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Mandatory Life Imprisonment Under Section 376DA IPC Does Not Bar Remission: Supreme Court Dismisses PIL Challenging Gang Rape Sentencing Provision

18 September 2025 6:41 PM

By: sayum


“Even if life sentence means imprisonment for the remainder of natural life, the right to seek remission under the Constitution or statute remains available”— Division Bench of the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice R. Mahadevan dismissing a Public Interest Litigation challenging the constitutional validity of Section 376DA of the Indian Penal Code. The Court declined to strike down the provision, which prescribes mandatory life imprisonment for gang rape of a girl under 16, but importantly clarified that such a sentence does not preclude the convict from seeking remission under Articles 72 or 161 of the Constitution or under statutory law.

“The Sentence May Be Life-long, But The Right to Remission Is Alive”

The primary grievance in the writ petition was that Section 376DA IPC, which mandates life imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life, was arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution due to the absence of judicial discretion in sentencing.

Section 376DA reads: “Where a woman under sixteen years of age is raped by one or more persons... each of those persons shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be punished with imprisonment for life, which shall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person’s natural life, and with fine.”

However, the Court held that even such a mandatory sentence does not extinguish the constitutional or statutory right of remission, stating:

“Even in a case where punishment is awarded under Section 376DA or 376DB IPC... it would not take away the right to seek remission in accordance with the Constitution or the statutory scheme as under the CrPC or BNSS and the applicable policy of remission of each State.”

This significant clarification tempers the otherwise absolute nature of the punishment by preserving the post-conviction rights of the convict, thereby balancing penal certainty with rehabilitative possibility.

The Constitutional Challenge

The petition, filed under Article 32 by two individuals, was supported by National Law University, Delhi’s Project 39A, which sought to intervene through IA No. 147023/2022, represented by Senior Advocate Siddharth Agarwal.

The core contention was that the use of the word “shall”, read with the phrase “for the remainder of the natural life”, eliminates any discretion from the sentencing judge and disallows consideration of mitigating factors—thereby violating the principles of proportionality and fairness in sentencing.

The petitioners argued: “There is no alternative punishment... Sessions Courts are compelled to impose imprisonment for the remainder of the convict’s natural life... This violates the tenets of just sentencing.”

Government’s Position: “The Law Targets Heinous Crimes Against Children”

The Attorney General, along with the Solicitor General and other senior law officers, defended the validity of Section 376DA, asserting that:

“The punishment is imposed on persons who have committed gang rape on a woman under sixteen years of age—i.e., a minor—and having regard to the egregious nature and seriousness of the crime, Parliament has, in its wisdom, chosen to impose such strict punishment.”

It was emphasized that the severity of the crime justified the rigidity of the sentence, and that legislative intent in prescribing such punishment cannot be questioned in abstract or through speculative PILs.

Two-Fold Legal Lens on Section 376DA

The Court approached the issue from two distinct legal perspectives:

First, it acknowledged that the sentencing under Section 376DA is mandatory and fixed and would be carried out after due judicial trial, whereupon an appeal can be filed before the High Court or even the Supreme Court itself.

Second, and more crucially, it clarified that even if such a life sentence is imposed, the convict retains multiple avenues to seek remission:

“The accused has the right of remission in accordance with Article 72 and/or Article 161 of the Constitution of India... and also a statutory remedy under Section 432 CrPC, subject to Section 433A, or under Sections 473 and 475 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023.”

Thus, the rigidity of the sentencing provision is mitigated by post-sentencing reliefs available under constitutional and statutory frameworks.

“No Adjudication in a Vacuum”: Court Declines to Decide on Constitutionality Without Concrete Facts

While not dismissing the broader constitutional concerns raised, the Court declined to adjudicate on the validity of Section 376DA in a Public Interest Litigation devoid of factual context. The bench held:

“In a vacuum, in the absence of facts of a case, in a Public Interest Litigation, we do not wish to adjudicate on the validity of the said provision.”

“We leave the said question of law open to be agitated in any appropriate case.”

This ensures that Section 376DA’s constitutionality may still be tested in future case-specific challenges, where real-life application of the provision can be scrutinized in context.

Section 376DB IPC Also Covered: Life Imprisonment or Death for Rape of Girls Under 12

The Court also examined Section 376DB IPC, which deals with gang rape of girls under twelve years of age and prescribes life imprisonment for natural life or death.

The same reasoning was applied: “Even in Section 376DB, the accused shall be punished with imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life... or with death. However, this too does not exclude the right to seek remission.”

Writ Petition Dismissed, Issue Left Open for Future Cases

The Supreme Court concluded: “Keeping open the question of law to be advanced in an appropriate case, we dispose of this Writ Petition and the impleading application.”

The remedy of remission, both constitutional and statutory, survives even when life imprisonment is expressly defined as for the remainder of the convict’s natural life, as under Section 376DA and 376DB.

The Supreme Court’s decision strikes a delicate balance between justice for heinous crimes and constitutional safeguards. While it refrained from invalidating the sentencing provision in abstract, it ensured that remission rights remain intact, preserving the rehabilitative and reformative ethos of Indian criminal jurisprudence.

This decision is especially significant for legal discourse surrounding sentencing proportionality, judicial discretion, and victim-centred justice—and may shape future constitutional litigation on mandatory minimum sentencing.

Date of Decision: 2nd September 2025

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