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by sayum
20 February 2026 8:24 AM
“Where No Date Is Fixed, Limitation Commences from the Date of the Decree” – In a recent order Supreme Court of India comprising Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan reaffirmed a crucial but often overlooked principle: a decree granting mandatory injunction must be executed within three years from the date of decree if no time for compliance is specified.
Dismissing the Special Leave Petition, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Execution Court and the High Court that the execution application was barred by limitation under Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The ruling underscores that the remedy of execution for mandatory injunction is not open-ended and that delay beyond the statutory period is fatal.
The litigation stemmed from a civil suit filed by the petitioners which was initially dismissed by the trial court. In appeal, however, the First Appellate Court, by judgment and decree dated 06.01.2005, reversed the findings and granted relief in favour of the plaintiffs.
The Appellate Court declared the cancellation of allotment by the respondents to be “illegal, wrong and unconstitutional” and granted a mandatory injunction directing compliance with an earlier order. Additionally, it restrained the respondents from demolishing the building or interfering with possession until compensation was assessed and paid.
The decree concluded by allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit as prayed for.
However, despite the decree being passed on 06.01.2005, the petitioners filed an execution application under Order XXI Rule 32 CPC only on 12.08.2010, seeking enforcement of the mandatory injunction portion of the decree.
Limitation Under Article 135
The core issue before the Court was whether the execution application was barred under Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
Article 135 prescribes a limitation period of three years for “the enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction,” and specifies that the period runs from “the date of the decree or where a date is fixed for performance, such date.”
The decree dated 06.01.2005 did not fix any date for performance. Therefore, limitation necessarily began from the date of the decree itself.
The execution application having been filed more than five years later, it was beyond the statutory three-year period.
The Court noted that the execution application was confined to enforcement of the mandatory injunction part of the decree. Since Article 135 squarely governs such enforcement, the limitation bar applied directly.
The Bench observed that as no date for performance was specified in the decree, “the limitation period would commence from the date of the decree,” as rightly held by the Execution Court.
In these circumstances, the Court found “no justification to interfere with the impugned order.”
The Special Leave Petition was accordingly dismissed.
Order XXI Rule 32 Subject to Limitation
An important takeaway from the ruling is that invocation of Order XXI Rule 32 CPC does not dilute the operation of Article 135. While Order XXI Rule 32 provides the procedural mechanism for enforcing injunctions, it remains subject to the substantive limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act.
The decision reiterates that execution of a mandatory injunction is governed by a specific limitation regime, unlike certain other decrees where longer periods may apply.
The Supreme Court has once again emphasised that statutory limitation cannot be bypassed under the guise of execution proceedings. Where a decree grants mandatory injunction and does not prescribe a time for compliance, the decree-holder must act within three years from the date of the decree.
Delay beyond this statutory window renders the execution application unsustainable.
The ruling serves as a reminder that while a decree may conclusively determine rights, its enforcement is strictly conditioned by limitation law.
Date of Decision: 17/02/2026