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by Admin
16 February 2026 1:47 PM
In a strong reaffirmation of judicial independence from police findings, the Supreme Court on 11 August 2025 ruled that a prior “innocent” tag by the police cannot shield a person from being summoned to face trial under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Bench of Justices Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and R. Mahadevan upheld the mid-trial summoning of a Ludhiana Assistant Jail Superintendent in a conspiracy to help an undertrial escape, rejecting his defence of preliminary exoneration.
Gurdeep Singh, an Assistant Superintendent of Central Jail, Ludhiana, was initially not named in the FIR arising out of a violent attack on two police escorts guarding an undertrial prisoner. The police’s preliminary enquiry gave him a clean chit.
However, during the trial of other accused, the prosecution applied under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon him as an additional accused, relying primarily on the injured eyewitness testimony of Head Constable Harjit Singh (PW-2).
The trial court allowed the application; the High Court upheld it; and the Supreme Court has now affirmed both.
‘Investigating Officer’s Opinion is Merely Tentative’
Rejecting the argument that the summoning was “mechanical” and “unsupported by fresh material,” the Court cited the Constitution Bench decision in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab:
“A person not named in the FIR or chargesheet can be summoned… provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. Prior police opinion is merely tentative and cannot override the Court’s independent judicial assessment.”
The Court clarified that:
The degree of satisfaction for summoning under Section 319 is the same as for framing a charge.
There is no need to wait for cross-examination; examination-in-chief can suffice.
Section 319 applies even to those given a clean chit or dropped from the chargesheet.
The Bench found PW-2’s testimony “detailed, consistent, and direct” in implicating Gurdeep Singh — from arranging the private vehicle to orchestrating the stop where the attack occurred.
“In light of this direct and incriminating evidence, the trial court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the appellant to face trial.”
The Court also discredited the Deputy Superintendent of Police’s preliminary inquiry that cleared the appellant, noting that it lacked clarity on inspection date, time, and detail — making it “vague and unsubstantiated.”
The ruling reinforces that judicial power to summon accused under Section 319 is independent of police investigation outcomes, closing the door on accused persons using police exonerations as a permanent shield.
Date of Decision: 11 August 2025
