Magistrate’s Order for FIR Registration Not Illegal Merely Because Police Were Not Approached First: Supreme Court

“Direct Application to Magistrate Without Prior Police Complaint Is Procedurally Irregular, Not Without Jurisdiction ,The Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC unless the informant has first availed the remedy under Section 154(3)” - In a key pronouncement on procedural rigour under criminal law, the Supreme Court firmly ruled that a Magistrate must not mechanically order the registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC unless the complainant has first attempted to set the criminal law in motion through the police under Section 154. The Court declared that a direct application under Section 156(3) without exhausting statutory remedies is improper, though not entirely illegal.

Justice Pankaj Mithal, writing for the Bench, observed: “The Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC.

The judgment elaborates the boundaries of judicial intervention in pre-trial criminal procedure and underscores that judicial satisfaction under Section 156(3) must not be a perfunctory exercise.

The matter involved a long-standing commercial dispute between Sunair Hotels Ltd. (SHL) and VLS Finance Ltd., arising out of a 1995 MoU involving a hotel project in Delhi. SHL had entered into an agreement with VLS for financial assistance, including an equity investment and a public issue of shares. The relationship eventually soured over allegations of non-fulfilment of financial commitments.

Multiple FIRs were filed by VLS against SHL alleging siphoning of funds. In retaliation, SHL filed an application under Section 156(3) CrPC, resulting in registration of FIR No. 380/2005, alleging that VLS misled SHL into signing an MoU based on false promises, including a public issue that was allegedly barred under SEBI guidelines.

VLS sought quashing of this FIR and the Magistrate’s order dated 01.07.2005, arguing that the dispute was purely civil in nature, the FIR was retaliatory, and the Magistrate’s order lacked application of mind.

The High Court dismissed the petitions. The matter reached the Supreme Court.

Whether a Magistrate can entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC without the complainant first approaching the police or the Superintendent of Police?

Answering in the negative, the Court held:

“A plain and simple reading of Section 154 CrPC makes it imperative upon the informant to first approach the officer-in-charge... It is only when no action is taken... that the person may move the Magistrate under Section 156(3).”

The Court criticized the Magistrate’s order, which directed FIR registration without verifying whether statutory remedies were exhausted, but refrained from quashing the FIR because:

“As entertaining an application directly by the Magistrate is a mere procedural irregularity... the action of the Magistrate may not be illegal or without jurisdiction.”

Whether the Magistrate applied his mind while directing FIR registration?

The Court stressed that reasons and application of mind are essential even under Section 156(3):

“Whenever any power is bestowed upon a judicial authority, it is incumbent that it should be exercised on the basis of sound legal principles by application of mind and by a speaking order.”

The Magistrate’s order, though brief, noted hearing the counsel, perusal of documents, and reliance on a judgment. Hence, the Court held it did not suffer from non-application of mind.

Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to quash the FIR, considering the investigation had been completed and chargesheets filed?

The Court ruled:

“If an FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence... and chargesheets have been submitted, there is no justification to quash the FIR unless the order is illegal or without jurisdiction.”

It upheld the High Court’s discretion in declining interference at this advanced stage of proceedings.

Is the dispute purely civil in nature, excluding criminal liability?

Rejecting this contention, the Court held that even if a dispute arises from a civil agreement (like an MoU), allegations of inducement, deception, or criminal conspiracy must be tested through evidence.

“Once such allegations are made out... it is difficult for the court to interfere with the FIR, only for the reason that some of the disputes are of civil nature.”

Can successive FIRs be filed based on the same MoU and allegations?

The Court acknowledged that the second FIR was based on similar allegations and noted the possibility of “camouflage” due to stay on the first FIR, but did not quash the second FIR outright. It held:

“Though similar, both FIRs are not virtually the same... and the matter must proceed to trial.”

Reaffirming the principle that criminal process must not be abused but also not stifled prematurely, the Supreme Court clarified the procedural hierarchy under CrPC. It ruled that:

“Direct applications to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) must not be the first resort. The hierarchy of remedies under Section 154 must be followed.”

Yet, in this case, since the investigation was already completed and chargesheets filed, the Court chose not to quash the proceedings, stating that the alleged irregularity was procedural—not jurisdictional.

This judgment restores the balance between judicial oversight and investigative autonomy, emphasizing that judicial orders directing FIR registration must be reasoned and not mechanical, but at the same time, once a lawful investigation concludes, courts should not undo it lightly.

Date of Decision: 25 July 2025