No Bar on Nominating a Non-Blood Relative if Only One Person is Named: Delhi High Court Upholds Single Nominee’s Right in Cooperative Housing Society

"Where nomination is made in favour of a single person, Section 78 imposes no restriction of blood relation" – In a recent Judgement  Division Bench of the Delhi High Court comprising Justice Navin Chawla and Justice Madhu Jain held that directly addresses the constitutional validity and interpretative contours of Rule 91 and Form 17 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 2007. The core issue before the Court was whether a member of a cooperative housing society could nominate a non-blood relative as their sole nominee under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003. The Court ruled in the affirmative, upholding the petitioner’s right to nominate a non-blood relative, and held that the existing rule, to the extent it implies otherwise, must be read down to conform with the parent Act.

"A Member Can Nominate Any One Person Irrespective of Blood Relation Where There Is No Joint Nomination"

The Court observed that the parent provision under Section 78 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 2003, clearly permits nomination to “a person or persons”, and it is only when more than one nominee is appointed that the restriction of blood relation applies. Referring to the proviso in Section 78(3), the Court stated:

“A holistic reading of Section 78 of the Act clearly shows that... if the nomination is to be made in the name of more than one person, the restriction is that these persons must be the blood relations of such member. If the nomination is made... in the name of one person only, there is no restriction on such nomination, and such right is absolute.” [Para 64]

The Court, therefore, rejected the interpretation of Rule 91 and Form 17 that appeared to restrict all nominations to blood relations and clarified:

“Rule 91 must be read in conformity with Section 78 of the Act... while a member may nominate any person as his nominee, if such member wishes to nominate more than one person, the condition of such persons being within the blood relation of the member shall apply.” [Para 68]

Petitioner, A Single Woman, Denied Right To Nominate A Chosen Individual

The petitioner, Ms. Ranjana Rajagopalan, a single woman and a member of the Supreme Court Bar Cooperative House Building Society Ltd., had sought to nominate Ms. Gayatri Kumari, her non-blood relative, as her nominee for the society membership and associated rights. However, her nomination was rejected by the society on the basis of Rule 91 and Form 17, which required that nominees be “within blood relation”. The Society cited a prior Division Bench judgment (Mayurdhwaj CGHS Ltd.) and the society’s own bye-laws.

This led to the constitutional challenge under Articles 14, 19(1)(c), 21, and 300A of the Constitution, with the petitioner asserting her right to nominate a person of her choice, especially in absence of close family.

The petition raised two core issues:

1. Whether Rule 91 and Form 17, in restricting nomination to blood relatives, are ultra vires Section 78 of the Act;
2. Whether such a restriction violates constitutional guarantees, particularly under Article 300A, which protects the right to property.

The Court's analysis turned heavily on statutory interpretation principles and the hierarchy between the Act and subordinate legislation. Noting the grammatical structure and purpose of the disjunctive "person or persons" in Section 78(1), the Court held:

“The only restriction is that there should not be more than one nomination at a given point in time. To this restriction, the proviso then carves out an exception... if the nomination is of more than one person, they must be blood relations.” [Para 64]

Further, the Court observed that the rules and the form cannot override the substantive right granted under the statute:

“In the event of a conflict between the provisions of an Act and the Rules framed thereunder, it is the provisions of the Act which would prevail over the Rules.” [Para 67]

Citing Central Bank of India v. Workmen and K.M. Charia Abdulla and Co. v. State of Kerala, the Court reiterated the doctrine that subordinate legislation cannot impose substantive restrictions not found in the parent statute.

Nomination Is Not a Transfer of Ownership

The Court clarified the legal nature of nomination under cooperative law, distinguishing it from testamentary succession or transfer of ownership:

“There is no transfer of title taking place by mere nomination. The nomination shall take effect only on the death of the member... There is, therefore, no transfer of title in an immoveable property at this stage.” [Para 75]

Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Indrani Wahi v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the Court underlined that nomination only facilitates transfer of membership, not ownership:

“Transfer of share or interest, based on a nomination... is with reference to the cooperative society concerned, and is binding on the said society... That would have no relevance to the issue of title between the inheritors or successors to the property of the deceased.” [Para 72, quoting Indrani Wahi]

Thus, concerns raised by the society and the state about revenue loss or misuse of property laws were found unconvincing.

Constitutional Rights and the Right to Property

Though the Court refrained from fully examining the constitutional validity of Rule 91 in the context of multiple nominations, it left the door open for such challenges. Emphasizing the constitutional protection under Article 300A, it observed:

“Any restriction on the right to nominate has to be tested on the Constitutional right guaranteed under Article 300A... and any restriction on such right must be strictly construed.” [Para 81]

The implication is clear: while reasonable restrictions may be imposed in the case of joint nominations, they must be narrowly tailored and cannot arbitrarily restrict the right of a member to dispose of their interest.

Having found the interpretation of Rule 91 and Form 17 to be overly restrictive and contrary to the parent Act, the Court allowed the writ petition, directing the cooperative society to recognize the petitioner’s nomination:

“The petitioner shall be entitled to make a fresh nomination... and the same shall be duly given cognizance of by the respondent no. 3 Society in accordance with the Delhi Co-operative Societies Act, 2003 and the Delhi Co-operative Societies Rules, 2007.” [Para 83]

Implications: A Clear Message to Housing Societies and Rule-Making Authorities

This judgment is a landmark clarification on the scope of nomination rights under the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act. It reinforces that subordinate legislation must align with statutory mandates and constitutional guarantees. Importantly, it upholds the autonomy of individuals — particularly single or childless persons — to designate a nominee of their choice, irrespective of familial ties.

The ruling sends a clear signal that housing societies cannot impose blanket bans or arbitrary restrictions, and any such clause in bye-laws or internal rules will be invalid if it contradicts the law.

The Delhi High Court’s judgment in Ranjana Rajagopalan v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Others marks a decisive affirmation of the legal and constitutional right of cooperative society members to nominate a non-blood relative when only one nominee is appointed. The Court’s insistence on interpreting subordinate rules in harmony with statutory provisions — and not in conflict with them — is a reiteration of a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation.

By reading down Rule 91 and Form 17 to align with Section 78, the Court not only ensured statutory coherence but also protected individual rights under Article 300A. This decision is bound to influence how nominations are understood and handled in cooperative societies across the country, particularly for members without traditional family structures.

Date of Decision: 16 December 2025