No Rape If No Deception: Knowledge of Prior Marriage Negates Consent-Vitiation Under Section 376 IPC – Supreme Court

“Since There Was No Concealment of First Marriage, Physical Relationship Cannot Be Termed as Rape”, Supreme Court of India delivered a crucial ruling. The bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Joymalya Bagchi held that when a woman is aware of the man’s existing marriage, consensual cohabitation and sexual relationship with him would not amount to rape under Section 376 of the IPC.

“Since there was no concealment on part of the appellant of his marriage... and if still the complainant cohabited with him and had physical relations with him, it would not amount to rape under Section 376 IPC.”

While the Court upheld the appellant’s conviction under Sections 493 and 494 IPC, it set aside the conviction under Section 376, leading to a partial success of the appeal.

The case originated from an FIR lodged by Amandeep Kaur on 19.09.2008 at Police Station Tripari, Patiala. She alleged that the appellant, Ranpreet Singh, had married her on 20.01.2006 without disclosing his existing marriage, and thereafter had sexual relations with her under the false belief of lawful marriage.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sections 493 (cohabitation by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful marriage), 494 (bigamy), and 376 (rape) of the IPC. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence of seven years' rigorous imprisonment.

Before the Supreme Court, the key issue was whether the offence under Section 376 IPC could sustain in light of the facts suggesting the complainant had knowledge of the appellant’s first marriage.

The Supreme Court carefully scrutinised the evidence, especially Exhibit D1, and observed:

“The Trial Court in paragraph ‘15’... has clearly noted on the basis of the document Exhibit D1 that the complainant party was in the knowledge of the existence of first wife of the appellant.”

The Court referred to the factual matrix showing that:

• The complainant and her family had lived in the appellant’s mother's house for over a year and a half.

• They were aware of the strained relationship between the appellant and his wife, who had been living separately for years.

• The complainant’s mother knew about the first marriage.

Thus, the bench concluded:

“If that be so, the appellant had not concealed the factum of his first marriage with ‘Inderjit Kaur’ from the complainant and her mother.”

Based on this, the Court ruled: “In the given circumstances... if still the complainant cohabited with him and had physical relations with him, it would not amount to rape under Section 376 IPC.”

The judges applied the principle that misconception of fact leading to consent is a core ingredient of rape, but no misconception arises if there was no deception.

While the Supreme Court set aside the conviction under Section 376 IPC, it upheld the conviction under Sections 493 and 494, noting that:

“As the second marriage was entered into during the subsistence of the first marriage, the conviction under Sections 493 and 494 IPC does not warrant interference.”

However, considering that the appellant had already undergone incarceration of about three years, the Court modified the sentence:

“We... modify the sentence awarded to the appellant to that of already undergone by him.”

Thus, the Court ordered the appellant’s release, holding that the punishment for Sections 493 and 494 stood satisfied by the period already served.

This judgment is a clear reiteration of the principle that rape under Section 376 IPC requires either force or consent obtained by deception or coercion. In the absence of fraud or concealment, even a morally questionable act does not meet the legal threshold for rape.

By clarifying that cohabitation based on known facts does not constitute consent vitiated by deception, the Court draws a fine yet crucial line in criminal jurisprudence around sexual offences in the context of fraudulent marriages.

Date of Decision: 20 August 2025