Credibility of an Injured Witness Carries a Built-In Guarantee of Truth: Delhi High Court Reverses Acquittal, Convicts Accused Under Section 324 IPC

“Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness” – Delhi High Court setting aside the acquittal of four accused persons charged with stabbing an individual during a scuffle in 1998. While the Court declined to uphold the conviction under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (attempt to murder), it found all four accused guilty under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC, holding that their collective conduct established a common intention to voluntarily cause hurt by means of a dangerous weapon.

The judgment, delivered more than two decades after the incident and following over 23 years of pendency, reinforces long-standing principles in criminal jurisprudence related to the weight of testimony from injured witnesses and the legal doctrine of common intention. The Court sentenced the accused to the period already undergone in custody, noting the considerable delay and time spent during the trial.

“Presence of Injury Is a Stamp of Truth” – High Court Restores Primacy of Victim's Account

At the heart of the case was the testimony of PW-2 Raju, the injured victim, who suffered a knife injury during an altercation in Delhi’s Subzi Mandi on 10 July 1998. His statement, recorded shortly after the incident, formed the basis of the FIR and specifically named all four respondents — Gulab, Ram Swaroop, Suresh, and Ramesh — as perpetrators. The Trial Court, in its judgment dated 01 February 2000, acquitted all the accused, primarily relying on perceived inconsistencies in the witness statements, discrepancies in identification, and deficiencies in the investigation.

The High Court, however, disagreed with this reasoning, holding that the Trial Court had failed to accord due weight to the most critical piece of evidence — the testimony of the injured witness. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Abdul Sayed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 10 SCC 259, the Court reiterated that the evidence of an injured witness is generally more reliable because such a witness comes with an inherent guarantee of presence at the scene of the crime. The Court observed: “Convincing evidence is required to discredit an injured witness.”

Drawing further support from State of U.P. v. Naresh & Ors., 2011 AD (SC) 20, the Bench noted that the testimony of an injured person is of such high evidentiary value that it cannot be disregarded merely due to minor contradictions. In its words: “The witness would not like or want to let his actual assailant go unpunished merely to implicate a third person falsely for the commission of the offence.”

Intention to Kill Not Clearly Made Out, but Injury with Sharp Weapon Proved — Section 307 IPC Not Attracted

The State had challenged the Trial Court’s acquittal on the charge of attempt to murder under Section 307 IPC, but the High Court carefully analyzed the nature of the injury, the circumstances of the incident, and the applicable legal principles. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 9 SCC 27, the Court acknowledged that while an actual injury is not essential to invoke Section 307 IPC, the presence of a clear intention to cause death or knowledge that such act is likely to cause death is a prerequisite. The Bench concluded that although the victim was stabbed with a knife, the injury was simple in nature, there was no targeting of a vital organ, and the act appeared to be impulsive rather than premeditated. Hence, the ingredients of Section 307 were not satisfied.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the use of a sharp-edged weapon like a knife, coupled with the injury sustained by the victim and corroborative testimony of two supporting witnesses — PW-3 Rakesh and PW-4 HC Goverdhan Singh — sufficiently established an offence under Section 324 IPC, which penalizes voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons.

“Joint Participation Makes All Accused Liable” – Section 34 IPC Invoked to Establish Common Intention

A central question before the Court was whether the co-accused, who allegedly held the victim during the incident, could be held equally liable with Gulab, who delivered the knife blow. The Trial Court had found the application of Section 34 IPC (common intention) inapplicable, largely due to lack of direct evidence suggesting pre-planning.

The High Court reversed this finding and emphasized that under Section 34 IPC, the existence of a prior plan is not mandatory. What matters is the presence of a shared intention and active participation in the commission of the crime. Citing Raju Pandurang Mahale v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 4 SCC 371, the Court stated: “Direct proof of common intention is seldom available and... the true concept of the section is that if two or more persons intentionally do an act jointly, the position in law is just the same as if each of them has done it individually by himself.”

The judgment further referred to Vasant alias Girish Akbarasab Sanavale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 337, to affirm that presence and facilitation, even in a spontaneous situation, are sufficient to infer joint responsibility. The Court concluded that while the stabbing may have been sudden, the act of the others in restraining the victim enabled the injury and constituted facilitation. Since none of them took any step to prevent Gulab from stabbing Raju, their conduct encompassed them within the scope of common intention.

Procedural Lapses in Investigation Do Not Invalidate Core of Prosecution Case

The respondents had highlighted several defects in the investigation — including non-examination of public witnesses, failure to recover the weapon, and lack of forensic examination of the victim’s clothing — as reasons for their acquittal. The High Court acknowledged these lapses but clarified that procedural shortcomings cannot override substantive and credible evidence on record.

Relying on C. Muniappan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2010) 9 SCC 567, and Sunil Kundu v. State of Jharkhand, (2013) 4 SCC 422, the Court held that defects in investigation should not per se result in acquittal unless they are grave enough to dislodge the foundation of the prosecution’s case. In this case, the Court found the testimony of the injured witness, supported by corroborative evidence and medical records, to be adequate and unaffected by the investigative lapses.

Judgment of Acquittal Set Aside; Accused Convicted under Section 324/34 IPC; Sentence Limited to Time Already Undergone

After comprehensively analyzing the facts, the Court concluded that the Trial Court had erred in focusing disproportionately on minor inconsistencies and ignoring the legal significance of the injured witness's testimony. The High Court set aside the acquittal, convicted all four accused under Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC, and, considering the long passage of time and custody already undergone, sentenced them to the period already spent behind bars.

In its concluding observation, the Court remarked that “findings were recorded relying on trivial discrepancies which have no potential to upset the case of the prosecution,” and added that “the impugned judgment is set aside and the appeal is allowed.”

Date of Decision: 31 October 2025