Section 113A Evidence Act | Presumption Of Abetment Not Attracted Unless Cruelty Is Clearly Established: Delhi High Court

“The statutory presumption under Section 113A of Indian Evidence Act, 1872 cannot be pressed into service, without establishing the foundational facts”— In a seminal ruling, the Delhi High Court, comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Manoj Jain, dismissed the State’s appeal against the acquittal of a husband accused of abetting his wife's suicide within two months of marriage, emphasizing that vague allegations and material improvements in testimony cannot sustain a conviction.

The Factual Matrix: A Death Within Two Months

The case arose from the tragic death of Preeti, who was found dead in a drain in Najafgarh on August 2, 2006, merely two months after her marriage to the respondent, Kamal. While the autopsy confirmed death due to antemortem drowning, the circumstances remained murky. The State appealed the Trial Court’s 2012 judgment which had acquitted Kamal of charges under Section 498-A (Cruelty) and Section 306 (Abetment of Suicide) of the IPC. Notably, the accused had already been discharged of the graver charge of Dowry Death (Section 304-B IPC) prior to the trial.

The prosecution’s case hinged on the testimony of the deceased’s parents and brother, who alleged that Preeti was subjected to harassment and dowry demands immediately after marriage. However, the High Court found glaring inconsistencies in their narrative, particularly when juxtaposed with the initial missing person report lodged by the father.

“If at all, there was any harassment or cruelty or demand of dowry, any father, in such a situation, would have, certainly, revealed the same to the police.”

Material Improvements and The "Afterthought" Theory

The Division Bench placed heavy reliance on the initial conduct of the complainant. On August 2, 2006, when Preeti’s father (PW-10) lodged the missing report, he explicitly stated that he did not suspect anyone (mujhe kisi par kisi bhi prakaar ka shako-shubha nahi hai). It was only after the recovery of the body that allegations of dowry demands, beatings, and even an instance of poisoning surfaced in subsequent statements.

The Court observed that these "umpteen huge improvements" lacked plausible explanations. The Bench noted that if the deceased had indeed been subjected to such severe cruelty—including being pushed out of the house or poisoned—these facts would naturally have been disclosed at the first available opportunity. The Court concurred with the Trial Court’s finding that these improvements appeared to be motivated attempts to fulfill the ingredients of Section 498-A IPC.

“Mere demand, even if it is presumed to be there, would not be sufficient unless prosecution is able to show and establish that there was harassment and cruelty, on account of non-fulfillment of such demand.”

The Presumption Puzzle: Section 113A Evidence Act

A critical legal takeaway from the judgment is the Court’s interpretation of the presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. The prosecution argued that since the death occurred within two months of marriage under unnatural circumstances, the presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act should apply.

Rejecting this contention, the High Court held that the presumption is not automatic. The Bench clarified that the mere fact that death was by drowning does not ipso facto prove abetment. To trigger the statutory presumption, the prosecution must first prove the foundational facts—specifically, that the woman was subjected to cruelty. Since the allegations of cruelty were deemed general, vague, and uncorroborated, the presumption could not be invoked.

“In an appeal against acquittal, the scope of interference is constricted and order of acquittal cannot be upset merely for the reason that another view is also possible.”

Judicial Reasoning: Why the Acquittal Stood

The Court also highlighted significant gaps in the investigation. It was noted that the prosecution failed to clarify whether the death was a suicide, homicide, or an accidental fall. Furthermore, the Court pointed to love letters written by the deceased to her husband—referenced in an earlier bail order—which indicated a cordial relationship, contradicting the theory of cruelty.

Ultimately, the High Court reiterated the settled principle regarding appeals against acquittal: the Appellate Court will not interfere unless the Trial Court’s findings are perverse or contrary to law. Finding the Trial Court’s appreciation of evidence to be plausible, the Bench dismissed the appeal and cancelled the bail bonds of the accused.

Date of Decision: 24/12/2025