Limitation Under Section 468 CrPC Does Not Apply to Section 12 DV Act Applications: J&K High Court Rejects Husband's Plea to Quash Complaint as Time-Barred

Section 12 of the DV Act is not akin to a criminal complaint under Section 200 CrPC, and limitation under Section 468 CrPC applies only to penal offences — High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh at Jammu in a significant judgment rejecting a husband’s petition seeking to quash proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act) on the ground of being time-barred. Justice M.A. Chowdhary emphatically held that applications under Section 12 of the DV Act are not governed by limitation periods under Section 468 CrPC, as those apply only to penal offences, such as breach of protection orders.

The judgment draws a clear legal line between civil relief applications under the DV Act and criminal complaints under the Code of Criminal Procedure, dispelling persistent confusion over limitation bars in DV cases.

“Reliefs Under DV Act Are Civil in Nature; Criminal Limitation Provisions Do Not Apply”

The dispute arose when Tilak Raj, husband of Darshana Devi, filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC to quash a domestic violence complaint lodged against him under Section 12 of the DV Act, filed on 12.02.2022. He contended that the acts of alleged domestic violence occurred in July 2019, specifically on 20.07.2019 and 22.07.2019, and that the complaint filed more than two years later was barred by limitation under Section 468 CrPC.

The petitioner relied on Supreme Court precedents such as Japani Sahoo vs. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty and Inderjeet Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab to argue that complaints under the DV Act must be filed within one year of the incident.

However, the Court rejected this premise outright, clarifying that Section 12 of the DV Act is not a criminal complaint in the sense of Section 2(d) of CrPC, and therefore, Section 468 CrPC has no application.

“It is thus clear that the contention made on behalf of the petitioner wrongly equated filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act to lodging of a complaint or initiation of a prosecution, so as to hold that the application under Section 12 ought to have been filed within a period of one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.”

“Application Under Section 12 of DV Act Is Not a Complaint Under Section 200 CrPC”

The Court elaborated on the legislative scheme of the DV Act, noting that proceedings under Section 12 are distinct in form and function from traditional criminal prosecutions. Referring to Section 28 of the DV Act, the Court observed:

“The proceedings under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 and offences under Section 31 shall be governed by the CrPC, but this will not prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of applications under Section 12 or 23(2).”

Thus, while the procedural framework of CrPC may guide certain aspects, limitation under Section 468 CrPC does not restrict a woman’s right to seek civil remedies under the DV Act, including residence, maintenance, custody, and protection.

The Court emphasized that the object of the DV Act is to provide effective and immediate relief to aggrieved women, and applying limitation laws meant for criminal prosecutions would defeat this purpose.

“Limitation Applies Only to Penal Offences Like Section 31 DV Act, Not Civil Reliefs Under Section 12”

Justice Chowdhary made a vital legal distinction, holding that Section 468 CrPC applies only to offences punishable under Section 31 of the DV Act, which criminalizes breach of protection orders:

“The bar of the period of limitation will be applicable only to the penal proceedings under Section 31 of the Act seeking punishment... However, there cannot be any bar to maintaining an application under other provisions including Sections 12 and 23 of the DV Act.”

This reasoning finds support in the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Kamatchi vs. Lakshmi Narayanan (2022) 15 SCC 50, where it was held:

“Limitation under Section 468 CrPC only applies to actual offences i.e. breaches of protection orders under Section 31. It does not apply to applications under Section 12.”

The Court also referenced Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi vs. Vidhi Rawal (2025 INSC 734), wherein the Supreme Court affirmed that Section 482 CrPC petitions to quash DV proceedings should be entertained only in cases of gross injustice or abuse of process, and not where the only objection is based on limitation.

“Complaint Was Not Time-Barred; Proceedings Must Go On”

The petitioner argued that since the alleged domestic violence occurred in July 2019, and the complaint was filed in February 2022, it was barred by time. The respondent, Darshana Devi, maintained that the application under Section 12 of the DV Act was not a criminal complaint, and hence, no limitation applied.

Agreeing with the respondent, the Court held:

“When the bar of limitation is not applicable to a complaint/application under Section 12 or under Section 23 of the DV Act, the plea raised with regard to limitation is not tenable... The petition is found to be misconceived, devoid of any merit and substance.”

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed, and the Trial Court was directed to proceed expeditiously with the domestic violence case.

“Domestic Violence Act Is a Social Welfare Legislation — Must Be Construed to Protect Victims, Not Shield Perpetrators”

The judgment underscores a broader judicial philosophy — that the DV Act, being a remedial and beneficial statute, must be interpreted in a manner that safeguards the interests of victims rather than permits procedural technicalities to frustrate justice.

“The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted to provide more effective protection to women who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. Applying rigid limitation norms would thwart this intent.”

By rejecting the plea to quash the complaint on limitation grounds, the Court reaffirmed the right of aggrieved women to seek civil remedies, regardless of the time lapse, so long as penal proceedings under Section 31 are not initiated after limitation.

Date of Decision: 21 August 2025