Order VI Rule 17 CPC | Proviso Cannot Defeat the Main Provision Which Allows Amendment ‘At Any Stage of Proceedings’: Karnataka High Court

“Due Diligence Test Not a Straitjacket Formula….Proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC cannot override the main provision in all post-trial amendment cases,” In a nuanced and far-reaching interpretation of procedural law, the Karnataka High Court held that the “due diligence” test under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply universally to every amendment application filed after the commencement of trial.

The Court found fault with the trial court’s mechanical rejection of a plaint amendment—filed ten years after the suit and after the commencement of trial—where the plaintiffs sought to plead dispossession during pendency of the suit and seek consequential relief of possession. Justice Anant Ramanath Hegde, exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, set aside the impugned order, and permitted the amendment subject to payment of ₹7,000/- as cost.

"Amendment Based on Subsequent Events Need Not Satisfy the Due Diligence Test"

Plaintiffs Claim Dispossession During Suit, Seek Possession as Additional Relief

The petition arose out of O.S. No. 188/2015, filed for declaration and permanent injunction, challenging a sale deed executed by the first plaintiff's father in favour of the defendants. Initially, the plaintiffs claimed to be in possession of the suit property. However, after PW2’s evidence, they moved an amendment application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, pleading that they were dispossessed on 29.03.2022, during the pendency of the suit.

The Trial Court rejected the amendment on four grounds: lack of due diligence, delay of 10 years, contradiction with prior admissions, and that the amendment was unnecessary for adjudication.

The High Court disagreed.

“Whether the application seeking amendment, post-commencement of trial, is to be allowed or not has to be decided on the ‘nature of amendment sought’ and not necessarily on the ‘due diligence test’,” held the Court.

“Proviso Cannot Defeat the Main Provision Which Allows Amendment ‘At Any Stage of Proceedings’”

Justice Hegde emphasized that Order VI Rule 17, post the 2002 amendment, comprises two parts—the main enabling provision, and the restrictive proviso. The Court observed that Parliament had consciously retained the phrase “at any stage of the proceedings” in the main part of Rule 17, even while inserting the proviso.

“If the Parliament really intended to create two categories of amendment applications with rigid yardsticks, it would not have retained the expression ‘at any stage of the proceedings’,” the Court observed.

Accordingly, the Court held:

“The proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC does not control the first part in each and every application filed post-commencement of trial... it must be applied in some cases, but not all.”

“Real Controversy is Whether Dispossession Took Place in 2014 or 2022—That Must Be Tried”

A key contention by the defendants was that the plaintiffs had admitted in cross-examination (through PW1) that they were dispossessed in 2014, and that the claim of dispossession in 2022—based on PW2’s evidence—was a belated and contradictory plea to circumvent limitation.

But the High Court held that such contradictions cannot be a reason to reject the amendment, as admissions in cross-examination are not conclusive, and their validity is to be tested at trial.

“Even if the plaintiffs have admitted in cross-examination that they were dispossessed in 2014, the application seeking amendment to incorporate the plea for possession is necessary to decide the real controversy,” ruled the Court.

It further clarified:

“Permitting the amendment does not ‘nullify’ the admission… the question of whether dispossession occurred in 2014 or 2022 remains a matter of evidence.”

“Delay of 10 Years Is Not Fatal—Amendment Not Barred by Limitation”

On the issue of delay, the Court held that a mere lapse of time is not a ground to reject an amendment application.

“The test is not the duration of delay but whether the relief sought by way of amendment is barred by limitation as on the date of the application,” said Justice Hegde.

The plaintiffs’ amendment was held to be within limitation under Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which provide 12 years for recovery of possession.

“Proviso Is Not a Tool to Deny Reliefs Flowing from Subsequent Events”

The Court laid out broad illustrative categories where amendments can be allowed post-trial, even without satisfying the due diligence test. These include cases where:

• Facts occurred after the suit was filed (subsequent events);

• Additional or alternate reliefs arise from existing facts;

• Amendments avoid multiplicity of litigation.

In particular, the Court noted: “The main object of the rule remains to decide real questions in controversy and to avoid multiplicity of litigation. Procedural law must serve the cause of justice.”

“Change in Relief from Injunction to Possession Is Not Change in Nature of Suit”

Rejecting the defendants’ objection that the amendment altered the nature of the suit, the Court held:

“A change in the nature of the relief does not equate to a change in the nature of the suit.”

The fundamental claim that plaintiffs are the owners, and that defendants have no valid title, remained unchanged. The additional prayer for possession, based on an event occurring during the suit, was held to be permissible.

“In Exceptional Situations, Courts May Invoke Section 151 CPC to Allow Amendments”

The Court also invoked the inherent powers of civil courts under Section 151 CPC, stating that procedural law must not defeat substantive justice.

“Even where due diligence is not established, the Court may resort to inherent powers to permit amendment in the interest of justice.”

“Trial Courts Must Not Treat Proviso As an Absolute Bar to All Amendments After Trial Commences”

In a significant observation, the Court cautioned against the trend of trial courts dismissing amendment applications purely due to delay or commencement of trial:

“Such mechanical dismissals are not desirable… procedural flexibility must yield to substantive justice.”

The Court allowed the amendment subject to ₹7,000/- in costs, and directed that the defendants be permitted to file an additional written statement.

Date of Decision: 16 December 2025