Tis Hazari Courts, discharging the accused of the offence under Section 376 IPC.

The Court held that the material on record did not disclose “grave suspicion” against the accused and that the prosecutrix’s consent could not be said to be vitiated under Section 90 IPC.

“Consent Cannot Be Said to Have Been Vitiated Within the Meaning of Section 90 IPC”

The prosecution case rested on the allegation that the accused, a constable in Delhi Police and a distant relative of the prosecutrix, established physical relations with her on 08.10.2015 on the assurance that he would marry her, but later refused.

The High Court closely examined the FIR dated 01.12.2015 and the earlier complaint dated 02.11.2015. It noted that the parties were in a relationship for nearly two years and were well acquainted. The prosecutrix voluntarily travelled from Ghaziabad to Delhi to meet the accused and went to his rented accommodation. After the incident, she was dropped back the same night and picked up by her father.

The Court observed that the prosecutrix was “a matured and an educated woman” and that there was no allegation of repeated acts. The alleged incident was a solitary instance. The medical examination did not reveal any external injuries.

Significantly, the Court found no prima facie material suggesting that the promise of marriage was false at inception or that it was made solely to obtain consent. In the absence of such material, the Court held that “her consent cannot be said to have been vitiated within the meaning of Section 90 of the IPC.”

The judgment reinforces the settled principle that for consent to be vitiated on the ground of misconception of fact, the prosecution must prima facie show that the promise was false from the very beginning and was a mere tool of deception.

“If Two Views Are Possible… Discharge Is Justified” – Grave Suspicion Test Reaffirmed

At the stage of discharge under Sections 227 and 228 Cr.P.C., the Court reiterated that the Trial Court is not to conduct a mini-trial but must assess whether the material gives rise to “grave suspicion.”

Quoting from Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, the High Court reproduced the principle that if “two views are equally possible” and the material gives rise merely to suspicion and not grave suspicion, the Judge is fully justified in discharging the accused.

In the present case, the long-standing relationship, voluntary conduct, delay in lodging the complaint, and absence of material indicating fraudulent intent at inception led the Court to conclude that the essential ingredients of Section 376 IPC were not prima facie made out.

Delay and Conduct – Relevant at Threshold Stage

The alleged incident occurred on 08.10.2015, the complaint was lodged on 02.11.2015, and the FIR was registered on 01.12.2015. While acknowledging that delay alone is not fatal in sexual offence cases, the Court considered the overall conduct of the parties and the surrounding circumstances at the stage of assessing grave suspicion.

The absence of repeated allegations and the admitted consensual relationship weighed with the Court in concluding that the case did not warrant trial.

Revisional Jurisdiction Is Not an Appeal

The Court emphasized that it was exercising powers under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C., and interference is warranted only in cases of “glaring perversity, illegality or inherent flaws.”

Relying upon Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander and State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, the Court held that where the view taken by the Trial Court is plausible and based on the material on record, the High Court ought not to substitute its own view.

Finding no patent illegality or perversity in the order dated 31.05.2017, the High Court refused to interfere.

Promise to Marry Cases Require Proof of Deception at Inception

The judgment sends a strong message that not every failed relationship or broken promise to marry would amount to rape. For Section 90 IPC to apply, there must be prima facie material that the promise was false from inception and that the consent was obtained by deliberate deception.

In the absence of such grave suspicion, the criminal law cannot be invoked to convert a consensual relationship into a prosecution for rape.

The revision petitions were accordingly dismissed, and the discharge of the accused under Section 376 IPC was upheld.

Date of Decision: 17/02/2026