Not Every Rear-End Collision is Rash Driving: Delhi High Court Upholds Acquittal in Fatal Road Accident Case

“Double presumption of innocence must prevail unless trial court findings are perverse” – In a case dating back to 1998, the Delhi High Court on 11 December 2025 dismissed a criminal appeal filed by the State, challenging the acquittal of Irshad Khan, who was accused of causing death by rash and negligent driving. The court ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prove culpable rashness or negligence, and the findings of the Trial Court were neither perverse nor unreasonable.

Delivering the verdict, Justice Manoj Kumar Ohri observed: “An appellate court must be cautious in overturning acquittals. Unless the trial court’s findings are perverse, interference is unwarranted.”

“Mere fact of collision or death does not establish criminal negligence”

The prosecution alleged that on 8 October 1998, the respondent, while driving a dumper truck, hit a motorcycle from behind near Rajiv Gandhi Camp, Badarpur, causing death of one Rajinder Kumar and injuries to complainant Khushal Singh. The Trial Court, however, had acquitted Irshad Khan in August 2014, granting him the benefit of doubt.

Challenging this decision, the State of NCT of Delhi invoked Sections 279, 337, and 304-A IPC, which relate to rash driving, causing hurt by endangering life, and causing death by negligence.

However, the High Court held: “The mere fact that a vehicle struck another from behind and caused death does not, by itself, prove that the accused was driving rashly or negligently. The prosecution must establish a clear link between the accused’s actions and the accident.”

“No statement on speed, lane, or manner of driving—Rashness not proved”

The court relied heavily on the testimony of PW-1, the injured complainant and sole eyewitness. While he stated that the truck hit his motorcycle from behind, he did not depose anything about the speed, recklessness, or erratic driving by the respondent.

Crucially, PW-1 failed to specify the lane of travel, the speed of either vehicle, or the respondent’s conduct before the collision. The court found that the absence of these details was fatal to the prosecution’s case.

“Identification of driver is not enough—Negligence must be affirmatively proved”

Justice Ohri emphasised that identifying the accused as the driver is not sufficient to establish guilt under Section 304-A IPC, unless the prosecution also proves the rash or negligent manner of driving.

“Even taking PW-1’s testimony at face value, being hit from behind and dragged does not conclusively prove rashness or criminal negligence.”

“No skid marks, no photographs, no exact impact point—Investigation flawed”

The High Court also highlighted serious deficiencies in the investigation:

• No photographs of the accident scene were taken.

• No skid marks or dragging evidence were shown in the site plan.

• The site plan itself did not bear the signature of PW-1.

• The exact point of impact could not be established.

“In a case where the allegation hinges on how the vehicle was driven, lack of technical or forensic evidence casts a deep shadow on the prosecution story.”

“Contradictory statements weaken prosecution case”

The court noted a major contradiction: PW-1 said his police statement was recorded at the police station, but the Investigating Officer (IO) claimed it was recorded at the spot. This inconsistency, combined with the lack of corroboration, added further doubt.

“Where the testimony of the sole eyewitness is shaky and uncorroborated, the benefit must go to the accused.”

“Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur has limited application in criminal law”

Referring to Supreme Court decisions in Mohd. Aynuddin v. State of A.P. and Naresh Giri v. State of M.P., the Court reiterated that res ipsa loquitur (thing speaks for itself) does not apply automatically in criminal trials involving vehicular accidents.

“The principle can only be invoked when the circumstances clearly point to negligence. Hitting a vehicle from behind, without more, is not enough.”

“Double presumption of innocence—Appeal dismissed”

Justice Ohri concluded: “After acquittal by a competent trial court, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence. Where the trial court’s view is plausible and supported by evidence, appellate interference is unwarranted.”

Thus, the court dismissed the State’s appeal and upheld the acquittal of Irshad Khan, cancelling his personal bond and discharging the surety.

Date of Decision: 11 December 2025