High Court Cannot Be Made Appellate Body by Executive Order: Andhra Pradesh HC Declares Land Grabbing Appeals Not Maintainable

In a judgment of profound constitutional significance, the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that appeals under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 cannot be entertained by the High Court in the absence of a legislative mandate. The Court ruled that the State Government cannot, by executive notification, confer appellate jurisdiction upon the High Court, a power reserved exclusively for the legislature.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam delivered the verdict in a batch of 39 Land Grabbing Appeals (LGAs), including cases transferred from the abolished Special Courts under the Act. The core issue was whether the High Court could act as an appellate forum after the abolition of Special Courts by G.O.Ms.No.420 dated 02.09.2016.

The Court’s answer was unequivocal: “The High Court is not the appellate authority under the Act of 1982. The power to constitute, reconstitute, or abolish Special Courts lies with the State. But substituting the High Court as the appellate forum requires an amendment to the statute — not an executive order.”

Despite the fact that the G.O. directed the transfer of pending appeals to the High Court and that an Administrative Committee of the then common High Court (Hyderabad) had passed a resolution to facilitate this transfer, the Bench found both actions ultra vires the statutory framework.

“The right to appeal and the appellate forum are creatures of statute. Executive action cannot override or supplement legislative intent in a field expressly occupied by statute,” the Court declared, reinforcing the foundational principle of separation of powers.

The Court examined Section 7A of the 1982 Act, which provides for appeals from orders of Special Tribunals to Special Courts. It found that while the State Government is empowered to abolish the Special Court, no provision in the Act permits the State to substitute the High Court or any other body as the appellate authority.

The judgment further clarifies that no vested right of appeal survives once the statutory appellate forum is abolished without substitution.

“If the forum of appeal ceases to exist and is not replaced by legislation, the right to appeal perishes. The High Court cannot assume that role by implication or by administrative fiat,” the Bench observed.

In rejecting the argument of “devolution” or “successive forum”, the Court ruled that such doctrines cannot operate in statutory appellate structures. “There is no basis in law to suggest that the High Court becomes the successor to the Special Court simply by virtue of being a superior judicial body,” it said.

The Court also addressed the remedy available to the aggrieved parties. While appeals are barred, the orders passed by the Special Tribunals remain open to judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. However, the Court declined to convert the dismissed appeals into writ petitions, holding that the procedural and factual foundation for such conversion was not made out.

Importantly, the Court carved out a three-month window for appellants to institute appropriate writ proceedings if so advised. It also directed that any interim orders previously granted in these appeals would remain in force for that period.

Summing up, the Bench held:

“The Government Order, to the extent it abolishes the Special Court, is valid. But to the extent it attempts to make the High Court the appellate authority, it travels beyond the statutory mandate. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by notification where the statute does not permit it.”

The ruling sets an important precedent on the limits of executive power, the primacy of statutory interpretation, and the constitutional structure of judicial forums. It sends a clear message that procedural forums cannot be assumed or assigned outside legislative intent, even for reasons of administrative convenience or institutional practicality.

Legal analysts see the judgment as a reassertion of the rule of law and a reminder that procedural due process is not a dispensable formality but a cornerstone of fair adjudication.

The decision is expected to affect similar appeals pending under the 1982 Act and may compel the State Legislature to consider formal statutory amendments if it wishes to assign appellate jurisdiction to any new forum, including the High Court.

Date of decision: 28/08/2025