Mere Securing Higher Aggregate Marks Is Irrelevant Without Meeting Mandatory Qualification: Rajasthan High Court Dismisses Plea for Stenographer Appointment

“When Statutory Language Is Clear, There Is No Scope for Interpretation”, High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Jaipur Bench, comprising Justice Avneesh Jhingan and Justice Bhuwan Goyal, delivered a notable ruling in the case of Kartikey Garg vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13803 of 2024. The judgment centered around the refusal to appoint the petitioner to the post of Stenographer Grade-III (Hindi) under the physically handicapped (low vision) category due to his failure to achieve the minimum required shorthand speed of 70 words per minute (WPM) under Rule 10 of the Rajasthan District Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986.

The Court held emphatically that “mere securing higher aggregate marks is irrelevant if the mandatory qualification is not met,” thereby affirming the primacy of eligibility criteria in public recruitment processes.

The case originated from an advertisement dated 28.07.2023 issued for recruitment to various posts under the Rajasthan District Courts Ministerial Establishment Rules, 1986. The petitioner, Kartikey Garg, who belonged to the low vision physically handicapped category, applied for the post of Stenographer Grade-III (Hindi). The selection process comprised a shorthand test in Hindi and a computer test (speed and efficiency).

According to the petitioner’s mark sheet, he secured 66.667 marks in the shorthand test, 23.475 marks in the speed test, and 31 marks in the efficiency test, resulting in a total of 121.142 marks. However, his actual speed in Hindi shorthand was assessed at only 50.167 WPM, which was well below the minimum required speed of 70 WPM.

The petitioner approached the Court after making unsuccessful representations, including one addressed to the Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, claiming entitlement to appointment on the basis of overall higher marks and citing vacancies in the PH category that remained unfilled.

The primary legal question before the Court was whether a candidate who failed to meet the mandatory shorthand speed could still claim appointment on the ground of higher aggregate marks and vacant posts in the reserved category.

The Court clarified the correct legal position by stating, “The claim of petitioner for appointment as Stenographer on securing 121.142 marks lacks merit. The petitioner failed to pass Hindi shorthand test at required speed of 70 WPM and consequently does not possess the required qualification for appointment.”

The petitioner’s argument hinged on the claim that the advertisement did not prescribe minimum qualifying marks for shorthand and, since his aggregate marks were higher than the qualifying threshold, he was entitled to selection. The Court dismissed this contention, observing, “It is rightly contended by the petitioner that there are no minimum qualifying marks prescribed for Hindi shorthand test but this cannot be considered in vacuum, ignoring that there is requisite of passing Hindi shorthand test with speed of 70 WPM.”

The Court further pointed out that there is a crucial distinction between “marks obtained in shorthand test” and the “speed of shorthand”. The Court stated, “The distinction between assessment of the speed of shorthand test and the marks obtained in shorthand test is evident by the separate formulas provided in the advertisement for assessing the speed and evaluation of marks.”

The Court highlighted that the recruitment was governed by the 1986 Rules, which explicitly provide under Rule 10 that the candidate “must have passed” the shorthand speed test at 70 WPM in Hindi. Addressing the petitioner’s plea to read the word “must” as “might,” the Court remarked, “The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the word ‘must’ in Rule 10 of the 1986 rules be read as ‘might’ is noted to be rejected.”

The Court reaffirmed the principle that the language of Rule 10 is clear and unambiguous, necessitating literal interpretation. Citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Raghunath Rai Bareja and Ors. vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors., (2007) 2 SCC 230, the Court reiterated, “Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule.”

The Court quoted the Supreme Court’s observation in Raghunath Rai Bareja, “The legislature is presumed to have made no mistake. The presumption is that it intended to say what it has said… the court cannot correct or make up the deficiency, especially when a literal reading thereof produces an intelligible result.”

The Bench concluded that the petitioner’s higher aggregate marks and the presence of unfilled vacancies did not confer upon him any vested right to appointment. The Court reasoned, “Securing of 121.142 marks by the petitioner and the vacancies in the physically handicapped category lying vacant, shall not create a vested right for the petitioner to be appointed.”

The Rajasthan High Court strictly applied the principle that “eligibility conditions cannot be diluted on sympathetic grounds” and refused to exercise writ jurisdiction in favor of the petitioner. The judgment laid down a clear exposition that eligibility criteria prescribed under recruitment rules are mandatory and non-negotiable.

The Court concluded by stating, “No case is made out for interference in the writ jurisdiction. The petitioner’s failure to meet the essential eligibility criteria disqualifies him from appointment irrespective of aggregate marks or vacant positions.”

Thus, the writ petition was dismissed, and the challenge to the recruitment process was unequivocally rejected.

This ruling by the Rajasthan High Court stands as a reaffirmation of the principle that mandatory eligibility criteria must be fulfilled in recruitment processes, irrespective of aggregate marks or availability of vacancies. The judgment underscores the supremacy of statutory mandates and the inadmissibility of judicial alteration of recruitment norms under writ jurisdiction.

By adhering to the literal interpretation and relying on binding Supreme Court precedents, the Rajasthan High Court has reinforced a significant doctrine in service jurisprudence: the rule of law prevails over equity in public employment.

Date of Decision: 10th July 2025