Once A Person Dead, Their Section 161 CrPC Statement Relating To Cause Of Death Assumes Character Of Dying Declaration: Supreme Court

“Minor Daughter’s Eyewitness Account and Victim’s Statements Under Section 161 CrPC Qualify as Dying Declarations….Real perpetrators must not escape trial merely because they were not chargesheeted” – In a powerful reaffirmation of victims’ rights and prosecutorial completeness, the Supreme Court set aside concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Allahabad High Court which had declined to summon the husband’s relatives as additional accused in a dowry-related murder case. The bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh ruled that cogent and credible evidence had clearly emerged during trial, including statements by the deceased and her 9-year-old daughter, warranting the exercise of Section 319 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC).

Reversing the High Court’s April 2024 order, the Court held that “courts below fell into grave error by rejecting summoning applications through a premature assessment of witness credibility and by effectively conducting a mini-trial at the 319 stage.”

“Once a person is dead, their Section 161 CrPC statement relating to cause of death assumes the character of a dying declaration” – Supreme Court

The appellant, Neeraj Kumar, the brother of deceased Nishi, had approached the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal of a prosecution application under Section 319 CrPC for summoning three relatives of the deceased’s husband: her mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and sister-in-law’s husband, who were named in later stages of the investigation and trial but had been exonerated from the charge sheet.

The Supreme Court disagreed with both the Trial Court and High Court’s reasoning that the statements recorded under Section 161 CrPC by the deceased were inadmissible due to the time gap between the statements and her death (over 50 days), absence of a magistrate, or lack of medical certification. The bench categorically ruled:

“It is a well-established position of law that a statement made by a deceased person... recorded under Section 161 CrPC, shall be relevant and admissible under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act... upon the death of the declarant, it assumes the character of a dying declaration.”

The Court emphasized that there is no legal requirement that a dying declaration must be made in contemplation of imminent death, and that absence of a doctor’s certification of fitness or recording before a Magistrate does not vitiate the admissibility of such statements.

“PW-2’s Testimony Cannot Be Discarded for Alleged Tutoring or Age – Her Account Shows Instigation and Active Participation”

The Court accorded significant weight to the detailed eyewitness testimony of the deceased’s minor daughter, who was just 9 years old at the time of the incident. She described how her father shot her mother at the instigation of the grandmother, uncle, and another male relative, and how the firearm was handed over by her uncle.

Rejecting the High Court’s conclusion that the minor witness could not be relied upon because she admitted hearing gunshots rather than seeing them, the Supreme Court held:

“Drawing such an inference amounts to conducting a mini-trial at the stage of summoning, which is impermissible... Whether she actually witnessed the firing or arrived immediately thereafter, and the extent to which her statement inspires confidence, are matters for trial.”

The Court observed that minor inconsistencies or alleged tutoring cannot discredit a child witness at the 319 stage, particularly when her Section 161 statement and deposition under oath are consistent and attribute specific roles to the accused family members.

PW-1’s Testimony, Though Not Eyewitness, Forms Strong Corroborative Evidence Along with Representation

The Court also accepted the deposition of PW-1, the complainant and brother of the deceased, noting that while he was not an eyewitness, his testimony narrated a consistent pattern of dowry-related harassment, including pressure for sex-determination and abortion of a fourth female child.

He testified that shortly after the incident, his niece informed him by phone that “Papa shot Mummy on the instigation of uncle, grandmother and Gabbar.” His written representation to the police dated 20 May 2021 naming these persons also supported the prosecution’s case.

Rejecting the lower courts’ view that his testimony was embellished, the apex court held:

“It is trite law that an FIR is not an encyclopaedia... omissions in the FIR cannot defeat otherwise credible and consistent testimony at trial.”

Section 319 CrPC: Supreme Court Reiterates Guiding Principles

The judgment reiterates and applies the well-settled doctrine that the power under Section 319 CrPC is:

• Extraordinary, discretionary, and must be exercised sparingly;
• The degree of satisfaction required is higher than framing of charge, but short of proof beyond reasonable doubt;
• A person not named in the FIR or chargesheet can still be summoned if credible trial evidence appears;
• Mini-trials at the summoning stage are impermissible;
• Section 161 statements, while not substantive evidence, can corroborate trial testimony and support summoning when consistent with other material.

Referring to the Constitution Bench ruling in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92, the Court emphasized:

“Only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence... but it must be stronger than mere probability of complicity.”

Court Summons Husband’s Relatives to Face Trial in Dowry Death

Finding the cumulative strength of PW-1’s and PW-2’s depositions, and the statements of the deceased under Section 161 CrPC, to be more than sufficient, the Supreme Court concluded:

“There exists sufficient ground to exercise the power under Section 319 CrPC and summon them to face trial... objections raised by the respondents... are premature and cannot be conclusively decided at the stage of exercising power under Section 319 CrPC.”

Accordingly, the orders of the Trial Court and High Court were set aside, and Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 (mother-in-law, brother-in-law, and sister-in-law’s husband) were directed to appear before the Trial Court on 08 January 2026. The Court also directed that trial proceedings be expedited, urging all parties to cooperate fully.

A Strong Reaffirmation That No Guilty Person Should Escape Trial Due to Procedural Lapses

This judgment stands as a significant reaffirmation of the victim-centric nature of criminal procedure and the purpose of Section 319 CrPC—to ensure no real offender is shielded merely due to oversight or evidentiary delay. The Supreme Court’s clear articulation that Section 161 CrPC statements can constitute dying declarations when the maker subsequently dies may have far-reaching implications for dowry death prosecutions, especially in cases where the victim survives temporarily post-attack.

Date of Decision: December 4, 2025