Order 1 Rule 10 CPC | Impleadment of a Third Party Cannot Be Permitted Merely to Avoid Multiplicity of Proceedings When It Changes the Character of the Suit: Delhi High

“You Can’t Turn a Contract Suit Into a Title Battle Just by Claiming Ownership” -  Delhi High Court emphatically ruled that a third party claiming co-ownership in a property cannot be added as a party in a suit for specific performance merely to prevent multiplicity of litigation. Terming the impleadment of a non-party to the contract as legally impermissible, the Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar allowed the appeal and set aside the Single Judge’s order that had impleaded the appellant’s brother-in-law as a co-defendant.

The Court made it clear: “The presence of a third party with an independent claim converts a suit for specific performance into a title suit — and that is not permissible in law.”

The ruling came in the context of a suit for specific performance of an Agreement to Sell dated 27.12.2022, where the plaintiffs (Respondents 1 to 3) had sought enforcement of a ₹7 crore agreement with Maryam Bee for a multi-storey property in Chandni Chowk. While the appellant denied default, she also highlighted that another agreement of ₹2 crore had been executed the same day, which the plaintiffs allegedly failed to honour.

What complicated the case was the application filed under Order I Rule 10 of the CPC by Respondent No. 4, the brother-in-law of the appellant, who sought to be impleaded on the basis of an alleged co-ownership claim. He asserted a 50% share in the suit property inherited from common ancestors and contended that any decree in his absence would result in conflicting rulings.

Rejecting this, the Court ruled: “A third party or a stranger to the contract cannot be added so as to convert a suit of one character into a suit of different character.”

Tracing its reasoning from well-settled law, the Court extensively cited Kasturi v. Iyyamperumal (2005) 6 SCC 733, where the Supreme Court had clarified that in a suit for specific performance, only parties to the contract or their legal heirs and transferees can be impleaded. If someone claims an independent or adverse title, their remedy lies elsewhere — not in distorting the frame of a contract enforcement suit.

“The issue in a suit for specific performance is enforceability of the contract — not title. Adding a person who claims adverse ownership introduces collateral issues. The litigation becomes something else entirely,” the Court observed.

While the Single Judge had relied on the possibility of preventing multiplicity of proceedings, the Division Bench firmly rejected that rationale. It held that the mere possibility of future litigation cannot justify altering the nature of the present suit. “Multiplicities of proceedings cannot be prevented at the cost of procedural purity,” the Court effectively noted.

The Bench clarified that impleadment under Order I Rule 10 CPC requires the person to be a “necessary” or at least a “proper” party. But the brother-in-law was neither. “He has no privity of contract with the plaintiffs. His claim, if at all, is of an independent right that must be litigated separately,” the Court said.

In doing so, the Court also distinguished the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sumtibai v. Paras Finance Co. (2007), which had allowed impleadment of legal representatives in view of specific peculiar facts. “The exception carved in Sumtibai was based on clear evidence of joint ownership arising out of a registered document. That’s not the case here,” the Court noted.

The Court summed it up with a sharp observation: “If Respondent No.4 is permitted to be impleaded in the present case, the nature of the suit will be converted, and it may lead to a title suit between the Appellant and Respondent No.4.”

Thus, it allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Single Judge. It granted liberty to Respondent No.4 to pursue his alleged rights through a separate, independent civil suit in a competent forum.

The Court concluded: “The reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge — that Respondent No.4 has claimed co-ownership and that refusal to implead would lead to multiplicity — ought not to have resulted in his addition as a party, particularly in the context of a suit for specific performance.”

Date of Decision: August 26, 2025