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by sayum
16 February 2026 7:15 AM
“Even Assuming It Is Suicide, It Falls Within Section 304B IPC” – Division Bench of the Jharkhand High Court comprising Justice Sujit Narayan Prasad and Justice Arun Kumar Rai delivered a reportable and significant ruling in Lakshman Prasad & Smt. Janki Devi v. The State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand), affirming the conviction of a husband and his parents for dowry death under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. The Court dismissed both connected appeals—Criminal Appeal (DB) No.22 of 1998(R) and Criminal Appeal (DB) No.23 of 1998(R)—against a 1998 conviction by the 4th Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi.
The High Court observed that all essential statutory requirements under Section 304B IPC were fulfilled, including the ‘soon before death’ cruelty requirement, thereby triggering the presumption of guilt under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act.
The Bench held: “The prosecution has been able to prove the charge under section 304 B of IPC against all the appellants beyond all shadow of doubts... Even assuming that the deceased committed suicide, the death was otherwise than under normal circumstances and squarely falls within the ambit of Section 304B IPC.”
Death On Day Of Compromise: High Court Finds “Live Link” Between Dowry Cruelty And Demise
The deceased, Renu Sahu, was married to appellant Dinesh Prasad in July 1991. On 28th September 1995, she was found hanging in her matrimonial home—the very day on which the Judicial Magistrate acquitted her husband and in-laws in an earlier dowry harassment case based on a compromise.
The prosecution relied heavily on this timing to establish proximity between the dowry-related cruelty and her death. The Court observed: “The compromise in G.R. Case No.1448 of 1993 was signed on 16.08.1995 and culminated in acquittal on 28.09.1995. On the same day, Renu was found dead. This clearly proves a proximate and live link between the demand of dowry and the unnatural death.”
Prior Dowry Case, Reconciliation, and Sudden Death
The deceased had earlier lodged Sadar P.S. Case No. 47 of 1993 under Section 498A IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, alleging persistent demands for a scooter, ₹50,000 in cash, and a photocopy machine, coupled with physical and mental cruelty. While a divorce case (MTS 23/1993) filed by the husband was also pending, the parties compromised in August 1995.
However, as per the prosecution’s evidence—including testimony from her parents (PW-1 and PW-2) and inland letters written by the deceased—the threats and cruelty had continued. Her letters expressed fear for her life and detailed ongoing abuse.
One such letter read: “I am being beaten and threatened daily for not bringing money and scooter… they may kill me anytime… I have no escape.”
The prosecution argued that this established a clear chain of continued dowry harassment right up to the date of death.
Legal Ingredients of Section 304B Fully Satisfied
The Court reaffirmed the established position of law, relying on key Supreme Court precedents including Satbir Singh v. State of Haryana (2021) 6 SCC 1, Shanti v. State of Haryana (1991) 1 SCC 371, and Major Singh v. State of Punjab (2015) 5 SCC 201. It noted that three statutory ingredients must be fulfilled to attract Section 304B IPC:
On all these counts, the Court ruled that the prosecution had established its case beyond reasonable doubt. The following key observations were made:
“It is evident from the evidence on record that the deceased was subjected to harassment and torture in connection with demand for dowry. The letters authored by her and the prior criminal complaint support this. The demand did not vanish with the compromise; rather, it intensified.”
The Bench further noted:
“The phrase ‘soon before’ does not mean ‘immediately before’. What is required is a proximate and live link between the cruelty and the death. In this case, such link is clearly established.”
Presumption of Dowry Death Under Section 113-B Takes Full Effect
After satisfaction of the foundational facts under Section 304B, the presumption under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act was invoked by the Court.
“The word ‘shall’ in Section 113-B mandates the Court to presume that the husband and in-laws caused the dowry death once cruelty is shown soon before death. The onus shifts to the accused to rebut this presumption. In this case, the appellants failed to discharge that burden.”
The Court emphasized that the defence version of suicide did not break this chain of presumption, especially given the unconvincing and suspicious conduct of the accused, who failed to explain why one door of the room was not bolted and why they directed the victim’s father to a particular door that was easily opened.
Suicide Or Homicide: Irrelevant Under Section 304B If Circumstances Are Unnatural
The High Court addressed the contention that the death was a suicide, citing post-mortem evidence showing death due to hanging, with the defence arguing that no injury or forced entry was found. However, the Court categorically held:
“Even assuming suicide, it was a death otherwise than under normal circumstances. As held by the Supreme Court in Shanti v. State of Haryana and Satvir Singh v. State of Punjab, suicide falls squarely within the ambit of Section 304B IPC.”
Suspension of Sentence Cancelled, Appellants Directed to Surrender
Appellant Dinesh Prasad, the husband, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and his parents Lakshman Prasad and Smt. Janki Devi were sentenced to 7 years of rigorous imprisonment. The High Court declined to interfere with the quantum of sentence, finding it proportionate and legally justified.
“Consequent upon dismissal of the appeals, the appellants are directed to surrender before the trial court to serve the sentence passed against them. Bail bonds stand cancelled.”
A Clear Message Against Dowry Cruelty
The Jharkhand High Court’s judgment in this case adds to the growing judicial resolve to tackle dowry deaths by enforcing the legislative intent behind Section 304B IPC and Section 113-B Evidence Act.
The Court remarked that compromises do not wipe out past cruelty, and the judiciary must remain sensitive to patterns of abuse that often precede unnatural deaths of women in their matrimonial homes.
This decision reiterates that once evidence of cruelty “soon before death” emerges, the burden shifts heavily upon the accused, and mere claims of suicide are insufficient to shake the statutory presumption of culpability.
Date of Decision: 06 January 2026