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by Admin
07 January 2026 4:15 PM
“Allegations of cruelty must be specific and supported by credible evidence; vague and general claims cannot dissolve a marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA” — In a latest Judgement Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, comprising Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, dismissed two appeals arising from divorce petitions filed by two brothers against their respective wives under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on grounds of cruelty. The Court upheld the judgment of the Family Court which had previously denied the divorces, holding that the allegations of cruelty were vague, unsupported by credible evidence, and based on FIRs that had all culminated in acquittals or compromise.
The Court ruled that "prolonged separation, absent evidence of mental cruelty or irretrievable breakdown, is insufficient in itself to justify dissolution of marriage under law."
The appellants, Surender Kumar and Devender Kumar, brothers by relation, had married Manita and Sunita, respectively, who were themselves sisters, on the same date—26 November 2001—through Hindu rites in Delhi. Both couples initially resided in a joint family household.
After alleged domestic discord, both brothers filed for divorce in July 2011, claiming that their wives and their in-laws inflicted cruelty upon them and their elderly father. The alleged instances included physical assaults, consumption of poison by one respondent, false criminal complaints, and non-attendance at the last rites of their mother.
The respondents, in turn, alleged that they were victims of dowry-related harassment and had been unlawfully ousted from their matrimonial homes. They also pointed out that the criminal cases the appellants relied on had resulted in acquittals or compounding, with no evidence to prove cruelty.
The Family Court, after a detailed appraisal of the evidence, dismissed both divorce petitions on 11 January 2019, holding that the allegations did not satisfy the legal standard required under Section 13(1)(ia) HMA. The appellants challenged this verdict before the High Court.
"Vague Allegations Without Proof Do Not Qualify as Cruelty" — Court Stresses Evidentiary Standard Under Section 13(1)(ia)
The Court reiterated the settled principle that cruelty must be proven by specific and credible evidence, even though the standard of proof is that of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond reasonable doubt. Allegations without corroboration—either medical, documentary, or by independent witnesses—cannot be elevated to the legal threshold of cruelty.
The Court observed: “This Court sustains the Family Court’s finding that the Appellants failed to prove any such Kalendra proceedings and did not produce any documentary record of admission in hospital or medical evidence regarding poisoning.”
Further, the Bench rejected the claim that the wife’s absence at her mother-in-law’s funeral constituted cruelty, as the wife had clearly stated:
“We were not informed about last rites of my mother-in-law... None of my family members had attended, as we were unaware.”
The Court also recorded the appellant's unwillingness to reconcile, noting his admission:
“I am not ready to live with the respondent.”
In such circumstances, the Bench held that the conduct attributed to the respondents, even if taken at face value, reflected domestic discord and incompatibility, not cruelty of the nature required under law to dissolve a marriage.
“Mere Registration of FIRs Does Not Prove Cruelty”— Criminal Allegations Ended in Acquittal or Compromise
The Bench examined in detail the three FIRs (Nos. 26/2011, 27/2011, and 59/2011) filed during the course of the matrimonial discord. Each case was found to have ended in acquittal or compounding, with no independent medical evidence or witness testimony.
Regarding FIR No. 26/2011 for alleged assault on the father, the Court referred to the trial court order acquitting the respondents and noted:
“It is evident that mere registration of the FIR, without corroborative evidence, cannot constitute cruelty.”
Similarly, FIR No. 27/2011 alleging damage to household articles was dismissed due to lack of evidence, and FIR No. 59/2011 was discredited on the ground that it had been filed three months after the alleged incident, lacked medical proof, and ended in acquittal.
Thus, the Court held: “The Appellants have failed to produce any corroboration to show that this incident, as alleged, ever took place.
“Long Separation Not Equivalent to Cruelty or Irretrievable Breakdown” — Court Distinguishes From Samar Ghosh and Naveen Kohli
The appellants invoked the precedents in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh (2007) 4 SCC 511 and Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558, arguing that the prolonged separation of more than 13 years demonstrated an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.
However, the Court firmly rejected this argument, clarifying: “In the present case, there is no evidence of sustained abusive behavior or intent to make cohabitation impossible; the separation appears to be largely a result of mutual differences and lack of reconciliation efforts.”
The Bench concluded that mere separation, when not accompanied by proof of cruelty or a hostile environment, does not entitle the parties to divorce.
“The reliance placed on Samar Ghosh and Naveen Kohli is misplaced. In those cases, evidence of sustained cruelty was clear. That is not the case here.”
“Failure to Examine Independent Witnesses Leads to Adverse Inference” — Court Criticizes Evidentiary Gaps
The Court also took note of the appellants' failure to support their claims with any independent testimony or documentary evidence, despite serious allegations such as attempts to poison, physical assaults, and malicious police action.
It noted: “Mere allegations without proof cannot sustain divorce on grounds of cruelty.”
This evidentiary lapse further reinforced the Family Court’s finding that the claims were general and unsubstantiated.
The Delhi High Court dismissed both appeals, upholding the Family Court’s verdict that the divorce petitions lacked legal merit. The judgment sends a clear message that "mere acrimony or unresolved differences do not amount to cruelty in law" and that "the registration of FIRs without conviction or corroboration cannot be used as a ground to dissolve a marriage."
The Court emphasized that long separation, unaccompanied by evidence of hostile or abusive conduct, is not enough to invoke Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA. The onus of proof lies with the party alleging cruelty, and failure to substantiate those claims will lead to dismissal of the petition.
Ultimately, the Bench refused to grant the divorces, holding:
“The Family Court has rightly dismissed the Divorce Petitions. Mere quarrels, differences, or isolated police involvement, without corroborative evidence, cannot be equated with mental cruelty as envisaged under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA.”
Date of Decision: 28 October 2025