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by sayum
26 May 2026 1:56 PM
“An Arbitral Tribunal’s Order of ‘Support Within the Confines of Law’ Cannot Become a Decree for Compulsory Action” – In a judgment of considerable legal consequence, the Delhi High Court ruled that execution proceedings cannot be used to transform an arbitral direction into a coercive decree, especially when the order is directed against a third party who is not a signatory to the arbitration agreement.
Deciding the case of Jamia Hamdard Deemed to be University v. Asad Mueed & Ors., the Division Bench comprising Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar set aside an executing court’s order that had directed Jamia Hamdard to issue a Consent of Affiliation (CoA) for 150 MBBS seats to HIMSR, in enforcement of an interim order passed by an Arbitral Tribunal under Section 17 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Calling such coercive execution a “clear jurisdictional overreach,” the High Court held that the Executing Court “cannot adjudicate regulatory legality or issue commands not contemplated in the arbitral direction itself.”
“Support ‘Within the Confines of Law’ Is Not A Mandate for Action — It Is Conditional and Discretionary”: Court Clarifies Nature of Section 17 Arbitral Orders
The central question before the Court was whether the Executing Court had the power to compel a third party to perform a positive act—in this case, issuance of CoA—when the Arbitral Tribunal’s interim order merely directed ‘support’ within legal boundaries.
The High Court emphasized that the Tribunal’s direction was not absolute or mandatory in nature. Quoting from the arbitral order dated 12.08.2025, the Court noted:
“Accordingly, it is directed that the Respondents and Jamia Hamdard shall extend all support to the Claimants and HIMSR... of course, such support by Jamia Hamdard has to be within the confines of law.”
Noting that this was reiterated by the Court’s own earlier order dated 16.09.2025, the Bench observed:
“This would necessarily imply that if the claimants and HIMSR are not acting within the confines of law, the appellant need not support them.”
Yet, despite this limitation, the Executing Court went ahead and adjudicated the legality of Jamia Hamdard’s CoA withdrawal, held it to be unlawful, and directed positive compliance—a move which the Division Bench found impermissible.
“Execution Proceedings Cannot Bypass Regulatory Framework or Pre-empt Judicial and Statutory Remedies”: High Court Preserves Institutional and Legal Balance
The Court placed strong emphasis on the regulatory dimensions of the dispute, particularly the bar under Regulation 26 of the UGC (Institutions Deemed to be Universities) Regulations, 2023, which states:
“The institution deemed to be University shall be unitary in nature and shall not affiliate any other institution.”
The UGC and the NMC had already taken the stand that HIMSR could not be affiliated or shown as a constituent unit, and had denied HIMSR the renewal of 150 MBBS seats. Jamia Hamdard had withdrawn its CoA in response to these regulatory concerns.
The Court found that the Executing Court’s attempt to override this statutory and regulatory framework by declaring the withdrawal as “illegal” amounted to “substantive adjudication” which “lay outside the limited execution jurisdiction”. The Bench observed:
“Executing Court exceeded the scope of the decree/order it was called upon to enforce... and had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the legality of the Appellant’s withdrawal of the CoA.”
Further, the Court stated that execution proceedings are not a forum to decide whether a university is violating UGC or NMC regulations, adding:
“Questions of regulatory legality are to be adjudicated by competent statutory forums, not by executing courts through indirect routes.”
“Order XXI Rule 32 CPC Cannot Be Used to Enforce Conditional Arbitral Support”: Court Rejects Use of Coercive Execution Against Non-Signatory
Crucially, the Court also struck down the use of Order XXI Rule 32 of the CPC, under which coercive execution was sought against Jamia Hamdard’s officials, including threats of arrest and civil detention.
The Court held that such a rule applies only to decrees for specific performance or injunctions, and not to conditional directions like “support within the confines of law.”
“The interim direction issued by the Arbitral Tribunal did not operate as, nor was it, a decree of injunction... the application under Order XXI Rule 32 was not maintainable.”
In setting aside EX.APPL.(OS) 1509/2025, the Court clarified that an executing court “cannot convert a non-binding, conditional direction into an enforceable coercive mandate.”
Maintainability of Appeal by Non-Signatory Upheld – Amazon.com Decision Not a Bar
The Bench also addressed a technical but crucial issue: whether Jamia Hamdard could appeal, since it was not a party to the arbitration agreement.
Upholding the appeal’s maintainability, the Court stated:
“Where enforcement proceedings directly affect the rights of a non-signatory, and the Arbitration Act does not provide a bar, the CPC governs the field.”
On the much-cited Amazon.com v. Future Retail Ltd. decision, the Court clarified:
“No such third party was before the Supreme Court in that case. The question was left open for future cases—and this is one such case.”
Hence, the Court held that Jamia Hamdard, though a third party, could not be denied appellate recourse, particularly when coercive directions affecting its statutory obligations were passed.
Arbitration Cannot Be a Tool to Evade Regulatory Law or Bind Third Parties Unlawfully
The judgment sends a strong message that arbitration proceedings and their enforcement must respect statutory frameworks, regulatory processes, and the limited jurisdiction of executing courts.
The High Court ultimately:
In a system increasingly relying on arbitration, the Delhi High Court has reaffirmed that enforcement cannot override law, and third parties cannot be turned into judgment-debtors without authority or consent.
Date of Decision: December 17, 2025
