Limitation Begins Only Upon Refusal to Perform, Not From Date of Agreement: Andhra Pradesh High Court Affirms Specific Performance Decree

“When Possession is Delivered and Consideration Paid, Denial After Nine Years Cannot Defeat Plaintiff’s Rights”: In a detailed and precedent-aligned ruling Andhra Pradesh High Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court granting specific performance of an agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. The defendants, who were family members of the plaintiff, sought to defeat a 2002 land sale agreement by alleging limitation, denial of execution, and invalidity due to stamp duty issues. The Court firmly rejected each of these contentions, declaring:

“When no time is fixed for performance, limitation under Article 54 begins from the date of refusal—not from the date of agreement.”

Dismissing the second appeal, the Court held that the plaintiff had validly proved execution, possession, and readiness to perform, and found no substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

“Family Members Cannot Deny What They Once Confirmed Before Revenue Authorities”

The case involved a dispute between brothers and their legal heirs over an unregistered agreement of sale dated 22.04.2002, by which the plaintiff claimed he paid ₹70,000 to his brothers (the defendants) and took possession of the land. The land mutation in revenue records and issuance of a pattadar passbook in the plaintiff’s name followed shortly thereafter. It wasn’t until 2011, almost a decade later, that the defendants issued a legal notice denying the agreement.

The plaintiff, citing this first refusal of performance as the cause of action, filed a suit for specific performance on 27.07.2011. The Trial Court in O.S. No. 74 of 2011 decreed the suit, which was upheld by the First Appellate Court in A.S. No. 39 of 2018.

When the matter reached the High Court, the appellants raised multiple questions of law—including limitation, admissibility of the agreement, and alleged lack of attestor testimony. But the Court found these issues to be well-settled in law and already conclusively addressed by the lower courts.

“Possession, Consideration, and Execution Proved Through Credible Oral and Documentary Evidence”

Justice Rao noted that Ex.A.15, the agreement of sale, was clearly proved through oral testimony of the plaintiff (P.W.1) and the son of one attesting witness (P.W.2). Though the attesting witnesses had died and one was paralysed, the plaintiff filed a memo to that effect, which was not disputed. The Court remarked:

“No one can expect a dead person to be brought to court to give evidence.”

The Court emphasised the credibility of the plaintiff’s version, noting that:“It is not even the case of the defendants that they were on inimical terms with the plaintiff. In fact, they admitted cordial relations, which lends further credibility to the plaintiff’s version.”

The plaintiff had also proved possession through revenue documents—Exs.A.2 to A.5 and Exs.X.1 to X.4—as well as the testimony of the Village Revenue Officer (P.W.3), who stated:

“P.W.1, defendant Nos. 1 and 3 came to me, produced the agreement of sale, and the name of P.W.1 was mutated after verifying the same.”

The Court observed that the 4th defendant (D.W.2) himself admitted that: “Since 2002 till date, our names were not reflected in the revenue records, and we never challenged the mutation entries or pattadar passbook issued to the plaintiff.”

“Mere Mutation Doesn’t Confer Title—But in This Case, It Supports Possession and Agreement”

The defendants argued that entries in revenue records could not confer ownership. While acknowledging that principle, the High Court clarified:

“Though mutation alone doesn’t establish title, when coupled with an executed agreement of sale and delivery of possession, it strengthens the plaintiff’s case.”

The Court added: “The evidence on record clearly establishes that after obtaining Ex.A.15 agreement of sale from the defendants, the plaintiff came into possession of the plaint schedule property.”

“Suit Filed Within Time—Delay Alone Does Not Defeat A Right When Performance is Not Refused”

On the key issue of limitation, the Court delivered a clear message: “Since no time was fixed in the agreement, the limitation begins from the date when refusal occurred. That refusal was by legal notice dated 16.03.2011. The suit filed on 27.07.2011 is well within limitation.”

It rejected the appellant’s argument that the clock began ticking from the agreement date in 2002, stating:

“The suit is not barred by limitation. Time is not an essence of contract here, and limitation began to run from the refusal of the defendants, not from the date of Ex.A.15.”

“High Court Cannot Re-Appreciate Evidence Without Showing Perversity in Findings”

Reiterating the narrow jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC, Justice Rao concluded that the findings of both the Trial and First Appellate Courts were well-reasoned and supported by evidence:

“I do not find any perversity in the findings arrived at by both the courts below. The second appeal does not involve any substantial question of law and warrants no interference.”

This judgment is a powerful reiteration of well-established legal doctrines in specific performance, limitation law, evidentiary standards, and the narrow scope of second appeal jurisdiction. By refusing to interfere with fact-based, concurrent findings, the Court upheld both legal certainty and contractual sanctity—especially in intra-family property arrangements.

As the Court observed: “The findings given by both the Courts below remain unimpeachable… They are not based on incorrect reading or misapplication of law… No interference is warranted.”

Date of Decision: 15th July 2025