Section 75 of the JJ Act | Moral Responsibility Cannot Replace Legal Requirement: Supreme Court Quashes Criminal Case Against School Chairman in Child Sexual Assault Matter

“Unless Actual Charge or Control Over the Victim Child Is Proven, Section 75 of the JJ Act Cannot Be Invoked”, - Supreme Court of India quashing the summoning of a school Chairman under Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court ruled that mere moral responsibility does not equate to legal liability unless actual charge or control over the victim child is established.

The case stems from a disturbing incident that occurred on November 17, 2017, when a four-year-old girl studying in the nursery class at Maxfort School, Dwarka, New Delhi, complained of sexual assault by a classmate. Although the accused child was under seven years old and thus exempt from criminal liability under Section 82 IPC, the investigating authorities filed a charge sheet under Section 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012, and Section 75 of the JJ Act against four school authorities, including the Chairman of the school’s Managing Committee, Mr. S.C. Narang.

The complainant (mother of the victim) had filed two protest petitions, resulting in the Special Court issuing summons to the Chairman. This was later affirmed by the Delhi High Court, which dismissed his revision application.

The key legal question before the Supreme Court was whether the Chairman of a school’s managing committee can be held criminally liable under Section 75 of the JJ Act on the basis of moral responsibility, in the absence of actual control or charge over the victim child.

The Special Court and High Court had relied on Directorate of Education Guidelines dated September 15, 2017, which mandated installation of CCTV cameras in classrooms and other school areas. The lower courts held the Chairman accountable for alleged non-compliance with the guidelines.

However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating emphatically:

“While considering the applicability of Section 75 of the JJ Act, we are not concerned with the moral responsibility of the school's management... Section 75 of the JJ Act cannot be applied unless it is shown that the appellant had the actual charge of the victim child or control over the victim child”.

The Court clarified the statutory language of Section 75, emphasizing that criminal liability under this provision arises only when there is:

1. Actual charge of the child, or

2. Control over the child.

Merely being the Chairman of the managing body that runs a large school cannot automatically satisfy either criterion:

“It is impossible to even allege that the appellant, being Chairman of the Managing Committee, had the actual charge of all the children studying in the school... He may have control over the management... That does not give him control over every child studying in the school”.

In concluding, the bench comprising Justices Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan quashed the summoning order against the appellant and set aside both the Special Court’s and the High Court’s orders:

“Taking the case made out by the State as well as the second respondent as correct, by no stretch of imagination, Section 75 of the JJ Act could have been applied against the appellant”.

However, the Court was cautious to limit its ruling to the appellant’s case, stating:

“The observations and the findings recorded herein are only for the purposes of examining the case of the appellant... What is held in this order will have no bearing on the pending case before the Special Court”.

The Supreme Court reaffirmed a fundamental criminal jurisprudence principle: criminal liability under a penal statute must flow from specific statutory requirements, not from perceived moral failings. In this case, where no legal evidence showed the Chairman had control or charge over the child, the invocation of Section 75 JJ Act was deemed unsustainable.

Date of Decision: April 22, 2025