Delay in Death Does Not Break Chain of Causation If Injury Was Fatal: Intention and Nature of Injury Are Key – Supreme Court

“If the original injury is of a fatal nature, it makes no difference that death is actually caused by a complication naturally flowing from the injury and not the injury itself, since the causal connection is proximate.” - In a judgment that settles a vital question of criminal law concerning causation and delayed death, the Supreme Court of India held that the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC must be restored where the injury inflicted was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, even though the deceased succumbed to septicemia and pneumonia nine months after the incident.

The Court categorically ruled that the High Court erred in reducing the conviction to Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder) on the ground that death occurred after a long gap due to alleged lack of medical treatment.

Justice J.B. Pardiwala, writing for the bench, emphasized: “The presence of the supervening cause in the circumstances will not, in our view, alter the culpability. There had been no such considerable change of circumstances as to snap the chain of causation.”

“Supervening Infections Like Septicemia or Pneumonia Do Not Dilute Culpability Under Section 302 IPC When Injury Was Sufficient to Cause Death”

The Court made it clear that subsequent infections, including pneumonia, septic shock, or bedsores, are not breaks in the chain of causation when they arise naturally from the original injuries inflicted by the accused.

“Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skillful treatment the death might have been prevented.” – Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC

Rejecting the High Court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court held: “There is absolutely no evidence to support the finding that the deceased died due to lack of proper treatment. Even otherwise, this aspect is wholly irrelevant in view of Explanation 2 to Section 299 IPC.”

“Intention Must Be Judged by the Nature and Location of Injury, Not by the Timing of Death”

The incident occurred on 22 February 2022, when the appellant, along with three others, dragged the deceased to the terrace, flung him to the ground, and assaulted him with sticks and fists. The deceased, Rekhchand Verma, suffered severe head and spinal injuries. Though he was admitted to multiple hospitals and underwent prolonged treatment, he ultimately died on 8 November 2022 from complications related to paraplegia and spinal cord trauma, including septicemia, pneumonia, and hepatic dysfunction.

Justice Pardiwala observed that intent to kill need not be proved solely through the result of death; it can be inferred from the circumstances: “The act must be done with such intention, or knowledge, or in such circumstances that if death be caused by that act, the offence of murder will emerge.”

Relying on principles laid down in Prasad Pradhan v. State of Chhattisgarh (2023) 11 SCC 320, Patel Hiralal Joitaram (2002) 1 SCC 22, and R v. Holland (1841), the Court reiterated:

“When the injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the delay in death or complications arising from treatment are immaterial.”

“Original Injury Need Not Be Immediate Cause of Death If It Is the Causa Causans: Delay Is Not a Defence”

The Court clarified that the test for determining liability under Section 302 is not whether the death was immediate, but whether the original injury inflicted by the accused was fatal in the ordinary course of nature, and whether the chain of causation remained unbroken.

“It would have been quite a different matter if the original injuries had healed or ceased to be dangerous to life and the fatal complications had set in unexpectedly. If that would have been so, the appellant would then be entitled to the benefit of doubt.”

The Supreme Court held that in this case, the injuries had never ceased to be dangerous, and no new mischief had occurred to break the chain. Therefore, the conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC must be upheld.

“Death After Months Still Attributable to Original Blows If Medical Complications Are a Natural Consequence of Injuries”

The Court relied on extensive medical testimony from three doctors – Dr. Sheetal Kaushal (PW-9), Dr. Twinkle Chandrakar (PW-24), and Dr. Abhishek Shrivastava (PW-28) – who all confirmed that:

• The spinal cord injury from the assault caused paraplegia.

• The bedsores, infection, and pneumonia were natural consequences of immobilization.

• The ultimate cause of death was cardiorespiratory failure due to septicemia arising from injuries sustained in the incident.

None of the medical witnesses were substantially cross-examined, and no suggestion of improper treatment or independent infection was ever made by the defence.

“Death Need Not Be Instant – What Matters Is Whether Death Was a Probable Consequence of the Injury Inflicted”

Justice Pardiwala, delivering a judgment that runs over 150 paragraphs, concluded: “Broadly speaking, courts must distinguish between remote, improbable consequences and natural, probable consequences of the injury. In the present case, the injuries were sufficient to cause death and thus fall under Section 302 IPC.”

Quoting Taylor’s Medical Jurisprudence and multiple Indian and English precedents, the Court held that: “If a man receives a wound which turns to gangrene or fever and dies, the original wound is still the cause of death — and the offender is guilty of murder or culpable homicide, depending on intent and knowledge.”

The Supreme Court found the High Court’s reasoning untenable, stating: “The High Court committed a serious error in bringing the case within the ambit of Section 307 IPC on the ground that the victim survived for almost nine months.”

Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction under Section 302 IPC was restored, reaffirming a life sentence for the appellant, Maniklal Sahu.

Date of Decision: 12 September 2025