Delhi High Court Refuses Blanket Injunction in Ancestral Property Suit: Plaintiff Cannot Claim Beyond 25% When Own Pleadings Limit the Share

“Equity Cannot Be Stretched to Protect What a Party Has Already Admitted to Be Alienated” – In a significant ruling balancing equitable discretion and the doctrine of lis pendens, the Delhi High Court dismissed an appeal filed by Vipin Kumar Manaktala, who had challenged a modified interim order that restrained the alienation of only 25% of the ancestral property—the portion he himself admitted as unalienated. The Court held that injunctions in partition suits must align with the plaintiff’s own case, and cannot be expanded to protect interests which the plaintiff neither owns nor legally substantiates.

The judgment, delivered by Justice Anil Kshetrapal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar, came in FAO(OS) 83/2023, arising from a dispute over the family’s industrial property at 39, Rama Road, Industrial Area Scheme, Najafgarh Road, New Delhi—originally held by three brothers and later subject to family settlement, alienations, and legal battles.

“Once the plaintiff has pleaded that only 25% of the property remains unalienated, the court cannot stretch the injunction to protect beyond what the plaintiff himself acknowledges as available,” the Bench observed, rejecting the appeal.

“Doctrine of Lis Pendens is Sufficient Protection — Injunction Cannot Be Granted Where Rights Are Already Transferred”

The Court emphatically held that the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act adequately protects the plaintiff’s interest, rendering further injunction over the entire property not only unnecessary but legally unjustified.

The Bench clarified:

“Any alienation during pendency of suit remains subject to the final outcome… Grant of injunction qua the entire suit property would not be in the interest of justice.”

The plaintiff had filed a partition suit in 2020 seeking a declaration that certain sale deeds and a Memorandum of Family Settlement (MoFS) dated 2012 were invalid and non-binding. He alleged that these transfers, made without his consent, deprived him of his rightful share in the ancestral property.

However, the High Court noted that two-thirds of the suit property had already been sold, including a portion sold in 2019 to a bona fide third-party purchaser, against whom no prior injunction had ever operated.

“The Plaintiff has failed to establish any prima facie right in respect of the remaining 75%... there is no irreparable loss which cannot be compensated,” the Court concluded.

“Courts Cannot Grant What Has Already Been Sold – No Relief Against Bona Fide Purchaser Without Proof of Fraud”

On the issue of third-party rights, the High Court upheld the refusal of the injunction against Defendant No.4, who had purchased a portion of the suit property in 2019 from M/s Gora Mal Hari Ram Pvt. Ltd.—a transaction the plaintiff had not challenged contemporaneously.

The Bench found:

“The Plaintiff herein seeks continuation of injunction even against Defendant No.4, despite absence of interim restraint at the time of sale in 2019, and no prima facie material to demonstrate fraud or collusion.”

The Court observed that granting an interim injunction now, years after the sale, would undermine the rights of a bona fide purchaser, destabilize commercial transactions, and violate equitable principles. The balance of convenience, the Court held, tilted decisively against blanket injunctive relief.

“Equity Favors the Vigilant – Delay, Silence, and Selective Participation Undermine Injunctive Claims”

The Court also considered the plaintiff’s delay and conduct, noting that he had knowledge of the earlier partition suit (CS(OS) 2850/1987), and failed to contest it even after being served notice. Although the plaintiff claimed he was misled by his brother’s assurances of legal representation, the Court declined to entertain that assertion at the interlocutory stage.

“Whether the Plaintiff was misled by his brothers is a matter for trial… At this stage, his conduct is relevant in evaluating equitable discretion,” the Court observed.

This observation is particularly significant in the context of equitable remedies, where silence or inaction by a claimant with knowledge of relevant events can be a decisive factor against grant of injunction.

“Plaintiff’s Own Pleadings Limit His Claim – No Room for Expanding Interim Relief”

A key turning point in the Court’s analysis was the plaintiff’s own admission in paragraph 4(t) of the plaint that only 25% of the property remains unalienated. Based on this pleading, the learned Single Judge had earlier modified the injunction, restricting it to only that portion.

The Division Bench found this entirely appropriate:

“Plaintiff cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate. Having pleaded that only 25% remains unalienated, he cannot now seek restraint over the entire property.”

“The learned Single Judge has merely confined the relief to what survives for adjudication.”

In doing so, the Court reaffirmed the foundational rule of pleadings—that no party can claim relief beyond its own averments, and injunctions must be limited to identifiable, actionable interests.

“Registered Lease During Litigation Is Not Ground to Expand Injunction” – Post-order Acts Must Be Raised Separately

The plaintiff also raised an issue regarding a registered lease deed executed during the pendency of the suit (dated 16.08.2023), arguing that the lease contained clauses that would allow further sub-letting or transfer without Court’s permission, thereby jeopardizing his interest.

The Court, however, dismissed this argument at the interlocutory stage:

“The grievance pertains to events subsequent to the impugned order… it raises independent factual issues and is amenable to appropriate remedies before the Single Judge.”

Hence, the Court refused to expand the injunction on this ground, noting that the core injunction over the unalienated portion continues to operate, and the plaintiff remains protected to that extent.

No Interference Warranted with Well-Reasoned Injunction Order

Summing up, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal, holding that the learned Single Judge’s approach was “balanced, cautious and legally sound.”

The Court declared:

“There is no illegality, perversity or error in the impugned order… The plaintiff’s interest stands adequately secured; no interference is warranted.”

The Court also observed that nothing in this judgment shall be construed as expressing final opinion on the merits of the case, which remain open before the trial court.

Date of Decision: December 17, 2025