Mere Recovery Of Blood-Stained Clothes… Does Not Discharge Prosecution’s Burden: Rajasthan HC Frees Man After 13 Years

“Reasons cannot be cryptic… the judgment may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to vital evidence.” - Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur allowed D.B. Criminal Appeal, reversing a 2013 conviction under Section 302 IPC and ordering the appellant’s release. The Division Bench of Dr. Justice Pushpendra Singh Bhati and Justice Sunil Beniwal stressed that an appellate court must independently re-appreciate the evidence and may “reverse the finding and sentence and acquit” under Section 386(b) CrPC when the chain is infirm. The Bench ultimately directed that the accused “be released forthwith, if not required in any other case,” while securing a bond under Section 437-A CrPC/Section 481 BNSS.

The case began with a call at dawn on June 14, 2012: “a dead body is lying opposite Shani Temple,” Sri Ganganagar, later identified as Kishanlal. An FIR (No. 312/2012) for Sections 302/201 IPC followed the same day. After investigation, the case was committed and tried; eleven witnesses were examined. On July 18, 2013, the Trial Court acquitted the accused of Section 201 but convicted him under Section 302, imposing life imprisonment and a fine.

The High Court began with a clear premise: “the entire case of the prosecution rests on circumstantial evidence, as there is no eyewitness,” which requires strict satisfaction of the Sharad Birdhichand Sarda “Panchsheel.” The judgment reproduces the five “golden principles,” emphasizing the gulf between “may be” and “must be” proof.

The prosecution urged that “circumstantial links, when read together, form a complete and unbroken chain,” pointing to same-day FIR and next-day arrest; seizure of blood-stained brick, soil, cardboard; recovery of the accused’s blood-stained clothes; and an FSL report finding human blood Group “A” on scene articles and the accused’s clothing. It paired this with medical testimony that blunt-force head injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The defence pressed three fractures in the chain: “no independent witness” to public-place seizures, a two-day unexplained gap before FSL deposit undermining chain of custody, and “absence of motive” in a purely circumstantial case.

“The five golden principles… constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.”

The Bench’s reappraisal is pointed. “Such recovery, while relevant, is not independently corroborated by any neutral or independent witness, despite the fact that the arrest and seizures took place in a public area,” a caution magnified because the prosecution relied “solely on circumstantial evidence.”

On the forensics, the Court flagged the precise evidentiary gap: “the blood… was of Group A (human origin). However, the prosecution has not proved the blood group of either the deceased or the accused, which seriously undermines the evidentiary value of this forensic match.”

Chain-of-custody handling fared no better. The Court recorded that the Malkhana official “admitted that there was a two-day unexplained delay” in depositing sealed samples at the FSL, with no proof of secure storage during the interval—“casting a shadow over the integrity of the chain of custody.”

As for oral links, the brother’s account—“he ‘heard’ the appellant had attacked the deceased with bricks”—was “purely hearsay and cannot be treated as substantive piece of evidence.” The Investigating Officer, moreover, “does not offer any substantive material” of last-seen, enmity, or nexus.

These deficits cumulatively trigger the Panchsheel. The Court’s bottom line is categorical: “the circumstances proved are not wholly consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and do not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. Mere recovery of blood-stained clothes and uncorroborated forensic findings do not discharge the prosecution’s burden.”

On appellate duty, the Bench recited Section 386(b) CrPC in extenso and invoked Supreme Court precedent to remind that “reasons cannot be cryptic,” and that a first appellate court must set out why it accepts the evidence before curtailing liberty. With the appellant having already undergone “about 13 years 02 months” actual custody (and “16 years 02 months 20 days” including remission), the Court held it “a fit case to exercise” its reversal power.

The operative directions follow: “the impugned judgment… is quashed and set aside. The accused-appellant is acquitted… he be released forthwith.” Compliance is secured by a ₹25,000 personal bond with like surety for six months “to appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court” if an SLP is filed.

This judgment is a crisp affirmation that in a circumstantial case, the law’s “mental distance between ‘may be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.” When independent witnesses are absent, custody gaps persist, and a blood-group “match” isn’t tied to either party, “suspicion” cannot stand in for proof—hence the acquittal and immediate release.

Date of Decision: 07/08/2025;