POSH Act | Limitation Is Not a Mere Technicality—It’s the Spine of Procedural Discipline: Supreme Court Dismisses Time-Barred Sexual Harassment Complaint

“The Wrong May Be Forgiven, But It Must Not Be Forgotten”— In a compelling decision balancing procedural law with moral accountability, the Supreme Court of India upheld the dismissal of a sexual harassment complaint filed by a senior faculty member of the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS) against its Vice-Chancellor. The Court ruled that the complaint, made in December 2023, was time-barred under Section 9 of the POSH Act, as the last incident of harassment allegedly occurred in April 2023.

Even as the Court dismissed the appeal on legal grounds, it made a remarkable observation, directing that “the incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever.” The Court ordered that its judgment be made part of the Vice-Chancellor’s official resume, thus ensuring a permanent institutional record of the wrongdoing.

This ruling delivers a strong message: procedural compliance cannot be waived, but moral culpability must not be erased.

“A Complaint Patently Barred by Time Can Be Dismissed at the Threshold—Just as a Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC”

Bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale ruled on the appeal of Vaneeta Patnaik, a law professor at NUJS, who challenged the rejection of her sexual harassment complaint against Vice-Chancellor Dr. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti. The complaint had been dismissed by the Local Complaints Committee (LCC) as time-barred, and a Division Bench of the High Court had restored that decision.

While the Single Judge of the High Court had held that administrative actions taken against the appellant after April 2023 constituted part of a “continuing hostile work environment” that could revive limitation, the Supreme Court firmly disagreed. It held that subsequent administrative acts did not constitute continuing sexual harassment and could not extend the limitation period provided under Section 9 of the POSH Act.

The appeal was dismissed, but the Court carved out a unique direction: the judgment recording the allegations shall form part of the service record of the Vice-Chancellor, thereby ensuring moral accountability despite procedural finality.

“Limitation Under Section 9 of POSH Act Is Rigid—Three Months, Plus At Most Three More”

The appellant, Vaneeta Patnaik, alleged that the respondent-Vice Chancellor had made inappropriate advances in September and October 2019, and again in April 2023, when he allegedly asked her to accompany him to a resort and threatened professional repercussions upon her refusal.

She filed a formal complaint before the LCC on December 26, 2023, which was over eight months after the last alleged incident. The LCC dismissed the complaint as barred by time under Section 9, which allows a maximum of six months (three months with a possible three-month extension) from the last incident.

The Single Judge of the Calcutta High Court revived the complaint, holding that subsequent actions—such as her removal as Director of a research centre in August 2023 and initiation of financial enquiries against her—formed part of continuing harassment.

However, the Division Bench disagreed, ruling that the post-April actions were collective decisions of the Executive Council, involving jurists and other professionals, and could not be attributed solely to the Vice-Chancellor. The Supreme Court endorsed this view.

“There Must Be a Direct Link Between the Action Complained Of and an Overt Act of Sexual Harassment”

The Court decisively held that the complaint was patently barred by limitation, and therefore could be dismissed without trial, analogizing the power of the LCC to the power of civil courts under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure:

“Where a complaint on the simple reading of the averments made therein appears to be patently barred by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 CPC.” – Para 15

The Court meticulously examined the definition of ‘sexual harassment’ under Section 2(n) and Section 3 of the POSH Act, which includes not only physical acts or demands for sexual favours, but also “threat of detrimental treatment” and “hostile work environment.”

Despite this expansive definition, the Court rejected the argument that the administrative actions taken after April 2023 could be interpreted as sexual harassment:

“The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023, are administrative in nature and does not create a gender based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.” – Para 26

“A Continuing Wrong Is One Where the Injury Persists—Not Where a New Cause of Action Arises”

The Court drew a sharp distinction between “continuing wrongs” and “recurring wrongs”, citing the seminal case of Union of India v. Tarsem Singh: “A ‘continuing wrong’ is when the injury itself persists, whereas a ‘recurring wrong’ is when a fresh cause of action arises each time.” – Para 28

Applying this principle, the Court held that the alleged act of April 2023 was a completed act, and the administrative actions in August 2023—such as her removal as Director and the inquiry into grant mismanagement—were independent decisions, based on third-party complaints, not extensions of harassment.

“The subsequent events have no connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly out of the purview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual harassment.” – Para 29

Notably, the Court also found that in her communications to the Chancellor and Executive Council, the appellant had not alleged sexual harassment post-April 2023, undermining the theory of continuing wrong.

“The appellant, in addressing her grievances to the Chancellor, had not made any mention whatsoever of the sexual harassment which may have taken place in August, 2023 onwards.” – Para 30

“Let the Judgment Be Part of the Resume—So the Allegation May Not Be Forgotten”

In an extraordinary closing note, the Court expressed that moral responsibility must still be acknowledged even when legal relief is denied. The bench stated:

“It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the wrongdoing.” – Para 33

Consequently, the Court directed that: “The incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever. Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.” – Para 34

This is an unprecedented direction in Indian jurisprudence under the POSH Act—recognizing that while law may sometimes be bound by timelines, institutional memory must not be wiped clean of serious allegations.

The Supreme Court’s judgmentunderscores the rigid time constraints of the POSH Act, emphasizing that sexual harassment complaints must be filed within six months of the last incident, unless strong justification is shown.

At the same time, the ruling is a striking example of the Court asserting a moral censure where procedural remedies fail. By directing that the judgment be appended to the Vice-Chancellor’s resume, the Court sent an unequivocal signal: the law cannot forget what the clock forbids it to remedy.

In this landmark case, the Supreme Court has fortified the principle that limitation is not merely a procedural hurdle—it is a substantive check. But it also demonstrated that justice is not always confined to legal relief—it can manifest in institutional memory, reputational accountability, and symbolic redress.

Date of Decision: September 12, 2025