Order Framing Charge is ‘Interlocutory’ and Not Appealable; Remedy Lies Only Under Section 482 CrPC/528 BNSS: Delhi High Court

“The term ‘intermediate order’ is a concept of revisional jurisdiction, which cannot be applied while interpreting the term ‘appeal’ both on facts and law.”— In a seminal ruling the Delhi High Court, comprising Justice Vivek Chaudhary and Justice Manoj Jain, has dismissed a batch of appeals, holding that an order framing charges under the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (NIA Act) is an "interlocutory order" and is therefore barred from appellate challenge under Section 21(1).

The Jurisprudential Knot: Interlocutory vs. Intermediate

The Division Bench was seized of a significant question of law in Shahid Yousuf & Ors. v. National Investigation Agency: Whether an order framing a charge is appealable under Section 21 of the NIA Act. The Appellants, relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s landmark rulings in Amar Nath v. State of Haryana and Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, argued that an order framing charges is not purely "interlocutory" but an "intermediate order" or a "matter of moment." They contended that since Section 21(1) only bars appeals against interlocutory orders, an intermediate order should logically be appealable.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA) countered this by invoking the doctrine of purposeful interpretation. They argued that the NIA Act is a special statute designed for the speedy trial of scheduled offences, and permitting appeals at the charge stage would defeat the legislative intent.

“An Order framing Charge, as against final order is an interlocutory order, as it does not decide any proceeding finally.”

Distinguishing Appeal from Revision

The Court drew a sharp distinction between the scope of Revisional Jurisdiction (under Section 397 CrPC) and Appellate Jurisdiction (under Section 21 NIA Act). The Bench noted that the concept of "intermediate orders" was evolved by the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye specifically to prevent the bar of Section 397(2) CrPC from stifling the High Court's revisional powers in cases affecting vital rights.

However, the Court held that this jurisprudence cannot be bodily imported into Section 21 of the NIA Act. Section 21(1) provides for an appeal "both on facts and on law." The Bench reasoned that at the stage of framing charges, the Special Court only takes a prima facie view of the evidence. Since there is no final adjudication of facts at this stage, an appeal "on facts and law" is jurisprudentially impossible.

“The term ‘order’ in Section 21(1) refers to a final order and not an interlocutory or intermediate order.”

Legislative Intent and Speedy Trial

The High Court emphasized the Scheme of the NIA Act, noting that the statute explicitly bars revisions (Section 21(3)) to ensure expeditious disposal of cases involving national security. The Court observed that where the Legislature intended to allow appeals against non-final orders, it did so expressly—such as in Section 21(4), which permits appeals against bail orders.

The Bench ruled that treating a charge-framing order as appealable would open the floodgates for delays, directly contravening the object of the Act. Consequently, the Court held that for the specific purpose of Section 21 NIA Act, an order framing charge remains interlocutory.

The Remedy: Section 528 BNSS / Section 482 CrPC

While closing the door on statutory appeals, the Court clarified that the accused is not left remediless. The Bench held that an aggrieved person can still invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (or Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023).

However, the Court cautioned that this remedy is supervisory in nature. It is limited to cases of patent illegality, abuse of process, or lack of jurisdiction, and does not extend to a full-blown appreciation of evidence as an appeal would.

Date of Decision: 23/12/2025