Can't Claim Irrevocable License Under Section 60 Easements Act Without Pleading It First: Punjab & Haryana High Court

"Reliance Placed Upon Section 60 Of The Indian Easements Act Is Without Any Foundational Pleading And Cannot Be Accepted", A defendant who spent years claiming ownership of disputed land found his last-resort legal argument — that permanent construction had made his license irrevocable — flatly rejected by the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which ruled that a plea under Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal without being grounded in the original pleadings.

Justice Pankaj Jain, dismissing five connected second appeals, held that parties are strictly bound by their pleadings, and a new legal theory — however "attractive at first blush" — cannot be introduced at the appellate stage when no foundational case was set up for it in the written statement.

The plaintiff filed a suit for possession claiming co-ownership of the suit property through revenue records. According to the plaintiff, the defendant was in permissive possession of the land as a tenant in lieu of supplying cattle manure to the landowners. When the defendant failed to fulfil this obligation, the plaintiff served a legal notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 terminating the tenancy and thereafter filed the suit for ejectment.

The defendant, however, took a diametrically opposite stand in his written statement — he denied the plaintiff's ownership entirely and claimed that his forefathers, who were original inhabitants of the village before the Partition of 1947, had been living on the suit land after constructing a residential house, and that his possession was as an owner, not a tenant or licensee. Both the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court concurrently decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff, accepting the revenue record as proof of ownership and finding the defendant's title claim unsubstantiated.

The central question before the High Court in second appeal was whether a defendant in permissive possession, having raised permanent construction on the suit property, could claim the benefit of irrevocability of license under Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 — even when no such plea was ever raised in the written statement.

Senior counsel for the appellants argued that since the defendants had raised permanent construction on the suit property while in permissive possession, the license in their favour stood irrevocable by operation of Section 60, and they could not be evicted. He pointed to the written statement to contend that the defendants had specifically pleaded their long-standing residence after raising construction.

Senior counsel for the respondent-plaintiff countered that this argument was entirely beyond the pleadings. The defendants had never claimed to be licensees — in fact, they had vehemently denied being tenants or licensees and had asserted ownership. The counsel argued that the plea of adverse possession or ownership by prescription advanced in the written statement was self-contradictory with a claim of permissive possession, which is the bedrock of any irrevocable license argument.

"The Argument Raised Seems Attractive At The First Blush, But The Same Sans Merit"

Justice Pankaj Jain acknowledged that the argument on Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act appeared persuasive on its face, but on close examination found it wholly unsustainable. The Court noted that the defendant's own reply to the pre-suit legal notice (Ex. P-3) was telling — the defendant had denied the plaintiff's ownership and claimed possession as an owner, not as a tenant or permissive occupant.

"As per settled proposition of law, the parties are bound by their pleadings. There is no plea raised in the written statement regarding defendant being licensee under the plaintiff. In view thereof, this Court finds that the reliance placed by senior counsel upon Section 60 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882 is without any foundational pleading and cannot be accepted," the Court held.

The High Court further pointed out a fundamental internal contradiction in the defendant's case. A claim of irrevocable license under Section 60 presupposes permissive possession — the licensee must have entered and occupied the property with the licensor's consent. The defendant, however, had throughout claimed to be an owner in exclusive possession and had even pleaded a form of adverse possession by prescription. The Court observed that a person who claims to have become the owner of property by prescription cannot simultaneously claim the protection of a permissive licensee, as the two concepts are mutually exclusive.

The Court affirmed the concurrent findings of both Courts below that the plaintiff had duly proved ownership through the jamabandi (revenue record) for the year 2000-01, and that the defendant had failed to lead any evidence establishing his title. The plaintiff had also duly served a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 before filing suit, completing the procedural requirements for ejectment of a tenant.

Finding no merit in any of the five connected appeals, Justice Pankaj Jain dismissed all of them along with any pending miscellaneous applications.

The Punjab and Haryana High Court's ruling firmly underscores the cardinal rule that pleadings define the battlefield of litigation. A defendant cannot defeat a possession decree by constructing an entirely new legal theory — particularly one as foundationally distinct as irrevocable license under Section 60 — at the second appeal stage, when his entire case below was built on the claim of being an owner, not a licensee. The judgment also highlights that claiming ownership by adverse possession and simultaneously seeking protection as a permissive occupant are legally irreconcilable positions.

Date of Decision: March 6, 2026