-
by Admin
08 January 2026 4:15 PM
“The Right to Maintenance Under Section 125 CrPC Survives – Even After a Private Settlement – Unless the Woman Can Maintain Herself”, Kerala High Court, in a strongly worded and legally robust judgment, set aside the Family Court’s denial of maintenance to a young divorced Muslim woman who had accepted a one-time settlement at the time of talaq. Justice Dr. Kauser Edappagath, delivering the ruling in Shereefa Munvara & Another v. Muhammed Kabeer, held that the existence of a private agreement under personal law does not ipso facto extinguish a Muslim woman’s statutory right to seek maintenance under Section 125 of the CrPC.
“The Family Court has committed a serious error in law by presuming finality of the private settlement without examining whether the amount was adequate to sustain the woman,” observed the Court, while emphasising that “Rs. 1,00,000 fixed as lifetime provision is prima facie inadequate, especially when Rs. 35,000 was paid for just three months of iddat.”
The Court has directed the Family Court to reconsider the claim in full, granting liberty to both sides to lead fresh evidence, and to dispose of the case—pending since 2010—within six months.
“A Meagre Settlement Cannot Muzzle a Woman’s Right to Live with Dignity”: Court Reaffirms Parallel Operation of Personal Law and Section 125 CrPC
The facts of the case disclose that the petitioner—a 17-year-old Muslim woman at the time of divorce—had been paid Rs. 35,000 for the iddat period and Rs. 1,00,000 as matah, under an agreement (Ext.D1) executed on the same day as the talaq. The agreement also stated that she would not claim any further maintenance.
Rejecting the Family Court’s view that such an agreement ousted the jurisdiction under Section 125 CrPC, the High Court categorically held, “There is nothing in the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 that extinguishes the right of a divorced Muslim woman under Section 125 CrPC merely because she has accepted an amount under personal law.”
Quoting the Supreme Court’s ruling in Mohd. Abdul Samad v. State of Telangana [AIR 2024 SC 3665], the Court reiterated, “When a husband opposes resort to Section 125 CrPC, he has to establish (a) that obligations under personal law stand fulfilled, and (b) that the wife is able to maintain herself. Failing which, the remedy under Section 125 CrPC remains open.”
The Court noted that the Family Court had skipped both these inquiries entirely.
“You Paid Rs. 15,000 Per Month for Iddat but Just Rs. 1 Lakh for Life – That’s Not Reasonable Provision”: Court Slams Inconsistency in Settlement
In an incisive analysis, Justice Edappagath drew a compelling comparison between the amounts paid. “The maintenance for the three-month iddat period was quantified as Rs. 35,000—roughly Rs. 15,000 per month. In contrast, the ‘life-long’ matah was just Rs. 1,00,000. This contradiction exposes the inadequacy of the so-called ‘fair and reasonable’ provision.”
The Court held that the Family Court failed to examine whether the Rs. 1,00,000 was sufficient to support a divorced woman who was just 17 years old at the time and had no independent means of livelihood. It stressed that reasonable and fair provision under Section 3 of the 1986 Act must be interpreted in light of the woman’s long-term sustenance needs, not as a token amount.
“Section 125 CrPC and Muslim Women Act Occupy Distinct Domains – There Is No Bar to Parallel Relief”
The judgment is particularly significant for its reaffirmation of the doctrine of harmonious construction between secular and personal law remedies. “Section 125 CrPC is a secular provision to prevent destitution,” the Court said, while citing Danial Latifi v. Union of India [(2001) 7 SCC 740], Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan [AIR 2010 SC 305], and Bai Tahira v. Ali Hussain [(1979) 2 SCC 316].
Justice Edappagath quoted paragraph 37 of Mohd. Abdul Samad, noting, “Equivalent rights of maintenance under the secular CrPC and personal law provisions continue to co-exist. They must be harmoniously construed—not viewed as mutually exclusive.”
The Court underscored that even if a divorced Muslim woman accepts a sum under personal law, her right to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC survives—until she either remarries or it is judicially determined that she is capable of maintaining herself.
“Minor Status Doesn’t Void the Agreement If Represented by Wali – But That Doesn’t Settle the Question of Adequacy”
The petitioners also argued that Ext.D1 was void since the wife was a minor at the time. The Court disagreed, holding that under Muslim personal law, a marriage—and related agreements—entered into on behalf of a minor female who has attained puberty by her wali (guardian) are valid.
However, the Court clarified that this does not shield the agreement from scrutiny on the question of adequacy. “Even if legally valid, an agreement cannot bar a statutory right unless it satisfies the standard of being just, fair, and reasonable,” the Court said.
“Rs. 750 Per Month for a Child Is Inadequate – Needs and Means Must Be Assessed Anew”
The Court also found that the Family Court had fixed the maintenance of the minor daughter at just Rs. 750 per month—an amount it described as “too meagre” given the responsibilities and financial capacity of the father.
It observed, “Considering the requirement of the 2nd petitioner and the ability and means of the respondent, the quantum of Rs. 750 is wholly insufficient.” This too was remanded for reconsideration on proper evidence.
Dignity Cannot Be Settled for Pennies
Justice Dr. Kauser Edappagath concluded the 28-page judgment with a directive to the Family Court to reconsider the entire matter in the light of constitutional and statutory principles, and to allow both parties the opportunity to lead further evidence.
The Court made it clear that while personal law agreements have their place, they cannot override statutory rights unless the woman’s future security is truly ensured. “The claim under Section 125 CrPC must be decided not on formality, but on the core question—can she maintain herself?”
Date of Decision: December 3, 2025