Matrimonial Proceedings Confidential, But Not Off-Limits When Law Demands Disclosure: Delhi High Court

“Right to Privacy Cannot Be Used as a Shield to Suppress Material Facts in Related Proceedings”, Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal by a husband seeking to restrain his wife, her brother, and her employer from disclosing details of ongoing matrimonial and custody disputes to third parties. The Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar clarified that Section 22 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) is aimed at preventing public dissemination of matrimonial proceedings, not bona fide references made in the course of defending related legal or administrative actions.

The appellant had filed multiple applications before the Family Court under Section 22 of the HMA, alleging that confidential details of the matrimonial litigation and connected custody proceedings were disclosed to the respondent’s employer, to police authorities, to the school of the minor child, and even formed part of a POCSO complaint. He claimed such disclosures amounted to a statutory breach of confidentiality and sought an injunction to prevent any further sharing.

The Family Court, by order dated 29 March 2025, dismissed the applications, finding that the alleged disclosures were not “printed or published in the public domain” but made in response to legal and administrative proceedings initiated by the appellant himself. On appeal, the High Court endorsed this reasoning, noting that “permitting such references in a bona fide legal defence, especially when occasioned by the appellant’s own actions, cannot be construed as a violation of confidentiality.”

Examining the scope of Section 22 HMA, the Bench reproduced the provision, emphasising that it has two distinct limbs — a mandate for in-camera hearings and a prohibition on printing or publishing any matter relating to such proceedings, except with court permission. The Court observed: “The mischief sought to be curbed by the provision is the unnecessary and potentially prejudicial dissemination of sensitive matrimonial details in the public domain.” However, the term “publication” is not to be read so broadly as to encompass disclosures made in a legal defence before appropriate fora.

The Court found that the respondent-wife’s references to the matrimonial case, whether in employer correspondence, in police complaints, or in POCSO proceedings, arose “in the context of defending separate proceedings initiated by the appellant” and did not amount to public circulation. When asked during the hearing to identify any instance of actual publication in the press, on social media, or in any other public medium, the appellant “was unable to point out any instance where the confidential details… had been printed, circulated, or otherwise made publicly accessible.”

The judgment stressed that Section 22 cannot be weaponised to obstruct disclosure of relevant facts where such disclosure is necessary to defend oneself: “To hold otherwise would amount to allowing Section 22 of the HMA to be used as a shield to suppress material facts in related legal proceedings, thereby defeating the ends of justice.”

Finding no breach of the statutory prohibition and no ground to interfere, the High Court dismissed the appeal, while making it clear that its observations would not affect the merits of the pending matrimonial case before the Family Court.

Date of Decision: 28 July 2025