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by Admin
05 December 2025 4:19 PM
“Section 307 IPC is not a fallback for delayed death—if the injury was intended to cause death and is sufficient in the ordinary course to do so, the offence is murder, not attempt.” - In a detailed and illuminating ruling, the Supreme Court of India clarified the precise legal requirements for invoking Section 307 IPC (Attempt to Murder), and how courts must not misapply it in cases where the offence properly falls under Section 302 IPC (Murder).
Restoring the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC, the Court criticised the Chhattisgarh High Court for mechanically invoking Section 307 IPC on the mere ground that death occurred nine months after the injury.
Justice J.B. Pardiwala, authoring the judgment, observed: “The High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of attempt to commit murder punishable under Section 307 IPC merely because the victim died after a period of nine months. This reasoning overlooks the nature of injury and the intention behind the act.”
“Attempt to Murder Requires Intention, Not Just Injury – Time Gap Between Injury and Death Is Not Determinative”
The Supreme Court underlined that Section 307 IPC is not triggered merely because death didn’t occur immediately. What matters is the intention or knowledge of the accused, and whether the act would constitute murder if death had occurred.
“To justify a conviction under Section 307 IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. But the prosecution must establish that the act was done with the intention of causing death or such injury as is likely to cause death.”
The Court held that this mental element (mens rea) is the defining feature of Section 307 IPC. It is not a refuge in cases of grievous injury where death happens later due to complications.
“Section 307 is not a halfway house between grievous hurt and murder. If the act was done with intent to kill, and the injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death, then the offence is not attempt—it is murder under Section 302.”
“Grievous Injury Alone Does Not Make It Attempt to Murder—Intention and Circumstances Decide”
In the present case, the accused and his co-accused had:
Dragged the victim to the terrace
Flung him from the terrace to the concrete ground
Beaten him with sticks and fists even after the fall
These acts resulted in spinal cord injury, paraplegia, bedsores, and eventually death from septicemia.
Yet, the High Court converted the offence to Section 307 IPC, reasoning:
“Due to lack of proper treatment, he died after about 9 months of the incident. Therefore, the case of the appellants falls within the purview of Section 307 IPC and not under Section 302 IPC.”
Rejecting this, the Supreme Court held: “This understanding betrays a confusion between the nature of the act and the consequence. The law is clear—Section 307 applies if the act, in the manner done, would be murder if death had ensued. In this case, death did ensue, and the act was intended to cause it.”
“Section 307 IPC Is Not a Safe Haven When Death Results—If Murder Ingredients Are Present, It Must Be Section 302”
Quoting from its own earlier decisions and English common law precedents, the Court explained:
“The intent becomes the principal ingredient of the crime under Section 307. The nature of the injury and weapon, the part of the body targeted, and the opportunity must all be examined to infer intent to kill.”
The Court elaborated that:
A mere grievous injury is not enough for Section 307 IPC.
The act must be of a nature that would have caused death, if not interrupted.
Even if no injury results, but the act is done with intent to kill, Section 307 can apply.
But crucially, if death actually occurs, and the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death, then Section 302 is attracted—not Section 307. “An act done with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if death is caused, it would be murder, cannot be downgraded to attempt just because the death occurred after a time lag.”
“Mens Rea Must Be Examined From Circumstances, Not Assumed From Delay in Death”
The Court also discussed how intention to kill must be inferred from circumstantial factors:
“The relevant circumstances from which the intention can be gathered include the nature of the weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the part of the body targeted, and the nature and number of injuries inflicted.”
In the case of Maniklal Sahu, these factors were overwhelming. The assault was brutal, deliberate, and targeted vital parts. The spinal cord injury rendered the victim bedridden until death. The Court found no room for doubt.
“It is clear as noonday that causing an injury that would endanger life is not an essential condition for the applicability of Section 307 IPC—but here, life did end. The act caused death. Hence, Section 302 IPC applies.”
Supreme Court Reverses High Court's Error—Restores Conviction Under Section 302 IPC
The Supreme Court concluded that the High Court's reasoning was legally untenable, and a misapplication of Section 307 IPC.
Justice Pardiwala held: “Section 307 IPC does not become applicable merely because the death occurred after some delay or due to complications. If the intention and injury meet the standards of murder under Section 300 IPC, the conviction must be under Section 302.”
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and restored the original conviction for murder, sentencing the appellant Maniklal Sahu to life imprisonment.
Date of Decision: 12 September 2025